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STELLINGEN
1. De opkomst van ideeen over het Latijn als een (Aeolisch) dialect van
het Grieks is mede een gevolg van de politieke verhouding tussen
Griekenland en Rome in de eerste eeuw voor Christus.
Vgl. M. Dubuisson, le latin est-il une langue barbare?, Ktema 9
(1984), 55-68.
2. De inhoud van de vorige Stelling onderstreept het belang van de
Studie van de (culturele) context van linguistische theorieen in de
Oudheid.
3. In Plato's Euthydemus 271bl-5 slaan de woorden την ήλικίαν
διαφέρειν ορ een (gering) verschil in lengte.
Vgl. P. Chantraine, Etudes sur le vocabulaire grec, Paris 1955, 159;
G J. de Vries, Mnemosyne 25 (1972), 42.
4. Het voorkomen van het αξίωμα το διασαφούν το μάλλον en το
διασαφούν το ήττον in de Stoische lijst van samengestelde axiomata bij
Diogenes Laertius (VII 69), moet mede verklaard worden met behulp van
de ethische theorieen van de Stoa.
Vgl. I. Sluiter, On "H διασαφητικός and propositions containing
ΜΑΛΛΟΝ/ΗΤΤΟΝ, Mnemosyne 41 (1988), 46-66.
5. Het Griekse nonsens-woord (το) βλίτυρι is in laatste instantie de
bron voor de uitdrukking "to Bliktri" in de 116e brief van Sara
Burgerhart.
Vgl. I. Sluiter, To Bliktri, TNTL 102 (1986), 207-213.
6. In Anthol Pal. XI 335,4 is de pointe van het epigram dat een
grammaticus de onjuiste vorm Κυνέγειρ gebruikt had.
Tegen: Paton (Loeb ed.) en Aubreton (Bud6 ed.). Vgl. I. Sluiter,
Perversa Subtilitas. De kwade roep van de grammaticus, Lampas 21
(1988), 41-65.
7. Tot nu toe hebben onderzoekers van de antieke taalkunde te weinig
gebruik gemaakt van het vele waardevolle materiaal dat de oud-
Christelijke schrijvers te bieden hebben.
Vgl. dit proefschrift.
8. De term επιρρήματα in de kopjes van het lexicon van Zonaras is
geen bezwaar om een driedeling van de woordsoorten in nomina, verba en
indeclinabilia als het principe van ordening van dit lexicon te aanvaarden.
9. Het (laten) toepassen van "levend Latijn" is een zinnige aanvulling
op de meer gebruikelijke didactische werkvormen in het onderwijs in het
Latijn.
10. Het gebruik van siecht Latijn of Grieks in een leergang is nooit
verdedigbaar, ook niet op didactische gronden.
11. Het is zinloos wetenschappelijk onderzoek te subsidieren als niet
tegelijkertijd voorzien wordt in financiele steun bij het publiceren van de
resultaten ervan.
12. Het (professioneel) uitgeven van je eigen proefschrift is een
schizofrene bezigheid.
13. Een leuke laatste gaat niet op be-.
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Preface
It would not surprise me if we discovered that Martianus Capella had just
finished a thesis similar to the one you have before you now, when he wrote
"homo est animal grammaticum" ("man is a grammatical being") (4,349), although
he still had the intellectual honesty to acknowledge that this is an example of
an incorrect definition. Writing a thesis involves the danger of developing a
hopelessly one-sided world-picture. I gladly take the opportunity to thank here
the persons who tried to guard me from this - whether successfully or not is
not for me to decide. They at least helped me to get this book off my desk.
Unfortunately, I see it landed in your hands.
Several light-years ago, Professor D.M. Schenkeveld suggested that I read
Apollonius Dyscolus. I have never regretted listening to him at that time. I
thank him for giving me so much room while I was preparing this book, and for
his sincere criticism when I finally let him read it. Did I mention his patience
yet? I consider it a privilege to have worked for such an intelligent Scholar, who
is at the same time a very able and efficient manager.
Professor S.R. Slings always was the William of Baskerville to my Adson of
Melk. I thank him for his penetrating criticism (always sit down before you read
one of his letters), and for his valuable suggestions.
Professor C.J. Ruijgh carefully read my work and saved me from many
errors. If it were not for my stubbornness he might have saved me from more.
He also obliged me by the lightning-speed with which he performed this feat.
Professor P.H. Schrijvers sent me his useful comments on chapter IV:
another very fast worker.
At an earlier stage, Professor C.H.M. Versteegh and dr. G.R.W. Dibbets
showed their interest.
My friends and colleagues at the Vrije Universiteit cheerfully bore up with
me and my grammarians. They must be heartily sick of both by now. Professor
A.J. Kleywegt and dr. Elseline Vester especially helped me by their professional
and personal advice.
My colleagues of the VU University Press had to cope with the extra work
during the times when I was absent. On top of that they had to produce one
more book - probably not even a bestseller at that. I did not hear any
complaints, I hope not just because I was not there to complain to.
Research for this project was partially supported by the Foundation for
Linguistic Research, which is funded by the Netherlands Organization for
Research, NWO.
xi
Mrs. M.L. Vaalburg-Darbon kindly corrected my English. Any remaining
howlers were surreptitiously slipped in by me after she had seen another "final
version".
Finally, I thank Mr. and Mrs. Rienks, Maaike and Pier for their
friendship and hospitality, and Margriet for all the music and general Support in
distress. My sisters and especially my mother, to whom this book is dedicated,
were always faithfully there, and honestly tried to find my work interesting. Now
that this work is finished, I shall try to be a bit more sociable ... for the next
couple of days or so.
Amstelveen, April 1990.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
modesto tarnen et circumspecto iudicio
de tantis viris pronuntiandum est, ne
quod plerisque accidit, damnent quod
non intelligent (Quint. 10,1,26).
The study of ancient linguistic thought enjoys an increasing popularity, the
last few decades having produced a number of valuable studies and important
progress having been made. Some long-standing assumptions, such äs the battle
between analogists and anomalists, and the Separation of technical from
philosophical grammar, were discarded and are no longer regarded äs structuring
principles for the modern approach to ancient grammar. Useful surveys of the
Status quaestionis may be found, for instance, in Siebenborn 1976, Taylor 1986
and, most recently, Householder 1989.
One of the major insights gained in recent years is that the ancient
philosophers, rhetoricians, philologists and grammarians deserve to be studied for
their own sakes, not just äs forerunners of linguistic theories developed in later
centuries. It is recognized that the violent superimposition of later theories and
principles may obscure or misconstrue intrinsically sensible and valuable material.
Moreover, consensus exists on the fact that the history of grammar is not
monolithic. A philosopher is not a grammarian, nor is a rhetorician. Their
contributions to the general progress of linguistic insights is often no more than
a by-product of their activities. Therefore, it is imperative to put each source
into context and to realize the Status of its contributions.1 This is one of the
reasons why it is so very difficult to write a complete history of ancient
grammar. Our sources suffer from large chronological lacunae, and what we do
have is not even uniform. School books and scientific works are simply too
heterogeneous to bear unqualified comparison. The problem of the chronological
lacunae can be solved at least partially, if the grammatical views hidden in the
Christian writers are taken into account.2
1
 Cf. Taylor 1986, 187.
2
 Cf. e.g. Neuschäfer 1987, 134f., who discerns a line of development
running from the Alexandrian philological study of Homer, through the "school
philology" of the Roman Empire to the Christian philology, represented by
Origen, applied to the Bible. The connection between Origen and the Alexandrian
school is especially close. Cf. also the influence of Philo. See also Schäublin
1974, 37; cf. Chapter III section 5; Chapter IV section 5.
In this study, too, the ancient theories themselves will be the focus of
attention. They will be explained äs much äs possible by means of their direct
context, by parallels taken from related works and by referring to the wider
cultural context in which they originated.3 This by no means implies that the use
of modern terminology is shunned at all cost - that would be very unpractical
for one thing. Our modern way of describing linguistic phenomena can at times
offer illuminating parallels for ancient usage. However, the use of modern
parallels here will be restricted to just that. A partial resemblance between
ancient and modern linguistic thought must never lead to putting ancient
grammar on a theoretical Procrustes-bed.4 There are too many instances of
wrong answers resulting from wrong questions.
The studies presented here share an emphasis on two points: Throughout it
will be stressed that ancient linguistic thinking was essentially semantically
oriented. Ancient students of language virtually always considered language äs an
Instrument for conveying meaning. Of course there also is a strong morphological
(and phonological/phonetic) interest in Antiquity. But äs soon äs the level of the
single word is left behind, it is the meaning - not just the structure - that is
central. Often this brings the grammarian into close proximity to the
philosopher of language. This does not mean that there is no syntax at all in
Antiquity. On the contrary, many syntactic observations were made, but they
always serve the purpose of establishing or confirming semantic relationships.5
The second theme of this book is the relationship of grammar in the strict
sense to other disciplines occupied with the study of language from whichever
aspect. It is well-known that grammar emancipated only slowly from its
philosophical, rhetorical and philological origins, but it is not always realized
just how slowly. Traces of these origins are remarkably persistent. This book
aims at showing how the contributions of the several disciplines were
interconnected and integrated into consistent, linguistic theories at various
stages of the history of ancient linguistics.
Sometimes, the influences are direct and feit to be so even in Antiquity-
an example is the Stoic Separation of form and meaning taken over by
Apollonius Dyscolus.6 Sometimes, the influence is there, under the surface, and
3
 This idea is by no means new. It was expressed in 1839 by Schmidt (75)
and in 1847 by Skrzecka (2) and Jahn (2) (ex ipsorum grammaticomm mente). It
was revived by e.g. Baratin and Desbordes 1981.
4
 Cf. Kahn 1969, 158; Egli 1986, 281.
5
 Hunger 1978, 15 points out that right up to and including the Byzantine
era, syntax was never an autonomous area; there was a kind of vacuum between
word-grammar and philosophical digressions, cf. Donnet 1967, 22ff.; 31.
2 6 Already to be found in Plato's Cratylus 394b2ff., see chapter I section 7 ?
the grammarians realize it is, but apparently do not want it to interfere with
their theories - an example is the Epicurean theory on the origin of language,
which was kept away frorn the (Latin) grammatical theory of the interjection äs
much äs possible. This may have been related to the "school-book Status" of
many of our Latin sources, which tended to avoid unnecessary complications.
Often, the influence is there, but it is neither alive and understood nor
productive any more - an example is the development of words like λεκτόν and
λέξις; even though a Stoic sense may still be detected in some contexts, the
words were also used by the same writers in more "technical", but un-
philosophical, applications.
My material consisted of everything both Greek and Latin grammarians had
to say on the indeclinable parts of speech, the prepositions, adverbs,
conjunctions and interjections, over a very long period (ca. 500 B.C. - ca. 1200
A.D.). Since this yielded a rather unwieldy mass of data, I chose to organize this
book äs a series of case-studies, rather than äs the originally envisaged
exhaustive historical survey of the theories on the indeclinabilia. This choice had
two advantages, namely that I could leave out many uninteresting pieces of
Information (thus, hopefully, earning the lasting gratitude of my readers), but
also could add more general problems from the history of ancient linguistics,
which were related to the cases selected. Therefore, this book will contain
remarks on issues äs divergent äs the origin of language, ancient theories of
causation, cosmic sympathy etc. Moreover, I have allowed ample room for
discussing problems relating to the (philological) Interpretation of our sources.
Each chapter represents a different approach to the general problem of
"grammar and context": In the first the starting point is the earliest period of
linguistic observation, with emphasis on the Stoa; the second centres around a
grammarian, namely Apollonius Dyscolus; in the third I Start from a grammatical
phenomenon, viz. the so-called "causal" use of ϊνα; the last chapter deals with a
pari of speech, the interjection. Accordingly, chapters I, II and III work from
Greek to Latin, whereas the opposite is true for chapter IV.
In chapter II the examples are mostly taken from the adverbs; in chapter
III from the conjunctions, in chapter IV from the intetfections. The preposition
is not dealt with separately. In all chapters the practical parallels with
philosophy, rhetoric and philology will be demonstrated.7
7
 While preparing this book, I heard from Mr. Baratin that he was working
on a thesis which had a set-up similar to the one of this book. Since he was to
concentrate on the Latin theories of the conjunctions, I, have paid relatively
little attention to that part of my material in this study. Unfortunately, Mr.
Baratin's book, La naissance de la syntaxe ä Rome, Paris 1989, reached me too
A list of abbreviations may be found at the end of the book. I shall refer
to modern studies by the name of the author and year of publication. For füll
references, see the bibliography.
late for me to be able to study it and take its result into account here. I hope
to review it in Mnemosyne.
Chapter I - THE STOA
0. Introduction
In other parts of this study many instances will be given of the
relationships between rhetoric, philosophy, philology and grammar. This chapter
serves a triple purpose: In the first place it will give a brief survey of the early
development of linguistic thought. Hardly surprising, the interrelatedness of the
various disciplines dealing with language is especially easy to see at these early
stages, where differentiation and specialisation have hardly yet occurred. Further,
right from the beginning there is a marked emphasis on the semantic aspects of
language.
Secondly, I shall describe some of the more striking aspects of Stoic
philosophy, with special emphasis on the strong linguistic component in that
philosophical school. Plato and Aristoteles will not be discussed separately.
Thirdly, this chapter serves äs a warning and a preventive antidote: The
lacunary state of our sources often tempts one to ascribe all kinds of linguistic
tenets to the Stoa; it is relatively easy to make the most beautiful theoretical
constructions, which, however, must remain entirely speculative. Baratin and
Desbordes rightly pointed out the danger of tracing all kind of theories back to
the Stoa, whose doctrine we know mainly through this very activity of
reconstruction from later sources.1 Moreover, it is not always clear what is
original Stoic theory and what was added to it later.2 As an example, I shall
discuss the way in which the grammarians applied the concept of συμπάθεια.
Although there are clear connections with some basic ideas of the Stoa, grammar
has gone its own way here. The result seems to be a perversion of the original
theory.
1. First linguistic observations
1.1. Glossography; synonymy
From the tentative beginnings of what was eventually to become "technical
1
 1986,216.
2
 Pohlenz 1939, 51f. n. 2.
grammar",3 the utmost importance was attached to meaning, understandably so,
since many grammatical categories are evidently distinguished on semantical or
pragmatic (logical) grounds. On an implicit level there are the great number of
etymologies which to a greater or lesser degree are hidden in the works of the
Greek poets.4 Explicit consideration of the meaning of words appears for the
first time in the collections of glosses, lists of difficult words from Homer.5
More thoughts about language and linguistics originated in the circles of sophists
and philosophers.6
The sophists also devoted pari of their time to synonymy. Instead of
explaining glosses, however, they tried to differentiate äs much äs possible
between apparent Synonyms, describing the correct context for each of them.7
Prodicus was especially famous (or notorious) for this subtle procedure of
διοάρεσις,
8
 so much so that Socrates, ironically, almost apologizes when he is
about to lump together τελευτή, ττέρας, and εσχάτου without more ado.9 The
whole principle of δυαί,ρεσις probably rested on the belief that each word should
convey only one meaning,10 and the meaning be expressed by one word only. The
3
 "Technical grammar" owes its inverted commas to the fact that it is
virtually impossible to regard grammar äs an independent science in Antiquity.
Some parts (notably those dealing with the formal aspects of language) deyeloped
more independently and did so faster than others, but, generally speaking, too
strict separations between "technical" and "non-technical" students of language
can be dangerously misleading.
4
 E.g. of the name Astyanax, Hom. Z 402ί.
τ
τόυ ρ' "Εκτωρ καλέεσκε
Σκαμάυδριου, αύτάρ οι άλλοι/ Άστυάυακτ'· οίος γαρ έρύετο "Ιλίου
"Εκτωρ, where -αυαξ is variated by ρύομαι and Άστυ- represents "Ιλύος.
These lines have been suspected of being an Interpolation, though. See further
Ar. Rhet. II 23 (1400bl7ff.), where etymology is given a rhetorical function, cf.
Rank 1951, 11.
For many examples, see Lersch 1841, 3ff.; Rank 1951, e.g. 84ff.; Pfeiffer 1968, 3ff.
5
 Pfeiffer 1968, 12.
6
 Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 16ff.
7
 Cf. Collart 1978, 196.
8
 E.g. Lersch 15ff.; Bluck on PL Meno 75elff. Prodicus (that is to say,
Plato's version of him) may be seen in action PL Prot. 339elff. As a technical
term for distinguishing alleged synonyms διοαρείυ is used.
9
 Pl.Meno75elff.
10
 For views on homonymy, see chapter II section 3.3.
existence of true synonymy would be a Symptom of a deficient one-to-one
correspondence of word and meaning.11
Distinguishing synonyms and demanding a proper choice of words gained a
permanent place in later linguistic theory, more specifically in rhetoric.
Accordingly, άκυρολογία, the use of an improper word, was regarded äs one of
the three major vices of speech.12 One should not for example apply ρύγχος
("snout") to a human being,13 but ττρόσωττον. The difference is expressed in
sentences built on the model "διαφέρει (το) Α καΐ Β".14 Interestingly, the
Stoics are explicitly said to have made a similar differentiation: οι μέντοι
Στωϊκοί διαφέρειν αλλήλων ηγούνται το μένειν, το ήρεμείν, το
ήσυχάζειν, το άκινητείν, το άκινητίζειν κτλ.
15
 In grammar, too, the
differentiation of synonyms was to have quite a follow-up.16
1.2. Protagoras and the moods andgenders
Protagoras' contribution to the history of linguistic thought is of a
different nature. His case illustrates the risks of neglecting the context in which
apparently "technical" observations were made. He was credited in Antiquity with
being the first to distinguish grammatical genders and kinds of sentences; he
distinguished prayers, questions, answers and commands.17 Fehling,18 however,
11
 Cf. the well-known Democritus fragment B 26 D.-K. in which the τύχη
character of language is proved from this very existence of synonymy, among
other things. Cf. Siebenborn 1976, 19f.
12
 E.g. PDS II 604A (Anon. de impropriis, p. 138,2ff. Nickau) άκυρολογ'ια
εστί λέξεων των ττερί τον αυτόν τόττον αναστρεφόμενων ου ττροσεχής χρήσις.
13
 As was done in comedy, cf. LSJ s.v. 2; perhaps also in colloquial
(affective) usage?
14
 L.l. διαφέρει δε ρύγχος και πρόσωπον κτλ.
15
 "The Stoics, however, think that to remain, to be at rest, to keep quiet,
to be immovable, to remain motionless differ from one another etc." (SVFII500).
16
 E.g. Gramer AP 296,29f. (from the Epimerisms on Hom. A 1): Διαφέρει
μήνις κότου' κότος μεν εστίν οργή μόνιμος ττρός το αντιλυττήσαι
όρώσα, μήνις δε ή άττλώς μνησικακία. Ammonius dedicated a complete
work to this single topic (de adfinium vocabulorwn differentiis, ed. K. Nickau,
Leipzig 1966). This work should not be ascribed to the fourth-century
grammarian Ammonius; rather, it goes back to the lexicon by Herennius Philo
from Byblos (2nd cent. A.D.) entitled ττερί των διαφόρως σημαινόμενων (cf.
Schmid-Stählin II 867; Hunger 1978, 49). Examples of the formula διαφέρει το Α
καΐ B are to be found in the Christian writers also, e.g. in Origen, in PS. 36
(37), 1. See Neuschäfer 1987,140; 142.
For the history of the differentiae verborum on the Roman side, cf. Brugnoli
1955, 7ff.
17
 D.L. IX 53; Ar. Poet. 1456bl5ff. See Schenkeveld 1984, 292f. and 328.
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insists that these distinctions were nothing more than a by-product of
Protagoras' demonstrative criticism of Homer.153 In the very first line of the Iliad
Homer was supposed to have made two major mistakes, viz. that he did not use
the Optative, äs befits someone praying to the goddess, but the imperative, thus
improperly commanding her,20 and in the second place that he took μήνιν to
be feminine, äs the congruent adjective ούλομένην shows, whereas Protagoras
maintained it had to be masculine,21 probably on the ground that μήνις is a
male passion.22 Now, these distinctions were clearly made entirely on semantic
grounds. According to Aristotle,23 Protagoras called the three grammatical
genders άρρενα, θήλεα and σκεύη. The last name, in particular, clearly
suggests an approach that was "biological" in origin, rather than grammatical: the
stress is on sex, rather than on formal, grammatical gender. Later theory
replaces σκεύη, "inanimate objects", with the technical ουδέτερον, "neuter".
Along the same lines are the comic suggestions of Socrates in
Aristophanes' Nubes to bring about a greater uniformity between morphologic and
18
 1965, 212ff.
19
 It may be remarked that Protagoras' program (PL Prot. 338e6ff.
ηγούμαι ... εγώ άνδρΐ τταιδείας μέγιστου μέρος είναι ττερί έττών
δεινόν είναι, εστί δε τοϋτο τα ύττό των ττοιητών λεγόμενα οίον τ'
είναι συνιέναι, α τε ορθώς ττεττοίηται και α μη) would have been
subscribed by most of the later grammarians. Criticism of the poets and being
able to judge them on the basis of a firm knowledge of language was the
ultimate goal of the study of grammar, cf. DTh. GG I i 5,4ff.; Classen 1829, 16f.;
Lehrs 1865, 39 rightly draws attention to the fact that a moralis interpretatio is
meant here, not a technical one.
20
 Apparently Protagoras assumed a one-to-one relationship of modus and
"speech-act" (cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 326ff., esp. 328.). His mode of prayer
corresponds to the optative, answer to the indicative, question to the subjunctive
(dubitative), and command to the imperative, cf. Gomperz 1922, 367.
21
 Ar. S.E. 173bl9ff. Alternatively, Protagoras may not so rmich have
intended to criticize Homer, äs to draw attention to the fact that what we
consider to be a correct use of language is also based on what we are used to,
on authority. Thus, anyone using μήνις äs a feminine noun could base himself
on the authority of Homer and everyone would accept its correctness, whereas in
fact he would be making a mistake. Conversely, the correct masculine gender
would generally give the impression of being false. In this Interpretation
Protagoras would be anticipating later theories on the "Kriterien der
Sprachrichtigkeit".
22
 So Gomperz 1922, 367. Cf. for the idea that masculine gender increases
the force of the expression and is thus not only a formal phenomenon, but also
related to the notional load of a word, SchHom. 0 626c: δεινός άήτης should
be read, rather than δεινός άήτη: ή γαρ αρσενική εκφορά έμφαν-
τικώτερον τον λόγον απεργάζεται καΐ τον άνεμον σφοδρότερον δε'ικνυσι.
23
 Ar. Rhet. III 5 = Prot. fr. 80 A 27 D.-K. (II262).
semantic characteristics of words: A female άλεκτρυών should not be called by
the same name äs her male pendant. Socrates, like a true Champion of
όρθοέττευα,
24
 suggests distinguishing the two by calling him an αλέκτωρ and
her an άλεκτρύαινα (Mio. 658ff.).25 It is clear that Socrates has been credited
here with an exaggerated version of the views of Protagoras.
l.3.Early "philology"; ύττερβατόν
Plato's Protagoras has another novum to offer to the linguistic tradition.
Protagoras' interest in poets and their Interpretation causes him to enter into a
fervent discussion with Socrates on the correct explanation of a poem of
Simonides in which the following line occurs (PL Prot. 339blff.): άνδρ' αγαθού
μεν άλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεττόν.26 Protagoras accuses Simonides of
contradicting himself because later on in the poem he objects to Pittacus' words:
χαλεττόν ... έσθλόν εμμεναι.27 The whole ensuing discussion is worthwhile for
its many shrewd observations, for instance on the difference between γενέσθαι,
and εμμεναι (340b4ff.), the exact connotations of a word such äs χαλεττόυ
(341a5ff.) and the implications of the use of the particle μεν (343c7ff.).
Moreover, the technique of interpreting by means of paraphrases (e.g. 343e6ff.),
quotations from other poets (340c8ff.) and supporting arguments derived from the
immediate context of the poem itself (341d9ff.), does not give the impression of
a primitive stage in the development of philology at all. All these feats are
achieved by Socrates in this dialogue, who poses äs an adept of Prodicus. On
various occasions the latter is called upon to confirm the correctness of
Socrates' observations (340b4ff.; 340e8ff., esp. 341b8ff.).
There is one point in the discussion which is of special interest because it
is the first instance of the linguistic use of the word ΰττερβατός to indicate an
24
 Όρθοέττεια or όρθότης ονομάτων means the correctness of
language. It may apply either to one's choice of words, e.g. the avoidance of an
indiscriminate use of alleged Synonyms, or to the correspondence between
expressions and things meant, äs in the discussion about the gender of μηνις.
This last aspect will play a dominant role in virtually all of ancient etymology
(see section 1.4.). I agree with Siebenborn 1976, 14 n. 3 (contra Fehling 1965,
216) that one should not try to construe a difference between όρθοέττεια and
όρθότης ονομάτων.
25
 In the same vein he suggests (669ff.) changing the ending of κάρδοττος
into a feminine one, because äs it is, gender and ending seem to contradict each
other (it is TJ κάρδοττο^). Here we find an explicit reference to the theory of
όρθοέττεια in the words όρθότερον λέγεις (679).
26
 "It is difficult to become traly a good man."
27
 "It is difficult to be good" (339c4f.).
inverted word order. Socrates uses the term while defending the view that
άλαθεία (bis paraphrasis for άλαθέως) is not to be taken with αγαθόν, but
with χαλεττόν (343d6-e2): ουκ αλήθεια αγαθόν, ow έττΐ τούτω λέγει την
αλήθευαν, ως άρα όντων τινών των μεν ως αληθώς αγαθών, των δε
αγαθών μεν, ου μέντοι αληθώς - εϋηθες γαρ τοΐτό γε φανείη αν
καΐ ΟΌ Σιμωνίδου - αλλ' ΰττερβατόν δεϊ θεΐναι εν τω όίσματι το
άλαθέως.
28
 Socrates regards Simonides' Statement äs a reaction to the words of
Pittacus that it is difficult to be a good man. According to Socrates, Simonides
means to say that it is not being a good man which is difficult - this is simply
impossible - ; what is truly difficult is becoming one (343c6-344a6). Therefore,
άλαθέως must be transposed to the end of the sentence (οτπω φαίνεται ... το
αλαθέως ορθώς έττ' έσχάτω κε'ιμενον).29
It should be noted that all the linguistic observations made in the
Protagoras passage finally serve a philosophical end. Socrates is not doing
philology for its own sake. Whereas Protagoras tries to limit the discussion to
the field of ονομάτων όρθότης, in which he is a specialist, Socrates manages
even here to broaden the question and to return to more basic issues. In his
uninterrupted expose on the poem (342a6ff.) he again Starts with a linguistic, or
rather a stylistic observation, namely that of the βραχυλογία of Spartans and
Cretans, which in early times was affected by philosophers äs well. He then
proceeds to analyse Simonides' poem äs a conscious attempt to emulate Pittacus
by demolishing the truth of Pittacus' words (343b7ff.). And then Simonides'
meaning is analysed in such a way, some additional verses being taken into
account äs well, that he turns out to be a Socratic avant la lettre (esp.
345d6ff.).
A similar use of "philological" techniques to convey a philosophical message
28
 "Not 'truly good', he does not use the word αλήθεια for this [namely
αγαθόν] äs if some persons are truly good, while others are good, but not truly
so - for that would be stupid and not like Simonides - but one has to
understand άλαθέως in the poem äs transposed [or: one has to take it that
άλαθέως can be skipped (and saved _ for later) in the poem]." As a verbal
adjective, ΰττερβατός can refer in principle to the fact that one can "pass
over" the constituent in question. However, perhaps it is better to connect it
with causative ύττερβαίνειν (or rather: ύττερβήσαι, cf. ύττερβιβάζειν) - this
would explain the technical meaning "which is (or: can be) transposed", cf.
Longinus ιτ. ΰψ. 22,2 ϋττερεβ'ιβασεν; 22,3 ύττερβιβάζειν.
29
 "So it appears that άλαθέως (truly) is rightly put at the end" (344a4f.).
For later theory, cf. Lausberg 1960, § 462, 3b; 716.
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may be found in the Derveni papyrus.30 This very early papyrus contains a
highly allegorical discussion of an Orphic Theogony.31 Here, too, we find
examples of paraphrasis and the explanation of the meaning of single words,32
and criticism of other Interpreters who misunderstood the poem.33 Moreover, in
col. IV 4-6 we read: Ζευς μεν έττεί δη [ττατοός έο]ϋ ττάοα θέ[σ]φατον
άογήν / [ά]λκήν τΐ έγ γεί,οεσσι ε[λ]αβ[εγ κ]αϊ δα'ιαον[α] κυδρόν / [τα]ΐτα
τα εττη ΰττερβατά έό[ν]τα λανθά[νει].34 It is unclear what exactly is supposed
to be wrong with the order in this case.35 The ensuing lines suggest that
-πατρός έοϋ ττάρα is to be taken with άλκήν τε κτλ. However, at first sight
this is contradicted by col. V 2f.: öl δε ου ·γινώσκον[τες] / τα λεγό[μεν]α
δοκοΐσι τον Ζάνα παρά του αϋτο[·ϋ] / ττατρός [την] άλκήν [τε καΐ] τον
δαίμονα λαμμά[νειν] (nc).36 On the other hand, the text quoted last may
only refer to a wrong Interpretation given by unknowledgeable persons to verses
which have in fact been restored to correct order. Their Interpretation would
then have been too literal for our commentator, who prefers an allegorical
explanation: Whatever Zeus takes into his hands, can no longer be wild and
chaotic; it becomes calm and allows combinations to be formed.37
30
 I thank Professor Slings who kindly drew my attention to this papyrus. I
have not been able to consult the edition (of the Heraclitus-fragments only?) by
K. Tsantsanoglou and G.M. Parassoglou; I used the provisional edition in the
appendix to ZPE 47 (1982).
31
 The papyrus is dated ca. 350 B.C. by Merkelbach 1967, 21.
32
 E.g. col. VI Iff.; VII Iff.; VIII 3ff.; XII 7f.; XIX 7ff.; XXII 2ff.
33
 E.g. col. V 2f.; VIII 3ff.; XIX 5f.
34 "'Wnen Zeus had taken from his own father [or: from the good father,
cf. col. XXII Iff.] the ordained sovereignty and had taken his strength and his
glorious power in his hands': It escapes notice that these words do not stand in
the correct order."
35
 Professor Ruijgh (personal communication) suggests that θέσφατον
αρχήν, an apposition to άλκήν and δαίμονα, should have come after these
words. This would also have resolved the syntactic ambiguity of τε ... καΐ: As it
is, Zeus may be supposed to have taken three things (A, B τε καΐ Γ) from his
father instead of two (B τε καΐ Γ (= A)).
36
 "Those who do not understand what is said, think that Zeus took the
strength and the power from his own father."
37
 Cf. for the former chaotic state col. V 6 ταράσσοι και κ[ωλ]ύοι τα
οντά συνίστασθαι, (subject?); for the calming effect of Zeus' hands col. V 7 δια
την θάλψυν (warming, fomenting); for the resulting orderly combination col. V
9f. δσα δ' ά[ν] άφθήι έττικρα[τεΙται. έτπκ]ρατηθέν δε μίσγεται / τοίς άλ[λοις.
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1.4. Etymology
After the implicit etymologies found in the Greek poets (see above, section
1.1.), there is a long Greek tradition of explicit etymology, in which we are con-
fronted with the "philosophical Obsession with meaning", äs Mrs. Rawson
uncomplimentarily puts it.38 Although I have no intention of going into details
here, it may safely be remarked that meaning is indeed what matters most in the
etymological Spielerei of Socrates in Plato's Cmtylus. The formal problems of
how one word develops phonologically from another, are hardly touched upon at
all.
To our view large parts of ancient etymology to our view look suspiciously
like a kind of linguistic catch-as-catch-can. Nothing seems to be barred, äs long
äs the desired meaning is found in the alleged origin of the word in question.
There were four principal categories of word-change: The change of one letter
into another (1), the addition of one or more letters (2), the removal of one or
more letters (3), and the interchanging of place of two or more letters within a
word (4). It will be clear that these "rules" in practice exhaust the possibilities
of what one can do with letters.39 In the Cratylus the first three categories may
be found and - moreover - the word πάθος/πάσχω is applied to words that
undergo these changes.40 In pari the gymnastics necessary to arrive at the
desired meaning may not be completely serious, äs many of the etymologies in
the Cratylus certainly are not.41
In Aristotle, etymologies serve the purpose of a posteriori confirming
Aristotle's Interpretation of a given word. He never Starts from etymological
38
 1985, 129.
39
 See e.g. Lersch 1841, 96ff.
40
 Crat. 394b2ff.: οϋτω δε 'ίσως καΐ ό επισταμένος ττερι ονομάτων
την δύναμιν αυτών σκοττει, και ουκ εκπλήττεται ει u -πρόσκειται γράμμα
ή μετάκειται ή άφήρηται, ή και εν άλλοι? τταντάττασιν γράμμασ'ιν εστίν
ή του ονόματα? δύναμις. The last type means that a completely different
word is used, e.g. Άστυάναξ and "Εκτωρ. Cf. further Crat. 431c7 έλλείττειν,
ττροστιθέναι; 432alff. εάν τι άφέλωμεν ή ττροσθώμεν ή μεταθώμέν
τι...εάν τι τούτων ττάθτ); 399bof. Τούτων το'ινυν εν και το των
άνθρώττων δνομα ττέττονθεν...; in Varro, a threefold System may be found in
LL VI 2 and 38. Varro also knows of the fourfold System though, cf. LL V 6
(quadripertita ratio, cf. Ax 1986a, 211). Cf. for threefold and fourfold divisions,
Usener 1892, 582-648 (1913, 265-314).
41
 As when ήρωες is almost derived from έρως because heroes spring
from the love of a god for a mortal woman or of that of a goddess for a mortal
man. Socrates then quickly gives the argument a turn and derives ήρωες from
ερωτάω or εϊρειν ("to say"), the ήρωες suddenly (and humorously) appearing
äs the fore-runners of the ρήτορες και σοφιστα'ι (Crat. 398c6ff.). Cf. Lersch
1838, 31-4.
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considerations, but the importance of etymology lies in the fact that it
represents the (ετυμος, "true") view of reality of the earliest Greeks.
Etymology, therefore, has the value of an argument based on auctoritas.42
However, the most famous etymologists in Antiquity were the Stoics. But
rather than starting from their etymology, I shall first say something about the
interrelated character of the Stoic philosophy. Then, I will discuss their views on
the origin of language and the relation between these views and their ideas on
the gradual corruption of mankind, thus showing a link between linguistics and
ethics. Here, their etymological principles will also be taken into account. After
that, the Stoic theory of meaning will be described and attention will be paid to
its connection with their materialistic physical ideas. Finally, we shall take a
look at an illustrative example of a perverted use of quasi-Stoic notions in later
grammar. In each of these sections I will try to outline succinctly how Stoic
ideas penetrated into later grammar and influenced it.
2. The Stoa
2.1. Coherence of their System
One of the most interesting phenomena in the philosophical System of the
Stoa is its internal cohesion, of which the Stoics themselves were extremely
proud. The three major parts, physics, logic and ethics are interrelated in many
ways and theories developed in one pari may have consequences for either or
both of the others.43 Since the Stoics were very careful in their terminology-
their over-consciousness is one of the main objections raised by their
adversaries -44 one way of tracing these correspondences is to check the use of
the same or similar terms in all three fields. The use of the term ακολουθία
may serve äs an example.
2.1.1. Ακολουθία
The Stoa believes that a divine λόγος permeates the whole cosmos äs a
supreme rational principle, creating order everywhere. This rational Order may be
indicated by the terms ακολουθία and τάξις, τάξις representing the structural
orderliness itself, i.e. the fact that one thing follows another, ακολουθία adding
42
 Cf. Eucken 1869, 246. Eucken has collected all etymologies occurring in
Aristotle.
43
 Cf. Long 1974, 108; 119f.
44
 E.g. Cic. Fin. IV 7; TD IV 3-6; 32.
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the idea that one thing follows from another, i.e. introducing a notion of causal
nexus. Often, however, these two words seem to be used äs mere synonyms.
Long has demonstrated the importance of these concepts in all three fields
of the Stoic philosophy.45 In physics they indicate the order of cause and effect,
the chain of causation,46 where the idea of συμτΓλοκή/έτΓπτλοκή also plays a
major role. Everything in the world is interconnected.47 Thus, έττπτλοκή may
indicate the linkage of events in the necessary chain of fate.48
Now, the relationships between objects and facts in the physical world find
a correlate in logic in the relationships between propositions.49 A state of
affairs may be expressed by means of a simple axioma, such äs "it is light", "it
is day". To indicate relationships between states of affairs, non-simple, complex,
axiomata are used, which are severally characterized by the conjunction linking
their parts. We should realize that because the connections between states of
affairs in the nature of things are real to the Stoa, they never doubted that
conjunctions have a well-defined meaning of their own,50 since these reflect
such connections linguistically. Thus the relationship of συμπλοκή was
expressed by means of the συμπλεκτικοί σύνδεσμοι, ("connective conjunctions"),
that of ακολουθία by means of the συνατττικοί and τταρασυνατττικοί
45
 1971, 95f.
46
 Cf. Phot. Bibl. 249, 440a4-5 Bekker: διαφέρει δε της τύχης (sc. ή
ειμαρμένη) δτι ή μεν ειρμού £χει και τάζιν και ακολουθίαν: SVF II
917 οι Στωϊκοί είρμόν αιτίων, τουτέστι τά£ιν και έτασύνδεσιν
άτταράβατον; 945 κατά είρμόν τίνα καΐ τάξιν ... των ττρώτων τοις μετά
ταϋτα γινομένοις αιτίων γινομένων και τούτω τω τρόπω
συνδεομένων άλλήλοις άττάντων; 946 ... και μην και των αιτίων
έτΓίττλοκήν προς άλληλα και τον άνωθεν είρμόν και το επεσθαι τοις
προτέροις αεί τα υστέρα καΐ ταΰτα έττ' εκείνα άνιέναι, δι' αυτών
γενόμενα και άνευ εκείνων ουκ αν γενόμενα, δουλεύειν τε τοις ττρό
αυτών τα υστέρα ...; see further Pease ad Cic. ND 1,55.
47
 This idea is much older than the Stoa, of course. It is ascribed to
Pythagoras and left its marks e.g. in Pl. Meno 81c9f. ατέ ... της φύσεως
άπάσης συγγενούς ούσης. Ι shall return to this concept when I discuss the
problems concerning συμπάθεια.
48
 Blank 1982, 31.
49
 Cf. DeLacy 1945, 255 "The causal relations that exist between objects in
the physical world correspond to the relation of consequence between
propositions in logical analysis". There is also a subtle distmctipn in terminology:
αίτία is used of the proposition, αίτιον of its non-linguistic pendant in the
physical world, Forschner 1985, 87.
50
 Frede 1978, 64; cf. Frede 1977, 74.
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("conditional-hypothetic" and "hypothetic-causal").51 Their nomenclature äs well
äs the description of their meaning were to be taken over by "technical"
grammar.52 (On the Latin side, the name of the coniunctiones continuativae
corresponds to the notion of the causarum continuatio.)^
However, it is not only in physics and logic that ακολουθία plays an
important role. It is perhaps its ethical consequences, i.e. the consequences for
our moral behaviour, that make ακολουθία into such a central concept.54 "The
51
 D.L. VII 71ff. For the word-formation τταρα-συνατιτικοΊ, cf. Sluiter 1988a,
57 and n. 25.
52
 E.g. DTh. GG I i 91,2 (συνατττικοί express ακολουθία:, but no ϋτταρξις
[i.e. they do not give Information about the factuality of the states of affairs
referred to]; τταρασυνατττικοί indicate both ϋτταρξις and τάξις); cf. SchDTh.
102,15ff.; 283,28ff.; 286,5f. (from 286,8 the practical synonymity of τάξις and
ακολουθία again appears); 436,1.
Apollonius notes that ει and ακολουθεί are equivalents, and adds the typical
Stoic example of a complex axioma, viz. the one built by means of the simple
axiomata ήμερα εστίν and φως εστίν: pron. 7,14-16 και ό ει συνατττικός
Ισοδυναμεί τω ακολουθεί ρήματι, ακολουθεί τω ήμέραν είναι και
φως είναι - ε'ι ήμερα εστί, φως εστί (cf. coni. 22Ö,8ff.). The relationship
of ακολουθία means that the order of the events cannot be changed, neither in
physical reality, nor in its linguistic representation; if it is, the result will in
the latter case be a false Statement. Apollonius mentions this explicitly, e.g. with
regard to propositions expressing cause and effect (synt. 347,7ff.): "I move,
because I walk", may be true, but "I walk, because I move" is not, because το
άκόλουθον το εκ του συνδέσμου ("the order signified by the conjunction")
has been neglected. Cf. further SchDTh. 288,5ff.: Ούτοι (sc. öl συνατττικοί)
τάξιν σημαίνουσιν ηγουμένου ττρός έττόμενον ή γοϋν αντιστροφή
ψευδός εισάγει· "ει φως εστίν, ήμερα εστίν, ε'ι νΰξ εστίν, σκότος
εστίν"· ου ττάντως· εν νυκτΐ γαρ οντος σεληνα'ιου φωτός ή ττυρείου,
ούτε ήμερα εστί δια το φως, ούτε σκότος καίτοι νυκτός ούσης. Τι
ουν; "ει ήλιος ύττέρ γης εστίν, ήμερα _έστ'ιν, ε'ι ήμερα εστίν, ήλιος
ύττέρ γης εστίν"· ττώς αληθεύει; "Οτι ταϋτα φυσικήν ειχον άκολουθίαν.
(Αντιστροφή may concern the order of the constituents or their meaning.
Therefore, two examples are given, one in which the order is inverted, the
other in which antonyms are used.).
Blank (1982, 16f.; 31) also notes how elaborately Apollonius uses the concepts of
έτΓίττλοκή and ακολουθία. As he puts it, "the linkage of the elements of
language is supposed by Apollonius to be of the same sort äs the articulation of
the elements and events in the universe" (1982, 31). This holds good not only for
conjunctions, but also for syntax äs a whole. For the conjunctions, cf. synt.
14,4ff. οι τε σύνδεσμοι ττρός τάς των λόγων τάξεις ή ακολουθίας τάς
ιδίας δυνάμεις τταρεμφαίνουσιν. Householder's translation "conjunctions, too,
may vary in force according to their position in the sentence or the context" is
clearly wrong; it is evidently not the position of the conjunctions that is
discussed here and "sentence or...context" is hardly illuminating either. For the
whole syntax being eventually based on correctly making συμτΓλοκαί/έτπττλοκαί,
cf. synt. 2,3ff.). To Apollonius ακόλουθος/ακολουθία even is equivalent to
ανάλογος/αναλογία (Blank 1982, 79 n. 32.), bqth denoting the element of
rationality in language in which Apollonius firrnly believed.
53
 Cic. ND 1,55; cf. Pease a.1
54
 Cf. Kahn 1969,171f.
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cardinal assumption of the Stoics is that man can put himself in touch with the
rational course of events and effect a correspondence between them and bis
own actions and intentions".55 Ακολουθία is of vital importance in the τέλος-
formulas: Living according to nature is ομολογουμένως or ακολούθως ζην.56
Our relationship to God, too, is determined by the fact that we have an
έττι/ιτλοκή with Hirn.57 Moreover, the Stoa was also a practical philosophy in
that it furnished precepts on how to function in the everyday world, providing
us with a theory of καθήκοντα. The καθήκον is also based on the principle of
ακολουθία, äs its definition "το άκόλουθον εν βίω" shows.58 And, finally,
there is the theory of the virtues: These cannot be separated from one another-
they are linked by mutual ακολουθία. If you have one, you have them all.59
This gives us an example of how thoroughly constructed the Stoic system
was. To my mind the case of ακολουθία justifies the method of looking for
more internal relationships in Stoic philosophy by checking their terminology,
always, however, guarding against imposing correspondences that are not really
there. The safest method of achieving this is by concentrating on the more
remarkable terms. The more colourless a word is, the more likelihood of its being
used without any ulterior motives.
This introduction also serves to underscore the fact that the Stoa is not a
school of grammar. Their linguistic theory functions in the context of a whole
philosophy and Frede is, therefore, fully justified in admonishing us that a
description of Stoic grammar should do more justice to its connections with
üther parts of their philosophy (1978, 74). However, the Stoics did carefully
systematize those aspects of "grammar" that they needed, and sometimes even
went a little further than perhaps would have been strictly necessary. Moreover,
later grammarians used the ideas they found in the Stoa äs a starting-point from
which to develop their more "technical" theories.
55
 Long 1971, 95; Forschner 1981, 84: "Der gute Mensch wird bestimmt in
Termini der ακολουθία".
56
 D.L. VII 89.
57
 Epict. 2,14,27.
58
 SVF III 494. Forschner paraphrases (1981, 186): "Die Folgerichtigkeit und
gesetzliche Ordnung des Lebensvollzug". Cf. Long 1971, 96.
59
 ' Αντακολουθία, cf. SVF III295-304; Forschner 1981, 205.
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2.1.2. "Η διασαφητικό«;
I applied this principle of putting a particular view attributed to the Stoics
into the context of their whole philosophy in my 1988 article on ή
διασαφητικός.
60
 As the example discussed there is of special interest (a
linguistic phenomenon having apparently been introduced into the logical part of
Stoic philosophy because of its relevance to ethics), I shall briefly summarize the
results of that article here.
It was shown that the list of molecular propositions and the corresponding
conjunctions given by Diogenes Laertius (VII 69ff.) cannot solely be explained by
referring to formal, truth-functional logic. The axiomata formed by means of the
conjunction η (fj διασαφητικός, "which makes it clear (that something is the
case)") are an example of axiomata for which it is hard to find a strictly
"logical" function.61 Now, it is true that arguments like this, based on
relationships of "more" and "less", had always had a place in logic - they
traditionally belonged in the logic of relation. Via Aristotle and Theophrastus,
they found a place in the logic of the Stoa äs well. The Stoics could not simply
take over their traditional form (of the type "Sx more-P than S2"), since their
logic did not work with terms, but rather with propositions, i.e. they did not
substitute names for their variables, but sentences, representing propositions
(axiomata). They had to adapt the form of these arguments in such a way that
their schema of two axiomata connected by one or more conjunctions could
remain intact, yielding sentences (or rather propositions) of the type "Σχ more
than Σ/.
The reason why they went to this trouble, I submitted, was because they
could use this kind of complex axiomata very well: To the Stoics they were
useful and necessary, since they expressed one of their foremost ethical
principles, namely εκλογή ("choice"), more specifically the Stoic αξία
εκλεκτική. This is the kind of (relative) estimation that plays a part in making
choices between προηγμένα, those "indifferent things" (αδιάφορα) that cause us
to undergo a positive impulse or inclination (ορμή). Examples are health, äs
opposed to illness, wealth äs opposed to poverty etc.
60
 For another example of the relationship between a linguistic phenomenon
and the other parts of Stoic philosophy, see Brunschwig 1978, 58-86.
61
 Diogenes' Laertius' example (VII 72) is μάλλον ήμερα εστίν ή νύξ
εστί The obscurity of this example is caused mainly by the fact that Diogenes
builds all complex axiomata from two of the three sentences ήμερα εστίν,
φως εστίν and νύξ εστίν plus one or two σύνδεσμοι. Α later example (ApL>.
coni 22118) is βούλομαι ττλουτεΐν ή ττένεσθαι. Here, one makes clear
(διασαφεΐ'ν) that one chooses wealth and rejects poverty.
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The non-simple axiomata formed by means of μάλλον (ήττον) ή are
eliminative - they may be used to choose one possibility and (at the same time)
to reject another. The fact that μάλλον ή-formulas seem to have functioned of
old in ethical discussions (even in Aristotle and Theophrastus the examples have
an ethical colouring) enhances the probability of their belonging in the ethical
context of εκλογή.
Apart from considerations of traditionality, their ethical use would thus
constitute an extra reason for the adoption of μάλλον r\-axiomata in the list of
Diogenes Laertius, especially since there are no good grounds on which to assign
a strictly formal logical role to these axiomata.
The grammarians took over the description of the eliminative semantic value
of ή from the Stoa and duly called this use "διασαφητικό?".62
2.2. Original state of language; etymology; connections with ethics; origin of
language
If we take a closer look at the Stoa's conception of the nature of language,
we may notice that here, too, there is a definite affinity with some of their
ethic convictions. Language was originally in perfect rational order, i.e. there
was a direct and simple mimetic relationship between the form of words and
their meaning.63 The first words (ττρώται φωναί) imitated in their forms the
meanings they were to express.64 This is most clear in those words which denote
a sound, since their onomatopoeic character is the perfect Illustration of this
principle. Thus, hinnitus means the neighing of a horse and sounds like it too,
and the same goes for balatus and the bleating of a sheep.65 With words that
are still original but do not denote a sound, things are a little more complicated.
There, the resemblance between expression and meaning is less direct. But most
words show more complications even than these: They have been gradually
alienated from their origins because of letters having disappeared or changed
62
 Cf.ApD.con/. 221,16ff.
63
 Cf. e.g. Barwick 1957, 30f.; Pinborg 1962, 156; Frede 1977, 68f. The
"latent and unacknowledged conflict between the Stoic theory of meaning and
the Stoic theory of etymology" (Lloyd 1971, 64f.; cf. Long 1974, 135) would have
to rest on an identification of meaning and expression which allegedly takes
place in Stoic etymology, whereas these two should be kept strictly separated
according to the theory of the σημαινόμενου and σημαίνοντα (for which see
sectipn 2.3.). However, the conflict may not be äs serious äs it seems,
considering the ispmorphism (which is not to say "identity") of expression and
meaning, and the sign-function of the expression.
64
 Origen, c. Celsum 124 μιμούμενων των ττρώτων φωνών τα ττράγματα.
65
 Cf. for this and the following, Aug. dial. 6 Pinborg.
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place, having been added or changed altogether. They have, in short, been
corrupted.66 It is the task of etymology to follow these changes äs it were in
the reverse direction and so to arrive at the original form - and therefore at
the same time the original and true meaning - of the word in question.67 The
theory of etymology is based on the assumption that the meaning of a word is
unaffected by any changes that may occur in its form. This principle is stated
explicitly by Socrates in the Cratylus.68
This whole procedure of the gradual corruption of language strongly
resembles the ethical theory of διαστροφή.69 There, it is man who from a state
of perfect rationality and harmony with nature is corrupted because he is misled
by external appearances which wrongly seem true to him, and is, moreover,
contaminated by his surroundings.70 This makes for a perversion of one's λόγος,
which in its turn entails making wrong judgements. This same syndrome is
described by saying someone has ττάθη in his soul.71
The relationship between primitive man and the original state of language
may be illustrated by a passage taken from Philo of Alexandria. He describes the
link of rational order in the name-giver and rational order in expressions and
meanings in this way (de opif. mundi 150): Άκρατου γαρ έτι της λογικής
φύσεως ΰτταρχούσης εν ψυχή και μηδενός άρρωστήματος ή νοσήματος
ή ττάθους τταρεισεληλυθότος, τάς φαντασίας των σωμάτων και ττραγμάτων
ακραιφνέστατος λαμβάνων ευθύβολους έττοιειτο τάς κλήσεις, ευ μάλα
66
 Corruptio vocum, Aug. /./. Cf. Colson 1919, 25f.; Blank 1982, 10 and 21f.
Notice the quadrupertita ratio.
67
 Schmidt 1839, 23f.
68
 394b2ff.; cf. section 1.4. note 40.
69
 Cf. Pohlenz 1948, 123ff.; Barwick 1957, 60; Gnilka 1984, 60 and n. 131;
SVF III 228-236. Διαστροφή is an Epicurean concept äs well, cf. Schrijvers 1974,
349.
70
 E.g. D.L. VII 89 διαστοέφεσθαι δε το λογικόν ζωον ττοτέ μεν δια
τάς των έξωθεν πραγμάτων ταθανότητας, ττοτέ δε δια την κατήχησιν
των συνόντων έττεΐ ή φύσις άφορμάς δίδωσιν άδιαστοόφους. Cf.
especially SVF III229.
71
 E.g. SVF III 382 καΐ ου κακώς οΐ άττό Ζήνωνος τα ττάθη της
άνθρωττίνης ψυχής του λόγου διαστροφάς είναι τιθέμενοι και λόγου
κρίσεις ήμαρτημένας. For ττάθη äs wrong judgements, cf. e.g. Cic. TD III 24.
Compounds of στρέφομαι are much used in these contexts, cf. e.g. SVF III 389
... ττάντες δ' οι εν τοις ττάθεσιν δντες αποστρέφονται ("abandon") τον λόγον.
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στοχαζόμενος των δηλουμένων, ως άμα λεχθήνα'ι τε και νοηθηναι τάς
φύσεις αυτών.
72
This passage takes us to the question of the Stoic view on the origin of
language. For whereas the very principle of etymology sufficiently informs us
about the Stoic views on the primitive state of language itself, it is not so easy
to see how according to them this state came about in the first place. Philo is
not the best of witnesses in this respect, since it Stands to reason that he
cannot but work with one namegiver, namely Adam. The testimony of Origen
indicates the primitive relationship between words and things, but does not add
anything about the origin of the words. In fact, we have no explicit testimonies
about this question at all - it may well be that the Stoa paid äs little attention
to this question äs Plato's Cratylus does. The nature of the original words is far
more important than their origin.
The Stoa and the Cratylus share the characteristic of having to postulate
the invention of language, rather than its evolution:73 Only in this way can
there be a fully rational correspondence between word and meaning. The identity
of the namegiver(s) is relatively unimportant. In Plato, the singular and plural
are used almost indifferently.74 For the Stoa it has been suggested that the
first namegiver(s) was/were the first king(s).75 In itself this is not unlikely,
considering the Stoic interest in kings.76 They held that only wise men (σοφοί)
could be true kings77 and lawgivers.78 Lawgiver (νομοθέτη?) was one of the
72
 "For when rational nature still was untainted in the soul, and no
weakness or disease or emotional disturbance had come in, he grasped a pure
conception of the presentations of bodies and things and gave them names which
hit the target, because he envisaged their meanings very well, so that their
nature was at the same time expressed and thought". The whole passage bristles
with Stoic terminology. Cf. Philo de opif. mundi 148; quaest. in Gen. I 20.
73
 Cf. Fehling 1965, 220f.; cf. chapter IV section 3.3.3.
74
 Singular: e.g. 388elff.; 404b3; 406b6; 418c8f.; plural: 397c8ff.; 401b6f.;
411b4ff.; 418a2.
75
 Cf. Frede 1978, 68ff.; Blank 1982, 77 n. 5.
76
 Works entitled ττερί βασιλείας are attested for Persaeus Citieus (SVF I
435), who was attached to the court of Antigonus Gonatas (D.L. VII 36);
Cleanthes (SVF I 481) and Sphaerus (SVF I 620), a pupil of Zenp and Cleanthes
who later went to the court of Ptolemaeus Philopator. Hellenistic monarchies
apparently were a source of Inspiration in this respect.
77
 E.g. D.L. VII122; SVF III617; 619.
7
^ SVF III 619: öl Στωϊκοί φιλόσοφοι δογματ'ιζουσιν, βασιλε'ιαν ...
νομοθετικήν ... μόνω τφοσάτττοντες τω σοφω. Cf. Luc. vitarum auctio 20
(Mercurius, in an attempt at selling' Chrysippus): μόνος οίτος σοφός, ...
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words adopted in the Cratylus to denote the name-giver (e.g. 389a2). Moreover,
Seneca teils us that according to Posidonius the wise men were kings in the
Golden Era of Saturnus (Κρόνος) from which all corruption was absent.79
However, in the same letter he adds that men's need for laws only originated
when times grew worse - the laws, however, were still given by wise men.80
Blank thinks a Stoic theory of kings being the first namegivers would best
explain the Epicurean criticism on this point in Lucretius and Diogenes of
Oenoanda.81 However, this criticism can in itself be sufficiently explained by
reference to the Cratylus, where a single νομοθέτης is mentioned several times
(see above, note 74).
There is one more testimony for the theory of the royal namegiver, but it
is again insufficient to ascribe the theory to the Stoa. Varro connects bis
quartus gradus etymologiae with a king, more exactly with a rex Latinus.82 The
words analysed in this department of etymology are all very old,83 and they
belong to the time of a mythic king, who established language and culture, the
first impositor of words. It cannot be proved that Varro is dependent on a Stoic
source here. We must conclude that we are in the dark about the identity of the
Stoic first name-giver,84 and that we may justly doubt its relevance.
μόνος ... βασιλείς ρήτωρ πλούσιος νομοθέτης.
79
 Sen. Ep. 90,5: Illo ergo saeculo quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes
fuisse regnum Posidonius indicat.
80
 O.e. 90,6.
81
 1982 77 n 5; cf. Lucr. V 1041ff.; Diogenes of Oenoanda col. IV 3ff. W.
(cf. Chilton 1962, 163ff.).
82
 LL V 8 and 9. Cf. Pfaffel 1981, 240f.
83
 Pfaffel 1981, 238.
84
 Cf. Fehling 1965, 222. One could even tentatively think of the λόγος
itself functioning äs the first namegiver, in which case the Stoics would have
found a kind of compromise between the namegiver theory and the concept of
language äs a natural product of humanity. [Is this what Dahlmann (1964, 7)
means by his words "So war dem Menschen die Sprache von Natur gegeben, das
heisst sie war richtig" (my emphasis)? Cf. also Pohlenz 1948, 41: "Die Namen sind
vom menschlichen Logos durch bestimmten Willensakt gegeben (θέσει), aber sie
sind zugleich natürlicher Ursprung (φύσει), weil die beigelegten Bezeichnungen
der Physis der benannten Dinge entsprachen."] We should not forget that the
Stoa's position in the group of the "mythological" explanation of the origin of
language, is due mainly to its etymological theories. If a word can, ideally
spoken, teil us something about its meaning, it must have been composed by
someone who knew what he was doing. This position derives from the Cratylus,
but it may well have been only the etymological pari that was borrowed by the
Stoa and expanded upon. Perhaps, then, according to the Stoics language was
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2.3. Theory ofmeaning; link withphysics; consequences in grammatical theory
We saw that the principle of etymology is a Separation of form and meaning
of a word, the meaning remaining unaffected irrespective of what happens to the
form of a word. In fact, the whole Stoic theory of meaning, which is perhaps
their most important contribution to the history of logic and grammar,85 is
based on this bipartition.
The Stoics divided the field of logic into dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is
subdivided into ό ττερί των σημαινόμενων τόττος and ό ττερί της φωνής
τόττος.
86
 The τόττος ττερί φωνής deals with a number of formal aspects of
language, a theory of the parts of speech among them. The theory of meaning,
developed in the τόττος ττερί σημαινόμενων, was quite unique in Antiquity and
has long been completely misjudged äs a kind of pedantic insistence on
terminological distinctions, which were generally held to be utterly irrelevant to
the issues at stake.87
The theory comprises the following: The Stoics distinguish the form of a
word, i.e. the expression (φωνή, σημαίνον), its meaning (σημαινόμενον,
δηλούμενον, -πράγμα), and that to which it refers in reality (τυγχάνον).88
natural, while at the same time it enjoyed all the adyantages of being created by
a supremely rational being - think again of the legitimation of etymology. The
Suggestion I make here finds some Support in Cic. Rep. III 3: eademque (sc. mens
divina) cum accepisset homines inconditis vocibus inchoatum quiddam et
confusum sonantes, incidit has et distinx.it in partes (i.e. it applied διάρθρωσις,
cf. chapter IV section 3.3.2.), et ut signa quaedam sie verba in rebus inpressit,
hominesque antea dissociatos iucundissimo inter se sermonis vinculo conligavit.
However, this text has the disadvantage that it clashes with the general
primitivistic tendencies of the Stoa, for which see chapter IV section 3.3.3. Non
liquet.
85
 So Coseriü 1975,1116.
86
 "The pari on meanings", "the pari on sound", D.L. VII43.
87
 Cf. e.g. Steinthal 1890, 274: "Es muss stark hervorgehoben werden, dass
die stoische Logik tief unter der aristotelischen steht. Kommt man von den
Analytiken zur stoischen Logik, so kann man zunächst nur besinnungslos staunen:
so jäh ist der Sturz!"; 275: "Ihre Logik ist ... fade und trivial biz zum Abstossen";
279: "Aus dieser empiristischen Richtung der nacharistotelischen Logik erklärt
sich ihr Formalismus und ihre Plattheit im allgemeinen, wie auch manche
bedeutsame Einzelheit."
88
 Cf. S.E. AM VIII llf.; SVF II 168. The word τυγχάνον is explained by
Frede 1978, 32 and 74f. n. l, äs meaning "that which has the quality signified
(by a noun)", i.e. it is derived from τυγχάνω "to obtain". LSJ put it s.v. A II 2
b (under the general caption of "to express a coincidence"). Although the
connotation of "res fprtuito obiecta" (Schmidt 1839, 55 n. 78) cannot be excluded,
I prefer Frede's view. SVF II 236 (ούτοι (sc. öl Στώίκοί) ... τα ττράγματα
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Φωνή is a physical entity, it is the sound we emit when we say something.
Therefore, it is corporeal, a σώμα. The same holds good for the τυγχάνον.89 If
there is a man Dion to whom we refer in using the expression Δίων, this Dion
is corporeal äs well. The meaning, on the other band, is something which can
only be thought, it is an άσώματον, a rare phenomenon in the materialistic
philosophy of the Stoa. It shares this characteristic of being incorporeal with the
void, time and space only.
There is a hierarchical order running from inarticulate sound through
articulate sound irrespective of meaning, to articulate meaningful sound.90 The
latter two stages are called λέξις and λόγος respectively. Λέξις may be either
one word or a string of words, which is looked upon from its non-semantic side,
λόγος in principle may also be one word or a combination of words, but it is
always meaningful - it is a combination of form and meaning.91
τυγχάνοντα καλοΰσι· τέλος γαρ το τυχειν τούτων) cannot support LSJ's
Interpretation; it is a banal etymology.
89
 We should realize that even "abstract nouns" äs we call them, such äs
δικαιοσύνη, to the Stoics correspond with (material) mind in a certain
disposition - its τυγχάνον would therefore be corporeal.
90
 D.L VII57.
91
 Müller 1943, 8ff.; Ax 1986b, 191ff.; 199; 204ff. Contra Schmidt 1839, 21
n. 37, according to whom one word can never be λόγος. If meaning alone should
be taken into account, the word λεκτόν is used, cf. chapter II section 1.4.4.
Later theory equated λέξις with "one word" and λόγος with "a combination of
words"; this explains the later definitions of βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός, e.g.
PDS II 598 (Polyb. de barb. et sol. 283,4f. Nauck): βαρβαρισμός εστίν
αμάρτημα εν μια λέξει ττερί (παρά?, cf. FDS 601) την τταρ' έκάστοις
συνήθειαν; FDS ΐί 601 (Anon. de barb. et soloec. 186f. Valck.): Σολοικία δε
καΐ βαρβαρισμός τούτω διενηνόχασιν αλλήλων ότι ή μεν σολοικία ττερί
ττλείονας γίνεται λέξεις άκαταλλήλως ττλεκομένας, καΐ το σημαινόμενου
εναλλάσσει ... ό δε βαρβαρισμός ττερι μίαν γίνεται λέξιν, και μόνης της
φωνής εστίν αμάρτημα. The Stoic definition in D.L. VII 59 runs äs follows: o
δε βαρβαρισμός εκ των κακιών λέξις εστί τταρά το εθος των
εύδοκιμούντων Ελλήνων, σολοικισμός δε εστί λόγος άκαταλλήλως
συντεταγμένος. In practice, it is easy to see how this could correspond to
faults in one or more words respectively, but the point is that βαρβαρισμός
affects the λέξις only, something going wrong in the articulation of a string of
sounds, independent on the ensuing meaning, whereas a σολοικισμός affects the
combination of sound and meaning which constitutes a λόγος.
Barwick (1922) tried to derive the Latin grammatical theory of the "virtues"
corresponding to βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός, viz. the tropes and figures,
from the Stoics äs well. However, Baratin and Desbordes (1986) have defimtively
eliminated this possibility by pointing out that to the Stoics Hellenismos, the
virtue of Speech par excellence, was the norm - there are np "virtues" to outdo
the norm. Moreover, the Stoic virtues of speech are nothing like tropes and
figures, but good Greek, consisting of clarity, conciseness, decency and elegance
(i.e. non-trivial speech, the opposite of ίδιωτισμός, D.L. VII59).
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In this case, too, a clear correspondence with physical theory may be
noted: Only σώματα are capable of ποιειν and πάσχειν. The somatic
expressions share in this trait in that they may affect the hearer acoustically.92
Apart from that, they may undergo various changes, äs we already saw when
discussing etymology. That the τυγχάνοντα are capable of ποιεϊν and πάσχειν
goes without saying. But, äs is clear from the very theory of etymology,
meanings cannot undergo changes - this fits their incorporeal character which
prevents them from both ποιεϊν or πάσχειν.93
As a matter of fact, although there are no explicit Stoic testimonies to the
impossibility of meanings being affected, we find it in the form of a rule-
without the physical explanation, of course - in an ancient grammarian who has
undergone a marked influence of the Stoics, Apollonius Dyscolus.
Apollonius adopts the Stoic division of linguistic matters into expressions
and meanings throughout his work.94 The point we are investigating at the
moment is mentioned by him several times, most succinctly in his rule: των ...
φωνών τα πάθη, καΐ ου των σημαινόμενων.9^ This means that the
meaning of a word cannot be affected in any way by the changes its form may
incur.96 For Apollonius the possibility of a certain πάθος having occurred in a
92
 SVFII3S7.
93
 5KFII363.
94
 Cf. chapter II passim; see e.g. his explicit remarks adv. 119,lf. and coni.
213,15f. He himself calls attention to the important influence of the Stoa on his
work, coni. 214, Iff. προς ols καΐ αυτοί τι έπινοήσαντες μετά της
δεούσης σαφήνειας τταραδώσομεν, ουκ εκτός γινόμενοι κατά το τταντελές
της των Στωϊκών δόξης.
95
 "Modifications affect the sounds, not the meanings", adv. 158,14f.; cf.
209,17f.; coni. 254,Iff.; saep. Conversely, the letters constituting a ττάθος can
never by themselves convey meaning, 158,llf. ουδέποτε πλεονασμός λέξεως
λε'ιττεται εις το δηλούμενον της λέξεως. In later sources the same sentiment
may be found. It is likely that in those cases it derives from Apollonius rather
than directly from the Stoa. E.g. SchDTh. 285,25f. τα πάθη το δηλοίιμενον
ουκ άλλοιοΰσιν. Choer. ps.epim. 14,4f. (Why can ενι also have the meaning of
a verb - sc. ενεστι - but is ποτ'ι < προσί always a preposition?) Διότι κατά
πάθος γινομένη την ιδίαν σημασ'ιαν έφύλαξε ("because it has only arisen
from a modification, but it has kept its proper meaning").
96
 To Apollonius, meaning is the most important factor in the context of
etymological questions. Cf. e.g. adv. 194,27ff.: νόσφι is derived from the
στερητικόν vo- and επεσθαι. Thus, it means "the contrary of συνέπεσθαι", cf.
Et. Orion s.v. νόσφι and Gramer AO1292,28ff.
Etymology may constitute an essential part of the argument. The formal
connection existing between θάμα and άμα is supported by their meanings, adv.
153,5ff.: το γαρ πυκνώς γινόμενο ν ϋφ' ένα καιρόν γίνεται- "that which
happens frequently, happens [at any given moment] at that same moment". ίιφ'
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word may even be rejected if such a ττάθος entails a change in meaning. Thus,
at adv. 136,28ff. he objects to the possibility that φρονώ might derive from
φρενώ by simply changing ε to o. In that case a change of meaning (έννοια)97
would also occur, and that is unacceptable since - again - τα ττάθη οίι των
λεκτών, των δε φωνών (136,32).98 Interestingly, this principle which was
essential for etymology and was founded in the Stoic theory of meaning, has
here found an apparently independent application in the later grammatical theory
of pathology, which cannot be traced back to the Stoa."
Wackernagel derives the origin of pathology from dialectology.100 In that
context, too, the Stoic principle of the constancy of meaning, was applied by
Apollonius. He explicitly links dialectology and pathology101 in the following
Statement, which from the rest of its wording clearly betrays the Stoic influence
we noted before (adv. 208,6f.): τα έγγινόμενα ττάθη κατά τάς έτεροιώσεις
των διαλέκτων των φωνών εστίν, ουχί των δηλουμένων.102 This
Statement justifies a method frequently employed by Apollonius, viz. to use
dialect forms in explaining either specific πάθη, or - more generally - the
ένα καιρόν is κατά τον αυτόν καιρόν, cf. Et. Gud. 254,13ff.; SchDTh. 280,27;
Lex. Vindobon. 185,16 Nauck; ApD. coni. 230,18; Gramer AO l 451,lff. θάμα =
ττυκνόν. άμα < θάμα: το γαρ ττυκνόν και έττάλληλον άμα γίνεται και εν
τω αΰτώ καιρώ.
Trypho' is criticized (adv. 174, Iff.) for not having given a satisfactory explanation
of the meaning of αΰτως äs well äs of its form. Apollonius himself explicitly
demonstrates that ττόθεν from which he wants to derive ττώμαλα is suitable
from a semantical point of view to serve äs ετυμον (adv. 190,21ff.).
97
 "Εννοια comprises all the notional aspects of a word, i.e. its semantic
and syntactic load. The word φρενώ means "to make wise", φρονώ is "to be wise".
98
 Changes of meaning are acceptable, though, if there is also a change in
part of speech, äs when from a perf. pass. (εψαλται) a nomen actionis is derived
(ψάλτης). Cf. adv. 161,13ff. Πάνυ γέλοιόν εστί το την αυτήν σημασίαν
άτταιτεΐν εν τε τοις έττιρρήμασι και τοις όνόμασιν κτλ.
99
 See Wackernagel 1816; Αχ 1986a, 199ff. Wackernagel (1876, 22f.)
decidedly rejects the possibility that the Stoics had anything to do with the
origins of pathology.
100
 In passing I remark that the use of dialects to facilitate an
etymological explanation may already be found in PL Crat. 408e8ff. - the meaning
of ήλιος is explained more easily if one Starts from the Doric form άλιος. Cf.
Crat. 398d2; 405c4; see also Slings 1976, 46 and notes.
101
 Cf. Egenolff 1878d, 168.
102
 "The modifications occurring in the alterations of the dialects affect
the sounds, not the meanings." Cf. synt. 484, l If.
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word-forms he finds himself confronted with.103 He also applies rules which are
specific to one dialect to explain forms which are in themselves koine.104
We have, therefore, seen that later grammarians underwent terminological
influence from the Stoa (η διασαφη-ακός), took over some of their linguistic
principles (the Separation of form and meaning)105 and adapted these principles
to new contexts (dialectology and pathology). Sometimes, however, the result of
their studies could not be reconciled to the philosophical principles they started
from.
3. Later grammatical theory and the relationships between σημαινόμενα,
σημαίνοντα and τυγχάνοντα
3.1. Συμινάθεια
Whereas later grammar can often be shown to build on philosophical
foundations - äs in the principles of pathology which found Support in
philosophical etymology -, often it simply works with concepts which have
become cultural common coin. The Stoic (or more generally philosophical) element
contained in them is not feit äs such any longer, and theories developed on their
basis might have been unacceptable if put back into their original context. An
example is the theory of συμπάθεια, one of the wilder offshoots of the
relationships between form and meaning.
103
 In de adverbio Attic is cited most (seven times), especially for its
έττεκτασις, the lengthening of a vowel, followed by Aeolic, Doric and lonic. The
dialects of the Sicyonians and Syracusans are each used once (164,17 and 197,5).
104
 The individual dialects are frequently described äs deviations from the
koine. I give here some examples of his use of the dialects:
(1) Forms occurring in dialects only (and not in the koine) may be .quoted äs
parallels for a πάθος, e.g. adv. 149,19ff.
(2) To defend the αναλογία of a form, which is not ανάλογο? by the Standards
of koine, it may be shown to behave in accordance with dialectal rules, e.g. adv.
177,5ff.
(3) Changes peculiar to certain dialects are applied to obtain intermediate Steps
in the development of a koine word, e.g. the lonic change of long α into η (adv.
134,31ff.; 148,25f.). Sometimes several dialects are necessary to explain a word or
its use, e.g. adv. 154,14ff. on the use of ένθεν and ένθα; 190,22ff. on
ττώμαλα, a specifically Attic word formed by means of a specifically Doric
pathos.
(4) Apollonius also uses dialectal forms äs a test: A satisfactory explanation of a
word should also account for dialectal variants, e.g. adv. 156,8ff.; 170,4ff.
105
 Here Stoic influence appears from the terminology. The principle itself
is already found in Plato's Cratylus.
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The συμπάθεια referred to here, is a supposed influence exerted by the
meaning of a word on its form, causing that form to undergo changes. These
changes usually consist of the adoption or loss of letters.106 I shall argue that
traces of this principle may be found in Apollonius Dyscolus. It was, äs far äs
we know, first stated explicitly by Trypho. After having discussed Wackernagel's
alternative Interpretation of συμπάθεια, we shall investigate what Stoic authority
there may have been for this grammatical tenet. Although the Stoics, too, knew
of the notion of συμπάθεια, they never extended the philosophical context in
which it belonged to language. Objections of a philosophical nature would have
arisen if they had done so. On this point the grammarians clearly wem their
own way.
3.1.1. Συμπάθεια; α grammanan's contribution
In adv. 127,17£f. Apollonius explains the length of the form οΐμοιμοΐ from
the continuity of the πάθος it expresses.107 Considering the exceptional Status
of the έπιφωνήσεις, the exclamations, this example does not mean much.108 But
in adv. 176,12ff. we find a similar case. There we are told that τήλε has a
sister-form τηλοϋ: δ < μη > ποτέ έδύνατο και τω τέλος παρακεισθαι, ώστε
το μεν εντελές είναι τελοϋ, είτα κατ' έπέκτασιν τηλοϋ· τα γαρ επί
τέλους συντείνοντα μεγεθύνεται. The first part of this passage gives no
problems: "(τηλοϋ) might be a form related to τέλος, so that its original form is
τελοϋ,
109
 and then, lengthened, τηλοϋ". The last part, which contains the ex-
planation (γαρ) of the first, is more difficult. Μεγεθύνεται110 refers to the
lengthening of ε to η, witness γαρ. A parallel passage (adv. 193,20ff.) runs äs
follows: τα γαρ επί τέλους διικνούμενα μεγεθύνεται.111 Apparently,
συντε'ινοντα is synonymous to διικνούμενα, which makes an Interpretation of
συντείνοντα äs "referring to" or something similar unlikely. Moreover, "τηλοϋ" is
106
 These ττάθη may be indicated by the words πλεονασμός, ένδεια, cf.
e.g. ApD. synt. 185,14f.
107
 Του γαρ πάθους επιμένοντος επεκτείνεται, αϊ αϊ αϊ, οϊ οι
οι. επί μεν ουν θρήνου αίαΐ, οίο'ι. τοιοϋτον δε εστί καΐ το οίμοιμοι.
108
 Cf. chapter IV section 3.2. and 6.3.2.
109
 Εντελές applies to a form which has not undergone any πάθη. It is
a synonym of όλόκληρον, for which cf. Wackernagel 1876, 15. Τα έι> πάθει
and τα ολόκληρα are explicitly contrasted, e.g. ApD coni. 257,Iff· (Trypho).
110
 The verb is applied äs a terminus technicus by Trypho apud ApD. pron.
65,21ff.
111
 "That which penetrates towards an end is lengthened."
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an έτα τέλους συντεΐνον. Ι would, therefore, suggest that τα ... έτα τέλους
συντείνοντα explains the meaning οι τηλοΰ ("far, distant", in time and in space):
τηλοΰ is "something which strains towards an end (τέλος)" [because one is
always far from something; being far away implies a τέλος] and this "straining"
has consequences for the form of the word, which accordingly "strains" itself äs
well, and is thus lengthened.112
Now, if we try to discover the grammatical source of this principle, we find
that Trypho, the grammarian Apollonius names most often, either neutrally
reporting bis views, or to express assent or dissent, knew of the phenomenon
ότι συνέτταθεν ή φωνή τω σημαινόμενα), "that the word-form was
sympathetically affected with the meaning".113 Thus, the word ημικυκλίου,
"half-circle", comes from ήμισυ-κύκλιον, the word meaning "half being reduced
to half its original form. In the same way, φιλήτης, "thief', has developed from
ΰφειλέτης, apparently by the theft of a couple of letters.114 Let me give only
one more example, in which the term μεγεθύνεται figures: Et. M. 820,16f. Ό
παρατατικός πάντοτε μεγεθύνεται κατά την αρχήν, η χρονικώς η συλλαβι-
κώς ...(.24ff.) "Αξιον δε ζητήσαι διατί ττάντοτε μεγεθύνεται ό τταρατατικός;
καΐ εστίν ε'ιττεΐν ότι επειδή ό παρατατικός πλέων εστί κατά την
σημασίαν του ενεστώτας...τούτου χάριν ως ττλεονεκτών κατά την
σημασ'ιαν τον ενεστώτα, πλεονεκτεί καΐ κατά την αρχήν.115 Normally
112
 There may have been a play on έττέκτασις - συντείνω: cf. pron. 27,25
τείνεται "is lengthened".
It is highly urdikely that the words could mean "words referring to τέλος, are
lengthened". Apart from the intrinsic improbability of the existence of such a
rule, it is nowhere attested. Nor do I believe that our sentence can possibly
refer to the lengthening of last-but-one syllables. Τα έτα, τέλους συντε'ινοντα
would be a ridiculously obscure and - again - unparalleled way of expressing
this. Besides, there is an entirely satisfactory and unambiguous terminus
technicus for the same notion, viz. ή παρεδρεύουσα. Cf. παραλήγουσα,
τταρατελευτώσα, παρατελευταία.
113
 Fr. 130f. v. Velzen: Λιμός, ή λεΐψις των επιτηδείων, γίνεται τταρά
το λείπω λείψω λιμός· καί ώφειλε δια διφθόγγου γράφεσθαι· αλλά
συνέτταθεν ή φωνή τω σημαινόμενα», επειδή γαρ ενδειαν δήλοι, τούτου
χάριν και ενδειαν φωνήεντος άνεδέξατο, ως Τρύφων.
114
 Fr. 131 ν. Velzen: ... καΐ εκ του ΰφειλέτης, γέγονε φιλήτης,
έττειδή ενδειαν σημαίνει· ό γαρ κλέπτης ενδειαν ποιεί κτλ. Many examples
are adduced by Lehrs 1865, 321ff. n. 234. Mrs. Rawson adds Varro LL 5.133
(laena quod de lana multa), but there it is not explicitly stated that the addition
quod de lana multa is meant to explain the addition of the letter e (laen- äs
opposed to Ion-.
115
 "The imperfect is always lengthened at the beginning [i.e. in the first
syllable] either by a temporal augment or by a syllabic one...It is worthwhile to
ask why the imperfect is always lengthened. And we can say that since the
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speaking, the imperfect could hardly be considered the result of a real πάθος-
here, the addition of the augment entails a definite change of meaning. But by a
stränge twist in the reasoning this additional meaning in respect of the present
is adduced äs the explanation for the additional element in the word-form.
The grammarians also knew of a less phantastic form of συμπάθεια,116 but
that is immaterial here. Our συμπάθεια της φωνής τω δηλουμένω seems to
be an expansion of the idea of a correspondence between form and meaning
occurring, äs we saw, in the Stoic πρώται φωναί, and in general supposed to
have occurred whenever a word originated. In those cases the form imitated the
meaning envisaged. To a grammarian it may have seemed a small step from such
a correspondence to arrive at an actual influence of meaning on expression.117
imperfect is more in meaning than the present...therefore, because it surpasses
the present in meaning, it also does so in the beginning".
116
 By the term συμπάθεια Apollonius indicates the relationship of, for
instance, consonants belonging to the same type (adv. 157,19: τ is συμπαθέστερου
to δ). The word is also usedror forms which are more closely associated with
each other than with other forms belonging to the same paradigm (συζυγία,
ακολουθία) (cf. chapter II sections 1.2. and 2.3.1.). Thus, Apollonius remarks
that genitive and dative are sympathetic (synt. 42,3ff.; adv. 173,16; cf. e.g.
MichSync. § 126, 981) äs opposed to nominative, accusative and vocative, which
have a συμπάθεια of their own. The same holds for present and imperfect tenses
compared with perfect and pluperfect (adv. 173,15). In the correlative adjectives
and adverbs there is συμπάθεια between the interrogative and "anaphoric"
(indefinite relative) correlatives (πότερος, όπότερος (adv. 173,19f.)) and the
relative and "antapodotic" ones respectively (δφρα, τόφρα (adv. 173,21)).
Apollonius argues that because the correlative adverbs belong together in pairs,
the existence of οφρα does not entail that of *πόφρα and *όπόφρα, but only of
τόφρα (adv. 173,14ff.). (Αναφορικά denotes the indefinite relatives (όπως,
όπηνίκα), τα διχά του τ are the relatives (ως, ήνίκα), τα μετά του τ or
τα ανταποδοτικά are the demonstrative correlatives (τώς, τηνίκα etc.), see
Schneider a.1.) The last example he gives is that of the συμπάθεια (προσπάθεια;
cf. 202,8 and 202,13) of local adverbs with a σχέσις εν τόπω and είς τόπον
(i.e. indicating place-where and place-whither respectively) (adv. 202, lf.).
Συμπάθεια means no more than that these forms co-occur (συνυπάρχειν, adv.
173,14 and 18) - i.e. if one of them exists, so does the other (c.q. the others)-
and may sometimes be homonyms: in that case they are συνεμπτώσεις, words in
which two or more forms coincide (cf. chapter II section 3.3.), such äs ώδε,
which means either "here" or "hither" (adv. 202,28ff.). Incidentally, in these cases
of συμπάθεια there are no real πάθη either - in this respect the examples are
parallel to the συμπάθεια of the form and meaning of the imperfect.
117
 Lehrs 1865, 321, takes it that a transfer has been made from the
interjections, where the principle is understandable, to the other parts of speech,
where it is not. The difference between these stages is marked implicitly by
Lehrs, when he assigns the more innocent idea of birds' names being mostly
derived from their respective sounds to the teacher of Trypho, Didymus, and
comments on the next, "fatal" step made by Trypho himself with the words:
"Discipulus eins Trypho iam υπέρ σκάμματα" (322, n. 234). Incidentally, since
the word συμπάθεια is not found in the context of Didymus' etymologies, I
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However, many a Stoic probably would not have approved of such a procedure at
all. To them the idea that a σώμα showed συμπάθεια with an ασώματου ought
to have been anathema.118 For how can something incorporeal produce such an
effect? Although some Stoics may have taken a less severe view, I do not think
this theory can be connected with the Stoa in any extant source (see below,
note 133).119
Before discussing a possible connection with the Stoa, however, I must first
say a word about Wackernagel's Interpretation of the συμπάθεια-phenomenon.120
According to him, the principle means that, once a word's original meaning has
been gradually changed and thus obscured, that word will be increasingly liable
to further corraption. He believes this to be the only Interpretation to explain
the use of συμπάθεια, for in the alternative view discussed above (meaning
influences form), there is no πάθος of the meaning at all for a formal πάθος
to correspond with; rather, the meaning of the word involved constitutes such a
πάθος by itself.121 Now, some support for this Interpretation may indeed be
prefer to compare his observations with the theory of the ττρώται φωνα'ι
(onomatopoeic wprds) and keep them out of the discussion of συμπάθεια.
If my Interpretation of the τηλοΰ-passage is correct, Lehrs (324 n.) is wrong in
finding only one comparable case in Apollonius, namely pron. 27,27 (his reference
is incorrect), where it is asked how it comes about that τις can be a
monosyllabic noun with a short vowel, and Apollonius - after having remarked
that this is no serious objection to its being a noun since this reflects only on
the form, not on the meaning - suggests: ίσως δε καΐ ή σύντομος της
ττεΰσεως άνάκρισις το μακρόν ι παρητήσατο (i.e. τ'ις by itself constitutes a
short question). Does Schneider a.l. confiise άνάκρισις and άττόκρισις?
It should be noticed that in both cases Apollonius somewhat hesitatingly
introduces his explanation by means of μήττοτε and ίσως respectively.
118
 Cf. SVF I 518 where the fact that ψυχή is a σώμα is deduced from
the existence of συμπάθεια between body and soul: έτι δε ό Κλεάνθης φησ'ιν
ουδέν άσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, ουδέ άσωμάτω σώμα, άλλα σώμα
σώματι. Cf. SVF II790; 791.
119
 Frede 1977, 68f. draws attention to the fact that in the matter of the
exact nature of the relationship between σημαινόμενα and σημαίνοντα
considerable confusion seems to have set in.
120
 1876, 29f.
121
 1876, 29: 5z enim πάθος idem in notionem atque in formam cadit,
formae vero πάθος in ένδεια formae antea plenae inferenda positum fuit,
etiam notionis πάθος ad ενδειαν notioni ab hac antea alienae addendam
pertinuerit necesse est. Quod certe absurdum est. Namque et λείπω et ήμισυ
iam per se inopiam exprimunt. Wackernagel's Latin deserves to be translated even
if it is quoted in a footnote only: "For if the meaning is affected by the same
pathos äs the form [which is necessary for the word συμπάθεια to be apt, I.S.],
but the pathos of the form lies in the introduction of ένδεια, 'deficiency', of a
form which was complete before, it is necessary that the pathos of the meaning,
too, refers to a deficiency attaching to the meaning, which formerly was
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found,122 but Wackernagel builds a most unsatisfactory case, since the
application of bis Interpretation to the examples is unconvincing,323 and the only
untouched by it. This, certainly, is absurd. For λείττω äs well äs ήμισυ already
express the deficiency by themselves."
122
 Several cases can be adduced where a form which has already
undergone a ττάθος is by the same token found liable to further pathological
changes, e.g. ApD. coni. 234, If. τα ττάθη τοις τύττσις συνεκτρέχει; synt. 67,11.
Most important perhaps, because attributed to Trypho, is ApD. coni. 232,14ff. The
question is whether εκητι is an adverb or a conjunction. There are severe
objections to both possibilities. Apollonius criticizes Trypho: "Εδει τον
Τρύφωνα και την φωνήν καταστήσαι του εκητι, εΐ όλως δύναται τη
εκών τταρακεΐσθαι. και φησιν ότι, "καθό ήλογήθη ή φωνή, δύναται
έττίρρημα καθίστασθαι, ήλογημένον εν τη τάσει, καθότι και εν αυτή
τη φωνή". The general idea is that since the form cannot be explained
rationally anyway, the anomalous accent should not be taken to count for much.
(Incidentally, Apollonius fully agrees with this view, cf. coni. 234, If. cited above
and adv. 135,llff. τταν σχήμα λέξεως, την ομοιότητα των -προκειμένων
μορίων άττοβαλόν εν ττάθει, εις τον τόνον μεταβάλλεται τον δυνάμενον
την ομοιότητα του ττάθους άναδέξασθαι. This characteristically Condensed
sentence means that "every word-form, which äs a result of pathos is no longer
similar to earlier [i.e. originally parallel] forms (for των προκειμένων μορίων,
135,11, see Schneider, comm. a.1) receives another accent, which agrees with
those forms which the word in question resembles after having undergone the
pathos"; Cf. 138,lOf. This rule would indeed apply especially well to the text of
Homer, since its accentuation dates from the time of Aristarchus, and is a
mixture of older and younger forms. The younger ones comply with
(Aristarchean) cpntemporary rules.) In this case, however, Apollonius, of course,
immediately objects that εκητι could then just äs well be a conjunction-
Trypho's argument is invalid. The whole passage deals with elements of the
expression, φωνή, only.
Other examples are SchHom. A 81 where an unusual σύνθεσις brings about an
unusual accent; Theogn. Gramer AO II 162,3ff.: different accent explained by four
other anomalies; Hdn. GG III ii 922,17ff. anomalous gender responsible for a
deviant declination. In all these cases one formal exception brings about another
one. It is only twice that I have found the explicit idea of a divergent meaning
explaining a formal aberration: Et. M. 806,9ff. it is stated about χαμαζε: καΐ
ως διήλλαξε ττρός τα αλλά ττερι το σημαινόμενον, διήλλαξε καΐ ττερί τον
τόνον - not a very illuminating example since the meaning ascribed to e.g.
Άθήναζε is "άττ" Αθηνών". The other example is Choer. GG IV i 388,15ff.
where it is remarked that ιδού, ιού and ου are exceptional, since they are
the only adverbs in -ου with a different meaning frpm either a local one or that
of a quantity. This is taken to account for their divergent accentuation äs well;
see chapter IV section 6.3.2.1.
123
 The examples are λιμός, "hunger", deriving from λείττω, "to leave
behind", by means of a loss of letters which corresponds to the nption of
ένδεια inherent in λείττω; and ήμικύκλιον, which I have already discussed.
Wackernagel says (o.e. 30): Quam enirn linquendi fatnes, quam partis dimidiae sella
excitat memoriam? Whereas bis point, though weak, may be upheld in the case of
λιμός, his taking ήμικύκλιον primarily äs the name of a kind of chair is
completely unconvincing to me, the more so since no allusion to the fact that we
are supposed to Interpret the word in this way can be found in the context. As
far äs I can see, there is nothing to prevent ήμικύκλιον from having its
primary meaning of "half-circle" here.
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text he adduces in Support of his claim is irrelevant in this respect.124 His only
point is, therefore, that the meaning, too, should be affected for the notion of
συμπάθεια to be apt. But I do not think this is necessary at all; I see no
objection to the use of συμπάθεια if the πάθος is the meaning, and affects the
φωνή. The latter is thus sympathetically affected by the former.
Now, the grammarians may actually have thought they had some Stoic
authority for their use of συμπάθεια,125 since συμπάθεια plays a not
unimportant role in Stoic philosophy äs "das naturgemässe Zusammentreffen
gewisser Vorgänge in den verschiedenen Teilen der Welt",126 for instance the
influence of the moon on the tides.127 Thus, it is a manifestation of an
"organicistic"128 world view and it is in the first place a physical phenomenon,
affecting σώματα (see above, section 23.). As such, it is used to prove that the
soul is a σώμα - since otherwise no συμπάθεια between body and soul could
exist.12^ This means that what we would call psychological sympathetic influence,
124
 He cites GG III ii 247,19ff. (Et. M. 148,8ff.): άρπεδόεσσα· ή άγαν
πεδινή κατά συγκοπήν παρά το άρί συγκειμένη, ττέπονθε δε, ϊνα μη
σημαίνηται ή άγαν ομαλός οδό?· όδοϋ γαρ εστίν επιθέτου.. .ούτως
Ήρωδιαυός καΐ Δίδυμος and remarks (1876, 30) Etiam hie πάθος ad
notionem refertur, sed ita ut multo distinctius, quid auctpr voluerit, discemi
possit: collatis enim quae statim sequuntur apparet, Herodianum vocabulo άρί
nullam omnino vim tribuisse indeque elisionem του ι repetiisse. The sentence to
which Wackernagel refers, runs thus: πέπονθε δε δμως τω έρθΰρις
Αίολικώς, έρ'ιθυρις γαρ ή μεγάλη θυρ'ις. Here έρί clearly is supposed to
have meaning, and that none other than its normal emphatic one: it is duly
paraphrased by means of μεγάλη. Quite apart from this, Wackernagel's forced
efforts to keep μη in the text make the whole sentence unintelligible. The text
may be accepted after deleting μη and (preferably) the first πέπονθε δε,
Lobeck's solution mentioned by Wackernagel 1876, 30 n. 1.
125
 It should be stressed from the Start, however, that the συμπάθεια-
theory cannot be taken to apply to words like εγώ, of which we have a
Chrysippean etymology, and in this way be directly associated with the Stoa.
Here, äs in its Latin follow-up by P. Nigidius (Gellius NA X 4), no πάθη are ex-
plained at all, but εγώ is held to show an original natural relationship between
its form and meaning, because in pronouncing the word we more or less point
our lips towards ourselves. The word συμπάθεια is nowhere applied to πρώται
φωνα'ι. I find Dahlmann 1964, 9 highly confusing in assigning this etymology of
εγώ to the συμπάθεια- theory. He is, however, entirely correct in pointing out
the context of this etymology; it is used äs corrobprative evidence for the fact
that the ήγεμονικόν is situated in the heart, not in the head, for it is at the
heart, c.q. the ehest our lower lip points when we pronounce the first syllable of
εγώ. Etymology, therefore, has consequences in ethics.
126
 Zeller 1923, 172f.; cf. 171 n. 2; a large collection of places is to be
found in Pease on Cic. de div. 2,34.
127
 Cic. de div. 2,34.
128
 Cf. v. Raalte 1988, 194; 205ff., for the influence of Theophrastus on
this point.
32 129 SJ/F 1518; II 790; 791.
which can make us resemble someone other than our physical parents, may also
be reduced to a physical phenomenon.130 Pease remarks that here, äs in other
fields, Stoic theory was applied to furnish justification of populär superstitions;
for instance, συμπάθεια came to be acknowledged äs a principle of medicine
and divination.131
The occurrence of the "real" Stoic notion of συμπάθεια combined with the
sometimes confusing effects of the Stoic theory of etymology, may well have
brought Trypho to his singular step - for he seems to be responsible for this
development. On the other hand, Lehrs links the whole affair explicitly with the
Stoa,132 because he finds examples of the συμπάθεια της φωνής τω
δηλουμένω in Varro and Seneca.133 However, I do not find his examples
convincing.
130 5j/p· ii 753 (τι·
ω
ς άλλοις γίνονται όμοιοι öl γεννώμενοι καΐ ου
τοις γονεϋσιν;) 01 Στωϊκοί συμπάθεια της διανοίας.
131
 L.L 412. Much later, the Neo-Platonists, first of all Plotinus, gave
συμπάθεια an almost universal application. Cf. A. Bouche-Leclerq, Histoire de la
divination dans l'Antiquite, Paris 1879 (New York 1975), 82ff.
132
 1882, 322 n.
133
 Ibid. One Varronic example concerns the explanation of the word vallum
by means of the resemblance of the letter V to the forked sticks that are used
to fortify a vallum (LL V 117) - this is not really an example of the phenomenon
we are investigating presently, but goes one step further on the downhill path to
perdition - it belongs in the category where there is allegedly a resemblance
between the written form of a word (shape of letters, form of accent) and the
meaning of the word - for examples, see Lehrs, /./. and cf. chapter IV section
6.3.2.1.; the second example ascribed to Varro is Apul. de diphthong. § 25:
saeculum per e breve deberet notari, quoniam a sequor, vel ut placet Varroni, a
sene derivatum est. sed quia rem productissimam designabat, placuit ut eius
principalis syllaba significationis causa produceretur et per diphthongum plane
dignosceretur. However, this example cannot with certainty be considered
Varronian, because it is not clear how far the quotation runs. It might äs well
be the derivation from senex only that Apuleius found in Varro. This leaves us
with the passage from Seneca (quaestnat. II 56): Dicimus enim ut splendere sie
fulgere. At illis (antiquis) ad significandum hanc e nubibus subitae lucis
eruptionem mos erat media syllaba correpta ut dicerent fulgere (older Latin:
fulgere; classical: fulgere). In this case, firstly, correpta does not necessarily
refer to a change in the original pronunciation (the original word could have
imitated the "thing meant") and if it does, I do not think this is Stoic
"orthodoxy", if such a thing ever existed.
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3.2. Σημαΐνον and τυγχάνον
Ιί we consider once more the possible relationships between σημαίνοντα,
σημαινόμενα and τυγχάνοντα,134 we may say that of these three, σημαινόμενα
and τυγχάνοντα lack a direct one-to-one correspondence:135 A λεκτόυ, which
may be a bearer of truth and falsity, is not identical with the referents involved
in the state of affairs expressed in the sentence. Σημαίνοντα and σημαινόμενα
have a quite complicated connection, not only in the case of those words which
still clearly show traces of their origins, but also in those where ττάθη of
various kinds have left their marks.136 The relationship between σημαίνοντα and
τυγχάνοντα has hardly been discussed so far. In the strictest sense there is
none, considering the intermediary function of the σημαινόμενα.137 Nevertheless
there is a text which suggests the existence of this very correspondence between
σημαίνοντα and τυγχάνοντα. However, this may be due to some mis-
understanding of the Stoic theories. But I must again stress the possibility that
the confusion originated within the Stoa.
In those first words "which imitate the things",138 it is not quite clear
which elements of the triad are involved. When the first words denote sounds,
σημαινόμενον and τύγχαναν seem to coincide. This may explain Augustine's
distinction of a category of words in which there is a resemblance of word to
thing in tactus:^9 Mg^ quam suaviter res ipsa gustum, tarn suaviter nomen
tangit auditum ... lana et vepres, ut audiuntur verba, sie illa tanguntur.140 In
134
 The lack of direct sources forces us to tread carefully here.
135
 It is this fact which forms one of the major differences between the
Stoic and Aristotelian theories on the relationship of language and reality, cf.
Forschner 1981, 76ff.; Nuchelmans 1973, 54f.; SVF II 168 (Ammon. in Ar. Int.
CAG 4,5,17,24ff.:) ττρότερον ήμας ό'Αριστοτέλης διδάσκει δια τούτων, τίνα
εστί τα προηγουμένως και -προσεχώς ΰττ' αυτών [sc. ονομάτων και
ρημάτων] σημαινόμενα, και δτι τα νοήματα, δια δε τούτων μέσων τα
•πράγματα, καΐ ουδέν έτερον δει τταρά ταϋτα έττινοείν μέσον του τε
νοήματος και του πράγματος, δττερ οι άττό της Στοας υποτιθέμενοι
λεκτόν ήξ'ιουν όνομάζειν. In Plato an intermediary between sound and the
things themselves is also lacking, cf. Banvick 1957, 76.
136
 Pinborg 1962, 156 talks about the "Isomorphie zwischen sprachlichem
Inhalt und Ausdruck".
137
 Cf. Pinborg/./.
138
 Origen c. Cels. 18.
139
 Dial 6 Pinborg.
140
 "Just äs honey itself affects the taste pleasantly, so its name, 'mel',
affects the hearing smoothly ... Just äs the words 'lana' (wool) and 'vepres'
(brambles) are heard, so the things themselves are feit" (transl. B. Darrell
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theory, the Stoics cannot have held such a view, because here clearly a
correspondence is described between the somatic thing, the object in the outer
world, i.e. the τυγχάυου, and the expression. This is evident from the fact that
here mel, lana and vepres ττοιοϋσιν, they touch, c.q. are touched. The neglect of
the role of the σημαινόμενον seems most un-Stoic, however risky this kind of
arguments may be.
Now, although Augustine is not uncritical of Stoic etymology, there is no
reason to assume he is consciously misrepresenting their theories here.141 The
origin of the confusion is easy to find (words denoting sounds) and we can,
moreover, trace this pari of the theory to one of the fragments of Varro, who
was one of Augustine's main sources on etymology: fr. 113 G.-S. runs thus:
syllabae ... aliae sunt asperae aliae leves, aliae procer<a>e, alias retomdae, aliae
barbarae aliae Graeculae, aliae durae aliae molles: asperae sunt, ut trux c/za142
trans; leves, ut lana luna; procerae sunt quae vocalem longam extremam habent
aut paenultimam, ut facilitas; retomdae sunt quae mutam habent extremam, ut
hie hoc; barbarae sunt, ut gaza; Graeculae, ut hymnos Zenon; durae, ut ignotus;
molles, ut aedes.14^ It is clear that Varro is drawing up a rather impressionistic
inventory of the sound effects of syllables.144 His examples show, however, that
Jackson).
141
 His critical attitude appears from dial. 6: De origine verbi quaeritur,
cum quaeritur unde ita dicatur, res mea sententia nimis curiosa et minus
necessana ... Quod si omnino multum iuvaret explicare originem verbi, ineptum
esset aggredi quod persequi profecto infinitum est. Quis enim repenre possit,
quidquid dictum fuerit unde ita dictum sit? According to Augustine the general
lines on which a word is to be derived will in most cases be clear to everyone,
provided we know what the word means. Only the details will probably remain
controversial - but these are irrelevant anyway. On the other hand, sometimes
the origin of a word is so completely obscure that we should not fester any
hope of ever being able to explain it. ...[originem verbi] persequi non quidem
ultra soni similitudinem possumus, sed hoc non semper utique possumus. Innu-
merabilia sunt enim verba, quorum origo, de qua ratio reddi possit, aut non est,
ut ego arbiträr, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt (II). _
But there is no trace of irony or doubt in the descnption we are dealmg with
now, of the ways in which words may be related to their meanings.
142
 Also one of Augustine's examples.
143
 "Some syllables are harsh, others smooth, some are extended, others
shrivelled, some are barbarian, others half-Greek, some are hard, others soft.
Harsh are e.g. trux crux trans; smooth: lana luna; extended are those syllables
that have a long last or penultimate vowel, like facilitas. Shrivelled are those
that end in a mute consonant, like hie hoc. Barbarian is e.g. gaza; half-Greek,
hymnos Zenon; hard, ignotus; soft, aedes." The fragment comes from Varro de
grammatica (disciplinarum Über I).
144
 Cf. already PL Crat. on the sound-effect of'letters', e.g. 426clff.
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he did not mean to establish a relationship between meaning (or, for that matter,
τυγχάνον) and sound here. It is hard to see how aedes could be called mollis in
any other way than because of its sound. The same objection holds, for instance,
for the asperitas of Irans and especially for the "retorriditas" of hie and hoc,
but the fact that Graeculae and barbarae are mentioned in the same context is
decisive: Here Varro clearly means those words which have a foreign phonetic
structure, because they contain the un-Latin sounds z and y. Therefore I
suggest that Augustine has been guilty of a little Hineininterpretieren.
3.3. Comic effects
There is another text which suggests a relationship between σημαίνον and
τυγχάνον. I add it because it shows how morsels of grammatical wisdom were
employed in a humorous context. Anth.Pal. XI 383 (Palladas) laments the fate of
a donkey that has fallen in the hands of a grammarian:145
THv αρά καΐ κάνθωσι Τύχη χαλεπή τε καΐ έσθλή,
καΐ Κρόνος ώρονομεί τετραπόδων γένεσιν.
έξότε γαρ καΐ τοΰτον δνον χαλεπός χρόνος εσχεν,
εξ άλαβαρχε'ιης γραμματικού γέγονεν.
τλήθι φέρειν λοιττόν, κανθήλιε· γραμματικοί? γαρ
ουδέ τέλος κριθή, κρί δε μόνον λέγεται146.
Kpl was one of the examples the grammarians usually adduced for
αποκοπή in Homer.147 Other examples are δω for δώμα, and μάψ for
μαψιδίως. The implication of the grammarians' habit of shortening the form of
the word κριθή, is apparently that an equivalent reduction of the donkey's
rations of real κριθή is to be expected. Here, äs in Augustine, it is a
relationship between σημαίνον and τυγχάνον that is alluded to. However, we
may freely acquit the author of this little epigram of any attempt at conscious
theorizing.
145
 For more epigrams in which grammatical theory and grammarians are
made fun of, cf. Sluiter 1988b.
146
 "So for mokes, too, there is sinister and good Fortune, and Saturn rules
the nativities of beasts also; for ever since evil time befeil this donkey, it has
become a grammarian's instead of being in the alabarch's palace. But bear it
patiently henceforth, donkey; for grammarians crithe (barley) has no end, but is
called only cri." (transl. W.R. Paton).
147
 It was so used ever since Ar. Poet. 1458a4f.; cf. Ennius' joke gau ( =
gaudium),Ann. 574 Vahlen.
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4. Condusion
In this chapter I briefly discussed the first Symptoms of linguistic
awareness in ancient Greece. From the first, linguistic thought took a great
interest in the meaning of words. Early manifestations of this interest were, for
instance, the simple explanation of difficult words in Homer and other poets, or
the study of apparent Synonyms. In this first stage the study of language always
served some ulterior end. It was related to the study of the poets and a
rhetorical interest (Protagoras in Plato) or to philosophy (Socrates in Plato; P.
Derveni).
A marked interest in matters linguistic was found in the Stoa. It was shown
that theirs was a tightly coherent System, the consequences of their views on
the rationality and original perfection of the universe being worked out for all
three major parts of their philosophy. Therefore, their linguistic observations
can never be understood out of context.
The Stoics held that originally language was in a perfect state, words and
meanings Standing in a one-to-one relationship. The later corruptions of
language, which obscured the trae meaning of the words, could be remedied by
the study of etymology. It was a necessary presupposition of etymology that the
meaning of the words was left intact, whatever happened to their forms.
Although it is clear enough how the Stoa envisaged the original state of
language, it is uncertain how they thought this original state had come about.
After an account of the Stoic theory of meaning, with its tripartition into
σημαινόμενα, σημαίνοντα and τυγχάνοντα, we turned to some of the effects of
these views on later grammatical theory. Although the principle of a strict
Separation of form and meaning was adopted in later grammar and may be
considered a truly Stoic inheritance, we saw that grammar also went its own
way and developed some of the principles it had taken over, in a quite un-Stoic
way. This should warn us not to regard a theory äs philosophical, just because it
developed from philosophical origins. The aims of philosophy and later grammar
no longer coincided. The original, philosophical drift of a concept was not
necessarily alive any longer - different questions produced different answers.
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Chapter II - APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS
0. Introduction
Since it is not my intention to write a formal history of grammar, I shall
omit quite a large period. I shall not deal with the exact nature and extent of
the grammatical knowledge possessed by Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarch
and their immediate successors. Grammar in Antiquity had a hard time freeing
itself from the strangling embrace of other disciplines, first and foremost from
philosophy and rhetoric, but also from the literary involvement with the ancient
writers. Grammar was never autonomous in Antiquity, when the central role of
grammar in education almost forced it to be non-specialistic.1
After Frede 1977 for instance, Taylor (1986, 175; 187) again drew attention
to the discontinuity in the development of "grammar". Instead of a fluent
continuum of one new insight evolving from the last and leading on to the next,
we are confronted over the centuries with different groups of people, pursuing
different objects and obtaining different results, wbich nevertheless somehow or
other contribute to the whole of grammatical knowledge.
It is very hard to see what happens between the third and first centuries
B.C., our sources being in a far from ideal state. What is clear, however, is that
from its philosophical, rhetorical and philological origins there slowly emerges a
grammatical System, even fit to be Condensed into a schematic form in the
interest of school-practice.2 The correctness of language, which, under different
aspects, was an object of study to philosophers (όρθοέττεια), orators
1
 Incidentally, medicine underwent a partly comparable development. The
relationship, especially the epistemological one, between medicine and grammar is
a recurring feature of the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, e.g. 2,4ff.; 110,26ff; cf.
Horstmanshoff 1987, 346 who points out that in the later Empire grammarians,
rhetors, philosophers and doctors were looked upon äs belonging to the same
branche; see further Schrijvers 1987, 374. Although there always was a strong
anti-theoretical medical tradition (doctors äs craftsmen), the rnore scientific
approach strongly emphasi/ed the philosophical and rhetorical aspects of
medicine, from which it derived its Status. The result was that medicine
eventually had to emancipate itself again from philosophy (äs in humoral
pathology) and rhetoric (äs in the prognosis). This was not effected until long
after Antiquity (Horstmanshoff 1987, 433f.).
2
 For some grammatical papyri, cf. Wouters 1979: P. Yale 446v. is dated to
the first Century A.D. (ibid. 47-60) äs is P. Heid. 197 (ibid. 125-34). For the
papyri äs representatives of grammatical handbooks, cf. ibid. 42 and Fuhrmann
1960, 29-34; 145-55 (on the Techne ascribed to Dionysius Thrax).
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(ελληνισμός) and philologists (διόρθωσις)3 became an important element in the
τεχνικόν, which was either an independent pari of the γραμματική τέχνη or
one of its όργανα or "tools".4 Grammar - at least in theory - became a
discipline in its own right. In practice however, the ties with its three mother-
sciences were too tight to be radically severed.
There are no grammatical source-texts of a reasonable extension until
Varro, who is a highlight, be it an idiosyncratic one.5 His place in the history of
ancient linguistics still requires further clarification.6 For the rest, we have
names and fragments, but hardly anything substantial, until we are offered more
than a glimpse of a grammarian who is generally recognized äs representing a
new stage in the whole development: Apollonius Dyscolus.
The work of Apollonius (and, to a lesser extent, that of his son Herodian)
illustrates a period in the history of grammar in which the influence of
philosophy and philology in particular, should still not be underrated - it makes
itself feit on nearly every page. However, it forms the background to their work,
rather than its aim. Far from being a Stoic philosopher doing technical grammar
äs a sideline, Apollonius is a grammarian whose work is based on scientific
principles which happen to be philosophical in origin. The exact philosophical
drift of the concepts and ideas he employs, is alive no longer - not at least to
the grammarians - and it is certainly not productive: The eventual outcome of
Apollonius' studies was not necessarily in accordance with Stoic tenets, even if
their starting-points were. With this one proviso, it is indeed impossible to
distinguish technical from philosophical grammar in this period.7
Nor can Apollonius be considered a philologist whose grammatical inquiries
serve only to solve literary problems. The purpose of his work is not only to
provide an Instrument for the study of the poets,8 especially Homer, although
3
 Cf. Siebenborn 1976, 24; Ax 1979, 304.
4
 Siebenborn 1976, 33.
5
 Although even the extent of his idiosyncrasy is difficult to establish with
certainty.
6
 Although excellent work has been done already by e.g. Dahlmann 1964,
Fehling 1956/7 and especially Taylor 1974.
7
 Blank 1983a, 59: "The Stoic System is not opposed to technical grammar
in Antiquity, but lies at its very roots" (contra e.g. Preller 1864, 101 and
Gudemann, Pauly-Wissowa RE VII1780-1811).
8
 Cf. chapter I note 19.
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this is important.9 His ambition is to provide a framework for the solution of
those problems äs well which arise out of everyday usage, by giving a general
theory of grammatical regularity.10
His contribution to the emancipation of grammar is an important one,
because elements of varying provenance are united into one clearly worked-out
System, designed äs an Instrument for problem-solving. Moreover, he seems to be
quite aware of the fact that bis approach to grammar is different from that of
both his philosophical and his philological predecessors. For in stressing the
fact that the scope of syntax extends to all kinds of linguistic usage, not just
that of the poets (cf. n. 10), he consciously sets himself apart from the
philologists. But he also notices that many philosophical ideas are irrelevant to
grammatical studies - even though he freely recognizes his debt to the Stoics.11
The thread connecting him to his predecessors äs well äs to his successors
is at the same time the unifying element in his views of language: the absorbing
relevance of semantics. Blank (1982, 23) believes "that Apollonius Dyscolus put
semantic considerations at the very heart of his syntactical theory". In fact, to
Apollonius' mind, this so-called "syntactical" theory would probably not differ in
any fundamental sense from a semantic theory, syntax being nothing more than
the exterior representation of combined meanings. Although in practice the result
is a combination of words, i.e. combinations on the level of the expression, the
9
 Cf. e.g. synt. 2,lf. την εκ τούτων (sc. των φωνών) γινομένην
σΰνταξιν' εις' καταλληλότητα του αυτοτελούς λόγου, ην -πάνυ ττροήρημαι,
άναγκαιοτάτην ουσαν τφός έξήγησιν των ποιημάτων. Here syntax is
considered a diorthotic (philological) Instrument. Siebenborn 1976, 34, perhaps
underrates the importance of the philological aspect of Apollonius' work, when
he describes it äs a "Spezialschrift zu [einer Teil] des Hellenismos", i.e. a
specialistic study devoted to a part of a part (viz. ελληνισμός) of the τεχνικόν
of grammar.
10
 See Lange 1852a, 3f. note 6; Blank 1982, 10; 53. Cf. e.g. synt. 51,7ff.;
183 14ff εις γαρ το τοιούτο τα της συντάξεως απεδείχθη, 'ίνα και τα
λεληθότα των ΰττερβατών, οντά καΐ κατά το σύνηθες, εχηται του
ακολούθου λόγου, καΐ μη μόνον τα τταρά ττοιηταις ως εξαίρετα τις
ΰττολαμβάνοι; 413,13ff. χρή ουν νοειν ως ου μόνον ττοιητικη αδεία εν
ελλείψει λέξεων καταγίνεται, άλλα και συνήθεις λόγοι.
11
 Cf. coni. 213,8ff. öl δε καΐ όνόμασιν άλλοτρίοις ττροσχρησάμενρι
ηττερ τοις εις γραμματικήν συντείνουσι, Στώικάς τταρεισφέρουσι δόξας, ων
ή τταράδοσις ουκ άγαν χρειώδης ττρός την εις γραμματικήν συντείνουσαν
τεχνολογίαν See coni. 214,2f. for his recognition of his indebtedness to the Stoa.
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explanation for these combinations is always sought on the level of meaning,
syntax being a function of semantics, no more.121 shall return to this later.
In studying Apollonius Dyscolus the modern distinctions between phonology,
morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics should recede into the background.
Apollonius took over the Stoic bipartition of form and meaning, the latter
incorporating at least the last three modern categories mentioned above. It is
amusing to read how modern grammarians defend their views on the importance
of meaning in the face of the Champions of autonomous syntax and to realize
that we are just about back where we started. To give just one very recent
example: how Apollonius would have approved of Mrs. Wierzbicka's words (1988,
1): "If semantics is to be defined äs a study of meaning encoded in natural
language, then syntax is simply one pari of semantics".13 The important
difference between Apollonius Dyscolus and Mrs. Wierzbicka is, of course, that in
Apollonius' day autonomous syntax was quite unimaginable, although some people
took a different view on the respective relevance of form and meaning.14
In the first part of this chapter I will pay attention to some key-notions
from the work of Apollonius and discuss a number of relevant passages.
Apollonius regards language äs a hierarchical structure (1.1.), whose various
levels have a symmetrical construction (isomorphism. 1.2.).
Language may be studied from its formal side or from a semanto-syntactical
aspect. The latter is intrinsically more important, since it is not liable to
corruption. Linguistic regularity means that all words of a sentence stand in the
appropriate relationships to one another from both a syntactic and a semantic
point of view. These rwo aspects merge into the notion of καταλληλότης. Correct
usage may refute (έλέγγειν) wrong usage, either in daily conversation or in a
literary context (1.3.).
If one studies language and understands its underlying principles, even
difficultly discernible mistakes may be detected and corrected. The combination
12
 Cf. Blank 1982, 28ff., esp. 35 syntax is a part of the 'έννοια of a word;
Skrzecka 1853, 15; ApD. synt. 1,2-2,1 (where this is implicitly indicated by means
of the Opposition to the φωνεά); adv. 128,13.
13
 See also Wierzbicka 1988, 3: "Grammar is not semantically arbitrary. On
the contrary, grammatical distinctions are motivated (in the synchronic sense) by
semantic distinctions." This should be compared with Blank 1982, 34f., describing
how in Apollonius all elements in a syntactic analysis should correspond to
elements in a semantic one. Within certain parts of speech, semantic distinctions
are made which have syntactic consequences: "The implication is ... that such
distinctions are syntactically relevant, because they are semantically relevant:
they affect the "έννοια." Seebelow, section 1.3.
14
 See section 1.4.4., with note 100.
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of a rationalistic, logical approach to language and a close adherence to observed
linguistic fact is a characteristic of Apollonius' inethod that is related to the
Stoic methodological principles. Apollonius uses two sets of criteria to decide in
matters of correct or wrong linguistic usage, one derived from textual criticism,
the other from the study of ελληνισμός. He integrales these approaches into a
new genre of grammatical work. His method of expressing καταλληλότης in a kind
of word-pictures of the corresponding λεκτά creates a new context in which
there is a one-to-one correspondence between λεκτόν and expression; here, too,
Apollonius borrows from the Stoa (1.4.).
In the second part of this chapter I will investigate how Apollonius puts
these principles into practice in his work on adverbs.
The third and last part deals with the concept of μερισμός, the
assignment of words to the various parts of speech. Here, I shall discuss the
phenomena of μετάληψις (translation) and συυέμτπωσις (coincidence).
-Z. Apollonius on the structure of language; hierarchy and isomorphism
l.l.Hierarchy
Apollonius strongly believes in the basic orderliness and logic of language.15
This appears quite markedly in the very beginning of his main work, the Syntax.
Here, Apollonius extensively discusses the hierarchical structure of language16
and the isomorphism, the internal stractural resemblance of the several levels
(letter/elementary sound, syllable, word, (τταρεττόμενα, "accidentia" of the parts
of speech), sentence).17 No doubt he shows the influence of the Stoa here. It is
noteworthy in this respect to mention, apart from the well-known passage from
Diogenes Laertius,18 the fact that Chrysippus was allegedly the first to use the
term στοιχείου not only for a letter, but also for a λέξις. In this way he
15
 See especially Blank 1982, passim. Blank's work was an important source
of Inspiration for this chapter.
16
 A hierarchical structuring was a Standard principle of Organisation in
ändern textbooks, cf. Fuhrmann 1960, 122; Holtz 1981, 55. Holtz 1981, 59
ultimately traces this principle back to PL Crat. 424c5-425a and considers it an
elementary didactic method.
17
 Cf. Priscian III 108,9f.; Priscian closely follows the work of Apollonius
and Herodian, cf. e.g. II l,lff.
18
 About the hierarchical structure in the discussion of the τόττος ττερί
φωυής, D.L. VII 56ff.; see Egli 1967, 56f., Sluiter 1988a, 48 n. 6.
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indicates the similarity of the relationship between letter19 and λέξις to that
between λέξις and λόγος.20
This is exactly what Apollonius describes. Στοιχεια (letters) do not enter
έτνιττλοκα'ι at random, but εν τη κατά το δέον συντάξει (synt. 2,5).21 In
this way syllables come into existence, for which the same rule holds good. They
form words, which in turn enter constructions on the basis of το κατάλληλον
(regulär semantic and syntactic congruence) and so, finally, the αυτοτελής
λόγος is formed (synt. 2,8ff.). For upon each word a νοητόν is, äs it were,
grafted, a meaning that can be thought, which functions äs a στοιχείον ... του
λόγου (synt. 2,11). The parallelism between these elements, which stand in a
climbing hierarchical order, is emphasized by the explicit comparison which
follows (synt. 2,llff.): και ως τα στοιχεία τάς συλλαβάς άττοτελεϊ κατά τάς
έτΓίττλοκάς, ούτω και ή σύνταξις των νοητών τρόττον τινά συλλαβάς
άττοτελέσει δια της έΐΓίττλοκης των λέξεων, καΐ έτι δν τρόπον εκ των
19
 Στοιχεϊον for letter (äs a synonym pf γράμμα) is much older. It is
frequent in Plato, who makes Socrates say in the Phaedrus (274d2) that the
γράμματα are an invention of the Egyptian Theuth and in the Philebus that
Theuth was the one who called the letters στοιχεία on the basis, it may be
added, of their function (18c6). The alleged reason for the distinction of the
letters was to create an intermediary stage between the essential unity of φωνή
on the one band, and its multiplicity and infiniteness on the other. For letters
can be counted and thus represent "number". The use of στοιχείον may serve to
stress the structural function of the element, in casu the letter; cf. D.L. VII 56
της δε λέξεως στοιχειά εστί τα ε'ικοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. Maybe the term
στοιχείον originally referred to the letters äs members of the alphabet, rather
than of the words; in the same way λέξις originally was any φωνή έναρθρος
rather than a specific word from a specific sentence, cf. chapter I n. 91.
However, this makes no difference for the hierarchical build-up of the System.
For the importance of writing in ancient grammatical theory (leading· to the use
of letter, where we would have expected sound), see Desbordes 1987; for
convenience's sake I shall nevertheless refer to the formal level of language by
the terms phonological, morphological etc.
Notice that the possibility of writing a word is connected with its being
"articulate", cf. chapter IV section 3.2.1.
20
 Galen, de placit. Hipp, et Plato. VIII 3, 673,3-6; PS. Theodosius (ed.
Goettling) 37,26; Schmidt 1967 (1839), 38; Blink Sterk 1845, 17 n. 3. Cf. ApD.
synt. 2,10l. το ... εξ εκάστης λέξεως τταρυφιστάμενον νοητόν τρόπον τινά
στοιχείον εστί του λόγου.
The comparison between extra-linguistic στοιχεία and linguistic ones is older
still, cf. PL Tht. 201d8ff.; 202e3ff.
21
 "According to proper rules of structural ordering" (transl. Householder).
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συλλαβών ή λέξις, ού'τως εκ της καταλληλότητας των νοητών ό
αυτοτελής λόγος.
22
The correspondence is the following: On the level of the sound-expression
στοιχεία, letters, combine into syllables which combine into words. On the
fundamentally different level of the meaning, the νοητά of the λέξεις combine
into "syllables", which in turn form an αυτοτελής λόγος. Notice that the
meanings are not at once complete; they are but the elements of the
αυτοτελής λόγος. The exact reference of the "syllables" on the level of
meaning is not quite clear. Perhaps the meaning of word-groups is envisaged.
However this may be, the well-formed sentence is built up from νοητά, which
must be combined in the proper way.
This idea can be connected with the Stoic theory of complete and
incomplete meanings. A complete meaning, or λεκτόν αυτοτελές, is the
independent semantic content of an uttering. Λεκτόν is more specific than
σημαινόμενον, in that it refers to a state of affairs that can be evoked by
uttering it, i.e. a state of affairs that is independent of its referents and exists
by virtue of its being pronounced.23 The content of a λεκτόν may also be
indicated by the word ττραγμα ("state of affairs").24
Λεκτά έλλιττή are the predicates,25 which cannot effectuate a complete
λεκτόν unless they are predicated of someone or something, i.e. when, on the
level of the expression, the "subject-slot" is filled in by means of a τττώσις.26
For the Stoics the αξίωμα was the norm for a λεκτόν αυτοτελές, it was the
λεκτόι» αυτοτελέςpar excellence.27
22
 "And just äs the elements [i.e. letters] in their combinations complete
syllables, so too does the syntax of the intelligibles complete syllables in a
certain sense, through the combination of words. Again, äs the word comes from
the syllables so does the complete sentence come from the regularity of the
intelligibles" (transl. Blank 1982, 30).
23
 So Müller 1943, 38.
24
 Long 1971, 76.
25
 Πτώσεις are nowhere said to be incomplete λεκτά and should not be so
considered (cf. Frede 1977, 63ff.; contra Schmidt 1967 (1839), 57; Müller 1943, 46).
26
 Nuchelmans 1973, 55ff.
27
 Müller 1943, 50; Nuchelmans 1973, 57: "A κατηγόρημα was seen äs a
kind of Schema for axiomata: By filling in the name-positions around the given
predicate one forms a full-blown assertion". Müller, who is rarely used in modern
studies but whose careful book has proved most useful, describes κατηγόρημα äs
"das Prädikat als der von der Verbform bezeichnete Bedeutungsinhalt bzw.
Sachverhalt" (48).
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Now, if we compare the Stoic theory with Apollonius' description of the
structure of language, it is at once clear that, although the former is clearly at
the basis of the latter, the emphasis lies elsewhere. Both parties are interested
in the relationship between expression and meaning, but Apollonius wants
primarily to explain the correctness of the expression, whereas for the Stoics the
theory of the λεκτόν serves the twofold purpose of making a corrective addition
to the ontology of the Peripatos and of supporting their logic.28 In this context
it is important to realize that for the grarnmarians the complete, grammatically
well-construed sentence no longer has anything to do with the αξίωμα als
"Normfall". The very word αξίωμα is absent from Apollonius' work.
1.2. Isomorphism
Apart from the hierarchy of linguistic levels, I mentioned their isomorphism
äs an important notion in Apollonius' work. Methodologically this isomorphism or
structural similarity of linguistic levels is a basic condition for the application of
analogy. It enables Apollonius to make an extensive use of comparison, both of
elements of the same hierarchical level and between elements which strictly
speaking belong to different levels of language,29 especially between phonology
and syntax. This kind of analogy is the theme of the beginning of the Syntax,30
but it is also a recurrent feature of the rest of his work. This means that he
has not just borrowed the phenomenon in the one context in which it may have
become more or less common, viz. the hierarchy of linguistic levels itself. It has,
on the contrary, been integrated into his whole approach to linguistic problems.
Least important are those cases where we are dealing with simple
terminological matters. One example must suffice here: In de adverbio (121,14ff.)
Apollonius Stresses the necessity of the presence of a verb for the construction
of an adverb, even in the case of the so-called έττιφωυήσει,ς.31 Apollonius then
defends the fact that he calls even a word like οϊμοι an adverb by adducing a
28
 Frede 1977, 59: Like the Stoa, Aristoteles considered both persons or
things and qualities äs corporeal, but he did not have an ontological label to
attach to the state of affairs of "x being cold", "that χ is cold", which is not a
body. The Stoic σημαινόμενα could account for these states of affairs by
conferring a special Status upon them. See chapter I section 3.2.
29
 Cf. Steinthal 1891, 226ff.; Wackernagel 1876, 20f.
30
 On both levels the same ττάθη operate, cf. synt. 3,3ff.
31
 It should be noted that the instances Apollonius quotes for these
έττι,φωνήσεις are all adverbs which may be construed καθόλου with all verb-
forms, and which say something about the ττραγμα of the (unexpressed) verb,
see below section 2.3.3.
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parallel example from another linguistic level (121,23f.): οϊμοι may be called an
adverb καταχρηστικώτερον (i.e. for lack of a proper or better term), just äs
syllables which consist of no more than one letter, may still be called
syllables.32 This example is not very striking in itself in that it primarily
illustrates κατάχρησις of linguistic terminology, which is, of course, not
connected with any specific level at all.
More striking is the fact that it is a matter of course for Apollonius to
illustrate syntactic pleonasms for instance, by means of phonological or
morphological ones,33 and syntactic combinations by means of a sample of
phonotactics avant la lettre.34 Apart from such comparisons of phonology and
syntax - certainly the most striking consequence of the basic symmetry in the
structure of language - Apollonius often observes that there is a similarity of
structure between elements of language which, although belonging to the same
hierarchical level, to our minds do not necessarily function in a comparable way.
On the level of the parts of speech (words), for instance, Apollonius in
various places in bis work comments on those adverbs that are special in that
they form συζυγίαι, groups of forms which belong together in one way or
another.35 These are the correlative adverbs, like ττότε, τότε, δτε, όττότε, or
the local ones (ττοϋ, πόθεν, ττόσε). The mutual relationship of the adverbs
belonging in these συζυγίαι may be compared to that existing between several
cases of the noun, or tenses of the verb: In other words, there is a
32
 Schneider, comm. a.l. wrongly paraphrases quem in numerum etiam
interiectiones referendae sunt, etiam unius syllabae sono prolatae (velut a), thus
completely ignoring the addition ουκ ουσαι συλλήψεις στοιχείων. These words,
however, contain the reason why syllables consisting of one letter only, do not
deserve the name συλλαβή unless καταχρηστικώτερον: syllables are per
definitionem combinations of letters (cf. synt. 2,6; 2,llf.; Prise. GL III 108,5-
109 3 esp 109 l syllaba comprehensio litterarum aptissime comunctarum; DTh.
16,6ff.; SchDTh.'57,12-21; 204,29f.; 508,31ff.). The best parallel is synt. 4,2ff.
This very same comparison between different linguistic levels is tound synt.
67,7f. (ω λόγω συλλαβαΐ και αϊ μονογράμματοι).
33
 Coni. 252,33ff. (phonology/syntax); synt. 197,13ff. (morphology/syntax).
34
 Synt 449 Iff correspondence between στοιχεία του λόγου and
στοιχεία της λέξεως; synt. 81,4ff., since the article expresses anaphora,
pronouns which have the value of introducing an entity or person (δειξις)
cannot be constraed with them: δν γαρ τρόττον κατά, των στοιχείων εστίν
έττινοήσαι τα υποτακτικά οΰττοτε προτακτικά γινόμενα των οις ϋπετάγη,
τον αυτόν τρόττον στοιχείου λόγον επέχοντα τα μέρη του λόγου το
τοιούτον έπιδείκνυται (... "in the same way the parts of Speech, which can be
considered äs a letter, exhibit this phenomenon").
35
 Cf. Steinthal 1891, 306 and see section 2.3.1.
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correspondence between the τταρεττόμενα, or accidents, of the several parts of
speech.
The local adverbs have so-called τοτηκαΐ διαστάσεις or σχέσεις τοτακαί,36
i.e. they exhibit several semantic nuances (place where, whither and whence).
The τοτακαΐ διαστάσεις are said to relate to one another äs do the genera
nominis (adv. 201,9ff.) in the matter of their distribution over a certain number
of forms: Just äs there are nominal forms which are used for both masculine and
feminine referents, so can some local adverbs indicate with the same form both
the place where and the place whither (for instance άνω).
Both correlative and local adverbs show the influence of the phenomenon of
συμττάθεια (ττροσττάθεια).37 This phenomenon also exerts its influence in the
cases of the nouns (genitive and dative). Just like a dual genitive coincides with
the dative, an adverb like άνω represents both the adverbs εν τόττω and είς
τόττον.
38
 One sees that Apollonius can compare the local nuances of the adverbs
with the genera and the casus nominis almost indifferently - in both cases there
is a manifest regularity. Elements of the "paradigms" formed by the correlative
and local adverbs are similar to aspects of the κλ'ισις of nouns and verbs.39
The correspondence between the Organisation of the cases and that of the
σχέσεις τοτακα'ι is sufficiently explained by Apollonius' view on the intrinsic
symmetry existing both inside and between linguistic levels. There is no trace of
a localistic case theory in the extant work of Apollonius - he never assumes a
36
 Σχέσεις is paraphrased in the Scholiasts by μεθέξεις (SchDTh. 60,7),
and συντάξεις καΐ σημασ'ιαι (SchDTh. 98,20). Uhlig ad synt. 474,3-4 explains
"habitus personae reive significatae". The word is possibly Stoic in origin and
denotes an externally (co-)determined state or relationship (cf. Forschner 1981,
63f.) or directedness.
Διάστασις may mean "difference" ("division"), thus indicating the fact that
several local meanings can be "distinguished" (cf. the use of διαφορά for
"separate usage", e.g. coni. 221,16). But I prefer to take it äs indicating the
spatial relationship, the space or distance described by a local adverb. In this
Interpretation ("from where to where") it is least suited to describe the adverbs
εν τόττω, but then again it is hardly ever so used; cf. adv. 201, lf., where the
whole construction makes the combination less harsh. Priscian avoids the
terminological difficulty and simply translates loci significatio (e.g. III 83,9f.;
84,11). Cf. the Latin translation of the difficult term διάθεσις into significatio,
Jeep 1893,197ff.; Flobert 1981.
37
 See chapter I section 3.1., note 116.
38
 Apollonius adds that now and then this causes confusion even in those
instances where separate forms do exist, e.g. ττοϋ (adv. 202,14ff.).
39
 Adv. 201,25ff.: The τοττικαι διαστάσεις have a ττροσττάθεια which exists
έττ' άλλων μερών λάτγου also. Examples: εν τττώσεσι (shorthand for: "in the
part of speech 'noun' in the cases"), εν ρήμασιν etc.
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local meaning äs the basic semantic value of the cases.40 Moreover, äs we saw,
he can compare the τοττικαΐ σχέσεις almost indifferently with various
τταρεττόμενα of the noun (and, for that matter, the verb).41 The order of the
τοτηκαΐ σχέσεις he adopts in adv. 201,2f. is a logical, not a "grammatical" one.
Further, what may teil agains localistic tendencies is the fact that it is τα εν
τόττω and τα εις τόττον which are said to have a basic similarity to one
another,42 whereas among the cases, genitive and dative belong most closely
together, äs opposed to the triad nominative, accusative and vocative.43
We have seen that the symmetry of linguistic structure allows Apollonius to
compare elements both of the same and of different linguistic levels. It is clear
that the intrinsic orderliness and regularity of language and the structural
similarity of levels are mutually determined.
There are two passages which, in making use of the very same principle of
the comparability of linguistic elements, take us to the very heart of Apollonius'
theory of language. I shall discuss them in the next two sections.
40
 It is still common at least to consider the possibility of Apollonian
Inspiration for a possible localistic case-theory in Maximus Planudes (Bachmann
AG II 121,22ff., esp. 122,23ff.), although scholars tend to reject it. I think the
theory can be vindicated neither for Apollonius nor for Maximus Planudes.
Schneider puts SchDTh. 549,22ff. among the fragments of Apollonius'
όνοματικόν (GG II iii 68,8ff.), a doubtful decision in view of the absence of
localist interpretations in what we know of Apollonius' case-theory (mainly synt.
405-433; here, the principal values attributed to the cases are the following: the
accusative is used to denote the semantic role of patiens in active, transitive
sentences; ΰττό + genitive is used for the agens of a real passive; the genitive
expresses the source of a ττάθος of the subject in the case of verbs like
ακούειν, όσφρα'ινεσθαι and έραν (417,3ff.); the dative has the value of
ττεριττοίησις, or "procuring" - it is used also when neither of the others can be
used (429, If.) (especially when the action is an "άντιττεττοιημένον", äs in
•γυμνάζομαι σοι.)).
I suspect that in SchDTh. 549,22ff. (where the primary object is to explain the
traditional order of the cases) and even in Planudes a somewhat exaggerated
version of the intra-level symmetry propagated by Apollonius (possibly partially
through the intermediary of Priscian, Murru 1979, 89ff.), is all there is to the
alleged "localism". Nowhere does Planudes explain the non-local usages of the
cases on the basis of the local pnes. See on this topic Robins 1974; 1984; Murru
1979 (in favour of Planudes being a localist); Chanet 1985; and especially Blank
1986 (against).
41
 Cf. SchDTh. 98,32ff.
42
 Adv. 202, If.
43
 Müller 1943, 94ff. believes the Stoic theory of the cases derives from
their theory of causes. See ibid. 119f. for the συγγένεια of nominative, vocative
and accusative case.
49
1.3. Structure and semantics; καταλληλότης and έλεγχος
1.3.1. Καταλληλότης
In coni. 218,7ff. we are told that, just äs not every noun may be
accompanied by an article, so it is impossible to join every σύνδεσμος to every
sentence indiscriminately. This passage is illuminating for two reasons. In the
first place Apollonius again introduces a comparison with another pari of speech,
thus showing once more bis conviction that the same basic principles can and
should be applied in very different constructions. This time, however, the
implications are more far-reaching: The reason a conjunction cannot always be
joined to a sentence, or, for that matter, an article to a noun, is that there is a
semantic impediment. The constituents of a sentence can give it such a semantic
load äs would clash with that of the σύνδεσμος in question. The sentences "it
is day" and "it is light" cannot, according to this principle, be joined by the
σύνδεσμος "or"; nor could the sentences "it is day" and "it is night" be joined
by the σύνδεσμος "and".
Now, in the very centre of bis Syntax., in the beginning of the third book,
Apollonius gives us an extensive discussion of the single most important notion
in all of bis work, viz. καταλληλότης, grammatical regularity and correctness. It
is Apollonius' professed object to give a careful expose in bis Syntax of the
καταλληλότης του αυτοτελούς λόγου.
44
 Α sentence is κατάλληλος if all its
parts are syntactically congruent and semantically compatible. Καταλληλότης
refers to the mutual relationships of the constituents of a sentence; it is the
notion into which symmetry of Structure and semantics merge.4^
In principle, the demand for compatibility is limited: There is no point in
asking for it if a part of speech lacks the relevant characteristics. Primarily, one
should look for compatibility in the τταρεττόμενα of a word, its grammatical
accidentia. Thus, a plural pronoun in the nominative should go with a plural verb
in the correct person (synt. 280,4ff.). These τταρεττόμενα are feit to contribute
something to the total semantic impact of a word. If a word is indeclinable, its
lexical semantic value is taken into account: If that is identical with or related
44
 Synt. l,3f.; cf. Blank 1982, 28ff.
45
 Apollonius explicitly excludes the possibility of άκαταλληλία resulting
from incorrect reference to extra-linguistic entities, äs when one points out a
woman äs "he": ου ... εν τοις ϋττοκειμένοις το άκατάλληλόν εστίν η
κατάλληλον, εν δε τη συντάξει των λέξεων, αίς τταρέττεται το
μετατΓοιεϊσθαι, είς το δέον, των ϋττοκειμένων άττάντοτε των αυτών
όντων (synt. 275,6ff.).
For κατάλληλος cf. Blank's Appendix, 1982, 55f; Blank, ibidem 28, takes
καταλληλότης to be the syntactic pendant of morphological analogy. See below
section 1.4.4. for the relationship of καταλληλότης and the Stoic λεκτά.
50
to the meaning conveyed by a grammatical accident like tense, there is
immediate danger of incompatibility and ungrammaticality. This is why χθες,
"yesterday", may not be combined with a future tense. I will return to this when
I come to the discussion of Apollonius' definition of the adverb (section 2.3.3.).
Another example where the lexical value may play a role,46 and not just
the τταρεμφάσει? of the morphosemantic categories (to use a modern terrn) of
one of the principal parts of speech, is the passage from which this discussion
started, coni. 218,7ff. Here, the basic incompatibility of antonyms ("day", "night")
seems to be taken into account, although Apollonius would probably have
considered the incompatibility to rest not so much in the words "day", "light"
and "night", äs in the propositions formed by their means; conjunctions by their
very nature join sentences. Usually, however, Apollonius concentrates on the
καταλληλότης occurring in the combination of noun or verb, which are the most
important, or έμψυχότατα parts of speech, with another pari of speech.47
Decisive for καταλληλότης in short is the question whether or not two
words48 agree with each other, in all the meanings of the word. Again referring
to our passage from de coniunctionibus, we can only construe words with τφ
δυναμέυω έταδέξασθαι,, that which can accept them. The consequence of all
this is that το άκατάλληλον is considered primarily to originate from flexion
(synt. 279,5ff.). For äs soon äs words that are marked for categories such äs
case or number, person or tense, enter into constructions, they need compatible
elements for the construction to be well-formed, or rather they should reject
incompatible ones. Thus, the parts of speech that are most liable to suffer from
άκαταλληλότη? are the dedinabilia. However, we saw that indeclinable parts of
speech are not automatically exempt from syntactic restrictions.
Apollonius' main Instrument to guarantee καταλληλότη? is negative in
character: it is a principle of falsification avant la lettre. He is concerned not so
much with proving the correctness of an expression, äs with discrediting wrong
ones by substituting a more correct alternative. Correct usage refutes the
incorrect. Sometimes a construction which is feit to lack optimal congruency
46
 Lexical semantic compatibility of adverb and verb does play a role in the
Latin grammarians, e.g. Servius IV 415,20ff.: quotiens sunt autem adverbia quae
significant ad locum, iungamus ea his verbis similiter quae habent significationem
euntis, ut pergo illuc etc.; [Sergius] IV 510,14ff.; Pompeius V 247,lff.: ... non
enim passim debemus quaecumque verba istis localibus adverbiis iungere, sed pro
rerum qualitate debemus etiam verba coniungere ... scire debemus quoniam non
iungis in loco nisi rei quae est in loco etc.
47
 Cf. synt. 28,6 and adv. 121,5ff.
48
 I use the word "word" with the same vagueness here, äs Apollonius
employs φωναί in the first lines of his Syntax, cf. Blank 1982, 29.
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has to be accepted for lack of an alternative - it is correct because it cannot be
refuted. But whenever a more correct alternative does exist, the persistent use
of the improper form creates a κακία.49 The process of discrediting faulty
linguistic usage is called έλεγχος.50
1.3.2.'Έλεγχος
The most usual way of applying έλεγχο? is to confront the questionable
word in a certain construction with the correct form of the same word, synt.
288,5ff, aL ... λέξεις ... άναμεμερισμέναι κατά τάς Ιδίας θέσεις, τάς
όττωσδήττοτε τταρεμτατπΌύσας ε'ις ουκ έταβάλλουσαν θέσιν διελέγχουσιν δια
της εξ αυτών ακολουθίας.
51
 Ελέγχω often means no more than "exposing,
bringing to light, discovering". It is a test, a signal that something is wrong.52
As remarked above, many constructions cannot easily be rejected, because
their incorrectness cannot be demonstrated by substituting a more fitting
inflected form:53 There is no better way to express the same meaning than by
49
 Synt. 193,21ff., where it is assumed that Homer is excused on the
grounds that the proper word did not exist in bis day.
50
 The same principle of correct usage refuting (διελέγχειν) incorrect
usage is applied to medicine by Basilius of Caesarea, cf. Gnilka 1984, 68: Basilius
asserts that medicine should not be condemned and abolished just because some
had made a perverse use of it; rather one should εκ της ορθής ... χρήσεως
το im' εκείνων τταραφθειρόμενον διελέγχειν (PGM 31, 1048). The latter
passage Stands in the tradition of a well-known protreptical topos (cf. PL Euthd.
307bc; Cic. TD 2,llf.); see Hartmann 1889, 293 and 302ff. (άττελεγκτικός λόγος
äs the negative part of protreptic).
51
 "When words have been subclassified [i.e. when they have separate
inflected forms for separate semanto-syntactical functions,I.S.] ... according to
their proper applicational positions [in the structure], they act by means of their
grammatical correctness [or: the regularity of their paradigm, I.S.] äs restraints
on words which, for whatever reason, have by chance come into a position where
they don't belong." (transl. Householder, who comments "i.e. the proper word for
a given slot serves to drive out an improper word"). Cf. synt. 270,8ff. iräv
άκατάλληλον έχει έττανόρθωσιν δια του ακολούθου σχήματος; Blank 1982,
44; the same principle holds for the detection of πάθη. Here, the corresponding
ολόκληρα make clear what has happened (cLpron. 38,22ff.).
52
 Cf. synt. 301,9ff., cf. 62,11; 288-90.
53
 Synt. 282,lff., esp. 4f. ΟΌ γαρ δη γε ελεγχον έχει τον 'ίδιον
μετασχηματισμόν, i.e. there is no inflected form to refute the construction; cf.
283,Iff.; 290,lff. (έμοί αύτω and έμοί αυτή are both correct, ότι μη
ένεχώρει (exists) το δυνάμενον έλέγξαι την κακίαν; 290,5ff. εαυτούς for
"ourselves" is correct, οττερ ην αν εν κακία ε'ι διηλέγχετο ύττό τοΐ
έμαυτούς, ως τιάρα το ινρόσωττον ήμαρτημένον. άνεξέλεγκτον οίιν
καθεστώς άδεεστέραν την σύνταξιν κατά των τφοσώττων έττοιήσατο (cf.
269,lff.); 289,4ff. αυτός may be combined with all three persons ένεκα του
μη εχειν άκόλουθον Ίτρόσωττον κατά συζυγίαν δ συνελέγχει το άλλότριον
52
using the questionable word under discussion. This last point is very important
because it is related to the problem of the relationship obtaining between form
and meaning. The original one-to-one correspondence was lost in the subsequent
corrupting development of language. The result was that any one expression -
out of context - could correspond to a number of meanings,54 and there were
several other types of misfitting between expression and meaning. One of these
is the fact that meanings might lack a proper expression. For Apollonius the
implication is that if an improper one is used for lack of better, it cannot be
proved wrong.
In principle Apollonius' grammar is normative, meaning that the best
solution should be the only one. Nevertheless, Apollonius is realist enough to see
that the language he studies, is a far cry from its ideal origins. He notices the
irregulär correspondences of form and meaning. In some cases language is
deficient in that it does not offer an alternative, better solution, thus creating
the necessity of κατάχρησις. At other times it offers more than one possibility,
none of which can be rejected on firm grounds. One can ask oneself, however,
which is the more regulär. Thus, one often encounters a preference for one
solution to another on the grounds that it is καταλληλότερου, or
άναλογώτερου.
55
 Moreover, even if a word offers an irregularity (mostly a
morphological one), Apollonius will try to find the regularity underlying the
aberration.56
Although the principle of the one-to-one relationship of form and meaning
can hardly ever be attained if one Starts from everyday usage, it still remains an
ideal Situation, and sometimes one comes pretty close: In adv. 205,12ff.
του τφοσώττου; 286,5f. &v is indeclinable: there is, therefore, no άνθυτταλλαγή
of a different form which would make the incorrectness of γράψω αν evident.
54
 Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 331.
55
 This applies especially in morphology. Cf. adv. 187,14ff. (χαμαΐθεν or
(Attic) χαμαθευ?): το οΰν ττρός Αττικών ττάλιν λεγόμενου άυαλογώτερου
καθέστηκευ κτλ.; cf. further adv. 175,25-176,5; 176,23ff.; 196,7 (άλογώτερου);
200,22ff.
56
 E.g. adv. 173,8ff. δθευ δοκέ! μοι καΐ τήυ Δωρικήυ διαλεκτού τω
μέυ ττροκατειΛεγμένω λόγω δττως άυαγιυώσκειν, ... τω μέυτοι μαλλου
α-ϋτοϊις συγκαταβιβάζευυ τα επιρρήματα όττώς. ώστε άμφοτέρας τάς
αυαγυώσεις λόγου εχεσθαι. Cf. Egger 1854, 45 (whose Quotation of pron. 14,2f.
is irrelevant to his point); Fehling 1956, 257; Camerer 1965, 185f.; Blank 1982, 17
"Once the cause of an irregularity is understood, the irregularity is no longer a
threat tp the rule, since it follows a rule itself and it is the knowledge of the
rule which gives the analogical/rational System its flawless continuity ..., allowing
it to deduce the correct form of any and every linguistic phenomenon"; contra
Steinthal 1891, 340, note 2.
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Apollonius puts it äs follows - the occasion is the question whether or not it is
correct to use είσω for two different τοτακαΐ διαστάσεις -: δττερ τταντί
μέρει λόγου τταρακολουθει το διελέγχεσθαι είς ακαταλληλότητα, όταν έτερα
τις χρησις η κατ' Ιδίαν μόνον σημασ'ιαν. το γράφει ουκ αν ττοτε έττΐ
ττρώτου η δευτέρου τεθε'ιη, έττεί άττομεμέρισται το γράφω και γράφεις
ε'ις τα ιτρόσωττα ... έξαιρέτως ουν άναμερισθέυ το ένδον άναγκαίως
διελέγχει την δισσήν χρησιν του εϊσω.
57
 Whenever a form is used
exclusively to express one particular meaning, which would, we may add, be
superfluous if there were no need for it to express that meaning, such a form in
turn causes all intruders into its domain to be termed incorrect.
Let me add one more observation: There is, äs we saw, no one-to-one
correspondence of form and meaning in Greek after the corruption of language
had set in. We should bear in mind, however, that this rule only holds good if
one Starts from the expression and tries to explain it. In that case - äs long äs
the context is ignored - we may be able to think of more than one meaning
represented by the words. We shall see that in the case of the λεκτόν it is
another story (see section 1.4.4.).
1.4. The hidden mistakes
1.4.1. Λεληθότα and reason
The second passage which leads us from the comparison of different
linguistic elements to another important theoretical principle, is synt. 183,9ff.58
Apollonius has just argued that the natural way of construing a pronoun is to
put it in front of the verb it is constraed with, if the pronoun has an
independent accent; it is irrelevant whether or not this όρθοτόνησις is caused
by a preposition. In case of enclisis, the pronoun comes after the verb. Rules
like this cannot simply be refuted by giving counter-examples. Everyday
sentences like (synt. 183,12) σήμερον έλάλησα κατά σου or σήμερον σε
έθεασάμην, or verses like και τυ φΊλιττιτον εθηκεν may seem to be in order,
but appearances are deceptive. As a matter of fact, though hard to discern, they
have undergone hyperbaton.'H δέουσα κατάστασις (synt. 184,If.), "the correct
conformation (of the sentence)", is in complete harmony with the general rule.
57
 "For [see Schneider, Tractatus 157 and ad pron. 103,7] it is an accidens
of every part of speech to be convicted of irregularity, when another word is
used in that one particular meaning only. For γράφει, 'he writes', could never be
used for the first or second person, because to those persons γράφω, Ί write',
and γράφεις, 'you write' have been expressly assigned ... Therefore, since ένδον
is assigned (to the meaning 'within') exclusively, it necessarily refutes the
double usage of είσω."
58
 Cf. Blank 1982, 49; 85 n. 24.
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Apollonius illustrates this äs follows (synt. 184,7ff.): ως εΐ καΐ έπι των
συναπτικών τις ΰπολάβοι ή καΐ έπι παρασυναπτικών μη ϊστασθαι το και
αρκτικοί? αυτούς είναι, ε'ι φαίημεν φως εστίν, ε'ι ήμερα εστίν, αϊτό
γαρ μόνον τη συνθέσει το ε'ι ήμερα έστ'ιν δευτερεύει, ου μην τη
διεξοδική επαγγελία" πρώτον μεν γαρ επιδέχεται ή διάνοια το ε'ι
ήμερα εστίν, και τότε έταδέχεται το φως εστίν, καΐ ου πάντως ουχί
προτακτικός ό ει συναπτικός, καίτοι γενόμενος καΐ υποτακτικός ενίοτε,
ο'ί τε παρά τοΐτον έσχηματισμένοι.59
In this passage Apollonius compares two cases in which the natural, rational
order of words, the order which most clearly reflects the intended meaning, has
been inverted. The comparison is meant äs an argument: The underlying thought
is that, in the case of the inverted order of πρότασις and άττόδοσις of a
conditional period, the Inversion of the logical order leaps to the eye, and no
one will combat the validity of the general rule on the basis of the occurrence
of this kind of counter-examples. Therefore, one should agree that appearances
may be deceptive and that although a sentence looks familiär enough and cannot
at first sight be condemned, it may still be in a less-than-perfect state. It is the
function of a Syntax to state the basic rules in order that deviations from the
rule, whether due to poetic licence or firmly rooted in everyday usage, even
when they almost escape notice (λεληθότα) may be detected and understood
(synt. 183,14f.).60
What I am concerned with here, is not so much the comparison itself, but
the point it tries to make: According to Apollonius it is the task of the
grammarian to provide a System, a framework, which will enable him to correct
language, not only in those cases where mistakes are evident, but also when they
may well escape the less well-equipped Student or user of language." Hidden
mistakes are more common than one might suppose: they are a feature of
everyday usage äs well äs a literary phenomenon (see above, section 0. of this
chapter).
59 "As when someone supposes in the case of the conditional or.causal
^f
toe that5 coSna? εί £ no? positive alrtaough it may be postponed now
and then, and the same holds for the words that denve from it.
For διεξοδική επαγγελία, see Uhlig's note a. l.
60 Interestingly, we may now compare RDerveni col. IV 6: [τα]ΰτα τα έπη
ΰπερβατά έό[ν]τα λανθά[νει], see chapter I section J...J.
61
 Cf. Blank 1982, 14ff. onsynt. 51,lff.
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Λεληθότα per definitionem cannot be detected by simple observation. The
only instrument by which they can be discovered is reason, because reason alone
can both explain the causes underlying our observations and formulate general
mies.62 Moreover, reason helps to find out why an error can be hard to
detect.63 The knowledge that Apollonius shows an interest, and a very marked
one at that, in hidden facts, rules and causes, leads us to bis epistemological
principles and to the criteria he applies in deciding in questions of right and
wrang linguistic usage.64
1.4.2. Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit; analogy and the Stoa
It is not my intention to duplicate the work done by Siebenborn (1976) and
Blank (1982) on the epistemological principles of ancient grarnmar in general and
Apollonius in particular. What I want to point out is the relationship between
Apollonius and the Stoa in this respect, too.
The history of the "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit" has been studied in
extenso by Siebenborn (1976). The three main criteria to be distinguished are
analogy, linguistic usage and the literary tradition. Whereas the latter two
criteria characterize an empirical point of view, analogy adds a rationalistic,
dogmatic element.65 Although äs a heuristic device it Starts from empirical data,
its claim to discover that which originally was hidden, is based on the a-
62
 A well-known principle, cf. e.g. Cic. Fin. V 58 consideratio ... rerum ...
earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratiQ_potest, ...
63
 Cf. synt. 316,5: It is insufficient to explain a seemingly irregulär
phenomenpn like a neuter plural subjunctive construed with a singular predicate
äs a Βοιώτιον εθος: αυτό γαρ τοϋτο επιζητεί ό λόγος, ως (how ft comes
about that) λανθάνει το σχήμα το του ουδετέρου.
64
 See also Blank 1982, Uff.
65
 Siebenborn has shown that the Implementation of the concept of analogia
underwent a rather drastic change. For the Alexandrians it was "die Normierung
einer unsicheren Form durch meist nur eine einzige ähnliche sichere Form" (1976,
13; cf. ibid. 83.) The comparison of two words is an abbreviated Version of the
proportional analogy with four rnembers (cf. ibid. 64). This form of analogy is
more closely related to the empirical than to the "logical" one (ibid. 125f.). For
later grammarians it came to be "die Normierung morphologisch unsicherer Fälle
durch Zuweisung zu einer umfassenden Regel" (ibid. 13). In this way it began to
cover non-evident material (cf. Galenus 18,2,26,6 Kühn: άναλογισ'μός δ' εστί
λόγος εκ του φαινομένου ορμώμενος καΐ του άδηλου κατάληψιν
ττοιούμενος). Thus, a reconciliation of empirical and rational principles emerges.
In early Greek epistemology there was a tendency to consider observation and
reason äs mutually exclusive (Lloyd 1966, 123). Exceptions are e.g. Anaxagoras'
dictum: δψις των αδήλων τα φαινόμενα (S.E. AM. VII 140; D -K 59B21a^ cf
Hdt. 2,33 (Lloyd 1966, 337ff.). h '
Cf. on Aristophanes' conception of analogy Callanan 1987, 107ff. and Schenkeveld
1990 (forthcoming).
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prioristic assumption of some underlying regularity. Blank has demonstrated
(1982, 12ff.) that Apollonius, like bis contemporaries Galen and Claudius
Ptolemaeus, successfully brought about a compromise between empiricism and a
logical, rationalistic approach to bis particular field of research. Both the
grammarian, the doctor and the astronomer went farther in their rationalisation
(description of causes, underlying principles and so on) than a strictly empirical
approach would have warranted. For strict empiricism, too, knows of an
analogistic heuristic procedure, caUed the μετάβασις είς το ομοιον.66 The
difference between empirical and "logical" analogy is, that in the former case no
abstractions of rules or causes result from the analogistic procedure,67 whereas
logical analogy uses induction to formulate explanations or general rules on the
basis of the empirical data.68 The next step is to apply such a rule or
explanation to a new problem.69
If we turn to the Stoa, we find that on the one band they share with the
empiricists the stress on empirical data äs the primary source of knowledge.70
But on the other band, apart from their basically rationalistic world-picture-
the λόγος penetrating our whole cosmos - they, too, had a method of looking
behind what is evident (εναργή) and of finding out what is obscure (άδηλα),
and this method, too, is called μετάβαση.71
66
 Empirical analogy is known especially from medical sources (cf. sectipn
0. note 1). Cf. Fehling 1956, 264 n. 2 (Fehling, howevei, does not distinguish
"logical" and empirical analogy); Deichgräber 1965, SOlff.; Hankmson 1987, 333f.,
336.
67
 Deichgräber 1965, 70; Hankinson 1987,344.
68
 Cf Siebenborn 1976, 124f.: The logical medical school stressed the
importance of aetiology, the description of hidden causes. They drew deductive
conclusions about the appropriate medication from the causes of each i llness
(explained on the basis of humoral pathology or physiology) (ενδει,ξις or mdicatw).
69 There is a slight, but unavoidable circularity in toprocedure The
four-member proportional analogy leads to a κανών (cf SchDTh. 309 9, 454,14)
which functions äs a criterium for dubia. Siebenborn (1976, 66) wrongly beheves
that the κανόνες make the analogistic procedure supervacuous; m fact they
become a new basis for it.
70
 Cf. Forschner 1981, 68ff.
71
 S E AM VII 25· Nuchelmans 1973, 52f. Forschner 1981, 152 calls
attention'to the fact that'according to the Stoics there is a parallelism m the
way natural and conscious judgments are formed, i.e. m the way one acquires
knowledge of empirical facts and knowledge based on rational procedures.
A very succinct description of the Stoics rational procedures applied to
empirically established material is to be found m Qc. Fin IV 8: mm argumenti
ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt, demde prdmem
sequuntur, turn, quid verum sit in singulis, extrema condusio est. ... quid, quod
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Our main sources for Stoic μετάβασις are Diogenes Laertius (VII 51ff.) and
Sextus Empiricus.72 In the latter (AM. XI 250) we find it stated that: -παντός
•γοϋν πράγματος αισθητού ή νοητοί γίνεται κατάληψις ήτοι κατά
ένάργειαν ττεριτττωτικώς η κατά την άττό των ττεριτΓτωτικώς ττεφηνότων
άναλογιστικήν ιιετάβασιν. καΐ ταύτην ήτοι όμοιωτικήν ..., η συνθετικήν ...
ή κατ' άναλογίαν.
73
 In AM. VII 25 we are told that according to the Stoics we
can acquire knowledge of the άδηλα by means of σημεία and αποδείξεις
"κατά την άττό των εναργών μετάβασιν".74 Here, too, the possibility of
μετάβασις is based on the a-prioristic assumption of underlying regularity.
The Stoa firmly believed in the basic rationality of the world.75 It is,
moreover, their epistemological conviction that we can also reach knowledge of
that which is not evident by starting from the empirical data and reasoning from
there. They had their reservations about empirical generalizations, but managed
to avoid them by combining generalized conditionals with a rule of instantiation
(type: if something is a man, it is mortal; Socrates is a man),76 another
compromise between a logical and an empiricial approach. This allowed them to
start from the empirically ascertained facts of the present77 and apply their
logical σχήματα to that material. It is clear that this kind of compromise
plurimis locis quasi denuntiant, ut neque sensuum fldem sine ratione nee rationis
<sine> sensibus exquiramus, atque ut eorum alterum ab altem <ne> separemus?
72
 Nuchelmans I.e. has shown that there is a slight discrepancy between
these sources, μετάβασις m S.E. being considered the genus of this heuristic
means, in D.L. a species only.
73
 "For certainly the apprehension of every object, whether sensible or
mtelligible, comes about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way
of analogical inference from things which have appeared empirically this latter
being either through resemblance ... or through composition or'by way of
analogy" (transl. Bury). Analogy can either work by magnification (frorn man to
Cyclops) or by dimmution (from man to pygmy).
74
 "Through inference from the evident" (transl. Bury).
75
 It is now widely recognized that it is fundamentally wrong to explain
the Stoics' view on anomaly äs if they feit language was in principle
unsystematic, irregulär. This clashes with the most basic tenets of their school
cf. Fehling 1956,264 n. 2.
_
 76
 Kahn 1969, 164ff.; cf. S.E. AM. I 86 and XI 8ff.; 11, for the way in
which a καθολικόν is accordingly expressed without the use of the quantifier "all".
77
 For their ontological restrictions on the Status of past and future cf
e.g. Kahn 1969,165. '
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between empiricism and rationalism would have met with the approval of
Apollonius and several of bis contemporary fellow-scientists.78
Finally, it should be noted that the Stoa did undertake a search for that
which is unclear in linguistic matters äs well: they studied etymology (see
chapter I section 2.2.).79
78
 Apollonius had no qualms about formulating general rules of the type: all
χ do y although he was always prepared to accommodate all the exceptions he
could possibly think of. The rules themselves are based on observation. It is a
firm pnnciple of ancient grammar that the majonty^ill constitute the rule (cf.
e 2 Egger 1854 45) If a variant is rare, it cannot mipose itself upon the rest.
Äpollomus expresses this concisely äs follows (pron. 72,6t): τταντί ττρσϋτττον ως
ή ττλείων τταράθεσις της ελάσσονος κανών, ''it is evident to anybody that
the largest number of examples (which can be adduced for a phenomenon) makes
out thl rule for the minority." Cf. pron. 25,30t; com. 252,1 9L· sym 250,5
Choer. GG IV l,H8,18ff.; M i c h S c § 126,9831, a . . . ,SchDTh. 94,18ff.; 582, 19f.; r.  I  l, , ff.; ichS^   , , 
the Acadenüc basis for the conduct of daily hfe, cf. S.E. AM VII (Adv. Log. I)
Opposition comes from the side of Socrates in PL Crat. 437dlff. (Cra-Άλλ' ώ
Σώκρατες οράς δτι τα ττολλά έκείνως εσημαινεν So. Τι ow ΤΟΌΤΟ,
ώ Κρατύλε; ώσττερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τα ονόματα και εν τοντφ
εσται ή όρθότης; οττότερα αν ττλείω φαίνηται τα ονόματα σημαίνοντα
ταϋτα δη Ιστοί τάληθή; Cra. Οΰκουν εικός γε. So. Ουδ' οττωστκχυν, ω
Φίλε) Her SB AM I (Adv.Gramm.) 225 combats the conviction ότι εκ
ΟνωΑ
 S
TO
?
'KoÄiKÖv(1rapa^WaVle) and pleads for the equivalence
T^re^SVaSs'^ graZ? the definition preserve_d in the
Τέχνη ofDionysius Thrax (5,2f.): Γραμματική εστίν εμττειρια των τταρα
ττοιηταΐς τε καΐ συγγραφεϋσιν ως έττΐ το ττολύ λεγομένων. Notice tha
CESS in toconteidtes not intend to detract from the epistemologica
Status of grammar (it is not meant äs an Opposition to τέχνη) but rather
points to its methodological basis. Jhis is „mam/es _ *****$*$ n 19 Sn s
from nothine eise Cf also Siebenborn 1976, 123; 133f. Ax 1979, 3U6 n. iy points
ouTthat Ihlrl ΓΪ an inconsistency between Siebenborn's mterpretaüon of the
definition of grammar in the Τέχνη äs representmg ^^^^^ά^1
induktiven Reeeleewinnung" and the fact that Siebentem (ibid. 27 n 2) places
thrsvsTematilme of erammar after Dionysius Thrax. The systemaücs of grammar
Sedynot howeve? ha™en developed to their ful| l extent m order to aüow
Dionvsius to studv "normal usage" which can be estabhshed numerically. Thus,
SiebSrris inconsistency primarily rests in his own formulation, rather than
the Όττοκείμενα ττράγματα.
79
 Cf Schmidt 1839, 23t The keyword latet appears in Aug. dial. 6: Quam
(sc ontinen ι verbi) persequi non quidem ultra soni simüitudmem possumm, sed
hoc noTse^peruiwe possumus. Innumerabilia sunt enun, quarum ongo de qua
g;0Ä of the
princlpTe s^ed £ ^ e'fJo o°gy to S procedure
 Of μετάβασις, cf. NucLlmans
1973 ^ 52 ?'Ss CTeSvTSowerof the human mind [sc. μετάβασις] ... amounts to
no more than the faculty of compounding, transposmg, augmentmg, or
dimiSfng the maSrials afforded us by the senses etc." Note that these are the
elements of the quadrupertita ratio, cf. Ax 198öa.
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1.4.3. Linguistic usage and literary tradition; thegenre ofthe Syntax.
Various scholars have noticed the fact that the two remaining major
"Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit" can have a different application depending on
the genre of grammatical study they are employed for.80 In the διόρθωσις, the
"textual criticism" of a work by a certain writer, συνήθεια, consuetudo is the
style and language of that particular writer, while τταράδοσις is primarily his
"tradition", the editions of his works with the learned comments, if any, which
have come down to the scholar. In the study of ελληνισμός81 συνήθεια is
contemporary educated usage,82 and τταράδοσις Stands for the literary tradition
in general, which may Support or avoid a certain idiom. Analogy was used in
both genres.83
It is hardly surprising that Apollonius shows an awareness of both sets of
criteria.84 Indirectly, this is a trace of his indebtedness to both the philological
and the philosophical tradition, of which in the last resort διόρθωσις and
ελληνισμός are the "technical" manifestations. However, Apollonius' work is
neither purely diorthotic in character (since it is not devoted to any one text
which he systematically strives to put in order), nor is it a τέχνη ττερι
έλληνισμόν. Siebenborn (1976, 34) thinks it is a study of a specialistic part of
ελληνισμός, like the monographs on orthography which had started to appear.
80
 See esp. Siebenborn 1976, 81.
81
 Works with titles like τέχνη ττερί έλληνισμοϋ/έλληνισμόν had a
predominantly morphological interest, see Fehling 1956,258ff.
82
 See Versteegh 1986; cf., however, Uhlig ad synt. 51,9, and see n. 84 on
Origen.
83
 I will not take the minor criteria systematically into account here.
However, notice that for Orthographie matters Apollonius knew of the
supplemental criterium of διάλεκτος (adv. 161,8ff.).
84
 The diorthotic ones: e.g. synt. 6,lff.; there are many places where
Apollonius mentions Homeric usage, e.g. coni. 233,10; 239,21ff.; synt. 196,3ff. (cf.
195,7ff.); 215,2ff.; 223,13f. (cf. 222,12ff.).
The set of criteria related to ελληνισμός: e.g. synt. 162,7ff.; general linguistic
usage e.g. synt. 54,12; 60,1; 167,10. A combination of both is found in synt. 51,8,
where Apollonius takes into account both the correction of ποιήματα and that
of ή ανά χείρα ομιλία. Notice that τταράδοσις is in itself ambiguous, having
the connotations of both textual and literary tradition, and moreover
designating the work of previous scholars which has come down to later times
(cf. Schneider ad pron. 94,16). For the partial overlap of the criteria of linguistic
usage and that of the literary tradition, see Siebenborn 1976, 54ff.; Blank 1982,
14 does not explicitly distinguish everyday linguistic usage and poetic (Homeric)
usage. Origen mterestingly knows, like Apollonius, of both applications of the
criterium of συνήθεια. With the word συνήθεια he refers either to ordinary,
everyday usage (not restricted to that of the educated Greeks, cf. Neuschäfer
1987, 144) or to Biblical idiom (cf. Neuschäfer 1987,143).
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But Apollomus apparently laid claim to something eise: bis work is an Instrument
for all students of both διόρθωσις and ελληνισμός, or, for that matter,
ορθογραφία.
85
 It functions on a different level from these three (cf. synt.
7,6ff.): Διόρθωσις, ελληνισμό·; and ορθογραφία are all, primarily, concentrated
on the (phonological/morphological) expression. A knowledge of the System of
language on the level of the meaning, äs described by Apollonius, is necessary to
justify the decisions one takes in any one of the other disciplines.86 Apollonius
offers us explanations of τα λεληθότα and he does so with the help of the
criterium of καταλληλότης which belongs first and foremost to the level of
meaning.87 In this respect he differs from the students of the other linguistic
disciplines äs he differs from the philosophers, because of his unswerving
attention to the problems connected with the expressions. Apollonius rightly
Claims that his is an important contribution to the study of language (synt.
51,7ff.).
1.4.4. Καταλληλότης and το εξής.· theperfect construction of language
What Apollonius does, then, is to present a general view of the linguistic
System. On the way, he shows how various problems can be solved, whether
arising from contemporary usage or from the study of (mainly) Homer. In this
way he contributes to the fields of both διόρθωσις and ελληνισμός and
borrows from their methodology without committing himself to either. His major
terrain is not morphology, but the relationship between the expression and the
meanings they express, the study of the common mean of our syntax and
semantics;88 he focuses on the καταλληλότης του αυτοτελούς λόγου.
This καταλληλότης or semanto-syntactical analogy is ideally represented by
a sentence whose construction is entirely perspicuous because all its elements are
put in their proper place: A sentence of this formation is called το έξης89 or
85
 Note that orthography is relevant only to those problems where a
mistake would not be obvious in reading aloud; in other words, orthography also
is primarily concerned with τα λεληθότα: Siebenborn 1976, 38; Blank 1982, 9.
8C
" For the function the study of ελληνισμός can have for διόρθωσις, cf.
synt. 51,8f.
87
 Cf. Blank 1982, 28.
88
 Cf. Blank 1982, 27f.
89
 Householder 1981, 74 comments (ad synt. 109,8): "to hexes, Latin ordo,
i.e., perhaps, the structure before any deletions, insertions, substitutions, or
transpositions have been applied by the poet"; (see e.g. synt. 175,9f.); cf.
Householder 1989, 134; Blank 1982, 55 says that the neuter adjective κατάλληλον
"can denote the sense (ό νους, το έξης) or the intent of an utterance".
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ή (δέουσα/κατά φύσιν) ακολουθία.90 In synt. 184,lf. (quoted at the beginning
of section 1.4.1.), it is represented by ή δέουσα κατάστασις.91 Like το έξης,
this expression emphasizes the structural orderliness of a sentence, which in turn
implies semanto-syntactical perfection.92
At this point we should return to the passage quoted at the beginning of
section 1.4.1. It will be remembered that the sentence φως εστίν, εΐ ήμερα
εστίν (synt. 184,7ff.), was an example of an evident hyperbaton, the conditional
protasis and the apodosis being inverted. The example is clearly recognizable äs
Stoic in origin; it is the prototypic συνημμένον, the complex conditional
axiom. I do not think this example was selected at random by Apollonius, but I
suspect its selection was occasioned by its similar use in Apollonius' sources. It
appears that the indifference of the order of the two axiomata which constitute
the συνημμένον is Stoic theory äs well.93 The λεκτόν, the asomatic entity
Κατάλληλον and το έξης are then synonymous, e.g. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. Met.
CAG l 141,11 (however, cf. the use of άκατάλληλον 141,6: έχει δε τι ή λέξις
άκατάλληλον ... δοκεΐ γαρ δι' αυτής το άντικείμενον λέγειν ου
ττροείρηκε.) Κατάλληλον, too, although primarily referring to the word-order of
the phrase, is explained (141,13f.): τοϋτο γαρ συμφώνον είναι τοις
ττροειρημένοις; 185,22. Usually, το έξης (and also ή ακολουθία, το
ακολουθούν) terminologically Stresses the structural aspect, whereas κατάλληλον
focuses on the semanto-syntactical relationships within an uttering. Cf. adv.
122,16ff. "Ετι φαμέν ούτως, καλώς ό ανθρωττος γράφει, και εστί
κατάλληλος ό λόγος· εκαστον γαρ των μορίων συμφέρεται τω ίδίω
συντάγματι ...[but] (ό καλώς άνθρωπος γράφει) μεταξύ ... γινόμενον το
επίρρημα δύο τττωτικών ... ουκ έχει την καταλληλότητα την έτα το ρήμα.
90
 Pron. 42,8f. (with the familiär Opposition to τα εν ύττερβατω, cf. Baar
1952, 33 on Nicanor, who always tries so to arrange his punctuation that
particles come in the second position in a sentence. When reporting another
Sossibility, he points out the hyperbaton (SchHom. I 528; Υ 157) and prefers therst one (SchHom. A 435; O 152), although sometimes his own position is not
made explicit); coni. 235,17; synt. 23,8.
91
 Cf. synt. 177,3f.: ττροφανές ως έτα ττάντων των τοιούτων ο λόγος
καταστήσει το δέον της συντάξεως.
92
 It is worked out by του έταρρήματος έτα το ρήμα φερομένου
(semanto-syntactical) and της αντωνυμίας έττΐ την δέουσαν θέσιν της
έγκλίσεως (structural; an enclitic should come after the word it belongs with)
(synt. 184,2ff.). Cf. the combination of τη συνθέσει and τη διεξοδική
επαγγελία (synt. 184,9f.) in the comparison with the conditional period.
93
 S.E. AM. VIII (= Adv.Log. II) llOf.: των δε εν τω συνημμένω
αξιωμάτων το μετά τον "εί" ή τον "εϊττερ" τεταγμένον ήγούμενόν τε
και πρώτον καλείται, το δε λοιττόν λήγόν τε καΐ δεύτερον, και εάν
άναστρόφως έκφέρηται το όλον συνημμένον, οίον ούτως "φως εστίν,
εϊπερ ήμερα εστίν"· καΐ γαρ εν τούτω λήγον μεν καλείται το "φως
εστίν" καίττερ ττρώτον έξενεχθέυ, ήγούμενόν δε το "ήμερα εστίν"
καίττερ δεύτερον λεγόμενον, δια το μετά τον "εϊπερ" σύνδεσμον τετάχθαι.
(111) ή μεν ουν σύστασις του συνημμένου ... εστί τοιαύτη, έπαγγέλλεσθαι
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expressed by the συνημμένον, is unaffected by any irregularities on the level
of the expression; a λεκτόν is always fully κατάλληλος. Incidentally, it will be
remembered that the Stoics considered the axiom äs the "Normfall" of the
λεκτόν.
Now, there is an inherent difficulty about the theory of the λεκτόν, namely
that per definitionem a λεκτόν cannot be expressed in words. However, since the
Stoics had no Option (neither do we), they did make verbal representations of
the incorporeal λεκτά. In this way two new relationships between the λεκτόν
and the expression emerged. For, firstly, these representations consisted of
normalized Greek,94 and secondly the Stoics used the same terminology to
describe both the expressions and the λεκτά.95 Incidentally, the relationship of
the λεκτόν and its word-picture is the second context in which we may rightly
speak of a one-to-one correspondence. Such a relationship between expression
and meaning also existed in the original state of language.96 It does not hold,
however, in later stages of normal Greek. - It would seem that the grammatical
δε δοκέ! κτλ.
Notice that the first πρώτον and δεύτερον primarily refer to the logical order
(i.e. the logical priority of the antecedent to the consequent); this also implies a
"logical ordering" of the expression.
94
 As Egli puts it (1978, 150; 1986, 300f.): "Stoic loquia (lekta) are
designated by expressions of a normalized Greek. They have the same structure
äs these Greek expressions. Thus, in most technical uses they serve
approximately the same purppse äs "semantic structures" or "semantic
representations" in modern hnguistics and philpsophy of language." There is no
other means to express a λεκτόν, although it is per definitionem an inadequate
method. It is precedented, however, in Stoicism itself. One very basic Latin
example is Sen. Ep. 117,13 video Catonem ambulantem. Hoc sensus ostendit,
animus credit. corpus est quod video, cui et oculos intendi et animum. dico
deinde: "Cato ambulat." "non corpus", inquit, "est quod nunc loquor, sed
enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii
dictum." It is clear that Cato ambulat is not looked upon äs a phonological string
here, but äs an asomatic meaning. But Seneca, of course, has to make do with
writing down a sentence.
95
 Cf. Lloyd 1971, 64f.; Kneale & Kneale 1971, 143; Frede 1977, 60; 68.
Frede (1977, 69) rightly upholds that "it would be natural for the Stoics to use
the same terms to refer to a feature of the lekton and the corresponding feature
of the expression, äs in fact we see they did". He mentions the use of ένικόν
and τΓληθυντικόν äs examples. Cf. Frede 1978, 58; see also Skrzecka 1855, 8: "Die
für die dreifach getheilte Zeit gewählte Bezeichnung ist auch auf die
grammatischen Formen, welche dieselben bezeichnen, übertragen"; he adds that it
is not always clear whether we are dealing with the grammatical pr the semantic
category. A sketch of the relationship between the domains of λέξι? and λεκτόν
in the Stoic temporal System is given by Müller 1943, 90.
96
 Cf. chapter I section 2.2.; chapter II section 1.3.2.
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concept of το έξης and its equivalents ultimately derives from the perfect
state of the Stoic λεκτά, be it in a special sense.
The difference between the physical expression and the asomatic meaning
was relevant to Apollonius and he often applies it for instance, in his remarks
on pathology, dialectology and etymology.97 Moreover, he is most emphatic in
giving precedence to the semantic aspects of a word over the formal ones.98
Should morphology and syntax contradict each other when one tries to establish
the correct μερισμός of a word, syntax/εννοια is decisive.99 He attacks
anyone who gives undue weight to morphological considerations.100 The
independence and priority of meaning appear from the fact that the meaning of a
word is unaffected by whatever happens to its form (adv. 136,32): τα ττάθη ΟΌ
των λεκτών, των δε φωνών. This use of the term λεκτόν seems to be in
agreement with the "orthodox" Stoic one. However, Apollonius usually applies the
word in a definitely un-Stoic sense. In adv. 158,20 (concerning αβαλε and its
alternative forms) he points out that: το βάλε αφαίρεσα δια το εν λεκτω
καταλιμττάνεσθαι το α.101 Λεκτόν indicates a meaningful word here, i.e. it is
used äs the Stoic term λόγος, designating the meaningful linguistic string, the
combination of λέξις and a semantic component. Apparently there was some
confusion about the exact denotation of technical terminology, especially where
Problems such äs asomatic meaning versus somatic expression are concerned.102
97
 Cf. chapter I section 2.3.
98
 Meaning is superior to form and is more or less independent of it
(principle of etymology, cf. chapter I section 2.2.; 2.3.); form, however, can be
influenced by meaning (adv. 127,18ff.), see chapter I section 3.1.
99
 Adv. 134,22ff.: ου ... τα τταρά ... τι των παρεπομένων ταΐς φωνάϊς
έκφερόμενα περιγράφεται του δέοντος μερισμοί.; in practice: 141,14f.
100
 Adv. 164,20ff. (esp. 29f.).
101
 "Βάλε is a case of aphaeresis, äs can be gathered from the fact that α
is left äs a meaningful word [and has not therefore been added pleonastically to
an εντελές 'βάλε']". Cf. pron. 59,1; 59,6; coni. 233,2; 253,5; adv. 195,16 (with
Schneider's comm. a.11). Schneider wrongly assigns two different meanings to
λεκτόν in his Index (viz. quod per se proferri potest, vox and vox quatenus
aliquid signißcat): in each passage the connotation of semanticity is present.
Notice that the word never occurs in the Syntax.
102
 According to Frede (1977, 69) this confusion, which was caused by the
use of the identical terminology for expression and λεκτόν, was especially
augmented by the ambiguity of the term λεκτόν itself ("what can be said", "what
is said"), which came to be used for the expression, instead of the meanings
expressed. I would suggest that this use of λεκτόν was a consequence, rather
than one pf the sources of the confusion, for never in the Stoic testimonies do
we find it used in this perverse way. Frede traces the confusion to the
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Another example of a similar nature in Apollonius is adv. 188,31 (το Δεκέλεια)
τον δημον του σημαινοιιένου δηλούντος.103
We can conclude that the perfect representations which we are offered now
and then by Apollonius in bis description of το κατάλληλου, are word-pictures of
the λεκτά of the sentences in question. In these representations all ambiguities
have been solved äs far äs possible. However, the asomatic character of the
λεκτόν has somewhat receded into the background: it has no direct relevance to
Apollonius' purpose. The axioma äs Standard λεκτόν has also disappeared. It is
sufficient for Apollonius to have recourse to at least one kind of expression in
which form and meaning find an ideal correspondence.
Often it is an underlying logical order that is described by το έξης etc.;
often, too, all the τταρεμφάσεις of the original expression are made explicit.104
In any case, the paraphrases or word-pictures or whatever we want to call them,
serve an interpretive end, rather than a structural one. I think this is the case
even in those sentences which strike one äs abnormal - or even ungrammatical-
Greek.105 On closer inspection, the interpretive intentions of these passages
cannot be doubted. This fits in with the essential unity of semantics and syntax.
Of the examples quoted by Blank and Householder, the most striking one is the
Position of the possessive pronoun insynt. 205,13-227,15.
Householder observes that several times Apollonius replaces a possessive
pronoun with the genitive of the personal pronoun, which is placed in the so-
called attributive position.106 He marks these word-groups äs ungrammatical
because "normal personal pronouns in the genitive cannot stand between article
and noun in ordinary Greek" (1981, 13). Apollonius himself is well aware of this
grarnmarian Chaeres (= Chaeris), cf. Blau 1883, 56ff., esp. 65), cf. S.E. AMI 81
(opposing λεκτά and νοητά).
103
 "The meaning denoting the deme Deceleia." Cf. further the rather vague
expression adv. 154,4 κατά την τοτπκήν έκφοράν (combining a semantic and a
formal element). See also Schenkeveld 1984, 35 who points out that Apollonius
confuses σημαίνον (ρήμα) and σημαινόμενο ν (κατηγόρημα) m synt. 403,1 (cf.
Müller 1943, 48f.).
104
 E.g. the circumscription of the value of a mood, GG II iii 96,2 Iff.
νενικήκοι ό έμός τταϊς = είθε άκούσαιμι ότι υπάρχει νενικηκως ό
ΤΓάΙς μου.
105
 Cf. Blank 1982, 45f., quoting synt. 414,6 τρέμω δια σε which serves
äs an explanation of τρέμω σε, cf. note 113; Householder 1981, llf.; 16.
106 The examples from our passage are synt. 208,9; 210,6; 210,7; 210,19;
211,20f.; 212,8; 213,14; 214,7; 214,10; 215,12.
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rule.107 Schneider, too,108 regards these passages äs an Illustration of the
liberties Apollonius allows himself in matters of word-order.
In fact, however, all examples but one can be defended. The rule forbidding
"attributive" position of the genitive of the personal pronoun in a possessive
construction holds good for the enclitic pronouns and postpositive αυτοί ( =
eins) only. However, the possessive pronoun usually corresponds with the
orthotonic pronouns (type έμοϋ) and with αύτοϋ (= ipsius). They are used, äs
Apollonius remarks, to indicate αντιδιαστολή, i.e. they have a contrastive value.
Now, it is true that the personal pronoun έμοϋ in ordinary Greek cannot
stand between article and noun, but αύτοϋ (= ipsius) can:109 In the paraphrases
offered by Apollonius, αύτοϋ is emphatic; it cannot simply be replaced by
αύτοϋ because, äs Apollonius points out, there is no identity between the
subject of the sentence and the referent of αΰτοϋ. It should be noticed
moreover, that by Apollonius' time αύτοϋ and τούτου have become more or less
interchangeable; incidentally, the difference between αύτοϋ and αύτοϋ had
begun to disappear äs well.
This means that all Apollonius' examples containing αύτοϋ or αυτής are
perfectly acceptable Greek.110 This leaves only one problematic case, viz. synt.
208,9 του έμοϋ δοϋλον. However, in this case, too, Apollonius' intention is
clearly interpretive:111 In synt. 208,6ff. he discusses the fact that the possessive
pronoun always has the value of a genitive, while its case-ending is solely
determined by the noun it belongs with. In order to show this, he replaces the
possessive pronoun with a genitive, without changing the order of the word-
group.112 However, since the result is irregulär, he is somewhat apologetic in
107
 Ct. synt. 218,14ff.;2210,12ff.;/TOM. 65,lff.
108
 Comm. 69f.; cf. Tractatus 161.
109
 Cf. KG I 564 Anm. 3. In synt. 212,8 the value of τω αύτοϋ θάρσει
is made completely clear by the preceding τω Ιδίω κτήματι.
110
 Notice that examples like κάλλεος εϊνεκα οίο (210,5) = ένεκα του
αύτοϋ κάλλους may have had the additional advantage of making clear that the
Homeric pronoun is translated by the combination of article plus pronoun.
111
 It is in itself a well-known phenomenpn that a native Speaker trying to
explain the meaning of a construction in bis own language will often take
recourse to paraphrases which are in themselves quite unnatural and would not
easily occur in everyday usage.
112
 208,8ff.: δυνάμει γαρ ό λέγων ούτως, τον έμόν δοϋλον έτταισα,
φησιν τον έμοϋ δοϋλον ετταισα, δττερ ουκ άλλο τι -γενήσεται ή τον έμαυτοϋ.
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presenting this paraphrase (note δυνάμει, 208,8ff., and the immediate
replacement of the dubious expression with the correct έμαυτοϋ).113
Summing up, it is true that the word-pictures of the λεκτά often strike one
113
 Householder's remark (1981, 13) that ττρός ταΐς έμαίς θύραις
(209,2f.) is puzzling since it is not the correct deep structure, is nonsense.
The other examples of ungrammatical Greek may be dealt with briefly here:
- synt. 413,5ff. τρέμω σε is explained äs τρέμω δια σε. Apollomus tnes to
make explicit the difference in relationship between the accusative with a verb
like τρέμω, which cannot become the subject of a passive sentence, and a
"normal" accusative with a transitive verb. Since everyday Greek did not offer
any alternative construction, he had to make do with this preposition group.
Although this construction is never attested, in itself nothing much seems wrong
with it - it was probably äs perfectly understandable to Apollomus
contemporaries äs it is to us. I must say that I really do not see why a
"surface-ungrammatical" form (Householder 1981, 16) eo ipso cannot be a helpful
paraphrase. Note Apollonius' addition (synt. 413,7f.) that these verbs express
α-ύτοττάθεια, which excludes the possibility of passivation; this, too, is a
semantic explanation. . . . . . .
- synt. 431,lff.; esp. 431,1 Iff.: the construction of μέλει + (article + mfimtive).
Here, too we have a rare, but perhaps not an impossible construction, cf. KG II
43ff (eg X Cy 16,16 (however, here the infinitive construction is resumed by
an anaphoric pronoun in the genitive, which makes a difference: το αρχήν μη
κάμνειν το στράτευμα, τούτου σοι δει μέλειν)). However this may be, m this
case, too the interpretive intention is clear: It must be demonstrated that the
infinitive is a nominative (and, thus, subject). The article can have this
clarifying function for all parts of speech, letters and even sentences, KG I 31;
cf. 36 Anm. 3.
 T T , ., , . ... , . iU ^
- synt. 408,10ff. βοΰλομαι έμαυτόν ττεριττατεϊν: Householder himself admits that
this construction is in order if the pronoun is contrastive, cf. KG II 30ff. The
construction has an interpretive purpose. The reason why the reflexive pronoun
need not be expressed in these cases, is that these sentences express
αΰτοττάθεια. This αΰτοττάθεια is explained in 409,lff. by means of a paraphrase
with έμαυτόν Cf. once again the circumspect mtroduction with δυνάμει,
408,10. . , . .,_
- those cases, too, where Apollonius presents a representation of το εξής
(Householder 1981, 11) may be explained interpretively, the question bemg What
goes with what"· For to Apollonius' mind this is a question of syntacto-
semantics. Cf. iy«f. 315,7ff.; 175,7ff.
- synt. 45 llf Apollomus polemizes against Trypho (synt. 43,5ff.) who holds the
view that the infinitive is a noun if it is combmed with the article, but a verb
in the other cases. Apollonius reacts by adding articles in cases where according
to Trypho the infinitive is verbal in character. This yields sentences like the
following: το φιλόλογε!ν βούλομαι ήττερ το ττλουτειν; cf. adv. 132,10ο.
βούλομαι γράφειν, καν μετά άρθρου, τφο·ηροΰμην το φιλολογειν ηττερ το
ραθυμειν The advantage of these sentences is, again, their clear Illustration
of Apollonius' point. Skrzecka's view (1861, 17ff.) purporting that "er dieses
Beispiel [the passage from the Syntax], ohne auf den Sprachgebrauch Rucksicht
zu nehmen nur um seinen Satz zu behaupten, selbst gebildet hat" is not qmte
correct, cf. KG II 43ff., e.g. S. OC 442.
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äs unusual Greek, but then they are meant to be more than just normal Greek:
they represent the true meaning.114
The concept of το έξης was to be a fruitful one. Apart from its
indicating the correct, grammatical order,115 it had been frequently used before
Apollonius by Nicanor116 to denote a sentence from which all grammatically
unnecessary elements have been removed, without any changes in the order of
the rest. Such a skeleton sentence is meant to facilitate the Interpretation and
the construction of the sentence.117 The parts which are not strictly necessary
for this goal are called δια μέσου.118 This becomes technical scholiastic
terminology.119 What is δια μέσου is considered to impede a quick grasp of
the meaning. The concepts of το έξης and δια μέσου result in the
114
 I am not sure about Apollonius' view on the relationship between the
"word-picture λεκτά" and the actual expressions. There does not seem to be a
fixed way for the one to develop out of the other. Although the four categories
of change (quadrupertita ratio, Ax 1986a), are found, they are not applied
systematically at all, especially not in syntactic matters. Morphologically, matters
he somewhat different.
115
 Cf. also synt. 109,8; 176,15 and the practice of the scholiasts, e.g.
SchEur. Hipp, l et saep.
116
 Who is never quoted in the work qf Apollonius, but fairly often in that
of Herodian (see Index by Ludwich in GGIII ii).
117
 Baar 1952, 27; 111. Nicanor tried to make the structure of the sentence
come out äs clearly äs possible. This is also apparent from his theory of
punctuation, see Blank 1983a, 60: he prefers to punctuate äs early äs possible,
i.e. äs soon äs a complete sentence has been formed.
118
 Baar 1952, 111: δια μέσου is a group of words which Interrupts the
expected course of a sentence or which is not missed if left out.
119
 See e.g. SchAesch. Suppl. 166-7 (Smith I 70,9); SchEur. Ph. 550; Hipp.
812; (το έξης e.g. SchEur. An. 1273); SchHor. Carm. III 5,6-8 (Porphyrion):
Turpis maritus vixit et hostium, pro curia inversique mores, consenuit socerorum
in armis} Ύττερβατόυ sie ordinandum: et hostium socerorum in armis consenuit.
Nam illa per exdamationem [per medium est], quae Graece δια μέσου inlata
esse dicuntur: "Pro curia inversique mores!". It is taken over along with the rest
of the pagan grammatical terminology by the Christian Interpreters, cf.
Neuschäfer 1987, 232 (Origen); with ευ μέσω for δια μέσου: Joh.
Chrysostomus, fragm. in Jerem. PGM 64, 929B-C ' (on Jer. 20:9-10: το "öu
ηκουσα ψόγου" ... άττοδέδοται τφ "και ειττου· ου μη όυομάσω" ... τήυ
•γαρ α'ιτίαυ της σιωττης τέθεικε. το δε "έγέυετο ή καρδία μου ... " εν.
μέσω κείται, ή δε εύνοια έστιυ ... (follows a paraphrasis); cf. also
Diodorus Tarsensis, CCSG 6,271,88ff. (in PS. 44:6): Τα βέλη σου ήκουημέυα,
δυυατέ
1
 λαοί ΰττοκάτω σου ττεσοϋυται ευ καρδία τώυ έχθρώυ του
βασιλέως] τταρέγκειται ό στίχος το 'λαοί ΰττοκάτω σου ττεσοϋυται'. Ή γαρ
ακολουθία εστί- τα βέλη σου, δυυατέ, ευ καρδία τώυ έχθρώυ του
βασιλέως, καΐ τότε λαοί ϋττοκάτω σου ττεσοϋυται· υϋυ δε, καθώς είττου,
τταρέγκειται ό στίχος και ττοιεΐ τήυ άσάφειαυ. For δια μέσου indicating a
parenthesis, see also chapter IV section 1.
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admonitions of Gregorius Corinthius not to be disturbed by the seeming
complexity of Greek sentences,120 but to begin calmly construing them by
looking for the verb and the corresponding noun in the nominative and to go on
from there121 - this sounds disturbingly like a school practice which the writer
knows from experience, although it now seems to be out of fashion.
1.5. Recapitulation; semantics
To sum up the preceding sections, it is evident that Apollonius regarded
language äs an ordered symmetrical whole, hierarchically organized in several
levels, which are characterized by the isomorphism of their internal structure.
Language can be studied from a formal or a semantic point of view. Semantics
are intrinsically more important than φωνα'ι. This is especially manifest from the
fact that semantic considerations are of a higher order than morphological ones
and are decisive in matters of μερισμός.
The whole concept of καταλληλότης is essentially semantic in character.
Καταλληλότης can be a characteristic of any expression. Often, however, there is
something wrong with language äs it presents itself to us, either in the form of
daüy usage or in a literary context. In the case of problems, the grammarian
should use his reason. He should do so especially if he cannot have recourse to
literature and the usage of his specific author, or to the works of earlier
grammarians and daily usage, in order to try to find out what is wrong: For
reason can detect even hidden mistakes because it can apply the System of rules
and regularity underlying the actual presentation of language. To the tools of the
grammarian belongs the falsification-principle of έλεγχος, which similarly rests
on a semantic basis. At all times there is the καταλληλότης, the principle of
rational analogy, which holds good for the meaning. This meaning can be
represented by a kind of would-be λεκτόν, which is, äs it were, put back into
expression.
120 Gregorius believes the order of words in Greek is a rather random
affair (§ 6 37ff Donnet (cf. 6,44 άδιαφορίαν)) although φυσικώς the noun comes
first, then the verb etc. The pupil is stimulated to reconstruct this order.
121
 § 530ff Donnet cf. § 16, 104ff. when sentences are complicated: μη
σ-υ-γχέο-υ wo των μεσεμ'βολημάτων (cf. τα δια μέσον) άλλα -πρώτον ζητεί
το δ νομό: και το ρήμα και σύνατπε ττρός άλληλα, είτα τα μεσολαβουντα
σύνταττε κτλ.
69
2. The grammarian at work; Apollonius on the adverb
The grammatically correct sentence consists of parts of Speech fulfilling
certain requirements of regularity in their mutual relationships. Donnet has
pointed out (1967, esp. 38ff.) that ancient grammar is primarily a word grammar
or a philosophical (logical) one. "Structural" grammar, with truly syntactic aims,
is lacking. Apollonius' work is a perfect mixture of these two aspects of ancient
linguistics. As a consequence, the parts of Speech are an extremely important
linguistic category and it is of vital interest to Apollonius to be able correctly
to identify a word äs belonging to one category or another (μερισμός). And
this is, indeed, a question we find him occupied with many times.
If Apollonius discusses the μερισμός of a word, an important criterium is
whether or not a word conforms to the definition of a given part of speech. In
the rest of this chapter I shall first study Apollonius' definition of the adverb
and put it into the context of the rest of his work (2.). Then, I shall look into
some aspects of Apollonius' method in establishing the μερισμός of a word (3.).
Before discussing the first part of de adverbio (119,5-125,5) I shall state
some principles from which I will work. In scholarly discussions about ancient
linguistics it was for a long time not uncommon to consider Apollonius'
definition äs a more or less autonomous and independent entity. It was
interpreted äs such and was compared with other definitions which have come
down to us. Often, the definition was criticized on the basis of other data,
either derived from the work of Apollonius himself or from other ancient
writers, or from later theories on this matter.122 It should be stressed that this
procedure is methodologically sound, since a definition should be autarchic.
However, its usefulness is limited, unless one is interested in finding the
"correct" definition only, and one regards ancient grammarians äs contemporary
colleagues, to be combated or supported according to the degree of their
agreement with one's own views.
Since I am not primarily interested in the correctness or faultiness of
Apollonius' definition, I will not isolate it from its immediate context or from
the rest of Apollonius' work. Rather, I intend to profit from the fact that this
definition of the adverb has not come down to us by itself. A lot of material has
come with it that may prove helpful in its Interpretation. This material consists
of three parts. In the first place, Apollonius explains his own definition (119,7-
125,5). Secondly, in the discussion of the words with unclear μερισμός, the
122
 So e.g. Schoemarm 1862, 166f.; 1871,229; Steinthal 1891, 320.
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question whether or not the definition applies to a word is an important
criterium (126,27-145,25; e.g. 128,13ff.). Finally, there are a number of other
places in bis work (especially in bis Syntax), where Apollonius teils us something
about bis views on the adverb.123
I will, therefore, regard the definition äs the result, rather than the
starting-point of Apollonius' linguistic studies. The question whether Apollonius
made a success of his definition recedes into the background. This approach to a
definition is legitimate only in cases like this, where we try to describe an
historical Situation, to assess the extent of grammatical knowledge of a certain
author, and to understand the linguistic thought in a certain period, and where
we have at our disposal more, and more extensive expressions of his opinions by
the author himself. Should we have the definition only, speculations about the
intentions of the author would be idle. In that case the criterium of self-
sufficiency of a definition would certainly hold.
Since such is not the case here, I shall try to Interpret the definition in
the light of what we know about Apollonius' opinions on the adverb. Where the
definition is ambiguous, Apollonius is given the benefit of the doubt. This does
not detract from the fact that ambiguity in a definition is objectionable. But it
is methodologically relevant to realise that Interpretation and criticism should be
applied in this order.124
There is one case in which this method is not unproblematic. If Apollonius
has simply taken over an existing definition, his definition may indeed have been
the starting-point, rather than the result, of his inquiries. Although this cannot
be absolutely excluded, it is highly unlikely. Certainly, Apollonius was influenced
by his predecessors and the Stoa has definitely left its mark,125 but it is
improbable indeed that it should have done so on Apollonius' actual theory of
the adverb, which played a marginal role in Stoic "grammar". Moreover, in
principle Apollonius did not borrow uncritically nor did he follow anyone blindly.
Anyone who has read only a few pages will be able to confirm äs much. The
cases where he enters into polemic discussions with his predecessors are legion.
As an example one might take the beginning of de pronominibus, in which he
presents us with a critical doxography of earlier grammarians. He criticizes even
123
 These testimonies should be used with care, because discrepancies
caused by Apollonius' having changed his mind on some points, may occur, cf.
Lehrs 1843, 120. Generally speaking, however, synt. and adv. are very close to
each other where our subject is concerned.
124
 So already Lange 1852a, 44.
125
 Especially in matters of division in presentation. Cf. for Stoic influence
Blank 1982, 5; 41; 52; Barwick 1957, 26.
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the names applied by bis predecessors to the pronouns (pron. 3,9ff.). A similar
passage in de adverbio has possibly been lost.12^ In de coniunctionibus, too,
after clearly stating bis debt to the Stoa, he still Claims room for contributions
of bis own (coni. 213,9-314,3).127 In de adverbio Apollonius never spares bis
predecessors bis criticism either. Apollonius was perfectly able to form an
independent judgment on bis subject. However, whereas it is improbable that he
took over material from bis predecessors uncritically, one cannot and should not
rule out the possibility that he was - terminologically or otherwise-
influenced.128
To facih'tate the understanding of what follows, I will state from the
beginning my Interpretation of the definition. Then I will analyse the structure
of the passage 119,5-125,5, paying special attention to Apollonius' method.
Finally, I will explain my Interpretation. This method will of necessity create
some overlaps, but it will relieve the section about the Interpretation of a lot of
complicating, though interesting, material.
2.1. Translation ofthe definition; anticipation of condusions
Apollonius begins his work ττερί επιρρημάτων by stating the bipartition he
means to impose on his work. Since every pari of speech can be studied from
two angles, the έννοια and the σχήμα της φωνής,129 he will divide the
presentation of his material accordingly. The λόγος ο ττερί της έννοιας
takes up the first part (119,5-126,24-(145,25)); the λόγος ό ττερί του
σχήματος της φωνής runs from 146,1 (έχομένως σκετττέον και ττερί των
126
 Cf. Schneider comm. 136f.
127
 Cf. Caujolle-Zaslawsky 1978, 435, who Claims that Apollonius äs a
grammarian rejects the complications caused by the philosophical approach of
grammar by the Stoics^ referring to e.g. coni. 213,8ff. öl δε ... Στωϊκάς
τταρεισφέρσυσι δόξας, ων ή τταράδοσις ουκ άγαν χρειώδης ττρό'ς την ε'ις
γραμματικήν συντείνουσαν τεχνολογ'ιαν. Incidentally, I consider the relative
ων-clause to be restrictive. For the positive influence of the Stoa on
Apollonius, cf. Frede 1977, 71ff.
128
 The only source for this definition one might reasonably think of is
Trypho. However, we know nothing about his definition of the adverb. '
129
 Cf. the Stoic σημαινόμενον and φωνή.
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εν ταίς φωναϊς σχημάτων) to 200,32.13° The study of the έννοια is in its
turn divided into:
-the definition of "adverb" and its discussion (119,5-125,5);
-the syntax of the adverb äs relating to the correctness of the name επίρρημα
(125,6-126,23);
-the discussion of a number of words which are problematic äs to their
μερισμός (126,24-145,25); this part is to be looked upon äs a kind of appendix
to the first part, cf. 126,24ff. I shall not consider the subdivisions of the second
part here.
The definition rans äs follows (119,5f.): "Εστίν ουν έτάρρημα μεν λέξις
άκλιτος, κατηγορούσα των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων καθόλου ή
μερικώς, ων άνευ ου κατακλείσει διάνοιαν.
"An adverb is an indeclinable part of speech saying something about the verbs,
in all their forms or part of them, without which (verbs) it cannot make the
sense complete".
Apollonius subsequently deals with the different sections of this definition
and treats first the άκλισ'ια (119,7-120,18), then the clause κατηγ. των εν τ.
ρήμ. εγκλίσεων (...) ων άνευ κτλ. (120,18-122,34); finally, he discusses the
words καθόλου ή μερικώς (123,1-125,5).
Before entering into a more detailed discussion I shall briefly state the
major problems involved in this definition and give a survey of my proposed
Solutions and conclusions.
The first question is the meaning of the phrase των εν τοις ρήμασι
εγκλίσεων. Ι will maintain the view that this means "the declined forms of the
verb", thus rejecting the possibility that εγκλίσεις exclusively means "moods"
here. In this Interpretation the phrase is almost synonymous to ρημάτων taut
court, so that the next question is: Why did Apollonius go to this extent of
terminological trouble at all?
The answer to this second question lies in the Interpretation of another
clause of the definition, to wit καθόλου ή μερικώς: Adverbs can either modify
all forms of a given verb, or part of them. In the latter case there are
combinatory restrictions caused by the fact that the meaning of the adverb is
related to that of one of the verbal categories (tense, mood, person); therefore
the adverb may be semantically incompatible with some elements of the verbal
130
 Notice that λέξις, like μέρος του λόγου, can refer either to the
category "part of speech" (thus enabling Apollonius to discuss the meaning ot
the part of speech 'adverb'"), and the individual word belongmg m such a
category (thus giving him the opportunity to discuss the 'form of the respective
adverbs'). Cf. Lallot 1985, 116.
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paradigm, some of its εγκλίσεις. This does not amount to saying that adverbs
cannot be combined with all verbs. Never does Apollonius discuss the restrictions
which obtain between (semantic classes of) verbs and certain adverbs (e.g. verbs
of motion and adverbs indicating the "place where"). If Apollonius had used
ρημάτων instead of the more elaborate phrase in bis definition, the reader
might easily have been misled: Apollonius may, therefore, have feit that his
formulation was clearer and more exact. Little did he know.
The addition of ων άνευ κτλ. was added in order to subsume under the
definition those adverbs which to all appearances form an independent uttering,
like καλώς, οϊμοι or vca. According to Apollonius, these words are adverbs
and thus exhibit the major characteristic of their part of speech, i.e. they are
construed with a verb: Only this time, the verb is not physically present, but has
to be understood from the linguistic or situational context. It may well have
been all the more desirable to point out the fact that the adverbs by themselves
cannot form an independent predicate, because a number of them were considered
by the Stoa to belong to the part of speech ρήμα, probably because they made
up part of the κατηγόρημα. The difference between adverb and verb was in
this way pointed out clearly in the definition.
The ων άνε-υ-clause, however, creates a problem of its own: by
concentrating on the failure of the adverb to form a complete predicate, and,
consequently, on the necessity of the presence of a verb, it causes the
combination of adverb + participle to fall outside the definition. Apollonius shows
some awareness of this problem himself in his discussion of the clause in
question.
2.2. Structure
2.2.1."Εστιν ... επίρρημα ... λέξις άκλιτο? (adv. 119,7-120,18)
According to Apollonius, the indeclinability of the adverb is an evident
(empirical) datum; it is τφοϋτττον (119,7), but Apollonius devotes an άττόδειξις
to it all the same. This is the typical combination of empirical data and a logical
approach of someone who believes in the basic rationality of language: even the
evident must be explained.131
The argument of the άττόδειξις is the following: Whenever nouns Start
behaving syntactically like adverbs, they also formally adapt to their new Status,
i.e. they turn into άκλιτοι. This is most important. According to Apollonius a
word comes to be a certain part of speech, äs soon äs it takes over its function,
131
 Cf. Blank 1982, 14. Things that are evident, are so on the basis of
either observation or common sense. They can either be the starting-point of an
άττόδειξις or, äs here, be combined with one.
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i.e. its meaning. One can understand how this works, if one realizes that he
always describes what we would call "syntactical functions" in terms of the
parts of speech.132 For syntactical functions to be fulfilled by different parts of
speech is not a familiär notion in ancient linguistics.133 Syntactical relationships
can, of course, by definition occur only when two or more words are combined.
There is no such thing äs a syntax of one word.134 Therefore, the complete
meaning of a word (syntax being a function of the semantic characteristics of a
pari of speech, cf. section 0. note 12) can be ascertained only by the use one
makes of a word in an uttering. It is only then that one can state its
μερισμός.
Το return to the άττόδειξις: Apollonius uses a potentially declinable word
(to wit ταχύ) to demonstrate and test the relationship between (adverbial)
meaning/function and indeclinability. Ταχύ in το ταχύ ττεριττατεΐ μειράκιον
("the quick boy walks around") is declinable, äs appears from the genitive του
ταχέος μειρακίου. But it is not so any longer in ταχύ irepiirorcl το
μεψάκιον ("the boy walks around quickly"), äs is shown by ταχύ ττερι/ττατούντος
του μειρακίο-υ. If even declinable words "freeze" when they are used
adverbially, it will be clear that the adverbs themselves must be indeclinable äs
well.135 The argumentation is briefly surnmed up in 120,15-18 άττόδειξις οίν ...
έξηνέχθη.
2.2.2. Κατηγορούσα των εν τοις ρήμασι,ν εγκλίσεων ... ων άνευ ΟΌ
κατακλείσει διάνοιαν (adv. 120,18-122,34)
In this passage two clauses of the definition are discussed in a kind of
"ring-composition". Recapitulating bis arguments about the άκλισί,α (120,19-22),
Apollonius Starts this new section of his discussion with the remark that it is
now also clear (σαφές, 120,19) ως κατηγορεί (sc. τα έταρρήματα) των εν
τοίς ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων. This, however, has not been demonstrated in what
precedes, but rather it has been presupposed in the pari dealing with the
132
 Cf. Steinthal 1891, 222f.
133
 In synt. 481,2ff. Apollonius describes how a local meamng which is
usually imparted by an adverb, may also be conveyed b>_aL Syntax ofprgjsigj
plus nounf but this is not quite the same thmg. Cf. Stemthal 1891, 344t. bee
further section 3.3.1.1.
134
 Steinthal 1891, 341.
135
 The declinable words are of course the only ones in which the
difference can be demonstrated, but at the same time the argument has an α
fortiori character, since to demonstrate the άκλισια of τττωτικα is certamly no
sinecure, cf. δττου γε, 120,16.
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άκλι,σία.
136
 Σαφές cannot, therefore, indicate more than ττροΰτττον in 119,7 did.
It is not a conclusion, but a generally acceptable presupposition.
From 120,22 onwards Apollonius concentrates on the relationship between
adverb and verb, comparing it with that between adjective and Substantive
noun.
137
 This comparison is the more legitimate since Substantive nouns and
verbs are the θεματικώτερα μέρη του λόγου: the other parts of speech are
subservient to them.13»
 in 121,140. the necessity of the presence of a verb is
discussed, which applies even in those cases where it is not physically there, äs
'with the έταφωνησεις.139 τ^
 inciusion of ομοι in {he categoiy Qf ^
adverbs is defended by a terminological comparison with another level of
language (121,23f., see above section 1.2.).
The natural link between adverb and verb is not only acceptable on the
basis of the experience of any user of Greek, one may also εξ υποδείγματος
ττιστώσασθαι τον λόγο. (121,27; cf. άττόδειξυς 119,7). Accordingly, Apollonius
proceeds to test the ων ανευ-theory by means of a test for optionality
(122,lff.), from which it appears that the verb may not be omitted. In yet
another comparison, he equates the necessity of a verb to an adverb with that
of a noun to an άρθρον (cf. note 138).
After a short remark about negatives and affirmatives (122,13-15, see
below), Apollonius again focuses on κατηγορείν των ρημάτων and introdu'ces a
test based on the order of words (122,16ff.).O καλώς άνθρωττος γράφει is a
semanto-syntactical monstrum. Καλώς is, äs it were, encapsulated in a nominal
group where it is a corpus alienum and it cannot be construed with the verb
where it would be at home, because it is held captive within the boundaries of
136
 There, the adverbial character was deduced from the fact that the
ΤΓτωτικα m the cases under discussion were construed with verbs fand l in a
drfferent way from their normal construction with verbs at ff rf secüon"
3.2.1. on τπ,ξ and λάξ).^ν 120,1 one should read with Matthias L Schneider
comm. a.1.) ρήματα mstead of ονόματα. ^ ρ' 0(;ηηεια6Γ>
137
 This comparison is a common one in Apollonius rf ηΛ, ιοηο Α
120,7f. the use of έττικεΐσθαι and Schneider comm wTad 12077 Ά
123,6ff.; 125,23; 126,9ff.; Lallot 1985, 85 points ouTthat üT the deLn™ ?nf ?£
adverb attributed to Dionysius Thrax fl» words 'Αγόμενον öS?? whue
P1
-T$ on the.etymoogy of έττί-ρρημα, may contain In kSidfTinarisoS
with the adjective (έττί-θετον). He compares SchDTh. 95 2 0 23324 However
Lallot is wrong to explain from this analoeical scheme the in r ,t r Γ HoweXer'
that the Greek8grammParia
n
s never ootioed^pÄy^ oSSfan Xrb
with an adjective or another adverb, although it is trae that th^v g 5 5
onits use with verbs. For references, see note 230 ey concentrated
138
 Cf. Lange 1852& passim; bis whole article is meant to
the structure of the Syntax is based on the supremacy of these two
139
 For the έτηφωνήσεις, see below section 2.3.4. and chapter IV section 6.3.1.
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the nominal group. From the fact that it cannot be construed at all in this
sentence, it follows that the adverb can only be constraed correctly with the
verb, or at least with a word capable of expressing ττραγμα. Thus, from 122,16
onwards Apollonius returns to the clause öu κατηγορεί των ρημάτων το
επίρρημα. This whole passage, therefore, is built up chiastically (κατηγ. - ώυ
αυευ :: ώυ άνευ - κατή-/.).
2.2.2.l.Excursus: adv. 122,13-5
It seems likely that the paragraph 122,13-15 is wrongly placed in its present
Position; it should be put after 121,26 (cf. Schneider comm. a.1). As it Stands, it
Interrupts the two passages which are meant to test the hypothesis that an
adverb without a verb does not yield a complete meaning, and that if a verb and
an adverb are both present in a given sentence, they ought to be construed
together; at the same time it is missing in the enumeration of the adverbs which
seemingly lack a verb to complete their meaning (121,14ff.).
Another good reason for putting adv. 122,13-5 immediately after 121,27 is
the fact that in two passages which are in all likelihood dependent on
Apollonius,140 this is the preserved Order. I refer to SchDTh. 95,26ff., where we
find an uninterrupted treatment of the three cases in which a sentence
140
 According to Schneider, it is highly likely, but not certain, that in
those cases where the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax are in agreement with
Priscian, they both go back to Apollonius Dyscolus, see praef. to GG II iii, v.
Schneider here corrects the more extreme view of Dronke 1856, 554. However, I
would not object to this more stringent assertion either, in view of the fact that
wherever we can compare the combination of Priscian and the Scholia on
Dionysius Thrax with material from Apollonius, they do indeed represent his
views. The definitions of the adverbs and the pronouns cannot decide this
matter, since Priscian and the Scholiast are not in agreement here.
Schneider's reservation seems to be built in mainly to discredit the testimony of
Priscian and the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax concerning Apollonius' definition of
the conjunction (see Schneider comm. 120). And this is the point on which the
whole discussion has concentrated from the very beginning (cf. e.g. Lersch 1840
(Π) 139; Blink Sterk 1845, 50; Jahn 1847, 14; Egger 1854, 207 all of whom are in
favour of considering the definition found through the combination of Priscian
and the Scholiast, äs Apollonian. Dronke 1856, 554 is the first to formulate this
state of affairs äs a general rule. On the other band, Schneider 1874, 183;
comm.·, and epim.; and Skrzecka 1853, 5; 11 object to the identification of the
definition äs Apollonian and thus reject the general rule about the combination
of Priscian and the Scholiast. I think it very unlikely that Priscian and the
Scholiast would be in agreement in the use of a different source from Apollonius.
Whose authority would have had the same weight? In that case we would
certainly have to assume that the definition by Apollonius himself was lost
already in Anticjuity, which I find unlikely. Notice also that Priscian mentions
Apollonius in his book on conjunctions (III 95,13f.). It is a priori likely that, if
Priscian and the Scholiast followed Apollonius in their discussions of the adverb
and the preposition, which they did, they did äs much in the case of the conjunction.
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containing an adverb lacks a verb. The verb has to be supplied, either from the
context or from our extra-linguistic knowledge. These three cases are:141
-φευ and οϊμοι, which depend on a διάθεσις ρηματική, since people who
wonder or complain have previously undergone something;
-ναι and 011, which cannot be said unless we have been asked a question
(εγραψας;)
-ει etc. which presuppose an activity to which such an έττιφώνησις can refer.
The second text is from Priscian, who offers, of course, only two of the
above-mentioned possibilities. He is also aware of the third, but discusses it, äs
was to be expected of a Latin grammarian, under the heading of the interjection
(see chapter IV). Priscianus ΠΙ 62,16ff. deals with the obligatory presence of a
verb with an adverb. He continues (62,18ff.) quamvis enim ab aliqua persona per
se profemntur adverbia, necesse est ea vel ad ante dicta ab alia persona verba
referri, ut si quis me interrogaverit "bona est superbia?" et respondero "non", vel
per ellipsin dici, ut si redtante aliquo dixero "bene, diserte, eloquenter": u'tique
enim subauditur "dicis".142
Apart from its position, adv. 122,13-5 contains another problem. The text
runs äs follows: και το καταφατικόν δε <και το άττοφατικόν», ίδια
λεγόμενον, ττάλιν ττρός άτταρτισμόν τοΐ ρήματος του λεγομένου
παραλαμβάνεται· ττρός γαρ την "εγραψας;" φωνήν
 φοίμέυ «val« ^ "οΐ)".143
At first sight it would seem that this passage perverts the relationship between
verb and adverb, if indeed Apollonius means to say that the adverb syntactically
completes the sense of the verb in this case. Schneidens paraphrasis is not very
helpful: "proferuntur tamquam complementa verbi, quod antea interrogantes
protulimus". Moreover, if we look for parallels, the same Inversion of the role of
adverb and verb seems to be present in synt. 349,5ΐ. ή έττερώτησις
άναττληρωθεισα δια της καταφάσεως υποστρέφει είς το είναι οριστική.
However, both passages can be explained quite satisfactorily in their
respective contexts. The lines from de adverbio indicate that in the context
under discussion, viz. the one-word sentences "yes" and "no" in reply to a
141
 Cf. chapter IV section 6.3.1.
142
 "For even though adverbs may be uttered independentlv bv someone it
143
 "Also, the affirmation and the negative, said by themselves are used in
heir turn to complete the verb that has been mentioned; foF t Γ n react on to
the word 'have you written?' that we say 'yes' or 'no'." reaction to
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question, the adverbs do in fact refer to a verb, although it is not expressed in
the same sentence äs the adverbs, but in the preceding one. These one-word
sentences belong to the same class äs appreciative comments like καλώς and
exclamations like οϊμοι. The emphasis is, therefore, on the words του
ρήματος του λεγομένου. Nevertheless, the Wortlaut of the sentence suggests
the influence of the other context in which ναι and ου would be discussed, an
example of which is synt. 346,5ff.
This passage deals with the value of the indicative mood, which is also
called άττοφατική (affirmative); the term οριστική is more specific in that it
explicitly points to the declarative, defining illocutionary force, whereas
άιτοφατική is more general: affirmation can also be expressed by adverbs.144
Nevertheless, the fact that affirmativeness is an essential characteristic of the
indicative, goes unchallenged. For äs soon äs it loses this characteristic, it stops
being a real (declarative) "indicative", and turns into a question.145 It can be
restored to its previous Status by giving it back the lacking characteristic, viz.
that of affirmation (349,Iff.): ή δη ουν προκειμένη ή οριστική εγκλισις
την έγκειμένην κατάφασιν άττοβάλλουσα μεθίσταται καΐ του καλεϊσθαι
οριστική, είς -γαρ έττέρωτησιν των -πραγμάτων έγχωρεί, ήν'ικα φαμέν
"γέγραφας; λελάληκας;" καΐ εΐ μεν μη εϊη το τοιούτον αληθές, φαμέν
ού· εΐ δε αληθές εϊη το γεγραφέναι, φαμέν να'ι. καΐ ούτως ή
έττερώτησις αναττληρωθεϊσα δια της καταφάσεως ϋττοστρέφει ε'ις το είναι
οριστική.
146
Thus, the passage from the Syntax means that when a question is
supplemented by an affirmation (which is therefore construed with a verb in the
144
 Cf. synt. 346,5ff. ή ... καλούμενη οριστική καλείται και άττοφατική.
και δήλον δτι κοινής μεν εννοίας εϊχετο <τό> καλεϊσθαι αυτήν
άττοφατικήν ... Ίδιας μέντοι εννοίας εχεται ή οριστική· δια γαρ ταύτης
άττοφαινόαενοι όοι£όαεθα.
145
 Notice that the mood is linked to a specific speech act here; see
Schenkeveld 1984a, 338; 347.
146 "xiie indicative mood which we are npw discussing, sometimes lays aside
its affirmativeness and its right to the name indicative, when it enters into yes-
no questions [or rather: 'for it then passes into yes-no questions', I.S.], äs when
we say geeraphas? ("have you written?") or lelalekas ("have you spoken?"), and if
the corresponding affirmation would not be true, we answer ou ("no", "not"), but
if it is true that we have written [or spoken] we say nai ("yes"). And so the
interrogative, when completed by an affirmative response, turns again into an
indicative" (transl. Householder). Cf. synt. 164,7ff. καΐ δη εν τοίς ρήμασιν
ττάμττολλά εστί τταρυφιστάμενα, εν μεν τοις όριστικοΐς αυτός ό ορισμός
καΐ ή εξ αΰτοΰ νοούμενη κατάφασις, οττου γε και ττρός τάς ερωτήσεις
άνθΌττάγομεν το ναί ή οίι ή ρήμα όριστικόν, ως αν ττάλιν
έγκειμένης της καταφάσεως κατά τα οριστικά. (.11) γράφεις; λέγω κατ'
έρώτησιν, και το άνθυτταγόμενόν εστίν ή ναί ή γράφω.
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indicative mood-minus-affirmation) it turns back again into an indicative, i.e.
into a Statement. The adverb ναι might here be considered "pure affirmation",
an όνομα καταφάσεων, to create a parallel to είθε being called an όνομα
ευχής (synt. 351,12). Accordingly, ναι may be replaced by the verb in the
indicative mood, and vai γράφω is feit to be pleonastic (349,7ff.). It is clear,
then, that άναττληρωθεισα (synt. 349,51) does not relate to syntactic completion,
but to (a kind of lexical) completion of the semantic value of the indicative,
from which something had been taken away in order to turn it into a question.
Whereas the passage from de adverbio emphasizes the fact that here, too,
there is a verb in the context with which the adverb may be construed, the text
from the Syntax focuses on the lexical semantic completion of an indicative· the
necessary element of affirmation may be made explicit by means of the
affirmative adverb.
2.2.3. Καθόλου ή μερικώς (adv. 123,1-125,5)
In this passage Apollonius again employs the comparison of the relationship
between adverb and verb with that of adj'ective and Substantive, this time with a
view to the restrictions on the combinations of adverbs with the moods, tenses
and persons of the verb.
Once again, the paragraph dealing with ου, (ναι and) μη (124,8-14), looks
suspicious in its present place. It Interrupts Apollonius' argument about the
tenses and returns to the combinations of adverbs with different moods.
However, I think it wise not to meddle this time, on the assumption that
Apollonius has structured this passage rather freely.147
Apollonius shows how the fact that some adverbs are bound by combinatory
restrictions, may be used to solve cases of αμφιβολία (123,13ff. (moods); 26ff.;
124,21ff. (tenses)). I will return to this when I discuss the phenomenon of
συνέμτττωσις. Ambiguity can occur in the use of both the moods and the tenses.
147
 Dronkesuggests t0,put this PWaPh after 123,16 τΰτττεσθε (see
app.cnt. O.I.). This, however, leaves unexplamed SchDTh. 966-8 and 2722025
both entirely Apollonian in content, where the order is ius't äs stranee' äs in
Apollonius. SchDTh. 96,6ff.: μερικώς δε, ως τα χρονικά το ΐάρ χθες
ούτε _ τοις ένεστώσιν ούτε τοις μέλλουσι συντάσσεται, αλλ' ουδέ το μ-η
τη οριστική έγκλ'ισει, ουδέ ή ου άττόφασις ττροστακτικοις SchDTh
272,20ff.: <Τά δε μερικώς-> ου γαρ ττάντα τα μόρια, ' φημί τα
εττιρρηματικα, ευθετει ττρος πασάς τας εγκλίσεις- ιδού γαρ το α-νε
μόνοις ττροστακτικοίς συνάσσεται, και το είθε μόνοις εΰκτικοϊς
συντάσσεται, και το εάν μόνοις υττοτακτικοις- και ττάλιν το χθες ου
δυνασαι^
 (Τάξαι έτα μέλλοντος, ούτε το αϋριον έτα τταρωχηκότος ούτε
το μη έτα οριστικών, ούτε το ου εττι προστακτικών. '
Schneider's acrobatics (comm. a.1) in trying to smooth out the argument are
ineffective and unnecessary. 6
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The section on the tenses has two distinct parts, the first of which (123,16-
124,7) centres on the bipartition of τα παρωχημένα versus τα μη
παρωχημένα. Some temporal adverbs can only be combined with past tenses,
some are exclusively compatible with tenses that are non-past, and a third
category may be combined with either group, since it has a non-specific temporal
meaning. If a verb-form (or, for that matter a participle, which strictly speaking
forms a part of speech of its own) is ambiguous and may represent either a
past or a non-past tense (äs e.g. λέγων, "while I am reading, while I was
reading"), the combination with certain adverbs allows us to decide which
meaning to assign to the verb.
The second part (124,15ff.) takes a closer look at τα -παρωχημένα.
Technically speaking, these include for Apollonius: παρατατικός (imperfect;
completely left out of account here); παρακείμενος (perfect); ϋπερσυντέλικος
(pluperfect) and αόριστος (aorist).148 The aorist can have the values of both
the perfect and pluperfect. One can see which temporal value applies, by looking
at the temporal adverb joined to the aorist. For an adverb like πάλαι can be
construed with past tenses only, and not, by the same token, with a perfect.
The difficulty is obvious. Formally speaking the perfect belongs to the past
tenses (124,22), yet it has present meaning.149 Accordingly, in synt. 288, If. we
read that the perfect is an ένεστώσα συντέλεια, denoting το άμα νοήματι
ήνυσμένου.150 Should we indicate the respective tenses on a continuum, the
perfect would be very close to the present ("recent past"), while the pluperfect
is much "more past".1-'!
The recognition of the present value of the perfect is due to the Stoics,152
who developed a very accurate terminology of the tenses: They combined a word
for the position in respect of the present on the continuum (viz. ένεστώς and
148
 This quadruple division is very common in later grammarians, cf.
SchDTh. 403,25?.
149
 Cf. Schöpsdau 1978, 285f.
150Skrzecka 1855, 11: "άμα νοήματι ήνυσμένον giebt ungefähr_ die
Bestimmung, welche andre durch opu geben, a. SchDTh. 251,1t. καλείται
παρακείμενο? [sc. ό γέγραφα] δια το πλησίον εχειν την σ-υντελειαν της
ενεργείας. The value of the perfect is often descnbed äs close to_ the
present": SchDTh. 249,16f. ό δε παρακείμενος νοείται από του παρακεισϋαι
και έγγΰς είναι του ένεστάπος την πράξιν awotr δήλοι γαρ το μη
προ πολλού χρόνου πεπράχθαι το πράγμα.
151
 Cf. Müller 1943, 79f. for the difference between the Stoic and the
grammatical approach to the tenses.
152
 Cf. e.g. Pinborg 1975, 92ff.
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παρωχημένο?) with one indicating the extension or completion of the action
(παρατατικός and συντελικός).153 The problem in Apollonius is that he uses the
notions past/present and imperfect/perfect alternatively. For he argues that an
adverb with the connotation "past" cannot be conibined with a present-tense
verb. Therefore, πάλαι can be constraed with a pluperfect, but not with a
perfect. This implies that the perfect is feit äs a present-tense verb. The
terminological confusion implied is the following: The perfect tense is "present"
(124,16), but it is also "perfect", "complete" (124,19). Formally speaking "perfect"
falls under the scope of "past". Therefore, it can be upheld of the aorist that
εμπεριέχει ... το τταρωχημένον του παρακειμένου και του ϋττερο-υντελίκου
(124,22f.).154
The combinatory restrictions of adverbs and the personae of the verb are
dismissed briefly (125,2-5).
2.2.4. Recapitulation
Having described the stracture of Apollonius' discussion of bis definition of
the adverb I will briefly sum up the methodological means which he employed in
this passage:
-a combination of empirical data, immediately acceptable to every user of
language, and rational argumentation and tests; both factors are supposed to
Support each other mutually.155
-the comparison of different levels of linguistics or of elements which belong to
the same level. This technique was shown to spring from Apollonius' conviction
that language is essentially orderly and one. The conception of language äs a
highly organized System is confirmed by the possibilities it offers to combat its
own internal ambiguities.
153
 Thus, they call the perfect ένεστως συντελικός, SchDTh. 251,4 (cf.
synt. 288,lf.). I shall not go into the intricacies of the temporal theory of what
we call aspect here. Cf. chapter III, note 18.
154
 "It embraces ... the past tenses of the perfect and the pluperfect." Cf.
Skrzecka 1855, 11; "Das Perfectum ... wurde von den Stoikern für ein Tempus der
Gegenwart angesehn. Dieser Meinung scheint Apollonius nicht unbedingt
beizustimmen, sondern angenommen zu haben [sie] dass durch das Perfectum eine
Handlung bezeichnet werde, welche der Vergangenheit angehöre, sich aber in
der Gegenwart vollende." See also Schöpsdau 1978, 286 n. 22.
155
 Cf. Blank 1982, 14.
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2.3. Interpretation
2.3.1."Εστίν ... επίρρημα ... λέξις άκλιτο1;
The adverb's άκλισία156 does not offer any problems of Interpretation.
Contrary to nouns, verbs, participles and pronouns, adverbs are not susceptible
to flexion.
Thierfelder's criticism (1935, 42 n. 1) to the effect that Apollonius neglects
the question whether a series like οίκοι οίκοθεν οϊκαδε can reasonably be
distinguished from a paradigm of declension, is perhaps justified from bis point
of view. Apollonius considered these forms the result of derivation, not of
inflection. Thierfelder implies that Apollonius should have thought more about
the fundamental difference, if any, between derivation and flexion. However, this
was never an issue, äs far äs I know, to the ancient grammarians äs it is to
modern ones.157 To Apollonius, inflection is coupled first and foremost with the
•πτώσεις or διαθέσεις/χρόνοι.158 An adverb has neither and is therefore an
άκλιτον, even if the relationships existing between some adverbs resemble
flexional ones (see above, section 1.2.).
Moreover, Thierfelder's argument is unsound. He finds fault with Apollonius
for calling the adverbs άκλιτα (= καθ' ένα σχηματισμόν έκφερόμενα), but
nevertheless talking about εξ ακολούθου προφοράς (adv. 201,18f.) äs opposed to
καθ' ένα σχηματισμό ν τταραλαμβανόμενα (adv. 202,14). However, neither of the
elements that Thierfelder sets against each other here, are used exclusively in
the Opposition of declinabilia to indeclinabilia. Καθ' ένα σχηματισμόν
εκφέραμε να in adv. 202,14 does not reflect the principle of άκλισ'ια, but
expresses the homonymy, the συνέμιττωσις (see section 3.3.) of different
τοττικαί διαστάσεις. In other words, καθ' ένα σχηματισμόν does not always
refer to the indeclinability which adheres to the adverbs by definition, it can
also be used in those cases where a word is accidentally used in one form,
without its being indeclinable.159
156
 Cf. e.g. adv. 128,33 καθ' ένα σχηματισμόν (so also 119,7; 120,17f.);
synt. (e.g.) 47,8; 73,5; 73,7.
157
 Cf. e.g. Schwyzer-Debrunner II 411; I 618f.; Jannaris 1897 (1968), 138 (§
434); Pinkster 1972, 63ff.; Matthews 1974, 37ff.; Janson 1979, 80.
158
 For words belonging to the domain of the noun and the verb
respectively. Cf. synt. 325,12f£ To the definition of the verb the clause was
added that verbs should signify tense εν τοις Ιδίοις μετασχηματισμοις (GG
II iii 71,38ff.) in order to distinguish them from the temporal adverbs.
159
 See e.g. adv. 131,8ff.: δει (and λείττει) + inf. are used καθ' ένα
σχηματισμόν, because the infinitive is μονοττρόσωττον (131,6).
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Το άκόλουθον, οη the other band, is often no more than "the logical,
regulär, expected form", e.g. adv. 167,1-3: dativus τόνω : adverb τόνω ::
dativus ττόρφ : (το ακόλουθον) adverb ττόρω; 187,33f. -παρά ... την
εκείνος ... το ακόλουθου ην έκεινόθεν. For ακολουθία cf. Steinthal 1891,
346: "Solche zu derselben Reihe, Akoluthie, gehörige Formen bilden die
Differenzirungen eines dieser Reihe zu Grunde liegenden Begriffes"; an example is
the τοτπκαΐ διαστάσεις. It may be noticed in this context that even συζυγία
and συζυγεϊν are said of adverbs, not only of local ones, but of any series of
adverbs where some regularity of derivation is in evidence.160 Apollonius
represents a period in the study of grammar in which older and vaguer meanings
of termini technici-to-be are used alongside the more clearly defined, really
"technical" meanings, cf. Steinthal 1891, 306: "Ueber den Terminus συζυγία ist zu
bemerken, dass er ursprünglich eine weitere Bedeutung hatte, nämlich die
Vereinigung in irgend einer Rücksicht zusammengehöriger Formen". The term
probably originated in a rhetorical context.161
Thus, Apollonius' terminological habits cannot be used to convict him of
contradictions. There is, however, another place where the general validity of
the άκλισία of the adverbs seems to be undermined: in synt. 279,12 it is stated
that σνεδόν απαντά τα έταρρήματα are indeclinable. Here, however, Apollonius
does not intend to say that some adverbs are susceptible of μετασχηματισμός,
but rather that some of them semantically share certain verbal categories, such
äs tense, cf. synt. 283,9ff.162
160
 E.g. adv. 161,28f. και καθώς άττό μιας συζυγίας των ρημάτων
(viz. in -ζω) μία σχεδόν καΐ ή συζυγία των επιρρημάτων (viz. in -στι);
172,8; 178,16; 183,10 (the correlative adverbs).
161
 Cic. Top. 12 mentions arguments based on coniugatio/συζυγία: a
συζυγία consists of words with the same origin, but different formation, äs
sapiens, sapienter, sapientia, cf. Quint. 5,10,85 (cpniugatuni); Fortunatianus
116,8ff. Halm. This coniugatio reminds one of what Aristotle calls συστοιχία (Top.
114a26ff.). Aristotle calls the adverbs belonging in such a συστοιχία "πτώσεις",
Top. 114b33ff.; Rhet. 1364b34; cf. 1366b28ff. For rhetorical arguments based on
this principle, cf. e.g. Top. 118a34ff.; 119a4ff.; 124alOff.; 151b30ff. (Συζυγία
occurs only once in the Topica and means "pair" there (Top. 113al2).) Varro's
assigning the adverbs to two distinct categories, according to the presence or
absence of a link with a verbal or nominal stem (LL VIII 9; X 14; esp. X 16)
may be inspired by the same context. The first category is susceptible to
declinatio voluntaria (derivational morphology), the second is not (Taylor 1974,
14). Notice that the adverbs which belong to the genus fecundum are
characterized by being unmarked for cases and tenses, the characteristics of
constituents belonging to the nominal and verbal domain respectively. Their
"fecundity" goes hand in hand with their being indeclinable in a strict sense. Cf.
Blink Sterk 1846, 11; Taylor 1974,16ff.
162
 Contra Lange 1852a, 30 n. 54.
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2.3.2. Κατηγορούσα των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων
The difficulty of this pari of the definition rests mainly in the exact
meaning of εγκλισις and in the question of what precisely is expressed by the
words κατηγορούσα των εγκλίσεων. In adv. 120,19-22 Apollonius, äs we saw,
summarizes his argument about the άκλισία of the adverb, at the same time
smoothing the way to his discussion of the next part of the definition. The text
runs äs follows: ως δε καΐ κατηγορεί των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων,
σαφές πάλιν καΐ δια τον προκειμένου λόγου, εν οΐς πάντα τα τττωτικά
επιθετικά, κατηγοροϋντα ου των ονομάτων, τώυ δε ρημάτων,
επιρρήματα έγένετο, καΐ την τούτων άκλισίαν άνεδέχετο.163
One can see that Apollonius allows himself simply to substitute των
ρημάτων (120,21) for the more elaborate των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων
(120.19).164 In general it should be noted that Apollonius uses the word εγκλισις
only once in the discussion of the definition, apart from 120,19 where ως ...
κατηγορεί των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων is clearly programmatic (it
serves to demarcate the next clause of the definition that will be dealt with). In
123,3 εγκλίσεις is named in one breath with the (χρόνοι and) πρόσωπα. This is
the passage, where the clause καθόλου ή μερικώς is explained. We read that
the capacity of adverbs to be combined with "the verbs" (τοις ρήμασι, 123,1)
is limited by their semantic features. If an adverb's meaning is similar to or
identical with that of a verbal category (moods (εγκλίσεις), tenses, person), it
can only be construed with verb-forms which are semantically compatible with it
in that category. Only such constructions, we may add, yield a result that is
κατάλληλος (see section 1.3.1. above). Should an adverb be unmarked for any
category, there are no combinatory restrictions in that respect.
This passage increases our suspicion towards the wording of the definition:
των εν τοις ρήμασι εγκλίσεων is again replaced with the simple ρήμασι;
moreover, it seems highly unlikely that εγκλίσεις can have the same meaning in
the definition itself äs here, at the only relevant place in its Interpretation
where it reoccurs. For in that case Apollonius extends his definition in 123, Iff.,
by replacing εγκλίσεις with the triad εγκλίσεις, χρόνοι and -πρόσωπα here.
163
 "And that they say something about the enkliseis of the verbs is clear
also from the preceding argument; for all adjectives with case-endings that did
not say something about nouns but verbs, became adverbs and received their
indeclinability." Provisionally, I translate κατηγορεϊν with "to say something
about something"; cf. section 2.3.2.2.
164
 So, top, in adv. 120,9ff.; cf. further 120,lf.; 121,8; 121,14; 122,21f.;
123,1; and outside the discussion about the definition e.g. 128,14; 141,3; 141,14f.;
synt. 440,8 et saep.
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2.3.2.1."Εγκλισις
Steinthal (1891, 275f.) distinguishes three meanings of the word
εγκλισις:
165
-"εγκλισις ... bezeichnet noch bei Apollonios ganz allgemein Wortbeugung und
Wortform, wie κλίσις, εγκλιμα, κλίμα, -προφορά, εκφορά, άττόφαυσις";166
-form of the mood, in other words the morphological category;
-(semantic value of the) mood.
The first-mentioned of these meanings is rare. However, it explains why
Apollonius can call the infinitive an εγκλισις.167 Apollonius' definition of ρήμα
runs äs follows (GG II iii 70,28ff.): ρήμα το'ινυν εστί μέρος λόγου ατττωτον
εν Ιδίοις μετασχηματισμοί? διαφόρους χρόνους δηλοϋν μετ' ενεργείας
η ττάθους η ουδετέρου τούτων, ττροσώττων <τε και αριθμών add. R.
Schneider > σημαντικόν, οτε καΐ τάς της ψυχής διαθέσεις δήλοι.168 It is
evident that the latter pari of the definition was added in order to accommodate
the infinitive, which lacks the characteristic of "mood" and is, therefore, also
devoid of person and number.169 It has to signify tense and verbal gender only,
to qualify äs a verb. At the same time, this makes it into the most neutral
165 ι
 w
jii
 not take tne use of ^γκλι,σις in the prosodic sense into account
here.
166 Cf. the examples of this general meaning in Skrzecka 1853, 4 n. l and
Schneider ad adv. 119,5-6; synt. 113,5ff. (εγκλιμα (tense, person)); adv. 173,24
(κλίμα (tense)). "Εγκλισις seems to mean "conjugation" in synt. 341,12ff.
(although the Singular might also stand for the plural, in which case it means
"moods"): ουκ αυτά τα άτταρέμφατα ττάντως α'ιτιατικήν άτταιτεί, τττώσιν δε
την καΐ εν τοις όριστικοις και τη ύττολοίττω έγκλίσει συντασσομένην.
Cf. further Simpl. in Ar. Cat., CAG 8,37,10ff.: -πτώσεις γαρ των ονομάτων öl
τταλαιοί έκάλουν ου μόνον τάς ττέντε ταύτας τάς νυν λεγόμενας, άλλα
καΐ τάς τταρακειμένας εγκλίσεις ... δθεν καΐ τάς νυν καλουμένας
μεσότητας τττώσεις έκάλουν.
167
 Cf. Schoemann 1862, 36 n. 2.
168 'Ά verb, then, is a pari of speech without cases which indicates in its
own conjugated forms different tenses, with activity or passivity or neither,
signifying persons and numbers when it also makes clear the dispositions of the
soul [i.e. the moods]." To take δτε äs a "relativischer Anschluss" here ("and in
that case it also makes clear ...") is unnecessary; moreover it would yield an
incorrect sense/Ότε + indicative is "when" here, cf. SchDTh. 72,15ff. quoted in
the next note and pron. 9,12f. in the definition of the pronoun; for the meaning
adv. 129,18; see also section 3.1. note 263.
169
 Cf. SchDTh. 72,10ff.: φησι δε ττάλιν ττροσώττων τε και αριθμών
είναι αυτό τταραστατικόν, και ουκ αεί, αλλ' δτε και τάς της ψυχής
διαθέσεις δήλοι, ο εστί τάς της ψυχής βουλήσεις, ϊνα ττεριλάβη καΐ τα
άτταρέμφατα· ταύτα γαρ ψυχικήν βούλησιν μη έμφαίνοντα ούτε -προσώπων
ούτε αριθμών εστί -παραστατικά κτλ.
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"mood" (in a slightly catachrestic sense).170 According to Hahn 1951, 3, a verb-
form is an εγκλισις and hos (if this applies) a διάθεσις (in the sense of
ψυχική διάθεσις). This distinction does indeed often work.171
As was the case with more termini fec/ira'c/,172 Apollonius' usage fluctuates,
the different meanings occurring side by side. Moreover, it is easy to see how
close to each other the different nuances may come. The difference between the
first and second meaning is somewhat blurred by the fact that a verb-form is
never marked for mood alone: In addition it will at least have the features of
tense and verbal gender, and in some cases it will be marked for person and
number äs well.173
Thus, the difference between εγκλισις "inflected form" and εγκλισις
"mood-form" cannot always be sharply defined. It is noteworthy that εγκλισις
and ρήμα are very often virtually synonymous.174 'Ρήμα, too, can mean
"inflected form" (= "verb-form"),175 and it can even come very close to meaning
170
 Cf. Armbruster 1867, 19ff.; Choer. GGIV ii 4,32ff.
171
 However, Steinthal (1891, 280 note) rightly draws attention to the fact
that Apollonius' terminology with regard to £γκλισις and διάθεσις is hardly
rigid. Moreover, if we compare synt. 324,10ff. with adv. 131,2, it seems
Apollonius plays on this termmological freedom to strengthen his argument. In
the former passage he defends the Status and position of the infinitive äs the
γενικωτάτη εγκλισις. In that cpntext he carefully avoids calling the deficiency
of the infinitive "εγκλισις", since that would almost amount to an overt
contradiction: The γενικωτάτη εγκλισις would then be the only εγκλισις
without εγκλισις. However, when Apollonius temporarily wants to undermine the
verbal Status of the infinitive in order to find support for his view of the
construction of δει and χρή, he piles on terms which are usually associated
with verbs, only to deny their being applicable to the infinitive. Not only are
they devoid of ψυχική τταρέμφασις, they are no ρήματα έγκλισεως
μεμοιραμένα at all! Cf. chapter IV section 3.2.1.
172
 Cf. above on συζυγία. Other examples are τταράθεσις (cf. O. Schneider,
1843, 651) and διάθεσις, which occurs in Apollonius äs verbal gender and mood
(Steinthal 1891, 275f.); further, it can denote "im Allgemeinen ... ein besonderes
Verhalten ... ohne dass dieses als wirkend oder durch eine andere Wirksamkeit
hervorgerufen gedacht werden kann" (Skrzecka 1858, 3). It is used for "die
spezifisch verbalen Sprachinhalte im Gegenüberstellung zu den nominal
bezeichneten", Carnerer 1965, 193; synt. 354,11 (χρονική διάθεσις).
173
 Cf. for tense synt. 354,11: "Ηδη μέντοι και ττερί της
έγγιυομένης χρονικής διαθέσεως ευ τη έγκλ'ισει διαττοροϋσ'ι τίνες ...;
for verbal genus synt. 394,7f.: διαλαβεΐν καΐ ττερί της έγγιυομέυης
διαθέσεως καθ' έκάστηυ εγκλισιν ..., and a little further in the most general
meaning (396,2) ή τταθητική εγκλισις. An εγκλισις can be marked for person
and number also, cf. synt. 290,9ff.
174
 Cf. Skzrecka 1861, 14f.
175
 E.g.synt. 327,12
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"mood-form".176 This makes the question why Apollonius went to the trouble of
using των ευ τοις ρήμασιυ εγκλίσεων instead of των ρημάτων all the
more pressing.
The closeness of the second and third shades of meaning distinguished by
Steinthal (form of the mood and modal content respectively) rests on what is by
now a familiär basis: the Stoic habit, inherited by the grammarians (and by us),
of referring to elements of the λέξις and the σημαινόμενου in the same
terminology. Whereas these levels should, strictly speaking, be carefully kept
apart, the identity of the terminology used to refer to them facilitates a looser
usage.
If εγκλισις has the wider meaning of forma per flexionem nata,i71 it does,
it is true, refer primarily to the level of the expression, but I do not see the
fundamental difference from a word like τττώσις, which also has a function at
both levels of language.178 I think δγκλισις itself can also signify the semantic
counterpart of the expression. This appears from e.g. synt. 290,9ff.: ττασαι γοΰυ
cd εγκλίσεις, μερισθεισαι είς τφόσωττα και αριθμοί)?, το ακατάλληλου
συυελέγχουσιυ δια των αριθμών και των ττροσώττωυ.17^ Άκαταλληλία can
only be proved on semantic grounds, so an εγκλισις, apart from having the
formal characteristics of the grammatical categories involved, must also contain
their meaning: An εγκλισις designates person and number äs well äs tense.180
On these grounds I think it likely that κατηγορούσα τώυ ευ τοις
ρημασιν εγκλίσεων means: "saying something about (modifying) the verbs in
their various forms". This paraphrasis is meant to bring out the fact that τώυ
176
 E.g. synt. 375,5; zie Skrzecka I.e.
177
 Skrzecka 1853, 4 n. 1; Steinthal 1891, 320; Schneider comm. 138.
178
 See Müller 1943, 47 and 94ff.
179 "A]j tjje fjuite forms, being characterized for person and number, admit
grammatical errpr in regard to agreement for person and number" (transl.
Householder). Since the infinitive is the only εγκλισις which is unmarked for
person and number, it can be freely combined with each person and number;
however, since it does share in the features of verbal genus and tense, an
awkward combination in that field can cause το ακατάλληλου.
Cf. synt. 352,6ff. (γράφω = -πράγμα + συμτταρεττόμευα + εγώ); 353, Iff. (γράψου
= ττρόσταξις + ττράγμα + αριθμοί + ττρόσωττα).
180 Every mood-form automatically coincides with a tense-form. Further,
some moods contain a certain temporal semantic value, e.g. the imperative always
implicates a future action (cf. synt. 96,10f.). See Schenkeveld 1983, 84 (parallel
taken from Dionysius of Halicarnassus). Apart from this, there is also a
relationship between the actual tense and the mood of a verb, cf. Apollonius'
discussion of the Problems connected with the optatives and imperatives of past
tenses. See^ynf. 354, l Iff., cf. Schöpsdau 1978, esp. 284ff.
εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων primarily indicates the semantic contents of the
various verb-forms with which an adverb may enter into semanto-syntactical
relationships (i.e. the meanings conveyed by the verb-forms). However, there is
an undeniable interference from the level of the expression in this definition
which still has to be explained. I refer to the emphasis on the different forms (+
meanings) of the same verbs which is caused by the elaborate phrasing of των
εν τοίς ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων. This problem remains unsolved for now.
Apart from corroborating the Interpretation defended here, we should also
try to exclude the possibility that εγκλισις means "mood" (modorum vis) here,
since that is by far the most common meaning of the word in Apollonius.181
This would limit the reach of Apollonius' definition to a small number of adverbs
(esp. άγε, είθε), which more or less have the value of the indicator of a
mood.182 Moreover, the use of κατηγορεϊν would be inappropriate: aliud est enim
convenire h.e. construi cum modis passe, aliud autem edicere aliquid de modis,
κατηγορεΐν των εγκλίσεων.
183
 And what about the adverbs which are supposed
to define the moods καθόλου? This seems a Strange way of indicating the
adverbs which say something about the action indicated by the verb, a group
which would virtually be excluded from the definition in the case of exclusive
concentration on the moods.184 Adverbs of the type όίγε and είθε allowing
construction with all moods, are non-existent.
The Interpretation of εγκλίσεις = "moods" can only be defended by
demonstrating that "modal" adverbs are of overwhelming importance to
Apollonius. However, this is far from evident from the discussion of the adverb,
εγκλίσεις being immediately replaced by a combination of εγκλίσεις, χρόνοι
and τφόσωττα. When it comes to giving examples, the χρονικά επιρρήματα take
up by far the most space. Είθε is not mentioned at all yet, and αγε, ου and
μη together are dealt with in twelve lines, which seems hardly excessive.
In the passage dealing with the μερισμός of δει and χρή, it is true,
181
 See e.g. Schoemann 1862, 166f.; 1871, 228f.; Schenkeveld 1984a, n. 140.
But cf. Schoemann 1862, 64 for an example ofmodus = "Verbalform"!
182 x
wo out Of the three groups of adverbs distinguished by Schoemann
would thus fall outside the scope of the definition, to wit the ones referring to
the action indicated by the verb and the ones which only indicate the emotions
of the Speaker, Schoemann 1871, 231.
183
 Schoemann 1871, 229.
184
 See Apollonius' examples adv. 123,4 (καλώς and οϋτως).
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α-γε and ε'ίθε are mentioned twice,185 but this should not lead to inferences
about a special Status for "modal" adverbs: if δει. and χρή are adverbs, they
can only be "modal" and would thus be pre-eminently comparable to άγε and
εϊθε: For just äs dr/ε and είθε can be μερικώς combined with the imperative
and Optative εγκλίσεις, δει and χρή would be constraed with the infinitive
εγκλισις only, if they were adverbs.186 But since the infinitive is the only
έγκλισις that lacks a modal value (ψυχική διάθεσις), it cannot be constraed
with a "modal" adverb. Note that there is no objection at all to the infinitive
being constraed with an adverb.187 However, since the whole presentation of the
problem concentrates on a comparison with the "modal" adverbs, it is logical that
other specific categories, such äs the temporal adverbs, are not brought into the
discussion here. Nor are there any other testimonies to be gleaned from
Apollonius' work which would betray a unique position for the "modal"
adverbs.188
However, there is yet another way to defend Schoemann's Interpretation,
which I derive from the study of Schenkeveld on the distinction of the
grammatical moods.189 Schenkeveld analyses the way in which the Stoic λεκτά
were thought to be represented on the level of the expression. Partly, of course,
there were the grammatical moods, which were, however, fewer in number than
the different kinds of λεκτά. In principle this is irrelevant, since there is no
185
 Adv. 128,21f.; 131,21 (in the latter passage εγκλίσεις does mean
"moods"; see section 2.3.2. CLsynt. 334,3; 336,If.
186
 Cf.synt. 334,3.
187
 E.g. adv. 124,4ff.: a χρρνικόν επίρρημα can be decisive for the
correct Interpretation of an infinitive (which, being a ρήμα, is marked for
tense; cf. synt. 295,4ff.).
188
 A survey of the remaining places where α-γε and εϊθε are discussed in
the Syntax, yields the following result: synt. 284,4f. there is nothing exceptional
in αγε and εϊθε being mentioned, because the χρονικά επιρρήματα were
discussed just before this passage. Nine times εϊθε and/or άγε are mentioned
without other groups of adverbs (e.g. the χρονικά) being taken into account äs
well (synt. 350,6-351,13; 353,lff.; 353,14-354,1; 359,1; 360,18; 365,6ff.; 371,2;
372,12; 474,9). Twice the reverse is the case (synt. 294,llff.; 317,2ff.). With the
exception of synt. 474,9, however, all these passages belong in the discussion of
the moods in book III of the Syntax. It is only to be expected that attention is
paid in such a context to the modal adverbs; this proves nothing äs to their
hyppthetically exceptional Status. The same goes mutatis mutandis for the
position of the temporal adverbs in synt. 294,llff.: συνέμτττωσις of the tenses
can be solved by means of temporal adverbs. On the other band, there is no
reason why the modal adverbs should not have been mentioned in synt. 317,2ff.,
if they really were so essential to Apollonius' theories on the adverb.
189
 Schenkeveld 1984a. Apollonius' definition is discussed ibid. 344ff. and
note 140.
90
one-to-one correspondence between the expressions and the λεκτά. One
expression could represent different λεκτά. However, the counterparts of the
Stoic λεκτά can also be found among other kinds of speech than the verb, more
specifically, in that group of adverbs which σημαινόμενου έγκλίσεως
επιδέχεται, "take up the meaning of a mood", and in expletive particles.190
Thus, it might be argued that modal adverbs like άγε and είθε can function äs
representatives on the level of the expression of the Stoic λεκτά προστακτικά or
άρατικά; they would, in other words, perform rauch the same task äs the
imperative and Optative moods.
The argument for taking εγκλισις in our definition äs "moods", derived
from the Stoic speech-act theory, would have to be something like the following:
Once one tries to establish which elements correspond with the several λεκτά on
the level of the expression, it becomes imperative to find such a correlate for
each and every λεκτόν. It would be convenient if Apollomus' definition aimed at
just these modal adverbs, since they "would form a good candidate for the
parallels to the lekta we were looking for".191
Although Schenkeveld's conclusions on the necessity of finding correlates
for all λεκτά are in themselves justified, and although he is right, too, in
looking for these correlates not only among the possibilities offered by the verb,
but also in the other parts of speech, I doubt whether it is necessary to connect
Apollonius' definition of the adverb with a speech-act theory. The following
arguments teil against such a connection:
In the first place the adverbs were distinguished relatively late. Pohlenz
thinks this happened under the influence of the Alexandrian grammarians who
tried to attain completeness in their description of language.192 Their aims in
the study of grammar differed from those of the Stoa.193 This makes it unlikely
that the adverb was considered primarily äs a means to fill out open places in a
speech-act theory.
However, this does not prove anything about the way the Stoa handled this
pari of speech once they themselves had accepted it. More important, therefore,
is the fact that here of all places, in the expressions for order or prayer/wish,
190
 Schenkeveld 1984a, 346.
191
 Schenkeveld 1984a, 344. This goes, indeed, for words like μα and vaL,
but not for άγε and είθε, äs will be argued below.
192
 1939, 167 (= Kl. Sehr. 55) and 182 (= Kl. Sehr. 70); see also Schoemann
1862,11.
193
 Cf. Blank 1982, 5, who adds that this need be no reason for a
difference in method.
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the speech-act theory did not have any lacunas. It is true, there is no one-to-
one relationship between sentence types and illocutionary forces in the Stoa; one
expression may have more than one illocutionary force - but, conversely, it
Stands to reason that once an expression was found to correspond to a particular
illocutionary force in a natural and satisfactory way, there would have been no
urge to look for alternatives. There was no specific need to trace a correlate
expression for the speech acts of order and wish, because there were separate
εγκλίσεις with just that function.194
It might be argued that αγε would be relevant to a speech-act theory,
because it solves cases of ambiguity - this is true, but it does not entail the
Interpretation εγκλισις = mood. For αμφιβολία may be resolved also by means
of temporal adverbs, äs we saw.
In generalizing my preceding point, I would maintain that, whatever the
function of άγε and ε'ίθε in a speech-act theory may be, this should not
preclude us from accepting the wider sense of εγκλισις in the definition.195 For
δγε and είθε "with the meaning of a mood" also fit in very well with the
looser Interpretation. On the other band, the narrower meaning of εγκλισις
means that we have to assume that Apollonius neglects all other adverbs in his
definition, an unattractive solution indeed. As I said at the beginning of this
section, Apollonius should have the benefit of the doubt.
Thus, εγκλισις does not mean "mood" or "mood-form" in our definition. It
primarily signifies the inflected forms of the verb, and, like so many grammatical
terms, it may also be used to designate the meaning conveyed by such a form. If
εγκλισις itself can also signify the semantic level of the expression,196 the
combination with the verb κατηγορεϊν becomes less objectionable (see above).
For, if εγκλισις means forma per flexionem nata, the use of κατηγορεϊν would
have fitted badly.197 Evidently, an adverb does not predicate something of the
word-form of the verb, but it says something of the action described by the
194
 Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 341: "They [sc. the Stoics] will have recognized
the imperative and the Optative äs such, too". It is true that adverbs such äs
αγε and είθε were probably feit to contribute something impprtant to a
speech-act theory because they were, äs it were, nothing but an indicator of the
illocutionary force, since they lacked any context-independent lexical value of
their own (cf. e.g. synt. 351,12 είθε is äs it were an όνομα ευχής).
195
 It should be noted that the Stoics, too, accorded both a wider and a
narrower meaning to εγκλισις, cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 336f.
196
 Even without this being added explicitly äs in SchDTh. 292,4 τα
δηλούμενα των εγκλίσεων are annihilated by the addition of αν. (Camerer
1965, 176 translates "... die Modusendungen, deren Sinn aufgehoben wird".)
197
 Schoemann 1862, 166; cf. Schneider comm. zAadv. 119,5.
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verb. However, this objection is no longer valid if we consider what was said
above: It might even be upheld that it can be inverted. The fact that one
cannot regularly κατηγορείν the form of a given word, may be taken äs a clue
to the fact that εγκλισις cannot signify the word-forms only. I need not,
however, insist on this point. Instead I will turn to the term κατηγορείν itself:
2.3.2.2. κατηγορείν
Κατηγορείν occurs seven times in de adverbio; six of the seven places are
to be found in the discussion of the definition.198 In the Syntax it also occurs
seven times, in various parts of the work. Apart from the verb, the noun
κατηγόρημα is found three times, always in the reproduction of Stoic tenets.199
Now, this state of affairs is in itself remarkable, the more so if we take into
account the relative size of both works. Apart from that, the six cases of
κατηγορεΐν in the discussion of our definition together with one case from the
Syntax differ markedly from the rest.
Baratin (1978, 208) Sketches the development of the meaning of
κατηγόρημα äs follows: "Le terme κατηγόρημα est reduit ä designer non plus ce
qui est affirme d'un sujet, mais ce qui est affirme d'une chose quelconque, ce qui
en est dit ... ce qui lui correspond du point de vue somantique ... et par lä
finalement ce qu'une chose signifie ..." Now, it would seem that in the discussion
of the definition, κατηγορείν is used in a more "old-fashioned" way than
elsewhere: although the wider sense is appropriate everywhere, the complement
of κατηγορεΐν in this group is always the word for another part of speech, äs is
its subject too, in most cases. Thus, in these passages κατηγορεΐν refers to
semanto-syntacticalrelationships.200
In the other passages from the Syntax and the remaining one from de
198
 Cf. in a similar context MichSync. 1208ff. κατηγορικά ... των ρημάτων.
199
 These data are based on the Index by Schneider, which is not very
reliable. Synt. 403,1 (= 281,28 B.) the word does not occur. Schenkeveld (1984a,
337) points out that in this case, too, Apollonius confuses σημαίνον (ρήμα)
and σημαινόμενον (κατηγόρημα).
200
 Adv. 119,5; 120,5 (exceptional because in this case the subject of
κατηγορεΐν is not the word for a part of Speech, but ö λέγων); 120,9f.; 120,19;
120,20f.; 122,33f. [of these cases 119,5 is the definition itself; 120,19 repeats the
clause from the definition and 122,33ff. picks up the same phrase in conclusion
of the section); synt. 91,7 (example: ό Τρύφων γραμματικός έγένετο): καΐ
σαφές ότι τα ρήματα κατηγοροϋντα τοΐ επιθετικού ευλόγως την του
άρθρου σύνταξιν τταρε'ιλετο.]
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^- κατηγορεΐν indicates what a word teils us about either its lexical
meaning or its other τΓαρυφιστάμενα,2^2 the extra Information a word conveys.2^3
It is significant that in Herodian the "modern" meaning is virtually the only one
attested.204
The concentration of instances of the less obvious use of κατηγορεΐν in a
grammatical context of Apollonius' day looks suspicious. It might corroborate
Schenkeveld's view (1984a, 344) that Apollonius' definition of έτάρρημα vaguely
reflects the Stoic opinion of these words: they considered the adverbs äs a part
of the ρήμα, because it was interpreted äs a part of κατηγόρημα. This would
also fit in well with the explanation of the Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax who
explained the clause τιθεμένη κατά των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων with
the words έττειδή καΐ το επίρρημα κατηγόρημα φασιν οΐ φιλόσοφοι (SchDTh.
201
 This passage (adv. 204,6ff.) in reality also belonged to the Syntax., cf.
Schneider comm. ad adv. 201,1-210,5.
202
 Cf. Blank 1982, 32.
203
 Synt. 91,lf.: εΐ ... τα ρήματα ττρώτης κατηγορο'ιη ττοιότητος (quae
primum de qualitate aliqua loquuntur eamque quasi inducunt, Ühlig a.l.); 36,8: το
των ή τοΐν ή άλλο τι τοιούτον ούχ ενός γένους κατηγορείται (N.B. if
γένος is taken to mean "a noun of a certain gender" this case may be
numbered among the first group; I think it mpre likely, however, that the phrase
means "των etc. do not signify one specific gender" (and therefore it is
unlikely that articles have been invented m order to make the gender of nouns
explicit); 53,18: -πάντοτε ουν το άλλοι συνέξει το άρθρον, ήνίκα του
κατηγορουμένου ττλήθους όλου εστίν έμττεριλητττικόν την τε διαίρεσιν ττάλιν
μερικήν ττοιεΐται; 61,15ff.: (αμφότεροι by itself indicates that something is
known; therefore, it does not need an article) το γαρ "αμφότεροι μέμασαν
ττολεμίζειν ήδέ μάχεσθαι" (Η 3) κατηγορεί των εγνωσμένων (viz. Hector
and Paris). This may mean either "the sentence teils something about ...", or
"αμφότεροι (in this sentence) says something about ..."; 278,7 (on the alleged
conflict of genders within the words ενδέκατος or ενδέκατη): ου δη ου ν
τταρά το εις έδΰνατο τα της συνθέσεως έγγίνεσθαι, ότι μη
κατηγορεϊτο και το θηλυκόν (subj.) ("because in that case it could not have
been used to say something of feminine words")· ουδέ μην τταρά το μία,
ότι μη συγκατηγορειτο καΐ το άρρενικόν; 437,2ff.: ου δη ου ν τα άλλα
μέρη του λόγου εξαίρετου συντάξεως έ'τυχεν, Ι'να ττρός το
μετατιθέμενον κατηγορή ("betray") και της μεταθέσεως; adv. 204,16ff.: και
δήλον δτι το κύκλω ου δια της παραγωγής την εις τόττον σχέσιν
σημαίνει, άλλα καθό καΐ το κύκλος κατηγορεί ("signify"!) σχέσεως τοτακής.
204
 In Herodian, κατηγορείν always designates the relationship between
signifier and denotatum; a word "κατηγορεί" an extra-linguistic entity. It can
always be translated by "to signify", or, passive, "to be applied to, used for".
E.g. GG III i 38,31 τα ε'ις ων θηλυκά μη έττΐ ττόλεων κατηγορούμενα
οξύνεται; 123,4f. τα ε'ις -λιος ΰττερτρισύλλαβα ττροτταροξύνεται, ε'ι μη
όρνέου κατηγοροίη ...; 123,20; 195,15f. τα δια του -τερος τριβράχεα τότε
βαρύνονται, οτε ττυσματικήν εννοιαν εχοι ή εκ δύο τφρσώττων εν τι το
κατηγόρημα ττοιεϊται, πότερος ... έτερος ("when one word is made to signify
two persons"). In GG III ii 909,25f. κατηγορείν means "to accuse of faultmess
and reject".
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95,19f.). The frequent comparison of adverb and adjective is another indication of
Stoic influence,205 which Apollonius adapts to bis own purposes: Whereas to the
Stoics the quasi-adjectival Status of the adverb was a sign of their falling short
of being an independent pari of speech,206 to Apollonius the similarity of the
relationship of adverb to verb with that of adjective to noun fits in with his
general ideas on the symmetry and regularity of language, without bringing him
to the same conclusion.
Returning to κατηγορεϊν: it goes without saying that a Stoic
terminological reminiscence in this word need have no repercussions on the
Interpretation of εγκλισις.
2.3.3. καθόλου η μερικώς
Apollonius' explication of the phrase καθόλου ή μερικώς is perfectly
straightforward and completely in accordance with his theory of grammatical
(in)correctness explained above: Whenever an adverb has a semantic value similar
or identical to that of a verbal category (mood, tense, (number), person),207 its
possible combinations with a verb are restricted to those forms which are
semantically compatible with the adverb in question. Only those combinations can
be styled κατάλληλος. If an adverb is unmarked for any category, then there are
no syntactic restrictions in that respect. This principle is worked out in the
Syntax (see also above section 1.3.1.) (316,10ff.): έδε'ιξαμεν ... ως ουδέν
μέρος λόγου γίνεται ακατάλληλου ευ ω μη διεκρίθη, ως τα επιρρήματα
εν αριθμώ, χωρίς ε'ι μη αυτά δηλώσειεν αριθμόν, οΰδ' εν διαφόροις
χρόνοις, χωρίς ε'ι μη αυτά ττάλιν διαστε'ιλειε χρόνου, ως εν τω χθες,
αΰριον καΐ άλλοις οίς τταρεθέμεθα.208 In this passage, the examples are
205
 Cf. Prise. II 54: [Stoici] quasi adiectiva verborum ea (sc. the adverbs)
nominabant. Cf. adv. 120,2; 120,7f.; 120,20ff.; 123,6ff.; 125,22ff.; 126,9ff.;
Schneider comm. 139.
206
 Cf. Schoemann 1862, 157f.
207
 E.g. άγε (δυομα τφοστάξεως synt. 353,2) is identical to the modal
content of ordering; χθες (synt. 489,7) is related to the temporal concept
"past", but in addition to the Information provided by a past tense, it indicates
which point in the past one is talking about.
208 "\y
e
 h
ave
 shown that no part of speech can be ungrammatical in
respect of a category which it fails to distinguish [better: for which it is
unmarked (διεκρίθη is passive), I.S.], e.g. adverbs cannot be wrong in regard to
number unless they are numerical adverbs, nor in tense unless they are time-
distinguishing adverbs like chthes ("yesterday"), aurion ("tomorrow") and the rest
that we mentioned" (transl. Householder).
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limited to the categories of number and tense, but mood, too, is often mentioned:
in synt. 282,1-285,5 Apollonius declares that επιρρήματα denoting something
temporal cannot be construed with every tense, and επιρρήματα denoting
something modal cannot be construed with every mood. As we saw, in the
passage from de adverbio, Apollonius does not restrict himself to giving examples
of possible combinations, but proceeds to show that the use of certain adverbs
can be decisive for the Interpretation of ambiguous verb-forms (adv. 123,13-6):
λέγετε is ambiguous, but if combined with άγε it can only mean an imperative;
123,26-124,7:209 the forms of present participle and infinitive are identical to
those of "imperfect" participle and infinitive: the use of a χρονικόν επίρρημα
can be decisive for the Interpretation; 124,21-5: an aorist can have the value of
either a perfect or a pluperfect. In this case, too, the use of a certain χρονικού
επίρρημα can determine the choice.
Not only can an adverb help decide in cases of ambiguity, its influence can
reach even farther (synt. 350,4ff.): (if one employs τα της ευχής
επιρρήματα παραστατικά with an ευκτική εγκλισις) μήποτε τα της
συντάξεως δόξη κατά παρολκήν έχειν τα συναντά επιρρήματα, καθό ή
εγκλισις δυνάμει έγκείμενον έχει το είθε (έττΐ μεν -γαρ του ε'ίθε
έγραψε Τρύφων, ε'ίθε έλάλησε καΐ επί των τοιούτων δήλον ότι εν τω
δέοντι παράκειται το ε'ίθε, ίνα TJ οριστική εγκλισις δια του παρακειμένου
εΰκτικοϋ επιρρήματος εΰκτικήν σύνταξιν άναδέ£ηται· δήλον γαρ ως
διαφέρει το έγραψε ν Τρύφων του ε'ίθε εγραψεν Τρύφων) :21^ there are cases
where the addition of the modal adverb changes the modal value.
In short, an adverb governed by the μερικώς-clause does not only suffer
the negative consequences of this state of affairs, in that it is barred from some
constructions by its semantic characteristics, there is also a positive side: it
defines an aspect of the meaning of a ρήμα. Α temporal adverb can determine
the temporal meaning of a verb (πάλαι + aor.);211 a modal adverb can
209
 The χρονικά επιρρήματα are partly construed with certain tenses,
partly - their meaning being indefinite - with every tense (e.g. νυν and ήδη).
Cf. for the κοινή παράτασις του παντός χρόνου synt. 284,2f. and 489, lOf.
[το νυν] χρόνου εστί του γενικωτάτου έμπεριεκτόν, ου τέμνον το
έπιμεριζόμενον του χρόνου, διήκον μέντοι δι' όλου and the commentary of
Uhlig.
210 "Perhaps this structure may seem to involve redundancy because of the
accompanying adverbs, since the mood already contains the same force äs eithe
(in sentences like eithe egrapse Truphon ["I wish Tryphon had written!"], eithe
elalese ["would that he had spoken!"] it is clear enough that the eithe is
necessary, in order to make the indicative mood function in the optative
construction, by means of the presence of the optative adverb. For obviously,
there is a big difference between egrapsen Truphon ("Tryphon wrote") and eithe
egrapsen Truphon ["If only Tryphon had written!"]" (transl. Householder).
96 211 Cf. SchDTh 97,12f.
Supplement or emphasize the modality of a verb-form (είθε + opt), determine it
(αγε + an ambiguous form like λέγετε), or change it (είθε + ind. praet).
Adverbs determining a verb καθόλου may be combined with all the forms of
such a verb, because they lack any semantic connection with a verbal category,
and are thus safe from incompatibility.212 Since these adverbs have nothing in
common with any of the characteristics of the verb qua verb, they determine the
common mean of all forms of any one verb, in other words the ττραγμα, cf.
synt. 351,8ff.: χρή μέντοι νοεϊν ως διαφέρει ή εκ των ρημάτων
ευκτική εγκλισις της έταρρηματικής τω τα μεν ρήματα μετά του
συνόντος πράγματος σημαίνειν την εΰκτικήν διάθεσιν το γαρ γράφοιμι
ευχή εστίν -πράγματος του γράφειν καΐ το φιλολογοΐμι του φιλολογεΐν, το
γε μην είθε σχεδόν όνομα εστίν ευχής· ου γαρ συμπαρίσταται καΐ το
εν τίνι τα της ευχής.
213
 This teils strongly in favour of Skrzecka's
conjecture, adv. 122,26 (in the discussion of the example ό καλώς Ανθρωττος
γράφει; the adverb cannot be interposed between article and noun, unless it can
be construed with a μετοχή), δυναμένη καΐ το γένος μηνϋσαι και το
ττ < ραγμα >, όπερ επιζητεί το έττίρρημα.214
The preponderantly semantic interest of Apollonius is reflected in this part
of his definition of the adverb, which is a very good Illustration of the
principles expounded in the first sections of this chapter: What we call syntax, is
a part of the σημαινόμενον of the words involved. There is no autonomous
syntax in Apollonius. Syntax is part of έννοια (cf. note 13 of this chapter).
Thus, Apollonius can state explicitly (adv. 123,2; 123,6) that adverbs are
construed with verbs σημασίας ουκ αντικείμενης, ... της φράσεως ... ουκ
άντιττηττούσης.
215
 The same principle comes to the fore even more strongly a
few lines below (adv. 123,10f.): καί τίνα των έταρρημάτων εϊργεται της
212
 Cf. synt. 316,10ff. quoted above.
213 "We should note that there is a difference between the Optative
meaning conveyed by the verb form and the adverbial pne in that the verbs
signify the event-or-action along with the attitude (illocutionary force, diathesis)
ofwishing - so graphoimi ("I hope to write") is a wish for the act of writing,
and philologoimi ("May I study") for the act of studying - but eithe is no more
than [or rather: "so to speak" (σχεδόν) I.S.] a word for "wish" with no
indication in it of what is being wished for" (transl. Householder). Cf. also synt.
352,6ff. καί έτι το εγώ ττρός το γράφω, καθό μετά πράγματος καί των
συμπαρεπομένων το γράφω έγκείμενον έχει το εγώ; pron. 23,19f. For
ττράγμα, cf. note 256.
214
 Cf. also adv. 121,25f.; see Lange 1852a,15ff. on Apollonius' theory of
the μετοχή.
215
 Cf. for φράσις = "meaning" e.g. pron. 55,26; adv. 186,5; coni. 214,11
(where it may also mean "context").
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συντάξεως ένεκα του σημαινόμενου.216 Cf. synt. 284,4: the adverbs δσα
σημαινόμενον έγκλίσεως επιδέχεται217 are thereby subject to syntactic
restrictions. Semantic features therefore entail syntactic consequences.
It is remarkable that nowhere the combinatory restrictions holding between
certain (groups of) verbs and certain adverbs are mentioned.218 However, O.
Schneider 1845, 457ff. believes that such restrictions are given for the τοπικά
επιρρήματα and their σχέσεις: "denn, um ein Beispiel zu geben, da που wo?
την εν τόπω σχέσιν bezeichnet, so kann es nicht mit Verbis verbunden
werden, die την είς τόπον σχέσιν bezeichnen; fragt also jemand nach dem
Ziele einer Bewegung und sagt που έρχεται, so wird diese Verbindung widerlegt
(ελέγχεται) durch das topische Adverbium ποι, welches seiner Bedeutung nach
eintreten muss, wo eine σχέσις ε'ις τόπον vorliegt, und so die άκαταλληλότης
einer solchen Verbindung beweiset" (458). Apollonian äs this sounds, nowhere is
the relationship between the (lexical) meaning of the verb and the acceptability
of an adverb discussed by Apollonius himself, not even in the passage which O.
Schneider quotes in support of bis Statements (adv. 205,10ff.). The
άκαταλληλότης is based on the fact that an adverb (εϊσω) is employed in a
meaning for which a separate adverb exists (ένδον) κατ' ιδίαν μόνον
σημασίαν219 (adv. 205,13f.). Apollonius does not mention why a certain σχέσις
τοττική would be obligatory. What matters is that a κατάχρησις, äs the use of
one adverb instead of another would be, is justified only when a more correct
form, which could be applied äs έλεγχος, is lacking.220
216 "And some of the adverbs are barred from construction because of their
meaning."
217
 "Which take up the meaning of a mood".
218
 As in Latin grammar, see note 46 of this chapter.
219
 "In that one particular meaning".
220
 Cf. for the local adverbs in -ω also adv. 195,23ff. The emendations of
Schoemann and Schneider (cf. Schneider comm. a.l.) have led to the following
text: τα εις ω λήγοντα επιρρήματα σημαίνει καΐ το εν τόττω καΐ το
εις τόττον ...· λέγω δε δτι μάλιστα. <&> από προθέσεως έσχημάτισται,
ίσοσυλλαβεϊ μεν [μάλιστα] τάϊς ττροθέσεσιν, εάν ωσι δισύλλαβοι, μια δε
πλεονάζει, ε'ι ειεν μονοσύλλαβοι, <έν> λήξει τη ε'ις σ ή φύσει ή
δυνάμει. This is no improvement compared to the text äs constituted by Bekker.
What does δτι μάλιστα mean? The examples of non-local adverbs in -ω to be
found in 165,20ff. make one suspect that adverbs in -ω are not "mostly" local.
The phrase <ά> από προθέσεως έσχημάτισται suggests that there are also
different derivations (which is true), without it becoming clear why only the
adverbs derived from prepositions should be discussed here. In fact, it is almost
exclusively the adverbs in κο derived from prepositions which are local. "Almost
exclusively", because a word like κύκλω (165,20) can also be considered äs
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And now it seems we have finally found the reason for the expression των
kv τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων: The fact that Apollonius is concerned solely
with the combinatory restrictions between adverbs and certain forms of the
paradigm of verbs, and not between adverbs and (semantically determined) groups
of verbs,221 may be the reason for the elaborate phrasing των εν τοις
ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων. This represented Apollonius' intentions more exactly than
των ρημάτων tout court would have done, since the latter expression would
have left open the possibility that we have just excluded.222
2.3.4. ων ϋ.νεν ου κατακλείσει διάνοιαν
On this final pari of the definition Schoemann remarks (1862, 167): "In dem
Schlusssatz der Definition bedeutet κατακλε'ιειν διάνοιαν wohl nicht dasselbe wie
κατακλείειν λόγον: denn dann wäre er wenigstens sehr überflussig, da sich dies
von jeder Wortgattung, ausser dem Verbum, von selbst versteht: er scheint
sagen zu wollen, dass das Adverbium für sich allein keinen abgeschlossenen Sinn
habe, sondern sich immer an ein Verbum anschliessen müsse, um richtig
verstanden zu werden".
In itself, this seems a reasonable enough supposition, but in practice it
cannot be upheld. The clause ων άνευ κτλ. was added to the definition in Order
having local value. Cf. 204,10ff. τα εις ω λήγοντα επιρρήματα, ήνίκα μεν
άττό προθέσεως παρήκται, πάντως εστί τοπικά ... ήνίκα δε άτι·'
ονομάτων, την του ονόματος σχέσιν παραλαμβάνει έπιρρηματικώς
νοουμένην ... καΐ δήλον δτι το κύκλω ου δια της παραγωγής την είς
τόπον σχέσιν σημαίνει, αλλά καθο καΐ το κύκλος κατηγορεί σχέσεως
τοπικής. Cf. further 204,19f.; SchDTh. 277,25ff. τινά δε δύο (sc. σχέσεις
τοπικάς δήλοι) ... ως τα εις ω παρά πρόθεσιν γεγονότα. So, too, SchDTh.
277,30ff. (Generally speaking, local meaning is often connected with derivation
from prepositions, cf. adv. 154,3f. τα τταρά ττρόθεσιν παραγόμενα των είς θεν
ληγόντων κοινή χρήται σημασία κατά την τοπικήν έκφοράν).
Thus, one should read with Bekker (and A) ..., λέγω δε δτε μάλιστα από
προθέσεως έσχημάτισται ("especially when they are derived from prepositions").
ίσοσυλλαβει μεν κτλ. For δτε, cf. note 168.
221
 This fits in with the principle of "word-grammar" äs set forth by
Donnet (1967, 39f.): "Les grammairiens traitent de questions de syntaxe, mais
leurs reflexions, loin d'Stre centrdes sur la fonctions grammaticale, sont dominos
par des catogories qui relevent de la morphologie ou, en tout cas, de la
description du mot pris isolement." An example (1967, 40) is Apollonius'
demonstration of the fact that a verb is constraed with a specific case by
showing that different tenses, moods and persons of such a verb all go with that
same case (synt. 432,9ff.).
222
 The fact that in the discussion there are various less exact
substitutions for the clause of the definition need not bother us here: As soon äs
this pari of the definition comes into sight, the compact, but less exact form
(123,1 τοις ρήμασι) is immediately worked out by the triad έγκλίσεσιν,
χρόνοις, προσώποις. In the rest of the discussion economy has won.
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to subsume under the adverbs those words, too, that are to all appearances able
to form independent utterings (the έτηφωνήσεις etc.).223 Apollonius also draws
attention to the existence of such a group in synt. 13,4ff. where the parts of
speech are compared to vowels and consonants: the independence of vowels is
shared by verbs, nonns, pronouns and the adverbs αττερ επιλέγεται τάϊς
γινομέναις ένεργείαις, ήνίκα έτπφθεγγόμεθα το κάλλιστα τοις κατά το
δέον τι ένεργοΰσιν, ή ϋγιώς η καλώ?.224 These words have a lexical
semantic value of their own, even when they are uttered without an embedding
construction, and they thus differ from the parts of speech which can do
nothing but συσσημαίνειν (ibid. 14,2). - But, äs Apollonius remarks adv. 121,4ff.,
in these cases the adverb does in fact belong with a verb äs well, be it an
unexpressed one: αϊ έττιφωνήσεις ουδέν άλλο είσΐν η επιρρήματα των
ρημάτων <ούκ> έταγινομένων.225
Thus far, there is nothing to contradict Schoemann's Interpretation.
However, if we take a look at adv. 120,25-121,4, a passage manifestly dealing
with this pari of the definition, we get into trouble. Apollonius declares that,
just äs adjectives always need a noun, τον αυτόν αεί τρόπον εστίν
έττινοήσαι ρήμα μεν δίχα επιρρήματος σιιγκλεϊον λόγον, έτάρρημα δε
ου μην δίχα ρήματος ή μετοχής, ήτις δυνάμει Ιδίωμα έχει το τοΐ
ρήματος, και ου τοϋτό φημι, δτι αϊ μετοχαΐ άπαρτίζουσι διάνοιαν, αλλ'
δτι τα επιρρήματα καΐ έττΐ μετοχάς φέρεται.226 Here, it is obvious at once
that Schoemann's distinction between διάνοιαν and λόγον does not hold water:
άτταρτίζειν διάνοιαν and συγκλείειν λόγον must either be synonymous in this
passage, meaning "to complete the thought", or άτταρτίζειν διάνοιαν (121,3)
should mean what Schoemann calls κατακλείειν λόγον and, vice versa,
223
 See Schneider, comm. 141 and 147 ad adv. 127,14 for the Interpretation
of 121,24-6 of Schoemann and Schneider. Cf. section 2.2.2.1. of this chapter. One
could rightly wonder if the inclusion in a definition of a clause which must seem
irrelevant to the majority of adverbs is justified, but this, of course, is another
matter entirely.
224 "Wh
en
 they can be applied to actions in the situational context, äs
when we shout kallista ("very well" - i.e. "bravo") at performers who are doing
something just right, or hugios ("soundly") or kalos ("well")" (transl.
Householder). Cf. Prise. III 114,9ff.
225 "Exclamations are nothing but adverbs without accompanying verbs."
226
 "... in the same way one can imagine a verb which completes the sense
(i.e. effectuates grammatical completeness) withput an adverb, but not an adverb
completing the sense without a verb or a participle, which virtually has the same
characteristics äs the verb. And I do not claim that participles complete the
sense (i.e. can complete a sentence), but that adverbs may be construed with
participles äs well."
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σνγκλείειν λόγον (121,1) what according to him is κατακλείειν διάνοιαν. For,
whereas it is perfectly in order to state that μετοχαί cannot complete a
sentence,227 it cannot be upheld that they leave the meaning of the adverbs
unclear or unfinished.228
As far äs I can see, συγκλείειν (κατακλε'ιειν, συνέχειν, άτταρτίζειν) (του)
λόγον in Apollonius never means "to give (a word) a finished, complete meaning"
(except when this meaning is included in the wider one). This makes it all the
more likely that συγκλείειν λόγου and άτταρτίξειν διάνοιαν are synonymous,
meaning sententiam efficere, "to complete the sense (and the sentence)" (cf.
Schneider, comm. 140, in his Latin paraphrase).229
There is yet another point: Schoemann upholds that an ων ανευ-clause in
the Interpretation which is defended here, would be supervacuous, because it
applies to all parts of speech but the verb, and is, therefore, irrelevant to the
definition of the adverb. I think, on the contrary, that its addition is especially
relevant in the case of the adverb. It will be remembered that the use of
κατηγορειν may have been prompted by the historical view of the adverb äs part
of the verb. It may well be that here we have to do with another trace of the
same state of affairs.230 Nor would our definition be the only one in which the
227
 A participle is not marked for person (synt. 113,3f.) or mood (synt.
292,llff.; 432,14ff.).
228
 A participle does have τφαγμα, cf. adv. 122,26 and cf. note 256.
229
 This is a perfectly normal meaning of (κατακλείειν) διάνοιαν, cf.
(σΌγκλε'ιειν) synt. 90,14f.; 333,10; (άτταρτ'ιζειν) 430,4.
230
 The almost exclusive concentration on the constraction of adverb and
verb, to the neglect of the combinations of adverb with noun, adjective or
adverb, may be occasioned by this same historical development. Schoemann
mentions the absence of these possibilities äs a weakness pf Apollonius'
definition (1871, 228), but acknowledges the fact that Apollonius shares this
deficit with his contemporary colleagues. The fact that Apollonius was not quite
unaware of these constructions appears e.g. frorn synt. 73,5ff.; 85,5ff.; 453,3f.;
488,10ff.; 490,2; pron. 15,23ff.; cf. GG II iü 36,17ff. φασί γαρ, δτι τα
επιρρήματα η ρήμασι θέλει συντάττεσθαι η στταν'ιω? όνόμασιν, ως έττί,
του "μα την αλήθευαν", "νή του Δία ..."; SchDTh 258,13ff. Cf. Egger 1854,
199 on Apollonius' analysis of a comparative form into μάλλον plus a form of
the positive degree (e.g. synt. 327,4f.). In later grammarians it was more
generally recogmzed. MichSync., who depends on Dionysius Thrax in his list of
the meanings of the adverbs, arranges this list on the principle of whether the
adverbs in question are construed with a noun or a verb, starting with those
which are construed adnominally. (The rest of his order corresponds with that of
the Techne, with two minor exceptions, to wit the place of the τοτπκά
(motivated 1510ff.) and the refinement of separating the επιρρήματα τάξεως
terminologically from the επιρρήματα χωρισμοί δηλούντα (1425f., cf. SchDTh.
100,9)). Nicetas of Herakleia (XI/XII Cent. A.D.; text in Boissonade AG II 340-93;
cf. Tovar 1969) goes to the opposite extreme of concentrating on the adnominal
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grammarian stressed the distinction between verb and adverb. The same goes for
the definition of the verb, which is expressly said to indicate tense εν τοις
Ιδίοις μετασχηματισμούς, an addition231 which can best be explained äs an
attempt at differentiation from the adverb.232 Therefore, it is relevant, too, that
the clause purporting that verbs alone can bring about grammatical completeness,
should be added to the definition of especially the adverb. This is one of the
major differences between the way adverbs and verbs can κατηγορείΐλ Therefore,
I reject Schoemann's opinion that this clause is a superfluous addition.
Apollonius' choice to include this stipulation in his definition did cause him
some problems äs well. Its adoption explains why the participles, which can very
well be construed with an adverb, äs Apollonius realises,233 have to be smuggled
in more or less through a backdoor. The ων άνευ-clause seems to prevent
their explicit mention in the definition.234 It is never sufficient to add a
participle to an έτπφώνησις in Order to κατακλε'ιειν διάνοιαν.23^ If Schoemann
had been right, there would have been no reason for Apollonius to omit the
participle from his definition. We now understand why Apollonius emphatically
adds in adv. 121,3: ου τοϋτό φημι, öu αϊ μετοχαι άτταρτίζουσι διάνοιαν23ί>
constructions tö the complete exclusion of the more normal one (1054ff.).
231
 The Stoic definition of ρήμα runs: 'Ρήμα δε εστί μέρος λόγου
σημαίνον άσΰνθετον κατηγόρημα (D.L. VII 58). It does not contain any
stipulations about tenses. In this respect the Stoa seems to take a conscious
stand against Aristotle, who defines the verb äs "φωνή συνθέτη σημαντική
μετά χρόνου ης ουδέν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αυτό" (Poet. 1457al4f.).
Apollonius could hark back to this.
The Interpretation of άσύνθετον is a matter of dispute. According to Schmidt
1839, 441 ρήμα is every verb-form putside the context of a sentence; Pohlenz
thinks άσΰνθετον is meant to bring out the difference with a predicate
consisting of copula plus noun (1939 Kl. Sehr. 53); cf. Forschner 1981, 70. Müller
1943, 51 takes it, rightly, I think, äs the verbal part of the κατηγόρημα, i.e. äs
the κατηγόρημα without the ττλάγιαι τττώσεις which may form part of it.
232
 Cf. section 2.3.1. note 158.
233
 Cf. adv. 120,13f.; 121,4; 122,25ff.; 123,26ff.
234
 For the position of the μετοχα'ι in Apollonius' System, cf. Lange 1852a,
15ff. It may not be irrelevant to mention the fact that the participle was
originally looked upon äs an εγκλισις ρήματος äs well (cf. Steinthal 1891, 217;
Priscianus II 549,1 modum verbi casualem).
235
 Cf. the way in which it is admitted after all that an αντωνυμία can
form a complete sentence if combined with a verb (synt. 17,15ff.), whereas
strictly speakmg only a noun can achieve this.
236
 This does not contradict synt. 115,llff. (esp. 13f.). Καθίσταναι τον
λόγον has been dealt with in 112,lff. Here, Apollonius is interested in the
construction o ... (participle) ούτος εστίν.
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- a clear echo of the definition, and why he finds it necessary to remark in
122,24-30 that, whenever an adverb belongs to a participle, one will find that
with the participle there will in turn be construed a verb in Order that the
sentence may be completed.237
If the antecedent of ων is εγκλίσεων, we are left with the problem of
the infinitive, which strictly speaking cannot κατακλείειν δι/άνοιαν any more
than the participle, cf. synt. 333,lff.: ου γαρ ή εξ απαρεμφάτου σίινταξις
κατακλείει λόγον, ει μη αναιτληρωθεί,η δι' ων απαρέμφατος εστί.238 Α
partial solution is to have ων refer to ρήμασι;239 the word-order is no
objection.240 This is, of course, a makeshift solution, since one is still
confronted with the problem that not every ρήμα that may be accompanied by
an adverb, is able to complete a sentence. However, since it is very common to
say that ρήματα fulfil this function, the problem is at least less acute if we
construe the relative this way. I plead emergency-philology.
2.4. The syntax ofthe adverb: adv. 125,6-126,23
The discussion of the έννοια of the adverb is not complete until Apollonius
has explained the correct position (σύνταξις) of the adverb vis ä vis the verb.
This discussion is related to the question whether the name έτάρρημα,
interpreted äs "word placed before the ρήμα" (cf. Schneider, comm. a.1), is
correct. Apollonius admits that the adverb can be put before and after the verb
- even in that case the adverb's name could be defended on the strength of the
parallel with αυτό? έττιταγματική. But then he rules that the ττρόταξι? is the
more correct position. And so we are presented with another succinct example
of the function of the work of the grammarian. For in daily usage we find
τφόταξι·; äs well äs ΰττόταξι·; (125,19f.), and we might therefore easily be led
to believe that the relative position of adverb and verb is indifferent. But if we
really do believe this, another ϋττερβατόυ has escaped us. This is one of those
cases where the empirical data of everyday usage clash with the results produced
by the ratio. For Apollonius can demonstrate that the ττρόταξις is correct and
proceeds to do so by offering us the parallel construction of noun + adjective:
Here, too, the adjective should come first. However, Apollonius realizes that this
237
 ... ττάλιν και ρήμα συγγενήσεται ΰττέρ του συγκλεισθηναι τον λόγον.
238 "The construction with an infinitive cannot be a complete sentence un-
less those things are supplied whose lack makes it non-finite" (transl. House-
holder).
239
 So e.g. Egger 1854, 189.
240
 See Schneider, Tractatus 161.
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parallel by itself may not be accepted äs proof241 and tries to corroborate it by
means of a combination of empirical data - derived from Homer - and a new
241
 It is interesting to see how Apollonius anticipates a criticism here
which elsewhere he himself extends to bis predecessors: adv. 188,llff. he
mentions Trypho's explanation of forms like άμφοτέρωθεν, which contrast with
the other adverbs in -θεν in that their penultimate syllable does not contain the
same vowel äs the genitive of the noun they derive from (or, if the genitive
ends in a dipthong, its first vowel) (here an -o). Trypho gives an ad hoc rule, to
which Apollonius reacts: μήττοτε δε βίαιο ν εστίν, δτι δι' αυτοί του
ζητουμένου ή άττόλυσίς εστί. [άττόλυσις, "solution", is rare, cf. adv. 185,11
and SchHom. B 12-4]. This is the principle of the vicious circle, well-known from
PL Meno 79d2ff. onwards, especially to the sceptics but also to the Stoa (cf.
Males 1961, 83 and n. 95), cf. S.E. PH I 61 άτοττον δε το ζητούμενον δια
του ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν έταχειρείν. In PH I 164 Sextus discusses the
five τρότΓοι of the younger Sceptics which lead to έττοχή. The name of the
fifth is ό διάλληλος τρόττος which is described in § 169: ö δε διάλληλος
τρότΓος συνίσταται δταν το όφείλον του ζητουμένου πράγματος είναι
βεβαιωτικόν χρείαν εχη της εκ του ζητουμένου -πίστεως. The termini
technici for this kind of indecisive argument are ό διάλληλος τρόττος or o
διάλληλος λόγος (PH I 36). This terminology is found in the Stoa, too (SVF II
90,29): δττου γε καΐ τταρά τοις Στωϊκοΐς καλείται τις διάλληλος λόγος, δς
εστίν άναττόδεικτος· οίον ττοϋ Θέων οικεί; ένθα Δίων, και ττοϋ Δίων;
ένθα Θέων ττέρας αΰτοϋ (= του διαλλήλου λόγου) ουδέν γίγνεται, δταν
τα σημεία του -πράγματος δι' αλλήλων συγκατασκευάζηται. [For απέραντος,
cf. Mates 1961, 82.]. This is a description of mutual implication, which may be
considered a special case of circularity, cf. Ar. An.Post. 72b36ff. Circularity
usually involves at least three elements (not necessarily syllogisms). However,
consider the following three arguments:
(1) &3 b)p(b:>a)
(2) (a^b^ and Co=cy)?(&? c)
) and (b>a))p(a> a)
If there are only two elements, äs in (1), one can construe a three-element
argument (cf. (2)) by substituting (a) for (c) in (2); the result is (3). Thus, one
can conclude that a is true, if a is true (a,b,c, = propositions).
The petitio principii is not only found in the Sceptics and the Stoa, but it is
described also in ApD., to wit in pron. 50,20 and at our place (adv. 126,2). In
both cases the ad /zoc-meanings given in LSJ are unnecessary: the technical
meaning fits. Pron. 50,20 deals with the question of the correct spelling of
έγώ(ν), with or without a final v. Some people argue that the v is a pleonasm,
because TU is spelled without one, and ττασα ... αντωνυμία εις ν λήγουσα
κατά το ττρώτον, -πάντως καΐ κατά το δεύτερον. However, this is circular in
that one of the implied premisses anticipates knowledge of the conclusion: The
underlying argument runs: If a pronoun ends in v in the first person singular, it
also ends in v in the second person Singular; second person τΰ does not end in
v; therefore, first person εγώ does not end in v. However, it is impossible to
ascertain whether the major is true, before the form of εγώ has been
established: petitio principii. The same hplds good for our passage, where there
are two unknown factors, to wit the position of the adjective in relation to the
noun and that of the adverb in relation to the verb. Since the major premiss
states that adjective is to Substantive äs adverb is to verb, the question
whether or not the adverb precedes the verb is the same äs the question
whether the adjective precedes its noun. The petitio principii is comrmtted in
this case by assigning a certain value to the minor ("the adjective precedes the
noun"). Apollonius tries to circumvent the circularity by providing independent
proof for this latter assertion. Notice the expression τί γαρ μάλλον Α η Β.
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demonstration (αττόδειξις, 126,6): The άττόδειξις consists of testing the effect
of adding the article to a combination of adjective and noun.242 If the adjective
precedes the noun, all is well, but if it follows it, the article has to be repeated.
This is held to prove that the pre-position is the more normal. Only then does
Apollonius return to the έττιρρήματα and add a test that is appropriate to that
part of speech, viz. the position of the adverbial interrogative.
This text is a mini-demonstration of the "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit"
which Apollonius takes into account: reason, daily usage and the authority of the
tradition - in this case it is the triad from the study of ελληνισμός that we
recognize.
2.5. Recapitulation; Apollonius and the Stoa
In summing up, I again draw attention to those elements in the definition
where Apollonius, consciously or not, makes a stand against his Stoic
predecessors, or betrays their influence.
A trace of undiluted Stoic terminological influence might be seen in
Apollonius' use of κατηγορεϊν in the definition and the ensuing discussion. This
is perhaps best explained äs an (unconscious?) reminiscence of the semanto-
syntactical function the Stoics accorded to this kind of words: they formed part
of the predicate.
Far more important are the points on which Apollonius disagrees with the
Stoics, or adapts their doctrines, the most glaring instance being the
independence of the adverb äs a part of speech in its own right.243 This
independence is stressed by the stipulation added to the definition of the verb,
that verbs signify tense ευ τοις Ιδίοις μετασχηματισμοί?, a characteristic
which was absent from the Stoic definition of the verb. This clause finds its
counterpart not so much in the adverb's άκλισία, but rather in the adverb's
potential lexical temporal meaning. On the other hand, the definition of the
adverb Stresses the fact that adverbs, äs opposed to verbs, cannot by themselves
complete a sentence. No matter how long the emancipation of the adverb had
been effectuated by Apollonius' time, I submit that traces of the discussion can
still be found.
242
 Notice that εκ της ττολλής χρήσεως refers to Homer's regulär
practice. Here one can see once again that the empirical component of
Apollonius' work should be analysed in material taken from daily life and
traditional attestations.
243
 Antipater did recognize the μεσάτης äs a sixth part of speech. The
recognition of the adverbs is not due to Apollonius; what I am concerned with
here, is the way he still shows traces of building a case, irrespective of who
started building it.
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In the discussion of the definition we noticed how Apollonius integrated
concepts borrowed from the Stoa into an entirely new context. The similarity of
the adverb and the adjective is no reason for him, äs it may well have been for
the Stoa, to deny the adverb its independence; rather, he employed it in the
context of the symmetrical and isomorphic build-up of language. Thus, it becomes
an argument for the syntactic behaviour of the adverb, of its optionality
(120,22ff.), its being construed μερικώς (123,5ff.) or its regulär position before
the word it belongs with (125,22ff.).
3. Μερισμό?
The discussion of the definition of the adverb is followed by a section (adv.
126,27-145,25) on words of which the adverbial Status is dubious. Since it is
imperative to Apollonius that each word is assigned to its proper part of speech
(μερισμός)244 - the parts of speech being the methodological framework of a
word-grammarian - he discusses these problematic cases at length. What is more,
such a procedure was apparently not unusual. All the cases discussed seem to
have been an object of attention to Apollonius' predecessors, too (cf. φασι, adv.
126,27). Twice Apollonius explicitly refers to Trypho, in the discussions of εκητι
and ΰπόδρα. After Apollonius, the same problems are mentioned in our sources.
Positions have often been taken up by this time, a particular point of view being
brought forward without discussion.245
Apollonius usually structures bis treatment of these problems äs a disputatio
in utramque partem.246 The problem is mostly stated in simple terms from the
outset: the word in question is either an adverb or another specific part of
244
 Μερισμός can refer to three things, the assignment of a word to its
proper word-class (1), the decision on how many and which words are formed by
a group of letters (2), and, äs the name of a grammatical work, the so-called
επιμερισμός or σχέδος, cf. Lehrs 1843, 126ff.
245
 Apart from the references mentioned by Schneider, see on δει and
χρη Et.G. 569,46-570,17; Et.M. 814,57f.; on εκητι Et. G. 175,58; Et.M. 321,44ff.
(this is not Apollonius' point of view); ΰπόδρα Et. Or. 157,6, representing the
view of Philoxenus (second half of the first Century B.C), cf. adv. 139,7-11; πυξ
Et. G. 487,33; Et.M. 695,52. πυξ and λάξ are examples of the επιρρήματα
ποιότητος in DTh. (75,1) - the problem Apollonius brings forward, is not
touched upon there; πέντε κτλ. Et. G. 172,18ff. (κοιυότης); (Et.M. 290,42ff.);
305,21ff. (κοιυότης); οφελου Et. M. 643,44ff., s.v. δφελες and δφελου; ακέωυ
Et.G. 25,17ff.; 604,43;£f. M. s.v.;Et. Or. s.v.; άυεω£ί. G. 48,4;£f. M. 105,16ff.
246
 This also was a structuring principle for Varro, cf. Fehling 1956, 268.
However, Dahlmann 1964, 73ff., points out that Varro informs us about the views
of other people in propria persona.
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speech. Usually Apollonius begins by listing the arguments for the μερισμός
favoured by bis opponents (συνηγορία, synt. 334,1). It is not unlikely that the
strategy for defending the rejected μερισμός is often also Apollonius' own.247
These arguments being refuted, Apollonius proceeds to state his reasons for a
different μερισμός. The passage dealing with the Status of δει and χρή is a
good case in point.
3.1. Δει and χρή; disputatio in utramque partem (adv. 128,10-133,12)
The question is whether δει and χρή are adverbs, äs is generally held
(128,11), or verbs, äs Apollonius thinks they are (129,16). This alternative is not
stated all at once in this case.248
Apollonius Starts by stating the αφορμή πλείστη, the many reasons, which
can be adduced to defend the position that δει and χρή are adverbs. This
advocacy of the devil consists of two parts, one positive, the other negative in
character. Apollonius first sums up three reasons why δει and χρή should be
considered adverbs (εκ συντάξεως, 128,13) and then adds two more to reject
the possibility that they are verbs. In this passage the applicability of the
definition of the adverb is the main criterium. It makes the transition from the
positive to the negative part of the argument more fluent, in that Apollonius
cites clauses of the definition not only throughout the positive part of the
argument, but also in the beginning of the negative part. The discussion may be
analysed äs follows; I add the relevant clause of the definition:
Δει and χρή are adverbs:
a) 128,13-4 ότι επίκειται τα έταρρήματα τοις ρήμασιν (definition:
κατηγορούσα των εν τοις ρήμασιν εγκλίσεων);249
b) 128,15-6 οτι μετά -πτωτικής συντάξεως και των συνόντων ρημάτων
λόγον άττοτελει (definition: ων άνευ ου κατακλε'ισει διάνοιαν);250
247
 Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 253 n. 27.
248
 It is implied in 128,24 ή ... εν ρήμασι συνταξις (vs. τα δε
επιρρήματα, 129,4) and in the argument brought forward in 129,9-15, which is
meant to combat the view that δει and χρή are verbs (129,15 ου ρήματα). In
synt. 334,5ff. the additional possibility of δει and χρή being σύνδεσμοι is
discussed and rejected, and in synt. 335,5ff. that of their being infinitives.
249
 "Because the adverbs go with the verbs" - äs δει and χρή go with the
Infinitive.
250
 "Because (adverbs) complete the sentence in combination with a case
and the accompanying verbs" - äs δει and χρή do in sentences like
' Αττολλώνιον χρή γράφειν.
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b') 128,16 ττροτασσόμενον ... ϋττοτασσόμενον (cf. 125,6-7 καΐ εν ϋττοτάξει ...
καΐ εν -προτάξει);251
c) 128,21 καΐ μερικώτερόν γε, καθότι καΐ το αγε έτάρρημα τοις
-προστακτικοί«; καΐ το ε'ίθε τοις εύκτικοϊς (definition: καθόλου ή
μερικώς).252
Δει and χρή are not verbs:
d) 128,23ff. They are καθ' ένα σχηματισμού for the category of "person"
(definition: άκλιτος);253
e) 129,9ff. Whenever two εγκλίσεις are construed together, they are a ρήμα
ττροαιρετικόν, a verbum cupiendi, and an infinitive. Δει and χρή are construed
with an infinitive. Therefore, either they are verba cupiendi or they are not
verbs at all.254
Apollonius then refutes each of the arguments mentioned above. His main
point is the position of the infinitive äs an όνομα -πράγματος,255 providing an
ονοματική κατηγορία του -πράγματος.2^ The refutation of all five arguments
of the opposing party is based on this nominal character of the infinitive.257
251
 "In pre-ppsition ... in postposition" - δει and χρή can come either
before or after the infinitive they are construed with.
252
 "And their construction is partial (with part of the forms of the verb),
just äs the adverb άγε goes with (έτάκειται) the imperatives and εϊθε with
the optatives" - The construction of δει and χρή is restricted (μερικώς), in
that they are combined with infinitives only.
253
 The argument runs thus: if verbs are construed with an infinitive (äs a
complement), they are still conjugated for person; adverbs construed with an
infinitive are not marked for person. Δει and χρή are unmarked for person,
when construed with an infinitive. Therefore they are adverbs (and not verbs).
254
 The last step, the Statement that δει and χρή are no verba cupiendi,
and thus cannot be verbs, remains implicit.
255 129,17;
 Cf. Skrzecka 1861, 15ff.
256 129,20. The term κατηγορία may be Stoic in origin, cf. Schoemann 1871,
239 n. 4. Camerer 1965, 193 neatly translates ονοματική κατηγορία του
-πράγματος äs "nominale Aussage (-form) über den (Verbal-) Inhalt". Cf.
Nuchelmans (1973, 49f.) on -πράγμα: "an asomatic action or passion which is held
to be true of some agent or patient, of a body or soma by which the pragma is
caused"; see section 2.3.2.2.
257
 There can be no doubt, however, that Apollonius still considered the
infinitive to be a verb, cf. 129,17f.: the infinitive is το γενικώτατον ρήμα το
τταρυφιστάνον το ουκ έγγινόμενον εν ττροσώττοις, and his discussion in the
Syntax (320,1-346,2). Skrzecka 1861, 16 remarks: "Dass ... Apollonius den Infinitiv
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Δει and χρή are verbs:
versus a) 129,16-21: Starting-point of Apollonius' argument and at the same time
an implicit rejection of the first argument of the Opposition: each infinitive is an
ονοματική κατηγορία του πράγματος, and therefore an unqualified assignment
of the infinitive to the verbs will not do. Δει and χρή do enter into
constructions with the infinitive, but not in its quality of verb, but rather in
that of a ώ? τττωηκόυ.
versus b) 129,21-131,2: The question in this case is: in what way do δει and
χρή form complete constructions, äs adverbs or äs verbs? Argument b) of those
in favour of an adverbial δεί and χρή suggests that the construction of δει or
χρή plus an accusative and an infinitive should be analysed äs that of an adverb
plus a -πτωτική σΐινταξις plus a verb, resulting in a complete sentence.
Apollonius counters this analysis by taking δε! or χρή äs the verb, the
infinitive äs the πτωτική σύνταξα in the nominative case and the accusative äs
the "obj'ect" of the verb. He checks the validity of his analysis by substituting
the indubitable verb λείττει. for δε! in the sentence δε! Απολλώνιου
ττεριττατεΐν and the manifest noun ό περίπατος for το περιπατεΐυ. The
resulting sentence λείπει Άπολλώνιον ό ττερίττατος does not strike one äs
particularly neat Greek,258 but that is, again, not what is aimed at: the sentence
has the advantage of an entirely perspicuous syntactic and semantic structure-
it serves äs the semantic representation of the problematic construction.
In anticipation of his reaction to argument e), which will be dealt with
more fully in 132,3-14, Apollonius now remarks that δε! is characterized by a
διάθεσις ελλειπτική (130,4), a transitive disposition signifying that something is
lacking.259 I suspect that it was this analysis of the meaning of δε! and χρή
that induced Apollonius to offer a second way of construing these words.260 He
suggests that we can also say δε! Απολλώνιος το -γράφειν, the verb δε!
being construed with a πτωτική σύνταξα in the nominative and an infinitive in
nicht vollständig dem Nomen gleichgestellt, sondern immer an seiner verbalen
Natur fest gehalten hat, geht auch schon daraus hervor, dass er ihn δνομα
ρήματος, nicht etwa δνομα ρηματικόν nennt".
258
 But cf. LSJ s.v. λείπω A I 3 b, Hom. χ 119 αΰτάρ έττεί λίπον Ιοί
όϊστεύοντα ανακτά ... ("fail"). The difference is, of course, that ιοί can be
counted, whereas περίπατος cannot.
259
 Cf. odv.H9,8ff. and Schneider comm. a.1.
260
 The text of 130,9ff. is uncertain; I follow the reconstruction by Schneider.
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the accusative case. This construction is not attested in Greek,261 but it is not
difficult to realize how Apollonius came to think of it. Δει and χρή share the
characteristic of indicating an ελλειψις του -πράγματος (130,7f.) with the
ττροαιρετικά and the εϋκτικά. For these by themselves do not express the
ττραγμα either, but this has to be substituted in the form of an Infinitive, the
δυομα του ττράγματος. Now, Apollonius takes these infinitives to be in the
accusative case (cf. adv. 132,7f., where προαιρούμαι άναγινώσκειν is held to be
the equivalent of προαιρούμαι την άνάγνωσιν).262 Apollonius has probably
projected this normal construction on δει and χρή. The resulting Greek is
dubious.
versus d) 131,3-19: The άκλισία of the verbs δει and χρή for the category of
"person" is caused by the fact that the infinitive - which is μονοττρόσωττον
(131,6) - is construed with it in the nominative case: In such a construction all
verbs would be μονοσχημάτιστον (131,11), äs is demonstrated by means of
λείπει. The άκλισ'ια, therefore, is accidental.
versus c) 132,2-3 (cf. 129,23-4): To invalidate the equation of the relationship
holding between δεί/χρή + infinitive and αγε + imperative, for instance,
Apollonius harks back to 129,16-21: The infinitive is the only mood which does
not express modality, because it indicates το ουκ έγγινόμενον εν
προσώποις.
263
 Therefore, it is not a combination of (modal) adverbs (δεί/χρή)
plus mood (infinitive) that we have to do with, but rather we are confronted
with a case of ρήματα (δεί/χρή), συντασσόμενα ως όνόμασι (the
infinitives).
versus e) 132,3-14: The construction of the verba cupiendi is also based on the
fact that the infinitive has the value of a nominal expression (the ίδια
ονομασία, 132,6) of the πράγμα of a verb. Therefore, this construction should
not be looked upon äs consisting of two εγκλίσεις either - which invalidates
the major premiss of argument e). Rather, the verba cupiendi are also construed
with an ως πτωτικόν. Notice the comparison of the προαιρετικά with δει and
χρή,
264
 and cf. versus b).
26! Perhaps there is some influence from the personal construction πολλοί
δέω + infinitive; cf. LSJs.v. δέω Β 2.
262
 Cf. GGII iii 88,39-89,30.
263
 "Das noch nicht an Personen sich zeigende" (transl. Skrzecka 1861, 12).
Cf. the definition of ρήμα (GG II iii, 70,28ff.): ... προσώπων <τε και
αριθμών > σημαντικόν, δτε και τάς της ψυχής διαθέσεις δήλοι.
264 132,3-4 καΐ τα ττροαιρετικά.
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All the arguments based on construction and meaning (syntax, cf. 132,13-4)
having been enervated by the infinitive's quasi-nominal Status, Apollonius
proceeds to add two compelling reasons why δεί and χρή should be verbs.
These reasons have to do with the form of the words. The first (132,15-23) is
based on the fact that only to verbs can an augment be added. Since this is
possible with δε! and χρή, too, they must be verbs.265
The second reason is the ending of δεί (132,24ff.) on the one hand, which
can be explained äs a contracted verbal ending, but has no adverbial parallel
with the drcumflexus and κατά το κοινόν εθος (132,27),266 and the
constitution of the form χρή (132,3 Iff.) on the other. Since in the foregoing
discussion δε! had been the main focus of attention throughout, Apollonius first
formally states that χρή is synonymous to it. The form is then explained äs an
άττοκοττή from χρήσι.267 This implies that the imperfect should have been
έχρη; however, it is έχρήν and this is remarkable because of its accent and its
final v, although the latter phenomenon is paralleled in ην.
3.2. Μετάληψις
Having seen a meristic problem being solved by means of a disputatio in
utramque partem, let us look at another important aspect of the way Apollonius
tackles such problems. As I pointed out in sections 1.4.4. and 1.5., arguments
derived from the form of a word are held to be inferior to those derived from
its meaning, which is related to the way it combines with other words, its
syntax. In order to establish the semantic contents of a word, Apollonius
frequently uses the technique of μετάληψις, the translation of a word into
synonymous expressions.268 Thierfelder (1935, 42) rightly points out, that
265
 Apollonius ignores the possibility of inflection for other moods and
tenses, maybe because they do not occur in Homer?
266 "According to cornmon usage." This remark was added because of Doric
ττεΐ. The accent was mentioned because of adverbs such äs άθεεί, αμελεί, cf.
Hdn. GGIII ii 464,19ff.; 469,10.
267
 This assumed ττάθος is supported by a parallel, according to Apollonius'
professed methodological rales, cf. adv. 140,8: The bürden of proof rests with
those who assume any pathological changes. For a practical example cf. adv.
135,3ff.; 140, 8-30.
268 por the classification of μετάληψις in the domain of the δηλούμενον,
cf. synt. 147,7f. 'Ρητέον δε καΐ ττερι των τη φωνή άρθρων καθεστώτων,
τη δε εξ αυτών μεταλήψει αντωνυμιών. Herodian' (GG III ii 70,14f.)
interestingly separates the structural and the semantic element when he defends
the όρθοτόνησις of σφίσι in Hom. K 210 "και δια την σύνταξαν (viz. after a
preposition) καΐ δια την μετάληψιν (it means "themselves")".
I shall use the term μετάληψις throughout to indicate this technique of
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Apollonius was very much dependent on these μεταλήψεις, since he had to work
from the Greek into the Greek. This was hardly a problem to the Latin
grammarians, who could use Greek to clarify Latin words. We have already met
the μεταλήψεις which constitute an ideal semantic representation of the
expression under discussion; in fact, in these cases Apollonius has created a
metalanguage of bis own, in which the semantic representations are not primarily
meant äs examples of well-formed Greek or äs deep structures from which the
actual sentences were derived; rather, every aspect of the meaning of the
object phrase should be represented in the target phrase. The "translations"
serve an interpretive end.269
Hoerschelmann (1880, 385ff.) gives a survey of the use made by Apollonius
of the terms μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις κτλ. He mentions the usages "Theil
nehmen an etwas", "Eines nehmen anstatt eines Anderen", "gebrauchen" (o.e. 388),
and the usage in the context of "Lautwandel" and more generally "umwandeln,
verandern" (387). However, the most important meaning in Apollonius is "zu
bezeichnen dass für einen Ausdruck ein anderer gleichwerthiger gesetzt werden
könne, ohne dass der Gedanke darunter wesentlich verändert werde" (o.e. 385).27°
In the use of this technique Apollonius could borrow from the discipline of
rhetoric, where it was employed in various ways.271 In the first place it was a
means of clarification.272 By substituting more familiär Synonyms, a sentence or
definition or text could be made more accessible. This makes the technique
useful in various kinds of argumentation, and accordingly several τόττοι are built
on it. The reverse, viz. the exchange of poetic or more recherche words for
translation or paraphrasing. Apollonius often applies the method without using
the terms μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις κτλ. "Implicit" μετάληψις is to be found
e.g. adv. 129,24f. δει ττεριττατεΐν σημαίνει γαρ το τοιούτον, λε'ιττει ο
ττερίττατος; 133,13ff. ως ΐσην ενόν δύναιαν τω ένεκα κτλ.; 143,23 άκέων
δαίυυσθε (φ 89). εν ΐσω γαρ εστί τω ήσυχη δαίνυσθε ή ήσύχως δα'ινυσθε.
269
 See section 1.4.4. The problem with Householder's 1981 essay is not the
comparispn between Apollonius and transformational grammar, which is indeed
illuminating in some respects, but the undue stress on structure.
270
 Cf. Skrzecka 1853, 15ff.; Lehrs, 1865, 19ff.
271
 I shall not take the use of μετάληψις äs a στάσις into account here;
cf. Russell 1983, 60ff.
272
 Cf. Ar. Top. lllaS: το μεταλαμβάνειν ε'ις το γνωριμώτερον όνομα;
Alex, in Ar. Top., CAG 2,2,156,20ff.: ό τόττος εκ μεταλήψεως ...
μεταλαμβάνειν το άσαφέστερον εις το σαφέστερον; Philop. in Ar. An.Pr., CAG
13,2,160,17f.: άττοφατικάς ε'ις καταφατικάς μεταλαμβάνει ώσττερ άττό
ασαφέστερων καταφάσεων ε'ις σαφεστέρας ττοιούμενος την μετάληψιν. Cf.
[Them.] in Ar. An.Pr., CAG 23,3,43,30; 141,12f.; Anon. in Ar. An.Post, CAG
13,3,570,25f.; Eustath. 2,805,20 vdV. διασαφητική μετάληψις.
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well-known ones should be avoided.273 In all cases, one should see to it that the
substitute really is identical in meaning to the original word.274
A second rhetorical application is that of a figure of speech: This rested on
a double Substitution, viz. first that of a homonym and then of a synonym. Thus,
θοός in the (exceptional) meaning "sharp", "pointed" (of a shape) was explained
by the fact that οξύς is its synonym. However, οξύς is a homonym, meaning
both "fast", and "sharp", and is strictly speaking synonymous with θοός only in
the former meaning.275 This μετάληψις is the key to Sextus Empiricus'
cryptogram (AM I 314) "έβαρβάριζε το όλου, έλκη έχον ευ τη χειρί".276
This puzzling sentence is explained äs the perfectly understandable "έσύριζευ ό
Παυ, σύριγγας εχωυ εν τη χειρ'ι".
277
 Συρ'ιζω is a homonym, meaning either
"playing the pipe" or "speaking Syrian".278 A synonym of the latter meaning is
βαρβαρίζω. Likewise, Παν is a homonym: it Stands for the name of a god or
273
 Cf. Ar. Top. 112a21f. εύλαβεΐσθαι δε χρή είς το χαλεττώτερου την
μετάληψιν ττοιεΐσθαι; 149a5ff.
While denying that such a thing äs the art of rhetoric is viable, Sextus
Empiricus (AM II 54) upholds that anyone has a good style who knows τίνος
ένεκα τάς μεταλήψεις ποιούμεθα των λέξεων, ήτοι χιττέρ του μη
εύθυρρηιιουειυ. τφοσκοττήυ φέροντος του εύθέος ρήματος (in fact this is
one of the ways to create euphony, cf. Sluiter 1988c, 80ff.), ή ύττέρ του τι
σαφηυίζειν. ως όταν το μεν αίτιον είς το ττοιοΰν μεταλαμβάνωμευ, το
δε σημείου είς το δηλοΰν.
274
 Ar. Top. 149a8ff.; cf. Alex, in Ar. Top., CAG 2,2,479,8t
The exception is the τόττος described in Ar. Top. 112a32ff.: There it is
suggested that one might argue frorn the fact that a word is not used in its
ordinary sense, but in a sense which can be established by means of an
analogical procedure (κατά του λόγου), which in practice is based on its
etymology. Thus, εΰψυχος need not mean "courageous", äs it usually does, but it
might be taken äs "ό ευ την ψυχήν εχωυ" on the strength of ευελτας,
meaning "δ αγαθά έλτάζων". (See the note of the Bude editor, Brunschwig.)
This τόττος is called a μετάληψις είς τον κατά την έτυμολογίαυ λόγου in
Alex, in Ar. Top., CAG 2,2,175,18ff.; Alexander explains κατά του λόγον äs
"according to an etymological procedure".
275
 Cf. Desbordes 1988, 96 n. 72; [Tryphp] ir. τρόττωυ (Rhet.Gr. VIII 738,7ff.
Waltz: μετάληψις εστί λέξις εκ συυωυυμίας το όμώυυμου δηλοϋσα· οίου
""Ενθεν δ' αν νήσοισιν έτηττροέηκε θοήσι" (Hom. ρ 299); cf. SchHom. o 299:
θοήσιυ] μεταλητττικόν εκ τοΐ κατά κίνησιυ οξέος έττί το κατά σχήμα.
276
 "The whole spoke like a barbarian, while having wounds in its hand."
277
 "Pan played the pipe, holding the pipe in his hand."
278
 Strictly speaking, the homonymy is orthographical only: σϋρίζω, playing
the pipe, has a long υ, σϋρίζω, speaking Syrian, a short one.
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for όλον.279 And, finally, σύριγξ is also a homonym, indicating the pipes or a
kind of sore. In the latter meaning it is synonymous with έλκος.280
When applied to philology, μετάληψις was especially useful for translating
poetical expressions into more ordinary ones. This was already common (school)-
practice by the fifth Century B.C.281 It was also used more generally here to
clarify one's Interpretation of any given passage.282 This application is found in
Apollonius äs well.283
But Apollonius does not only employ the philologic/rhetorical use of
μετάληψις, there is one passage in which the rhetorical "double Substitution" is
put into practice äs well, even though the actual word μετάληψις is not found
there. In adv. 147,24ff. Apollonius explains the respective origins of ευτε and
ηυτε.
284
 He derives είτε from οτε, whereas ηυτε comes from α-τε or ή-τε,
Synonyms of ώσ-τε. This last point is demonstrated by an uncomplicated form of
μετάληψις.285 Now, from 150,15 Apollonius briefly teils us that sometimes ευτε
is used where η-υτε would have been expected and he explains (150,16ff.): öv
γαρ τρόπον το ως αυτί του δτε, "Εκτωρ δ' ως Σκαιάς τε ττύλας (Ζ
237), κατά τον αυτόν δη τρόττον ουδέν κωλύει καΐ το εΐτ' ορεος (Γ
279
 In this case it is the accent that is neglected: τταν versus Πάν.
280
 Eustathius (1,125-126,19 vdV.) neatly distinguished the two rhetorical
applications of the term. The "double-substitution" variant was attributed
especially to the γραμματικοί, (l,126,14f. vdV.; 4,726,6ff. vdV.); cf. 3,582,2ff. vdV.
281
 Cf. Plato's habit of paraphrasing Homeric verses, e.g. Rep. II 379c9-e2;
P. Derveni col. VIII 3ff. See chapter I section 1.3.
282
 Cf. e.g. Philop. in Ar. Phys., CAG 16,85,26ff.: in order to explain the
coherence of a passage Philoponus first submits that δε should be read äs a
substitute for γαρ. This would make the lines which follow into an explanation
of what went before. But Philoponus also has an alternative solution, in which
an incision is made in the argument at the point in question. In that case δε
should not undergo μετάληψις with γαρ, but rather it Starts a new line of
reasoning, it is αρκτικός. Cf. Simpl. in Ar. Phys., CAG 10,1055,20.
283
 Cf. e.g. coni. 236,16ff.; adv. 200,8ff. For obscurity caused by the
Substitution of a poetic word for a normal one, cf. the literary critic and rhetor
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (77z. 31).
284
 Apollonius regards disyllabic ηΐτε äs the original form and trisyllabic
ήΰτε äs a "pathological" derivation (the ττάθος is "διάστασις"). Cf. adv.
149,221 and Schneider ad adv. 147, 24-150,19.
285
 Adv. 148,12-22: την αυτήν έχον σημασ'ιαν τω ως, και σχεδόν
την αυτήν σύνταξιν (148,17f.); cf. της μεταλήψεως (148,22).
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10), σημαίνον το οτε, τταρειλήφθαι αντί του ως.286 We see that ως is a
homonym, meaning "when" and "äs". In the former meaning it is synonymous to
δτε, which in its turn is a synonym of είτε. Apollonius upholds that δτε could
mean "äs", and so, therefore, can its substitute είτε.
Along with many other concepts from pagan grammar, the technique of
μετάληψις was taken over and applied in various contexts by the Christian
writers.287 These, of course, did have the benefit of being able to use a
different language (Hebrew!) äs a means of clarification. Incidentally,
μεταλαμβάνειν can also be used for translating from the Hebrew.288 More
revealing of underlying theory is the debate of Gregory of Nyssa contra
Eunomium 1,560: According to Gregory, Eunomius has maintained that God's
qualification äs "Father" should be interpreted äs "having come into being from
nothing", not äs "having begot a Son". He infers this from the fact that the
Father is άγέννητος, and that "Father" and άγέννητος are, therefore,
synonymous. Gregory, however, argues that a word can have more than one
connotation and that it is not admissible to use one μετάληψη to the exclusion
of all the others. He realizes that a μετάληψις may cover a word only partially,
and shows that Eunomius' line of reasoning is misleading and wrong. He does
not, however, reject all μεταλήψεις; but he demands care in its application. One
synonym does not necessarily cover a word completely. Although his example is
not exactly a case of double-substitution μετάληψις, Gregory's careful
observation would apply there, too. In rhetoric the result of the double
Substitution is a trope. However, in Apollonius a warning that the resulting
286
 "For just äs ως [when] is used instead of οτε [when] in the line 'But
when Hector (had come to) the Scaean gate', in the very same way there is
nothing to prevent that (είτε in) 'even 3$ (the South wind sheds a mist over
the peaks) of a mountain', since it means οτε [when], is used instead of ως [äs!]."
287
 Schäublin 1974,60 (on biblical ζητήματα): "Oft vermag eine Art
synonymisches Verfahrens (δια εκ άττό της λέξεως) Hilfe zu schaffen"; cf.
ibid. 141 on the use of paraphrasis by Theodorus of Mopsuestia.
See chapter III section 5 on the usefulness of these witnesses for the history of
ancient linguistics.
288
 Cf. Bus. P.E. 7,8,8f.: (Αδάμ) ... του γηγενή δηλοϋν κατά τήυ είς
έλλάδα φωνήν μετάληψιν. Cf. Orig. Selecta in PS., PGM 12,1269 (in PS. 23,10):
Σημειωτέον δε, δτι öl τα Εβραίων ήκριβωκότες φασί.· την Σαβαώθ
φωνήν εν τω Έβραικω κειμένην εις Ελλάδος φωνήν οι
Έβδομήκοντα μεταλαμβάνοντες, δτε μεν το Κύριος των δυνάμεων, οτε
δε το Κύριος κραταιός οτε δε το παντοκράτωρ έταξαν. Λέγουσι γοΰν
δτι καΐ εν τω τόττω τούτω κειμένη του Σαβαώθ ^ ή μετάληψις είς το
Κύριος των δυνάμεων γέγόνεν. Ει δε το Σαβαώθ έττί του Σωτήρος
κείται, ερμηνεύεται είς το παντοκράτωρ.
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expression was uncommon or ornate, would have been in order. Instead, he
applies the principle at least this once äs a matter of course.
In its more common form in Apollonius, μετάληψις was a method which by
bis time was well-established in grammatical theory. He can even reproach some
of bis predecessors for having restricted themselves in their treatment of the
σύνδεσμος to a list of names, and an indication of which σύνδεσμοι were
synonymous (τάς γινόμενα? μεταλήψεις εξ αυτών εις αυτούς, τουτέστι
τους Ίσοδυναμοϋντας άλλήλοις (coni 213.4)).289 Moreover there had clearly
been some discussion äs to the value of μετάληψις in meristic questions even
before Apollonius' time. Trypho had issued a warning against blindly trusting to
this test: Although the value of εΐ can be paraphrased by means of ακολουθεί,
these words evidently do not belong to the same part of speech (coni.
220,7ff.).290
The exact value to be attributed to the meristic results obtained by means
of μετάληψις, was also a hot item in the question of whether or not
prepositions and conjunctions should be looked upon äs belonging to one part of
speech. The Stoics actually did this, or rather, they had not yet separated them
in two distinct parts of speech.291 If we may believe Apollonius (synt. 457,12ff.),
they relied heavily on the interchangeability of prepositions and conjunctions in
some contexts. The prepositions (or -προθετικοί σύνδεσμοι, äs the Stoics called
them, synt. 458, If.) convey a syndesmic force in constructions like δια τί
λυττή; (= ένεκα τίνος λυττη;) or εκ της ραθυμίας (= ένεκα της
ραθυμίας).292 However, in the beginning of de coniunctionibus Apollonius
argues against the view that conjunctions and prepositions can be taken together
289
 "The translations that were made from one into the other, that is their
mutual relationships of synonymy." Cf. μετάληψις συνδέσμου εις σύνδεσμον,
Eustath. 3,354,20 vdV.; Od. l,59,22f. Stallb.; 1,338,9 Stallb. In Eustath. Od.
1,244,24 Stallb. this is ascribed to öl ρήτορες. Cf. SchHom A 117a; 13 la; Z
149a; 0 634; Υ 105al.
290
 It is interesting to notice that some formal logicians refused to accept
their logical equivalence äs well, cf. Alex.Aphr. in Ar. An.Pr. CAG l,373,29ff.: öl
δε νεώτεροι ^αΐς^ ^λέξεσι έττακολουθοΰντες, οΰκέτι δε τοις
σημαινομένοις ου ταΰτόν φασι γίνεσθαι εν ταΐς εις τάς ίσοδυναμούσας
λέξεις μεταληψεσι των ορών. ταΰτόν γαρ σημαίνοντος του "ει το Α, το
Β" [εν] τω άκολουθεΐν τω Α το Β, συλλογιστικόν μεν λόγον φασίν είναι
τοιαύτης ληφθείσης της λέξεως "ει το Α το Β, το δε Α, το ώρα Β",
ούκέτι δε συλλογιστικόν αλλά ττεραντικόν το "ακολουθεί τω Α το Β, το
δε Α, το άρα Β."
291
 Or, in the case of Posidonius (ca. 135-51), they did not accept the Separation.
292
 Synt. 458,2ff. Cf. below section 3.3. note 385 for the syndesmic Status
of ένεκα.
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on account of μεταλήψεις which are partial at best, and he defends their
Separation.293
3.2.1. Πυξ and λάξ (adv. 141,1-15)
For a closer inspection of the way Apollonius applies the technique of
μετάληψις in meristic matters, let us turn to the passage dealing with the Status
of ττύξ and λάξ. The question is, whether these words are adverbs or nouns.
The argument for including them with the nouns is based on the possibility
of μετάληψις with ττυγμη, undeniably a noun; moreover, the άκλισία is
invalidated äs a counter-argument, because there are more ονόματα άκλιτα.294
However, Apollonius rejects the μετάληψις äs a decisive argument and
Supports bis assigning ττύξ and λάξ to the adverbs on account of their
construction with verbs and by pointing out that the άκλισία cannot be
explained by the word-form, äs it should have been if ττύξ and λάξ had been
nouns.
293
 Neither the actual word μετάληψις nor a related expression occurs in
this context. However, cf. 214,18 τα 'ίστ\ν δύναμιυ άναδεδεγμένα συνδέσμοις
μόρια and 214,22 άυθτπτάγοιται/. The latter word is a synonym of
μεταλαμβάνοντας cf. 222,2f.; 222,9f. and 220,7ff. Another synonym is αντί
τίνος τταραλαμβάνεσθαι, synt. 147,15.
The argument of coni. 214,4ff. runs äs follows: 1) Tp prove the fact that
σύνδεσμοι have meaning, Posidonius Starts from a certain group of σύνδεσμοι,
viz. the prothetic ones. These cannot be meaningless, since they are not
interchangeable; if they are varied, the meaning of the compound verbs formed
by their means also varies (214,4-8). Apollonius concentrates on this argument
which is based on the combination of prepositions and conjunctions into one
part of speech. This he will combat.
2) The "real" conjunctions that are formally speaking homonyms, are classified äs
conjunctions or adverbs on account of their meaning - Posidonius admits this
(214,8-17).
3) It would have been consistent for Posidonius to have concluded that an
incidental syndesmic use of a preposition also points to homonymy; such a word
should be classified at one time äs a preposition, at another time äs a
conjunction on the basis of its meaning. Instead he runs together two whole
parts of speech and calls the most evident cases of preposition "σύνδεσμοι"
(214,17-20).
4) But on the other band, the Suggestion made under 3), a kind of compromise
between the strict Separation and the combination of the two parts of speech, is
completely unwarranted: for there is no exact correspondence between the
preposition and the conjunction. If a conjunction is paraphrased with the help of
a preposition, the addition of more parts of speech is necessary to obtain a
correct representation of the meaning envisaged (214,20-6). Therefore, there is
not even homonymy between prepositions and conjunctions - they should in all
respects be kept apart.
Cf. the commentary by Kidd on Posidonius fr. 45.
294 T^ j
s
 ^  g
rst Of a number of meristic problems in which άκλισ'ια is
a prominent feature of the argumentation.
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Thierfelder (1935, 41-5) is very severe in bis judgment on this passage. He
has two major objections to Apollonius' argumentation, the first being bis
arbitrariness in accepting or rejecting μετάληψις äs a criterium for μερισμός.
I shall return to this below. His second objection concerns the faultiness of
Apollonius' argument, which he explains äs follows: According to Apollonius the
μετάληψη with a noun should be rejected äs a criterium on account of the fact
that, like other adverbs, ττύξ and λάξ are always construed with the verb (έττί
ρήμα φέρεσθαι); besides, they are indeclinable (141,3-4). Apollonius then
continues thus: καΐ γαρ αν τα ονόματα έττΐ τα ρήματα φέρηται, αλλ' ου
κατά rrjv ownv εννοιαν ουδέ καθ' ένα σχτ,ματισμόν (141.6-7).295 This
Thierfelder finds unacceptable. For ττυγμή is used in exactly the same meaning
äs ττύξ, äs is apparent from the very possibility of μετάληψη He suggests that
we read 141,7 äs οΰ<κ άεΙ> κατά την αυτήν έννοιαν,296 paraphrasing
Apollonius' point äs follows: "dass ein Nomen nicht bloss wie ein Adverb zum
Verb konstruiert werden könnte, sondern auch noch 'in anderem Sinne', d.h.
selbstverständlich: als (Subjekt oder) Objekt" (1935, 45)
I do not find this criticism justified. We can interpret the text äs we have
it without taking recourse to accusations of captio on the side of Apollonius
Thierfelder's problem with this passage rests on bis Interpretation of 141 6f
which he takes äs follows: "For even though nouns [like ττυγμή] are also
construed with verbs, it is not with the same meaning [äs ττύξ] nor in one form
[hke ττύξ]." If read in this way, it is indeed hard to see what Apollonius intends
to achieve with this argument, which simply does not make sense I suggest
however, that we interpret it differently: "For even though nouns are also
construed with verbs [supposing ττύξ is a noun], it is not with the same meaning
[äs the adverb ττύξ] nor in one form [like the adverb ττύξ]". If ττύξ had been a
noun, it would have been in the nominative case297
 and thus WQuld haye been
"subject" of the verb.298 This appears from its form, which could not possibly be
70S HT~» · pFor even if nouns are construed with verhs it ic etiii + · *i,
meaning, nor in one (indeclinable) form." ' 1S stiU not m the same
296
 This is unnecessary anyway, cf. Schneider adpron. 7,28 and 13,7.
297
 Cf. 141,13 the comparison with τττύξ, τττυχός, τττύχες.
tlie
word
 "
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indeclinable if ττύξ were a noun.299 And since άκλισ'ια would have been the
only viable explanation of the fact that a manifest nominative form could be
replaced by a dative, it cannot reasonably be upheld that ττύξ is a noun.
I submit that by adding καΐ γαρ &ν τα ονόματα έττΐ τα ρήματα
φέρηται κτλ. Apollonius anticipates a possible objection. For a moment he admits
of the theoretical possibility that ττύξ is a noun, only to deny that this yields
the desired meaning in our construction. The same phenomenon of temporarily
focalizing the problem from the standpoint of the opposing party recurs in 141,8
καΐ άλλα ονόματα άκλιτα αν εϊη.300
Apollonius therefore concludes that ττύξ and λάξ are adverbs because of
their syntax äs well äs their form. There is no attempt at misleading the
reader.301
The other objection brought forward by Thierfelder concerned the
arbitrariness in accepting or rejecting μετάληψις äs a criterium for μερισμός:
299
 Άκλισία would in that case have been inexplicable and therefore it is
unacceptable. Notice once again the firm belief in the powers of reason, cf. adv.
168,7ff. (if έγγυτάτω and other such adverbs had been derived from the
Superlative εγγύτατος (instead of deriving from the comparative adverbs, äs
Apollonius believes), all superlatives should allow of such a derivation. However,
this is not true): εϊττερ ουν τα -προκείμενα έταρρήματα τταρ' όνομα
έγεγόνει, άττορον αν το τοιούτον ην, τταρά τι ή κακία των τοιούτων
επιρρημάτων [viz. adverbs like ταχυτάτω]. If Apollonius' rule to the effect that
Superlative adverbs in -ω are not derived from nouns, is not universally valid,
Problems will arise which cannot be explained (chropov) and that is
unacceptable.
300
 Cf. 141,11: the όνομα τι ες διττλοΰν ληγον hints at ττύξ again; cf.
synt. 323,7f. where the use of τα επιρρήματα is also shorthand for "supposing
the infinitive is an adverb".
301
 A problem left undiscussed by Thierfelder is 141,15. I suggest we should
read there ουκ έχοντα τιν' άλλην σύνταξιν ή την < έττιρ > ρηματικήν. The
Index by Schneider offers only one parallel for the combination σύνταξις
ρηματική, viz. synt. 189,14, dealing with the άρθρα ύττρτακτικά: ευ αρχή ...
λόγου τταραλαμβανόμενα εις σύνταξιν ρηματικήν ("it ... Stands at the
beginning of its clause, construed with a following verb", transl. Householder):
Since in our passage the foregoing discussion focuses on the different
constructions of nouns and adverbs with verbs, this cannot be meant here. I
have found the combination again in adv. 132,13f., where it means "the
construction of a verb". This cannot be intended here either. 'Ρηματικήν
wrongly suggests that, contrary to adverbs, nouns can have another construction
apart from the one with verbs, but this is beside the point entirely. The point is
that there are two constructions, viz. that of nouns plus verbs and that of
adverbs plus verbs, and that these two constructions are different from one
another. This last sentence of the discussion of ττύξ and λάξ should therefore
contain the conclusion that the adverbs ττύξ and λάξ are construed with verbs,
and that in no other way than by means of the adverbial construction.
Therefore read έταρρηματικήν. Cf. adv. 120,17. The error probably originated
from 141,14 συντασσόμενα τοις ρήμασι. For the same addition, cf. coni. 222,20.
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"wo es Αρ. für sein Beweisziel vorteilhaft erscheint, billigt er ihr unbedingten
Beweiswert zu ...[bis example is synt. 149,8ff.] Umgekehrt kann nach [synt.
118,2ff.] die Möglichkeit, den Satz γραμματικός τταρεγένετο δς διελέξατο
'umzuwandeln' in -γρ. τταρεγέυετο καΐ ούτος διελέξατο, durchaus noch nicht
beweisen, dass der 'hypotaktische Artikel' (d.h. das Relativpronom in nicht-
verallgemeinernder Verwendung) ein Pronomen wie ούτος sei, - denn (pron. 7,9f.
in einer ähnlichen Sache) ουκ, ει τι αντί τίνος παραλαμβάνεται, ευθέως
ταύτόν έκείνοο εστίν" (1935, 42f.).
Now, adv. 141,lff. is one of a series of places where μετάληψις is
disqualified äs the sole decisive factor for μερισμός, cf. e.g. pron. 7,9 quoted
above.302 This does not mean at all that μετάληψις is devoid of all "meristic"
value. It cannot, however, decide the matter all by itself.303 Only if a word
shows the syntactical behaviour along with all other characteristics belonging to
a certain part of speech, is μετάληψις a valid argument. This μετάληψις
consists of substituting a word whose μερισμός is certain, for the word in
question. In such a case the μετάληψις motivates the μερισμός of the word in
question: it joins the part of speech of its substitute.304
Again a proviso should be made: incidental μετάληψις of two words
stemming from different parts of speech cannot justify the combination of those
two parts of speech in their entirety. Remember in this connection the adjectives
which took on the adverbial άκλισ'ια when construed with verbs - such an
adjective virtually became an adverb. However, this did not induce Apollonius to
302
 Cf. further coni. 222,9ff. τα άνθυτταγόμενα ουκ είς τα αυτά μέρη
-^1^
α?αλο>ΐΐί1<!?π>^ένφ ™M}™;Pron. 64,3ff.; coni. 220,7ff.; GG IIm 35,13ff. (= SchDTh. 519,6ff.). A related idea is expressed in pron. 620f- ου
..., ει τι τινι κατά τι κεκοινώνηκε, τοϋτο ττάντως έκε'ινω ταϋτόν εστίν. '
n^-F· °™ ··,· εύθέω? Pmn- 7,9; ουκ ... εν τω καθόλου coni. 222,9;
to all likehhood also ου τταντως pron. 6,21; coni. 220,7· GG II iii 35 13ff
especially because of pron. 6,21 - but cf. Schneider, Tractatus 151 for ου
ττάντως "not at all" (note, however, that many of Schneider's examples need not
be given this Interpretation; but cf. e.g. synt. 94,15; 118,13; 118,16; 326,8ff.).
304
 CL synt. 150,9ff. ... καθότι καΐ άλλα μέρη λόγου ττάλιν
μετατεθεντα ^ της ίδιας συντάξεως και άλλων άνα-ττληρώσαντα τάς
ιδιότητας, τταλιν της τούτων ονομασίας ετυχεν ... ΟΌ γαρ μάλλον αϊ
φωναι έτακρατοϋσι κατά τους μερισμούς ως τα εξ αυτών σημαινόμενα
(which are established by means of μετάληψις). Some grammarians even went so
far äs to estabhsh the correct accent of a word on the basis of μετάληψις (this
is no doubt related to the concept of the perfecta analogia, where meaning too,
is taken intp account): SchHom. M 137b αυας] βαρυτονοϋσιν οι ττλε'ιους.
Νικίας δε οξύνει δια το μεταφραζόμενος έττεί και το ξηράς οξύνεται
ειρηται δε ττερι των τοιούτων δτι ου δεΙ ττοός υ,εταωοοίί:όακνα τάς
A s i S τονοϋν. The warning comes from Herodian, of course. CfrSteinthal 1891,
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do away with the part of speech "noun" and to use the denomination "adverb"
for nouns, adjectives and adverbs indiscriminately.
The upshot of all this is that μετάληψι? is a valuable diagnostic test, but
can be rejected äs an argument for μερισμό? on account of remaining
ambiguities. Such a case is synt. 118,12ff., dealing with the μερισμός of the
"postpositive articles" (i.e. the relative pronouns) and the "anaphorical" pronouns
(the demonstratives). Thierfelder quoted this passage in Support of his criticism.
Especially relevant is 118,13ff.: ου γαρ ότι το τταρεττόμενον τόϊ? άρθροι?
άττηνέγκαντο, και άρθρα, εστίν, ε'ίγε και άλλοι? διάφοροι? διέστηκε τα
μόρια30^ and 119, 13f. ττώ? ου ν τοσαΰτη? διάφορα? οΰση? τταραδέξεταί τι?
το ΰφ' ευ μέρο? λόγου ύττάγειν τα άρθρα και τα? αντωνυμία?;3^
It is clear so far that Apollonius was not in favour of drawing conclusions
from μετάληψι? automatically and without qualificitations. But what about the
one place put forward by Thierfelder where the μετάληψι? allegedly has
"unbedingten Beweiswert"? "Nach synt. [149,8ff.] [enthalten] ό ττεριττατών
κινείται und ös αν τταραγένηται άναγινωσκέτω nich 'Artikel', sondern
αόριστα μόρια (= Nomina indefinita), weil μετάληψι? erfolgt in ει τι?
ττεριττατεϊ bzw. ει τι? αν ελθη (ΝΒ. τι? ist ein indefinites Nomen)" (1935, 43).
A look at the context may prove helpful.
From synt. 147,6 onwards Apollonius discusses pronominal constructions of
words which formally speaking are άρθρα. The definition of άρθρον states that
it is a part of speech συναρτώμενον τττωτικοϊ? κατά τταράθεσιν ττροτακτικώ?
η ΰττοτακτικώ? μετά των συμτταρεττομένων τω ονόματι ε'ι? γνώσιν
τφουττοκειμένην, δττερ καλείται αναφορά (GG II iii 130,3 Iff.),307 cf. synt.
148,6ff. σΰνεστι τα άρθρα μετά των ονομάτων άνθ' ων παραλαμβάνεται ή
αντωνυμία.308 However, in a sentence like Hom. A 12, ό γαρ ήλθε θοά?
έττΐ νηα? Άχα'ιων,309 there is no noun to accompany the άρθρον: όταν το
305
 "The mere fact that [pronouns] claim some of the properties of
'articles' doesn't make them 'articles', since the two word-types differ in other
respects" (transl. Householder).
306
 "So when the difference is so great, how can anyone suppose that
'articles' and pronouns should be reduced to a single part of speech?" (transl.
Householder). The Stoa classified the pronouns äs a species of the άρθρον, ApD.
pron. 5,13ff.; see note 314.
307 "Attached to words with cases, used in construction [i.e. not forming a
compound, I.S.], either prepositively or postpositively, with the accidents of the
noun, to indicate something which is known already, which is called 'anaphora'."
308
 "Definite articles are used with those nouns which are represented by
pronouns" (transl. Householder). An αντωνυμία is per definitionem a λέξι? άντ'
ό νάματος, pron. 9,11.
309
 "For he came to the fast ships of the Greeks." 121
άρθρον μη μετ' ονόματος παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσηται δε σύνταξιν
ονόματος ... εκ πάσης ανάγκης είς άντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εϊγε
ουκ έγγινόμενον μετ' ονόματος δυνάμει, αντί ονόματος παρελήφθη· καΐ
εντεύθεν ή σΰνταξις αΰτοϋ προσεχώρει είς άντωνυμικήν μετάληψη
(148,12ff.).310 And again (149,2): καΐ σαφές öu ή ελλειψις του ονόματος
τω άρθρω παραδώσει τα της συντάξεως, καΐ ουκ άλλο τι -γενήσεται το
άρθρον η αντωνυμία, η εστίν αντί τταντός ονόματος κτλ.311
It is the syntactic behaviour of the άρθρον in question which makes a
μετάληψις with a pronoun possible. In this kind of construction the άρθρον can
be classified äs an αντωνυμία, because it completely answers to the description
of a pronoun and fulfils all requirements for being a pronoun.312
Apart from this (anaphorical) use of the άρθρον instead of a pronoun,
there is another deviant σύνταξις and this is the one Thierfelder concentrates
on (synt. 149,9ff.): ή ... μη οϋτως έχουσα, αΰτόθεν δε εν προλήψει του
έσομένου προσώπου, αόριστον μετάληψιν των άρθρων ποιείται (examples: ό
περίπατων κινείται, δς αν παραγένηται, άναγινωσκέτω)· συμφερόμενον γαρ
παντί ονόματι καΐ επί παν όνομα άναδραμεΐται εν καθεστηκός, όπερ
ίδιον αορίστου.
313
Again the definition of άρθρον does not apply, this time because the
characteristic requirement of αναφορά is unfulfilled. There is in this case no
31
° "When the article is used without a following noun, and it is construed
like a noun ... it will necessanly translate into a pronoun, since, thoueh not
accompanying a noun, it is used with nominal force. Thus, its construction
brought about the possible translation into a pronoun." (transl. Householder,
adapted).
31l "It is clear ftat deletion of the name will put its whole syntactic
function upon the article, so that the article will become nothing but a nronoun
which Stands for any noun" (transl. Householder).
_
 312
/It may be added that the very definition of αντωνυμία äs a λέξις
αντ_ ονόματος (pron. 9,11) implies an intrinsic increase in the value of
μεταληψις. If anywhere, it should be here that μετάληψις is a vital test It
should be noticed in this context that μεταλαμβάνω is also used for 'the
ÄTi^rVf f d Pronouns (<*· Hoerschelmann 1880, 386; e.g. pron. 26,16;
26,19; 8,17ff.). If, therefore, it is demonstrated that an article without a noun
αντί ονόματος παρελήφθη (synt. 148, 14f.) and that it takes over τα της
συντάξεως of the noun, it Stands to reason that this kind of μετάληψις is feitvery μετάληψ19 is a
 Mfümeni of the proprieties
_
 313;When the construction is not like that, but the article occurs in
anticipation of an entity yet to be, then there is a transformation of articles
into indefinites. For the article can combine with any noun and refer to anv
noun at all, though it is a single thing, and that is the mark of an indefinite"(transl. Householder).
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γνώσις τφοϋττοκειμένη, on the contrary: This άρθρου has an entirely
indefinite reference. But this means that it cannot be a pronoun here either,
because a pronoun characteristically refers to a ττρόσωττον ώρισμένον (pron.
9,Hff.)· That is the reason why τις was accorded a nominal Status in
Apollonius.314 An important argument for assigning the same μερισμός to δς
would be the fact that τ'ις, τις, δς and όστις form a συζυγία (see section
2.3.1. above and 3.3.1.2. below).315
One more remark should be added: in the example discussed by Apollonius,
the participle ττεριττατών was clearly not interpreted äs if it were used instead
of a noun. Apollonius explains such participles äs a kind of attribute with the
semantic connotation of ττληθος: the addition of a restrictive modifier suggests
that there is a group of two or more persons or things, from which those
entities are selected that answer to the description expressed by the modifier.316
Thus here too, Apollonius looks at meaning and syntax in evaluating the
μετάληψις. As soon äs a noun is joined to the "άρθρον" in any of the
constructions which are given äs examples, the άρθρον automatically falls in
with its original part of speech again.317 It will be clear, therefore, that the
o
314
 Cf. pron. 26,27-29,10. Τις cannot be a pronoun, since it is αόριστος; it
cannot be an άρθρον, because it lacks αναφορά. The Stoa is criticized for
calling some άρθρα "άοριστώδη" (cf. Schenkeveld 1983, 75f.): this contradicts
their expressing αναφορά. The only point Apollonius can think of to justify the
name, is the fact that, whereas pronouns are without exception definite, the
άρθρον is at least in one construction indefinite. The example is ... ö
ττεριττατών κινείται. Although Apollonius does not seem really to have changed
his mind on this problem between de pronominibus and the Syntax, he is much
more explicit in the latter work.
315
 Cf. GGII iii 54,23ff.
316
 Cf. synt. 93,5ff.: a predicative participle is explained äs having temporal
value; an attributive one is either restrictive and indefinite pr definite. Thus, o
δειττνήσας τταις κοιμάσθω may either refer to a specific τταις which we
already know from the context (definite), or its reference is indefinite, viz. any
chüd proyided it has had dinner. In the latter case, the article was identified by
the Stoics äs an άοριστώδες μορίου (synt. 93,llff.). This indefinite
Interpretation may be strengthened by the presence of a verb-form with the
connotation of futurity (future, imperative, synt. 96,lff.). In synt. 39,9ff. (esp.
40,lff.) Apollonius distinguishes three possible interpretations for the article in
the sentence ό τυραννοκτήσας τιμάσθω (nptice that there is some interference
with the ideas on the function of the participle): There may be an αναφορά of a
ττροϋφεστώς ττρόσωττον (40,lff.): definite use (1); or connotation of ττλήθος
(40,6f.) (2); or the article has an indefinite reference (3).
317
 Cf. synt. 150,3ff.: ε'ι γοϋν συνενεχθε'ιη τι των ονομάτων ταϊς
ττροκειμέναις συντάξεις, και αυτό καταστήσεται ε'ις τον 'ίδιον μερισμόν,
ό Διονύσιος ττεριττατών κινείται κτλ.
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arbitrary application of the criterium of μετάληψις imputed to Apollonius by
Thierfelder, is not borne out by the evidence.
By way of summing up and äs a transition to the next section I shall
discuss one more passage. In the doxography at the beginning of de pronominibus
Apollonius combats the view of the Stoics, who called άρθρα and άντωνυμίαι
together by the name of άρθρα and held the view that they belonged to one
part of speech (pron. 5,13ff.). From pron. 8,12 onwards (κακεΐνο δε
ττροσθετέον, ως αϊ μεν άντωνυμίαι άντ' ονομάτων, τα δε άρθρα μετ'
ονομάτων, ττώς OOV <εν> μέρος λόγου το μετά τίνος καΐ αντί
τίνος;)318 a whole series of differences between pronouns and articles is
enumerated. Apollonius concludes (pron. 9,lff.) that the Stoics used the same
name for different entities and offers the alternative of separating the two parts
of speech, calling the one άρθρον, the other αντωνυμία. The explanation of
the Stoics' error is that they may have been fooled by the fact that some
pronouns and articles are homonyms (pron. 7,23).319 Their forms coincide
(ομοφωνία, συνέμτττωσυς). Μετάληψις allows one to detect homonymy: In
different constructions a word can have different μεταλήψεις and this is an
indication of its correct μερισμός in each context. Again we are warned that a
context-dependent μετάληψις is insufficient evidence for combining two parts of
speech which can otherwise be shown to have different characteristics. However,
two different parts of speech may indeed have some forms in common. The
correct μερισμός is established, äs always, on syntactic and semantic grounds.
We may again compare the case of the adverbial construction of adjectives:
There, too, we had to do with συνεμτττώσεις (adv. 120,14f.) which had to be
classified by means of their semantic properties. And these, in turn, were
established by "translating" them.320
318
 "And this should be added, that the pronouns are used instead of the
nouns, but the articles with the nouns. How then can that which goes with
something and that which replaces something belong to one part of speech?"
319
 Cf. Steinthal 1891,223f.
320
 Cf. e.g. adv. 120,11 (το ταχύ) ϊσον ... εστί τω ταχέως (this is
implicit μετάληψις).
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3.3. Συνέμτττωσις
The last passage discussed in the previous section showed that μετάληψις
could be especially useful in cases of homonymy or συνέμτττωσις. We have to do
with συνέμτττωσις whenever one form expresses two or more conceptions or
more than one combination of lexical and grammatical meaning of the same
conception (äs when two or more forms from the same paradigm coincide).321
In her 1988 article, Mrs. Desbordes gives an interesting survey of the
various fields in which the concepts of homonymy and synonymy play a role,
notably philosophy (dialectics), rhetoric and grammar. In philosophy, Aristotle
uses ομώνυμος and συνώνυμος for the persons or things involved, not for
the names/words - a word is not yet called a homonym.322 Incidentally, this
usage stems from Homer, who calls the Greater and the Lesser Ajax
"ομώνυμοι" (Ρ 720). It was apparently Speusippus who applied these concepts
to the names.323 In dialectics, the foremost problem involved seems to have been
the relationship between names, definitions and things.
In rhetoric, homonymy is a cause of ambiguity (αμφιβολία) and it is
evaluated differently in accordance with the context in which it occurs.324 It
belongs either in the inventio,325 or, alternatively, it is looked upon äs a cause
oiobscuritas, thus constituting a vitium orationis which should be avoided.326
321
 Cf. O. Schneider 1843, 653; Skrzecka 1858, 9f. n. 2; 1853 17; I was
somewhat handicapped in my research here, because pages 18 and 19 ot my
photocopy of the latter article are regrettably lacking.
322
 Desbordes 1988, 52. The concept of the fourfold lack of
correspondence between ονόματα and ττρά-γματα goes back to Democritus äs
quoted in Proclus' commentary on the Cratylm (fr. B 26 D.-K.). One example ot
deficient correspondence is the phenomenon of ομωνυμία.
323
 See Desbordes 1988, 58f. for the terminological complications. For
ομώνυμο v applied to the name Ajax, see ApD.pron. 4,12f.
324
 Desbordes 1988, 76ff.
325
 Cf Ar Rh. 1401al3ff. (äs a τόττος for an "apparent" enthymeme);
1404b37ff. των δ' ονομάτων τω μεν σοφιστή όμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (τιάρα
ταύτας -γαρ κακουρ-γει), τω ττοιητη δε συνωνυμίαι. Synonymy rmds^a piace
in elocutio and it is a useful mearis of vanatio. Cf. the use of ασυνεμτΓτωτος
(referring to the variety of contents in Homer) Eustath. 1,738,51. ydV.
(ττολυειδής και ως δυνατόν άσυνέμτττωτος), cf. 3 693,30f. vdV. και ούτως
έξέφυγον την εν λόγω συνέμτττωσιν (sc. Zeus and Hypnos, Hom. υ_ iötl.; er.
Ξ 249ff.). καΐ οΰτ'ω μεν ττολλαχοϋ ττολυειδής ό ποιητής εστί και
άσυνέμτττωτος.
326
 E.g. Quint. 8,2,13.
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What does grammar take over from all this? Primarily two things, viz. the
capita de amphibolia (cf. rhetoric) - these belong in the part of the Latin
grammars dealing with the vitia cetera -; and the subcategories of the noun
called homonyma and synonyma?^
When we turn to Apollonius again, we find that he acknowledges the
subcategories ομώνυμα and συνώνυμα in the theory of the noun.328 This is
no more than a grammatical (semantic) sub-classification.
More interesting are Apollonius' views on the ambiguities caused by
συνέμιττωσις329 and on the ideal, but often non-existent one-to-one
correspondence between forms and meaning, in other words, the rhetorical and
philosophical application of the concept. Apollonius combines these aspects into a
coherent doctrine: Since in his opinion the context will in principle solve any
ambiguities caused by συνέμτττωσις,330 language has no need to avoid
συνέμτττωσις artificially.331 Apollonius is therefore bitterly opposed to any ad
hoc argument of the form ϊνα μη συνεμιτέση:332 Συνέμιττωσις is one of the
327
 Desbordes 1988, 86ff. Mrs. Desbordes concentrates on the Latin
grammarians. There are no early Greek grammatical attestations for the use of
these words. See Uhlig ad DTh. Techne 36,lff.; SchDTh. 236,lff.; Prise. II 59,13ff.
328
 GGII iii 50,26ff.
329
 Συνέμτττωσις is a cause of αμφιβολία, but αμφιβολία may also be
almost synonymous with it, cf. Uhlig ad synt. 35,12. Ar. Poet. 1461a25 αμφιβολία
is used in virtually the same way äs Aristotle usually applies ομωνυμία see
BywateroJ. '
330
 An example is (pron. 52,4ff.) the string ΟΥΚΕΡΩ, which is in itself
ambiguous (ου κερώ, ουκ έρώ < έράω, ουκ έρώ < έρέω) The
construction becomes self-evident äs soon äs the complement is added· for each
of the above constractions takes another case (acc., gen. and dat respectivelv)
Cf. also synt 217,2f. ' J''
^
 δ
ί
θί
ί ^
ΟΓΥ
 i0rLan£!Ä is/or 5.large Part based on the neglect of the
context, cf. Edlow 1975, 424f. (based on Galenus de captionibus cap. IV)
331
 The coincidence of word-forms was compatible with καταλληλότης, since
i. robs language of the possibüity of έλεγχος by means of a more suitable form;
cf. Lange 1852a, 31; section 1.3.2.
332
 This makes Blank's Suggestion (1982, 37) that Apollonius applies this
very principle m drawmg up syntactic rules somewhat infelicitous. Apollonius'
under ying thought m syrü. 42,9 (and 68,2ff., which is indeed, äs Blank rightly
remarks of another level) (Blank's examples) is not so much that the rules serve
to avoid comcidences, but rather that they are necessary here to prevent the
expression getting hopelessly confused, and thus virtually meaningless
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realities of language.333 In the same vein he finds the idea totally unacceptable
that some parts of speech have no other function than to clarify obscurities in
the other parts of speech.334 I have found only one case where Apollonius is not
true to his principle in a morphological matter: In adv. 181,29ff. he remarks that
the (Attic) accentuation of εγωγε and εμούσε is intended to avoid το
αμφίβολου: The forms make it clear that here we have to do with a derivation
by means of the suffix -γε, not the enclitic particle -ye.335
In his rejection of the argument that forms change to avoid unwanted
coincidences Apollonius seems to stand alone. In later grammarians, the avoidance
of coincidences could either motivate why certain changes in the wordform had
taken place or why they had not.336 The phrase ϊυα μη σνυεμττέστι is
333
 Cf. pron. 92,10f. against those who claim that τω is oxytonon because
it should be set apart from the dative sing.: αλλ' ε.1 ένεκα τούτου, ληρώδες·
αττειρα γαρ τα συυεμτάτττουτα; adv. 159,17ff.: Trypho's Suggestion that in
ώταυ, a κλητικού έττίφθεγμα, the v has been added "δια τηυ άντέμφασιυ
τήυ Trpos τα ώτα" is indignantly rejected. Apollonius sums up his objections in
159,22ff.: Πώς δε ου γελοίου αΐτεΐσθαι δια τάς συυεμτττώσεις προσθέσεις
συμφώυωυ fj αφαιρέσεις, δτε σχεδόυ ττασα λέξις ΰττ' αμφίβολου ττ'πττει,
και ου ττάυτως δια τάς σ·υυούσας αμφιβολίας δει ττροσνέμειυ η
αφαιρεΐυ σύμφωυα ή φωυήευτα. Notice the echo of Stoic theory: according to
Chrysippus every word was "natura ambiguum", Gell. NA XI 12. Edlow 1975, 425
thinks this refers to psychological rather than semantic ambiguity: since every
word is a sign, it may, like all signs, be misunderstood even while being
semantically unambiguous. Neither Interpretation (psychological or true semantic
ambiguity) can be proved absolutely from the text of Gelhus. Gellius states the
positions of Chrysippus and Diodorus without choosing sides himself. Chrysippus
apparently looks at the communicative process through the eyes of the addressee:
This means every word can fail to achieve the correct result. Diodorus takes the
point of view of the Speaker and consequently maintains that no word is
ambiguous, since the Speaker knows what he wants to say. This latter view
increases the probability of a psychological Interpretation of the former.
334
 Synt. 35,10ff.: Apollonius considers it a major mistake for anyone to
suppose that the article's only function would be the διάκρισις γευώυ in the
nouns. The article has a clearly defined meaning and function of its own and,
apart from that, it is unfit for the task of distinguishing the gender of nouns,
because a form like τώυ is just äs ambiguous in this respect äs the words it is
supposed to relieve of their ambiguities (synt. 36,6ff.).
335
 Cf. Hdn. GG III ii 24,27 (where the avoiding of συυέμτττωσις is not
mentioned); Et. M. 314,55.
For the tentative proposal of avoidance of συυέμτττωσις äs an additional
explanatory factor in Apollonius, cf. chapter III section 1.2., note 20.
336
 Cf. Wackernagel 1876, 8 for the use of ττάθη and/or dialect forms to
avoid συυέμτΓτωσις.
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frequent.337 Not only single words were taken into consideration, but also
wordgroups, a fact which seems to be a reflection of the rhetorical theory of
ambiguity originating from wrong word-boundaries.338 Words were replaced in
their entirety if an indecency would have resulted from the συνέμτττωσις (see
above, section 3.2., and note 273).339 Sometimes the avoidance of coincidences
is even linked with certain dialects (lonic, Doric).340
Herodian sides with the other grammarians against his father in this
respect, for instance when he discusses the absence of anastrophe in the
prepositions δια and ανά to prevent confusion with the accusative of Ζευς
and the vocative of αναξ respectively.341 It is noteworthy that he applies the
concept of συνέμτττωσις more than once to defend the similarity of words;342
337
 E.g. the nominative Ζευς is used instead of Δίς to orevent
σ-υνεμτΓτωσις with the adverb meaning "twice", Eustath. 1,177,17 vd V.; cf. ^ 25 1?9
o ,
282911 iiid n' vHV ™νε>™™ ^ explain why a form does not occur
a& < ϊ- *
SchDTh Eol' ϋΓΓ6
θε
οΤ1 EHSta*·· V39'7 YdV·; Cf' &Γί1ΐ6Γ the remarks in
ΕΣΤΙΝΑ^ΙΟΣ f^ ΝΛΡ /?ia?ntlcalt mark of the -ΰττοδιαστολή; example:
„ 7V' XH l , N^OS/£CTTLV άξιος), e g 156 llff Hdn Cin- fr
"phietaeros" attnbue a Herodien (ed. A. Dain) p 76 iir7 = p 414 ed KochV the
gemtive ανθέων is preferred to ανθών to excludecon&sTon with άνθ' ων )-
e^atte;103'1^ Stallb': «^έσιμο? is preferred to αιδοίο,
« *
Eustath l,772,20f vdV. ™
Ρ
εκκλίνουσι ... καΐ "Ιωνε^ την τωνo&„ir&Ärr ά,
την της φωνής σ-υνέμτττωσιν. '
ΙΠ [ 42545; 48
°'
i3f
-
also c o o n i S S
should have had a^perispomenon a c c i v e ( t a B u i n T the
οξυνομεν δια την ο-α,νέμτττωσιν της ευθείας, fe Γ-γάρ ^  τττωϊις έτέοα
STni iTÄ^ ^  Τ ^  άρΐθμόυ' ™VT"S^L ΥμΓοΙει. S
Λ V· Γ · Τ116 accusatives αιδώ and ηώ (GG III Ü 33 19> do not fal
under this rule, smce in their case the nomina ives and accusa ives are not
identical: μη κρατούμεναι -ΰττό της συνεμτττώσεως κατά S ευθείαν
ττερισττωνται, κατεχόμεναι τω λόγω της ^  σ^ναλοιφης οι? ΰτ^ό τοϊ
τττωτικοη; χαρακτηρος. ή δε Λητώ και Π^θώ καθάτίεΤ ' κατεϊόμεΓαι S
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in those cases συνέμτττωσις is not avoided, but rather it triggers an analogical
procedure to create a greater (visual/acoustic)343 regularity in a paradigm. It
seems that in these cases he employs the word συνεμτάτττειν and its derivates,
where bis father would probably have spoken of σ-υνεκδρομή (false analogy).344
3.3.1. Συνέμτττωσις and μερισμός
We have watched Apollonius establish the μερισμός of a word a number of
times already. Usually, if there are two or more options, he checks the formal
characteristics of a word and its semanto-syntactical behaviour against the
definitions of the parts of speech for which the word at issue is a candidate. If
the dubious word is a συνέμτττωσις, however, its form becomes irrelevant for its
μερισμός. In those cases Apollonius is forced to concentrate bis arguments on
semantic and syntactic points only. We have seen a sample of such a Situation in
the case of o and δς: in some constructions their value is paraphrased with
the help of τις. It was remarked above (section 3.2.1.) that the main test for
establishing such a separate meaning was μετάληψις.345
της συνεμτττώσεως της φωνής κατέχονται και τω τόνω (cf. 335,24ff.).
343
 Cf. the peculiar note on the orthography of χίλιοι, GG III ii 605,9ff.:
το χίλιοι δια του ι γράφεται δια την τοιαύτην αίτίαν ττας αριθμός εν
τη άρχούστ) κατά την φωνήν συνεμττίτΓτων ονόματι στοιχείου καΐ την
αυτήν φιιλάττει γραφήν (e.g. είκοσι which begins with the Greek name of the
epsilon, cf. Plutarchus' work Περί τρΰ EI TOT) εν Δελφοις). The same goes for
χίλιοι. Professor Ruijgh calls attention to the fact that the name of the letter
was, in fact, originally χει.
344
 Cf. adv. 142,9-19; 143,26; cf. on this kind of creative analogy also Phot.
Bibl. 279 (532al): ό τε συμπλεκτικός έγκλίνεται μόνος, ίσως διότι τοις
τταραττληρωματικοις κατά φωνήν συνεμτάτΓτει (the proof that one really has to
dp with two words in the case of τε is based on Aeolic, which makes a formal
distinction between the two). I cannot explain the purport of this observation on
Aeolic το. For τε äs τταραττληρωματικός, cf. Ruijgh 1971, 71ff.
345
 It is clear that συνεμτττώσεις are an interesting field of research if
one wants to exclude the influence of formal arguments - the ancient authors
dealing with these words are äs it were forced to come out with conceptual
(semantic/syntactic) arguments. At first sight it would seem that we could in a
similar way distil the purely syntactical· views of the ancient grammarians, if
any, by concentrating on those categories of meaning that can be represented by
two or more parts of speech, i.e. the reverse of the "synemptotic" Situation. For
if arguments based on the σημαινόμενον are to be used at all, they evidently
have to be of a syntactical rather than a semantical nature in this case.
Examples from the sphere of the indeclinable parts of speech are the semantic
categories of δισταγμός or ε'ικασμός, βεβαίωσις and τταρακέλευσις. Each of
these categories can be realized by either an adverb or a conjunction. However,
we always find it simply stated that an adverb or conjunction has a certain
meaning; nowhere in our sources is the slightest attention paid to the fact that
these semantic categories can have such a double Implementation, let alone that
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A group of words in which there is a kind of structural συνέμτττωσις is
formed by the σύνδεσμοι which coincide with temporal or local adverbs e.g.
έττεί, "when" (adv.) or "because" (conj.); δττου, "where" (adv.) or "since"
(conj.).346 The classification of έττεί is a relatively marginal issue to
Apollonius,347 but perhaps for that very reason all the more illustrative of some
important principles underlying Apollonius' μερισμός. What strikes the modern
reader, is that the use of έττεί äs a subordinator, introducing a temporal
subordinate clause, is without hesitation called adverbial by Apollonius. It will
appear that there are at least two, and possibly three reasons for him to do so.
First of all it should be noted that certain categories of meaning are
preferably, although not necessarily exclusively, linked with certain parts of
speech. Thus, if a word expresses αναφορά, this teils in principle for its being
an άρθρου, and if it expresses πράγμα, chances are that we have to do with a
verb. As we shall see, the meanings which are primarily linked up with adverbs
are τόττος, χρόνος and τρόττος (place, time and manner). Therefore, temporal
meaning would in itself be sufficient reason to call a word an adverb, provided
there are no formal objections to such a μερισμός. Moreover, causal meaning
was almost automatically connected with conjunctions. In the case of έττεί this
explains why it is considered an adverb if it has temporal meaning and a
conjunction if it is causal (section 3.3.1.1.). Here I shall have occasion to add
some remarks on the absence of the notion of Subordination in Antiquity (section
3.3.1.1.1.).
Secondly, Apollonius considered the fact that a word belonged to a certain
ακολουθία or συζυγία, valuable evidence for its μερισμός. Words pertaining to
one ακολουθία belong to the same part of speech. The notion of συζυγία needs
extending a little to make έττεί fit in. It can be used äs an argument because
syntactical observations were made on the basis of which the meristic decision
was taken. In fact we only find that formal arguments - which do, of course,
apply here - are made use of again.
As an example I give the füll material for the category δισταγμός/ε'ικασμός:
adverbs:
r
 ίσως, τάχα, τυχόν, σχεδόν, μη, (δήττου δήθεν ττου); conjunctions:
εάν, ει, ή.
Sources: adverbs: DTh. 80,2; ApD. synt. 494,3ff.; SchDTh. lOl.lff · SchAp.Rhod. Γ
539a; P.Yale 446 col. ii 2ff.; 18; P.Lit.Lond. 182 col. ii 80-105; Gramer AO I
280,15ff.; Bekker AG I 309,20ff. Conjunctions: ApD. synt. 374,10ff.; 375,10ff.;
SchDTh. 283,33f.; 284,2; Hdn. GG ΙΠ ii i 110,25ff.; Gramer AO l 162,26ff.;
MichSync. § 196, 1690ff.
346
 Cf. coni. 245,15ff. Notice that in the example of δττου "since", the
Greek always has δττου ^ε (coni. 245,20). I will not discuss the syndesmic Status
of δττου separately - here too, it is causal meaning (μετάληψις with causal δτι,
coni 245,23) that is decisive.
347
 Cf. especially coni. 245,llff.; synt. 483,3ff.
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δτε does belong in a συζυγία, and οτε is synonymous to έττεί; this can be
proved by means of μετάληψις (section 3.3.1.2.).
A third factor which may have played a role is that the Stoics paid
relatively much attention to the conjunctions and virtually none to the adverbs.
The conjunctions were related to the Stoic list of complex axiomata; they were
necessary for the construction of such axiomata?^' It cannot be excluded that
the grammarians were inclined to assign those "connectors" that had no function
in the Stoic list to the rest-category of the adverbs.349 However, I shall leave
this latter possibility out of account and discuss the former arguments, especially
the first, in more detail.
3.3.1.1. Τρόττος, τόττο?, χρόνος and causality
The importance of the three categories of local and temporal adverbs and
those of manner, appears from their prominent position in the discussion of the
interrogatives. Such a discussion is to be found in Apollonius' Syntax for
instance (28,1-33,8), where it serves to underscore the superiority of nouns and
verbs to the other parts of speech. After having discussed the order of the parts
of speech and before dealing with the several parts of speech by themselves
(synt. 28,lff.) Apollonius gives a survey of the problem of the interrogatives:
Why is it that interrogatives belong to only two parts of speech, namely the
noun and the adverbs, and why are there various kinds of nominal and adverbial
interrogatives?350 As a matter of fact, it is this very state of affairs which to
Apollonius indicates once again the prominence of nouns and verbs. For by means
of nominal interrogatives we request Information about a nominal constituent
(synt. 29,lff.), whereas an adverbial interrogative seeks Information about an
unknown διάθεσις, i.e. a verbal Situation (synt. 32,9ff.). Such adverbs ask
something about the ττοιότης της -πράξεως, the nature or quality of the
action,351 or about the time when an action or event took place, or about the
place where, whither, or whence.352 The existence of nominal (adjectival) and
348
 See chapter III.
349
 See chapter IV section 3.2.2. note 107. Cf. Lallot 1985, 93.
350
 The examples of adverbial interrogatives are ττώς, ττότε, ττηνίκα,
ττοϊί, ΤΓ-η ("whither"), ττόθεν.
351
 The most typical examples are axiological qualifications of the type ευ,
κακώς, καλώς, αίσχρώς, δικαίως, αδίκως.
352
 Cf. ps.Theodos. 22,28f.; Prise. ΙΠ 123,13ff. (for 123,20f., cf. ps.Theodos.
26,21ff.); Max.Plan. synt. 119,llff., esp. 121,23ff. Modal: cf. [Serg.] IV 509,24ff.;
Cled. V 20,29ff.
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adverbial interrogatives is related to the quasi adjectival character of the
adverbs (synt. 32,10f., see section 2.2.2.)· Accordingly, the Scholiast on Dionysius
Thrax remarks (SchDTh. 281,1 Iff.): Εκ του πώς ζητείται τρόπος, του
πηνίκα γρόνος. του πόθεν τόπος καΐ του που καΐ πόσε.
353
 In the same
vein we read in SchDTh. 240,12ff.: και τρία κατά το σημαινόμενου εν τοις
έπιρρήμασιν (sc. τα ερωτηματικά)' ή γαρ πράξεως ε'ισι ζητητικά, ... ή
τόπου ... η χρόνου ... (240,15f.) πρόσκειται "κατά το σημαινόμενον",
έττειδή κατά φωνήν πλείονα ε'ισιν, οίον ...
354
 Although in later discussions
there is a greater variety in species of the interrogative adverbs (corresponding
largely to the semantic refinements that were applied in distinguishing the
several (semantic) types of adverbs), these three types remain dominant.
The pre-eminence of the χρόνου δηλωτικά and the τοττικά355 is fairly
evident.356 The έταρρήματα τρόπου are less familiär, at least
terminologically.357 However, there are several occurrences, the earliest not even
in a "real" grammarian, but in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Comp.V. 5,24ff.).358
Now, Dionysius' interests are primarily rhetorical and philological. This state of
353
 "By means of the interrogative πώς ('how?'), we inquire into the
manner, by means of πηνίκα ('at what time?') into the time, by means of ττόθεν
('whence?'), που ('where?') and ττόσε ('whither?') for the place."
354 "Xhere
 are
 semantically speaking three kinds of adverbial
interrogatives. For they either ask for the (manner of the) action, or for the
place, or for the time ... 'Semantically speaking' was added, because from a
formal point of view there are more of them, e.g...."
355
 DTh. 73,3; 76,2; cf. Schneider ad ApD. adv. 123,16.
356
 I suspect the organizing principle of the second pari of de adverbio by
Apollonius Dyscolus is a list of the endings which can be used to form local
adverbs (from 176,7 onwards, after an initial alphabetical ordering).
357
 More usual is (έπ.) ποιότητος, which is used to the exclusion of
τρόττοΌ by e.g. ApD. (adv. 196,8f.; 12f.; 29; cf. 178,27; 205,3). I will not discuss
the matter of the μεσάτης here.
358 "£
u
 _ _ _ άμεινον έδόκουν είναι τα ρήματα προτάττειν των
επιρρημάτων, επειδή ττρότερόν εστί τη φύσει το ποιοϋν η ττάσχον των
συνεδρευόντων αΰτοΐς, τρόπου λέγω και τόπου καΐ χρόνου και των
παραπλήσιων, α δη καλοϋμεν επιρρήματα. Schenkeveld 1983, 86 points out
that DH has used (Stoic) διαλεκτικαι τέχναι in this chapter. However, since he
explicitly mentions the fact (Comp.V. 4f.) that he tried to work out a rhetorical
theory on the basis of philosophical principles, but that this approach failed, it
is not unlikely that he combmed some of the principles found in the Stoic
τέχναι with hnguistic Information from other sources, and built a new, but
untenable, theory on that basis. This means that it is unnecessary to ascribe a
theory of adverbs of time, place and manner to the Stoa.
Επιρρήματα τρόπου: cf. Schenkeveld 1983, 81; SchDTh. 281,llf.; 60,3ff.; 433,21;
ps. Theodos. 87,3ff.; Max.Plan. synt. 71,27.
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affairs should be combined with the fact that τρόττος, τόττος and χρόνος
appear in the context of the interrogatives, which were used not only by the
grammarians, but also to establish the rhetorical περιστάσεις.359 Could the
prominence of these three types of adverbs originate in rhetoric, one wonders?
Apart from the connection between adverbs of time, place and manner and
the interrogatives, there is also the applicability of the term σχέσις. According
to Ammonius (in Ar. Int, CAG 4,5,ll,15f.)360 adverbs indicate σχέσιν ... τίνα
του κατηγορουμένου ττρός το ύττοκείμενον, a relationship of predicate to
subject. Now, the types of adverbs which are usually indicated with the word
σχέσις are the local and temporal adverbs (see section 1.2.). But there also is
one instance where the adverbs of manner are included in this expression, viz.
ApD. adv. 178,25ff.: "Εχοι δ' αν έτάστασιν καΐ το ώδε, συνήθως μεν την
εις τόττον σχέσιν δηλοϋν, εν δε τοις Όμηρικοϊς, ως Άριστάρχω
δοκει, εν τω καθόλω μη τοττικης εχεσθαι σχέσεως, της δε κατά
' 1ιΐ\\
ποιότητα.
3 Οί
In Latin grammarians the denotation qualitatis is, of course, the translation
of ποιότητος (cf. DTh. 75,1) rather than of τρόπου.362 However, we may
wonder about Scaurus, whose definition of the adverb (apud Diomedes I 403,20f.)
runs thus: adverbium est modus rei dictionis ipsa pronuntiatione definitus, ut
359
 In rhetoric a θέσις may be turned into an ΰττόθεσις, a quaestio
finita, by adding the so-called περιστάσεις, the circumstances (Martin 1974, 17).
These also play a role in the inventio; they constitute the loci argumentorum.
Hermogenes (II 212,19f. Spengel) divides the -περιστάσεις into τόττος. γρόνος.
τοόττος. ιτρόσωττον, αίτια, πράγμα and mentions the fact that öl φιλόσοφοι
had added a seventh item, namely ΰλη. Augustinus (141,20f. Halm) mentions
seven categories, which can be found by. posing the questions quis quid quando
ubi cur quomodo quibus adminiculis.
The link with the (Aristotelian) theory of the categories is made in Quintilian
(3,6,23ff.)in the context of the theory of στάσεις. Adamietz a.1. refers to the
more usual context of the loci argumentorum 5,10,20ff. It should be noted that
neither the Aristotelian categories nor the -περιστάσεις are linked with the
parts of speech in their original context (although the Aristotelian categories are
meant äs an Instrument for analyzing predication (Pohlenz 1948, 69)).
360
 Cf. chapter IV section 6.1. note 215 for the correspondence of
Ammonius' ordering of the adverbs to that of the Techne.
361
 "One could call ώδε a problem, also, because in ordinary usage it
means the relationship of the direction whither, whereas, äs Aristarch thinks, in
the work of Homer it usually does not express local relationships, but one of
manner."
362
 E.g. Char. 248,8ff.; Aug. V 518; Prise. II 91,20ff.; III 161,1.
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rede diligenter qpfz'rae.363 Scaurus was probably influenced by the Stoics,3^4
which makes me wonder whether such influence is also to be found in bis
definition of the adverb.365 However, this is mere speculation and I shall not
insist on this point. His definition is unique.366
Now, if manner, time and place are connected with adverbs on the level of
the expression, what about causes?367 For if our hypothesis that parsing is
priniarily based on certain meanings preferentially being linked with certain parts
of speech, is to prove any good, we should demonstrate the likelihood of causes
being linked with σύνδεσμοι. As a matter of fact, the linguistic elements that
express causal relationships, were regarded äs conjunctions from the very time
they were seriously taken into consideration at all. As will be remembered, this
was done by the Stoics, who formed their compound axiomata by means of two
simple axioms and a conjunction. These compound axiomata were characterized by
the conjunction which figured in them, and their names found a correlate in the
name of the corresponding conjunction. Thus, the compound causal axiom was
typified by the causal conjunction.368
363 "An adverb is a manner of the action defined by the very pronouncing
of the word, e.g. 'well, carefully, very well'." Notice that an adverb according to
Scaurus adds spmething to the meaning of the res (πράγμα) by means of a
separate word, i.e. lexically, äs opposed to temporal meaning for instance, which
is mherent in the verb itself.
For Scaurus' definition we may compare the formulation of SchDTh. 101,11·
είκασμός εστίν ό μετά δισταγμοί ε'ικάζων ττραγμα λόγος; 101,17f. καΐ
εϊρηται έτπτάσεως ή παρατάσεως τα τοιαϋτα έταρρήματα, έττειδή δι'
αυτών έττιτε'ινομεν και αύξάνομεν τα ττράγματα; 101,29f. βέβαιων γαρ τις
ττραγμα τούτω κέχρηται τω έττιρρήματι.
364
 This appears for instance, from his distinguishing the appellatio
("common noun'^ from the nomen ("proper noun") (Stoic: ττροσηγορ'ια, όνομα),
cf. GL 1300,25ff.
365
 The thought of the second meaning of modus inevitably crosses one's
mind. However, Scaurus' examples leave no doubt that he does not envisage
adverbs with the meaning of an εγκλισις.
366
 Cf. Cledonius V 20,29ff.: adverbium dictum est ideo quod coniunctum
verbo vim eins explanet et impleat. nam cum dico lego, nee dicitur quem ad
modum legam, sed adiecto adverbio exprimitur.
367
 Cf. chapter III on the development of the notion of αΐτιολογικοί σύν-
δεσμοι.
368
 D.L. VII 72: αΐτιώδες δε εστίν αξίωμα το συντασσόμενον δια
του διότι οίον διότι ήμερα έστ'ι, φως εστίν οιονεί γαρ αίτιον εστί
το ττρώτον του δευτέρου. The cautious οιονεί and the similarly careful
designation αιτιώδες are due to the fact that bodies only can constitute causes.
A causal axiom is the linguistic representation of a real cause, cf. SVF II 118,5
ΑΊτίαν δ' είναι λόγον αιτίου η λόγον τον ττερί του αιτίου ως αιτίου;
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Moreover, in the eyes of the Stoics, causes formed a class of their own,
which was unrelated to other attendant circumstances. Whereas the Peripatetics
had styled all those circumstances "causes" that have to be present for any
action or event to take place, the Stoics had drastically reduced their number
and no longer looked upon time and place äs causes.369
To my hypothesis that causes are primarily connected with conjunctions on
the level of the expression, it might me objected that διατί could be added to
the list of interrogative adverbs.370 This implies that causal meaning did not
exclude such a classification. It is true that the "meristic" Status of διατί was
not uniformly agreed upon. It is either called an adverb, or an αιτιολογικός
σύνδεσμος, and perhaps it was sometimes looked upon äs a nominal question.371
The fact that διατί - and especially διατί - was included among the
adverbs can be connected with my hypothesis that the theory of the
interrogative adverbs has something to do with the rhetorical theory of the
•περιστάσεις: This may not only explain the terminological surprise "τρό-ττος", but
also the (rare) inclusion of "cause" among the adverbs. For "cause" is included in
the rhetorical theory of the -περιστάσεις äs well äs in the dialectical one of the
categories.372 We should thus assume that the diagnostic question διατί,
establishing the nature of the -περίστασις, is lumped together with the other
interrogatives in grammatical theory.
It is unlikely that διατ'ι should have been regarded äs an adverb because of
its form. Superficially, διατί may have seemed to parallel words like είσο etc.
SVF II 119,41f. öl δε το μεν σώμα κυρίως αίτιον φασι, το δε
άσώματον καταχρηστικώς και οίον αΐτιωδώς; Cf. Sluiter 1988a, 46ff.
369
 Sen.£p. 65,11.
370
 SchDTh. 433,13ff.: ττοϊα τα της ερωτήσεως; το -πόθεν ΤΓΟΌ διατί
ττηνίκα ττώς. Notice that διατί does not recur in 433,21ff. On the other hand,
δια τούτο was sometimes called a σύνδεσμος, cf. chapter III n. 49. For
Ινατί, see chapter III section 3.1.3.
371
 Adverb: Hdn. GG III i 506,15f. (cf. Gramer AO III 280,4); Et. M.
471,16ff.; Choei.ps.epim. 66,15f.; Max.Plan. synt. 125,Iff.
Σύνδεσμος αιτιολογικός: SchDTh. 585,19.
Nominal: ? Zonaras 1110 (although in all likelihood the caption έττίρρημα (which
in Zonaras includes all indeclinabilia) is missing here, cf. the first lemma of
1111. Cf. also my remarks on ApD. below.
In the Latin grammarians cur is considered an interrogative adverb, Prise. III
65,15; 137,18ff.; 123,23; Don. IV 362,26; [Asper] V 552,10f.; Aphthonius VI
201,27f., cf. Excerpta Audacis VII 348,14 and Dositheus VII 410,24 (with Jeep
(1893, 278 n. 2) read percunctandi instead of recusandi); Sacerdos VI 442,20;
Cassiod. VI 156,12ff.; Beda VII 267,28.
372
 Cf. note 359 αιτία, cur; cf. Quint. 3,6,27.
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It is a compound, consisting of a preposition and a noun. Such preposition groups
(ε'ιςδ etc.) are discussed in Apollonius' Syntax (478,13ff.; 480,21ff.). But there,
it is argued that the meaning of such groups is adverbial; they indicate either
time or place.373 Since these preposition-groups (consisting of a preposition plus
an δρθρον) clearly yield one simple meaning instead of a complex one, they are
looked upon äs a syntactic/semantic unity. Their meaning then causes them to be
looked upon äs adverbs.
This kind of argument could not have been put forward in the case of
διατ'ι, unless the semantic aspect was completely neglected. Since there is no
confirmation for this line of thought in our sources, it is an unattractive
solution to our problem. Apollonius, who did not associate causal meaning with
adverbial Status, certainly does not support such a theory. He pays attention to
these causal words/word-groups in two contexts. The first is to be found at the
end of de adverbio: There Apollonius asks himself to what pari of speech the
word τω belongs (adv. 199, Iff.). The possibilities that are offered at the
beginning of the discussion are an επίρρημα αίτιας τταραστατικόν,374 a
σύνδεσμος α'ιτιώδης or a preposition with an accusative case. In the latter
case, τω is supposed to have originated from δια το, with ensuing ellips of
the preposition and lengthening of the o.375 Apollonius decides in favour of the
latter solution, after having discarded the Option that he was dealing with a
conjunction on the grounds that no μετάληψις could be effectuated with any
373
 Είσο is a synonym of έως, which agrees in μερισμός with its
demonstrative correlate τέως. Apollonius rejects the direct derivation of είσο
from έως by means of an "inversion of all accidents of the word" (synt.
479,6ff.): exchange of length of syllables, transposition of the σ from the middle
of the word to the end, and of the aspiration plus spiritus from first to last
syllable. Synt. 481,8ff. it is set out how the different meanings can be explained.
If combined with nouns indicating a place, preposition-groups will regularly have
local meaning. The αναφορά expressed by the άρθρα makes a temporal nuance
likely (482,1 χρόνου ίπτόμνησις). The reason the whole construction is feit to
be adverbial, is that its meaning is one (482,3ff.) instead of complex. Apollonius
concludes that in the case of είσο, εν ω, εξ οί etc. we are dealing with
adverbs "εκ παραθέσεως". Although Apollonius himself regularly uses εν ω
(and εν οίς) äs causal conjunctions (Schneider, Tractatus 158), he nowhere
mentions this "συνέμτττωσις".
374
 Which would have been unique in its kind, if we except the
questionable Status of the interrogative διαύ. It seems likely that Apollonius
introduced this Option solely for the sake of the argument to present an
alternative (disputatip in utramque partern). However, he never seems explicitly
to return to this possibility.
375
 Cf. the assumed ellips of δια in a construction like τρέμω σε, φεύγω
σε (synt. 413,5ff.). There may be a play on the etymology of αίτιατικός and
αιτιολογικός (causativus).
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other causal conjunction ("therefore" cannot be replaced with "because", or
"for").376 The possibility of τω being an adverb has totally disappeared.
The second context is that of synt. 456,llff. There, Apollonius treats διότι
and καθότι äs preposition-groups with the value of a σύνδεσμος.377 This
syndesmic value originales in the prepositions themselves, which often have a
semantic value that is related to that of a σύνδεσμος (cf. section 3.2.).
Summing up, I think the representatives of causal relationships on the level
of the expression were primarily associated with the pari of speech of the
conjunctions. This appears from the Stoic origins of the grammatical theory of
the conjunction and from Apollonius Dyscolus. The counter-example διατί cannot
be decisive: it is almost the only word expressive of a causal relationship to be
now and then classified äs an adverb. Probably this relates to its being an
interrogative: such words were classified äs either nouns or adverbs.
Thus, my hypothesis that adjuncts of time, place and manner will readily be
associated with the part of speech adverb, whereas causal meaning will
contribute to a word's syndesmic Status, still Stands. The fact that the difference
became less pronounced in later theory can hardly be a serious objection.378
3.3.1.1.1. Subordination
There is absolutely no trace here of the conception that the causal
subordinate clause Stands on a different level from the main clause: This is
caused by the logical character of the relationship, the expression of which is
analysed äs follows: On two propositions A and B various logical operators may
work, e.g. both/and, either/or, if/then: This excludes on principle any difference
in Status between coordinators and subordinators - the matter is passed over
because it is entirely irrelevant to the problem. A proposition may be "one" in
either of two ways: Either it is simple or it is united by a conjunction. In the
376
 I.e. Apollonius rightly sees that the clause introduced by τω never
contains the cause. Γαρ and δτι do share the characteristic of introducing the
clause containing the cause, in accordance with the rule (coni. 239,16 öl ...
αιτιώδεις σύνδεσμοι μετά των αίτιων θέλουσι τταραλαμβάνεσθαι).
377
 E.g.iynf.461,lff.
378
 The example is the adverbial Status of Latin cum in Charisius and
Dositheus: Char. 291,25ff. the coniunction.es finitivae are discussed, cum among
them (292, Iff.). However, Charisius does mention an alternative view, taking cum
to mean quo tempore: per hoc et adverbium esse potest temporis (ibid.). Cf. Dos.
VII 418,23ff. Similarly, in his Scholia on Ter. Eun. 936 Donatus comments (the
context being Ter. Eun. 934ff. quae [sc. meretrices] dum foris sunt, nil videtur
mundius,/nec magis compositum quicquam nee magis elegans/quam cum amatore
cenam quom liguriunf): unum 'cum' praepositio est, alterum 'cum' coniunctio. Et
dicitur haec figura ττλοκή.
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latter case it is indeed a unity, but it also consists of two entities which
individually are also independent propositions (Ar. Int. 17a8f.; cf. Ammon. in Ar.
Int. ,CAG 4,5,66,3 Iff.).
In the same way the automatical inference from temporal meaning to
adverbial Status ignores the whole problem of a hierarchical structure of
sentences. A passage which illustrates how this works is Ammonius in Ar. Int.,
CAG 4,5,68,10ff.: The issue is the fact that the sentence ηλίου ΰττέρ γην
οντος ήμερα εστίν forms a unity (εις εστίν), but it neither seems to be
άττλοϋς, nor is there a conjunction present in it. But on the other hand it is
impossible that two αυτοτελείς αποφάνσεις can be joined into one sentence
without a σύνδεσμος being ενεργεία, i.e. expressis verbis, present. And indeed
Ammonius upholds that here, too, a sentence which did contain a σύνδεσμος or
the equivalent adverb was rephrased in such a way that the σύνδεσμος or the
equivalent adverb are δυνάμει present still. The gen. abs. accordingly replaces a
phrase introduced by the adverb οτε or the σύνδεσμος συνατττικός εΐ (25f.);
the gen.abs. is thought to contain ει or οτε "δυνάμει". There is no difference
in syntactical Status. The difference is semantical only.
3.3.1.2. Συζυγία and μερισμός
Recalling our example mentioned in section 3.1., έττε'ι would thus be
classified äs an adverb if it has temporal value, but if causal, it would be
regarded äs a conjunction. Another factor for the μερισμός of a word is its
belonging to a συζυγία: For all members of such a series of words belonging
together in a certain respect tend to be reckoned to the same part of speech.
Now, at first sight έττεί does not belong to a συζυγία at all. However, έττεί
is a synonym of δτε, äs appears from the possibility of μετάληψις, and δτε
does form part of a συζυγία: Just like the fact that τις formed a
συζυγία/ακολουθία with τίς, δς and όστις was used äs an argument for its
μερισμός,379 so in this case, too, we are dealing with a συζυγία: οτε belongs
in one group with ττότε, τότε and οπότε, and indeed it is a relative temporal
adverb. The responsion δτε ... τότε or vice versa is an indication that the two
words belong to the same part of Speech.380Έτνε'ι is a synonym of οτε and it
can, moreover, be answered by the indubitable temporal adverb τότε.381
Therefore, temporal έττεί is held to be an adverb.
379
 See section 3.2.1.
380
 Cf. Lallot 1985, 87.
381
 SchHom. M 13a; notice the context (M lOff.) δφρα μεν ... τόφρα δε
...· αύτάρ έττεί... δη τότε ...
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But the grammarians were not satisfied yet and tried to come up with an
appropriate etymology for έττεί. Analogous to the other relative adverbs, a
relative derivation of έττεί χρονικού was looked for. Heracleides (apud ApD.
synt. 483,3ff.) thought that the origin of έττεί was comparable to the adverbs
είςδ, εν ω, εξ όν. He derived it from the local adverb oi> which changed
into εί in Doric. It was then combined with the prefix έτά meaning αϊτό. The
psilosis was not feit to be an objection.382
Apollonius, however, rejects this etymology, because it leaves the accent
(484,8) and the meaning (484,llff.) unexplained. In dialectal changes, it is the
form only that can undergo πάθη. The meaning should be left intact, on the
now familiär principle that a meaning, being incorporeal, cannot act or be acted
upon. Since the original local meaning would have been lost in the new
compound - which is unacceptable -,383 έττεί should rather be considered a
case of συνέμτΓτωσις with the conjunction έττεί (which is derived from the
συνατττικός "εί", and not from any adverb). And then we are on familiär ground
again: Έττεί is not the only word in which a temporal adverb and a causal
conjunction coincide.384 The same goes for words like δφρα and δττως.
Therefore, it is not at all Strange, if έττεί functions in the same way: It is a
causal conjunction, coinciding with a temporal adverb.385
382
 This derivation found its way into e.g. Cyrillus' Συναγωγή (Bachmann
AG l 227,4); it is probably based on the Homeric use of έττεί, denoting
anteriority of the action or event in the temporal clause.
383
 Cf. Et. G. 197,30: έττεί έτάρρημα τοττικόν αντί TOTJ αφ' οί (it
then derives from έττί and εί); it is also a χρονικό ν έττίρρημα instead of
άφ'ο-υ and δταν; 197,35ff. ήνίκα δε καΐ αιτιολογικός -παραλαμβάνεται,
σύνδεσμος εστίν, οίον έττεί ήμερα εστί, φως εστίν. Cf. also the various
derivations m Et. M. 356,7ff.; Zonaras 854.
384
 For this broad use of "causal", cf. chapter III.
385
 ApD. coni 245,18ff. If έττεί is causal, it can only be a conjunction.
Cf. the μερισμός of μεταξύ and ένεκα. Neither word can be a preposition on
formal grounds: The prepositions are a well-circumscribed group of 18 words
which are characterized by the fact that they can be used both συνθέσει and
τταραθέσει. Μεταξύ has local meaning; therefore it is an adverb (cf. Lallot 1987,
84). "Ενεκα is causal in meaning, which pleads for its being a conjunction. In
this case, there is also the corresppndence and confusion with the real
conjunction οΰνεκα and the corresponding correlative τοΰνεκα which will have
been of influence. Οΰνεκα is analysed äs being either a simple conjunction,
equivalent to δτι or a complex one, composed of οί ένεκα. In the latter
meaning it finds a correlate in the demonstrative τοΰνεκα, which is not
immediately derived from it, but is independently compounded out of του and
ένεκα (ApD. coni. 237,23ff.) (cf. Schneider ad coni. 238,3-6 for the contradiction
with pron. 57,4). "Ενεκα and οΰνεκα were wrongly interchanged now and then,
cf. ApD. coni. 239,3f. τταρασυγχέοντες; Ammonius diff. 362; 473 Nickau; Lehrs
1865, 151: In these cases ένεκα was construed with a verb and οΰνεκα with a
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4. Conclusion
This chapter contained a study of the best of ancient grammarians,
Apollonius Dyscolus. Apollonius has a clearly conceived image of the structure of
language. This is an ordered, symmetrical whole, hierarchically organized in
several levels, which are characterized by the isomorphism of their internal
structure. The highest level of language is that on which meanings combine to
form complete messages. The levels below have to do with the form of the
expressions. This dichotomy of form and meaning is a Stoic inheritance.
In itself, language can be studies from a formal point of view äs well äs
from a semantic one. However, semantics are intrinsically more important than
the physical sounds (φωναί). Accordingly, if formal and semantic aspects of a
word contradict each other, it is the semantic aspect that is decisive for
establishing the pari of speech such a word belongs to (μερισμός).
Another indication of the importance attached to meaning, is the concept of
καταλληλότης. For this is essentially semantic in character: it indicates complete
syntactic congruency and semantic compatibility; it is the notion into which
symmetry of structure and semantics merge. Ideally speaking, καταλληλότης
should be a characteristic of both the form and the meaning of any expression.
In practice, however, it often happens that something is wrong with language äs
it presents itself to us, both in daily usage and in a literary context. One of the
grammarian's diagnostic methods is the falsification-principle of έλεγχος, which
similarly rests on a semantic basis. A word or a construction can be rejected
only if there is an alternative linguistic means which conveys the same meaning
in a more appropriate way.
In case of problems, the gramrnarian should use his reason. Should there be
a problem in a (literary) text, he can also take recourse to literary parallele and
the usage of his particular author - the same criteria that the pure philologist
would apply. If a problem arises in everyday usage, he can consult the work of
preceding grammarians and see if a confrontation with observed daily usage
yields any satisfactory results. These criteria were applied by scholars who
studied "correct Greek" or Hellenismos. The latter differed from Apollonius in
that they were mainly interested in morphological matters. But if all eise fails,
reason is the ultimate refuge. Thus, a compromise is effected between an
genitive: It is clear that both constructions facilitated the classification of
ευεκα with the conjunctions. Thierfelder's explanation of ένεκα äs a causal
conjunction is weak (1935, 52 n. 4). In the case of ένεκα, therefore, the same
factors work äs for έττεί, namely semantics and correlatives.
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empirical approach and the a-prioristic belief in underlying order. The Stoa had
managed a similar compromise.
Whatever may go wrong with the form of the expression: at all times there
is the καταλληλοτης holding good for the meaning. And here is another advantage
of reason (or analogy) over the other criteria, namely that it penetrates
immediately into the orderliness of the meaning. It is able to detect even those
(formal) mistakes which completely escape the eye or the ear and refers us to
the system of rules and the basic regularity underlying the actual presentation of
language. The underlying system is used mainly to clarify and Interpret the
physical sentences which form the object of study of the grammarian. Apollonius
represents the meaning of any sentence under discussion by means of a
paraphrase. Thus, he makes a word-picture of the meaning, which in itself
cannot, of course, be caught in words, because it functions on a fundamentally
different level from those words. In these word-pictures Apollonius imitates the
ideal one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning, which is mostly
absent from real language.
After having surveyed Apollonius' views on the functioning of language and
the role of grammar, we observed him at work. First a number of passages from
Apollonius' work de adverbio were studied. His definition was interpreted on the
basis of the ensuing discussion and parallel passages from his other works. It
was shown that a quick grasping of Apollonius' meaning is often impeded by the
fact that he uses his technical terms in a looser sense äs well. We studied his
use of εγκλισις and κατηγορεϊΐλ Further, it was made probable that the
definition contains traces of implicit polemic against the Stoa. Especially those
elements in the definition which stress the differences between adverb and verb,
pointed in this direction. The definition was subsequently used by Apollonius äs
an important criterium for establishing μερισμός.
Like all Greek grammarians, Apollonius analysed linguistic structure into its
smallest independent meaningful components, the parts of speech. These parts of
speech were automatically associated with certain functions, or perhaps it is
better to say that certain semantic categories were feit to call for a specific
part of speech. The result is, that a correct μερισμός of any given word is
equivalent to the correct description of its linguistic function. We watched
Apollonius establishing the μερισμός of a number of problematic items and
observed the techniques he applies: In his use of the disputatio in utramque
partem he showed influence from rhetoric; μετάληψις, the technique of replacing
a questionable word with a less problematic equivalent, was populär not only in
rhetoric, äs a means of clarification, but also in a philological context. It is one
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of the means by which Apollonius tackles the problem of the coincidence of
word-forms, homonymy (συνέμτττωσις).
Homonymy was a thorn in the skin of all students of language from the
earliest times. It is one of the Symptoms of an imperfect one-to-one
correspondence of words and meanings. Apollonius accepts the existence of
homonymy, satisfying himself with showing the linguistic factors which are of
help in dealing with it: any ambiguities resulting from it will usually be cleared
away by the context.
For the Student of Apollonius it is interesting that in cases of
συνέμτττωσις all recourse to formal arguments in establishing a correct
μερισμός is made impossible. The grammarian is forced to come up with
conceptual arguments, of a syntactic or semantic nature. It appears that semantic
arguments again dominate the discussion. Certain categories of meaning were
automatically associated with a particular part of speech. Time, place and manner
are the most important semantic categories of the adverb. Causes are connected
with syndesmic Status. Since "time", temporal relationships, could be lexically
expressed by adverbs only, no such thing äs a temporal conjunction can exist in
Antiquity.
Another important factor in establishing the μερισμός of a word was the
question whether or not it shows relationships of a paradigmatic nature
(συζυγία) with other words, the μερισμός of which was undisputed. In that
case it follows its paradigmatic correlate.
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Chapter III - CAUSAL INA
0. Introduction
In this chapter the starting point will not be the sciences which were at
the origins of grarnmar, nor one particular grammarian, but a grammatical
phenomenon that we know of through virtually no other source than the
grammarians. I refer to the so-called causal use of ϊνα.
As a matter of fact, the subject of causal ίνα shows several affinities with
the preceding chapter: "Ινα is a συνέμπτωσι? of a local adverb and a final and
causal conjunction and, moreover, the grammarian who is most informative on
this issue is no other than Apollonius Dyscolus. I mean to Start from his
extensive discussion, and to try and resolve the obscurities it contains. Then I
shall look into the origins of causal Ινα by comparing the history of the
theories on causation to the history of the grammatical ideas on conjunctions.
I will argue that the whole concept of causal Ινα rests for a large pari on
a terminological confusion. For, whereas a well-differentiated theory on the
various types of causes had come down through the Peripatetics, distinguishing
between efficient and final causes among other things, the grammatical
terminology that was used to describe the conjunctions, was inherited from the
Stoics, whose theory of causation was more monolithic. Therefore, the only term
that penetrated into grammatical theory was αΐτιώδης or αιτιολογικός, and
this term embraced both the final and causal types of conjunctions. Some
grammarians, however, apparently tried to give a more adequate description of
the most current semantic value of Ινα, calling it άττοτελεσ(μα)τικός (final). In
these grammarians, the word αιτιολογικός came to be used for the purely causal
conjunctions only. However, right up to the end of Antiquity, the broader use of
the word also remained current.
This, I submit, made those grammarians who distinguished final and causal
conjunctions, wonder what was meant by Ινα αΙτιολογικός, which they took äs
"causal" in the strict sense. Possibly supported by the occurrence of a real, if
rare and marginal (Alexandrian? colloquial?) usage, they came up with a theory
of causal 'ίνα, which, incidentally, became a lasting bother to grammarians.
I add some passages where Ινα seems to be given a causal Interpretation
by ancient writers and a few places where causal ίνα may actually occur.
Finally, I briefly discuss the possible semantic development which may have led
to a causal use of ίνα. The chapter ends with a brief digression on the
consecutive use of 'ίνα and the relevance to the history of linguistics of the
study of early Christian writers.
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1. Apollonius Dyscolus on causal ϊνα1
1.1. Causal ϊνα in de coniunctionibus
In bis long discussion of the causal conjunctions (coni. 234,13ff.), Apollonius
states that ϊνα is used in three different ways, two of which are "syndesmic",
one adverbial (local) (coni. 243,llff.). As a σύνδεσμος it requires a subjunctive
verb form, äs an adverb it is followed by the indicative mood. The syndesmic use
is normal, everyday usage; äs an adverb it occurs in poetry. In this way the
συνέμιττωσις of the adverbial and "syndesmic" usages can be relieved of its
ambiguity.
But the conjunction ίνα is not quite straightforward either, for it is
interpreted äs either causal or final. The examples of causal Ινα are: ϊνα
άνα·γνώ έτιμήθην, ϊνα λοιδορήσω έττεττλήχθην (243,2l).2 By their very
nature the examples clearly betray their class-room origin. I will return to this
point later.
The final use of 'ίνα - which seems to be sneaking in through the back-
door, since the issue was causal conjunctions - instigates a discussion of two
other final conjunctions, to wit οττως and δφρα.3 These words are part-
synonyms of ϊνα, namely in its final meaning only. This is made clear by the
examples Apollonius adduces, for these are derived from the ones he uses for
final ϊνα, at least in the case of δττως.4 It should be noticed that nowhere
eise in de coniunctionibus äs we have it, are the final conjunctions given a
separate treatment. We shall bear this in mind for the moment.
The most interesting part of Apollonius' discussion (from 244,24 onwards) is
the brief treatment of the syntactic differences between causal and final ϊνα
1
 In the following I disagree on a number of issues with Schöpsdau 1978,
who uses much the same material to Support his opinion that Apollonius ascribed
the value of a preterite to the aorist subjunctive in de coniunctionibus, but
corrected this view in the Syntax.
2
 "Because I had read, I was honoured; because I had used foul language, I
was rebuked."
3
 Coni. 243,26-244,23. The strict order of Apollonius' expose is often
interrupted by short excursus which are linked to the main theme mainly by
association.
4
 And δφρα is said to be synonymous to ϊνα and οττως, so that it cannot
but be final.
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and öl ίσοδυναμοΰντες σύνδεσμοι.5 We shall see that there is some confusion
in this passage, which, however, will be clarified by means of the parallels from
the Syntax.
The difference in construction, Apollonius explains, is a matter of verbal
tense. A sentence containing final ϊνα is construed with a verb which refers to
the future (μέλλοντα);6 the "one that is used in a causal sense" (τον δε
α'ιτιολογικόν λεγόμενον 244,27f.) is construed with a past tense
(-παρωχημένα). It will appear shortly that Apollonius himself cannot seriously
uphold this difference, which rests on a somewhat forced Interpretation of
γράψω in "δός ϊνα γράψω" äs a future indicative. However, at this stage of
his exposition he confidently explains why the alleged difference between the
final and the causal construction should obtain at all: τα γαρ γεγονότα
αΐτιολογείται, 244,28.
The most natural Interpretation of this sentence is "for it is things past
that are explained". This suggests that the past tense with which ϊνα supposedly
is construed, is the tense of the apodosis:1 Since the Statement of the apodosis
concerns something past, an explanation of it can be given, in this case by
means of a causal protasis introduced by 'ίνα. However, äs Apollonius continues
his expose, it appears that he is discussing the tense of the protasis·^ ϊνα
αΐτιολογικός is followed by the aorist subjunctive, whereas he mentions that
final 'ίνα could be construed with a future tense, äs in δός 'ίνα γράψω. If
Apollonius indeed wants to express the fact that the protasis should contain a
5
 "The equivalent conjunctions." The latter addition could be taken to mean
that Apollonius did consider δφρα and δττως to have a causal application after
all, but I do not believe this is the case. Either he adds this clause fpr the sake
of theoretical completeness or he means ϊνα + other final conjunctions vs. 'ίνα
+ other causal conjunctions respectively and has expressed himself in his usual
concise, not to say obscure, way. I think the latter explanation the more likely
one. The places where δφρα is called a σύνδεσμος αιτιολογικός (a.o. SchDTh.
439,27ff.; Choer. GG IV ii 275,3) cannot be used to Support any but a final
meaning for δφρα; they must be explained differently, see below.
6
 Although this is clearly not the only possibility, cf. και 244,27; cf. Uhlig
on synt. 382,3-9. Apollonius probably does not envisage the future tense only,
but also e.g. imperatives, which have a future reference. Cf. Ruijgh 1985, 22ff.
7
 I use the words apodosis and protasis irrespective of their physical
Position in the sentence in respect to one another. In modern terms they are
equivalent to governing and subordinate clause respectively. I prefer to use the
Greek words in order to avoid the association of Subordination. The use of
apodosis and protasis is usually restricted to conditional and correlative periods;
I have extended this usage somewhat for the occasion.
8
 244,29ff.: ό γοϋν λέγων ϊνα γράψω ταϋτά μοι έγένετο, ομολογεί
το ήδη γεγοαφέναι. ώστε ένήργησεν ήδη το έγραψα καΐ αίτ'ιαν κατ'
αΰτοϋ έττήγαγε.
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past tense, we must Interpret the sentence τα γεγονότα αιτιολογείται
differently, viz. äs "things past are given äs cause", τα γεγονότα being, so to
say, a cognate accusative, which here has become subject of the passive
construction.9 But then again Apollonius subsequently undermines bis self-created
9 This is in itself a very common construction, only in the case of this
verb there are no parallels. Usually, the direct object becomes the subject of the
passive construction, cf. e.g. Simpl. in Ar. Phys., CAG 9,669,15 ούτω μεν ου ν
ή δια του ττλήρους των ριτττουμένων κ'ινησις αιτιολογείται.
The only potential parallel that I know of for the construction of α'ιτιολογέω
that we should assume here, I do not consider a satisfactory one: in ApD. coni.
235,7ff examples are given of öu α'ιτιολογικός: ότι ήμερα εστί, φως
εστίν ότι ττεριττατώ, κινούμαι· δτι ήτταιδεύτησας, δαρήση. καΐ ην ττάλιν
το τοιούτον εκ του συνδέσμου ήτιολογημένον. τα δε δύο τα ττρότερα
αύτόθεν ττάλιν είχε την έττιφοράν αληθή· έττεί ου ττάντως ότι άνέγνως
τιμηθήση4 <οϋ γάρ> ττάντως σύνεστι τω άυαγνώναι το τιμηθήναι.
(Incidentally, I feel an addition before or after δτι ήπαιδεύτησας δαρήση may
not be imperative, but is very likely at least. Matthias suggests <οτι άνέγνως,
τιμηθήση >. In itself the necessity of a Supplement has nothing to do with the
meaning of έττε'ι, contra Schneider a.l.)
The drift of the passage seems to be a distinction between cause and effect
which are necessarily linked up with each other (αΰτόθεν) (it being day/it
being light), versus cases of "optional effect": As sopn äs the effect is realized
there need be, in these cases, no doubt äs to its being related to its cause, but
the cause by itself does not of necessity bring about the effect. Therefore the
causal relationship has to be made explicit by means of the conjunction. Cf.
Clem.Alex. Strom. VIII 9 = SVF II 347. (a distinction is made between an αίτιον
(ττοιητικόν) and το δι' δ): ττολλά γοϋν εφ' εν αποτέλεσμα συντρέχει, δι' α
γίγνεται το τέλος, αλλ' ουκ εστί ττάντα αίτια· ου γαρ αν έτεκνοκτόνησεν
Μήδεια, εΐ μη ώργ'ισθη· οϋδ' αν ώργίσθη, ει μη έζήλωσεν ουδέ
τοΰτο, ει μη ήράσθη· ουδέ τοϋτο, ει μη Ιάσων εττλευσεν εις
Κολχοΰς· ουδέ τοϋτο, ε'ι μη Αργώ κατεσκευάσθη· ουδέ τοΰτο, εΐ μη
τα ξύλα εκ του Πηλίου έτμήθη· [cf. the opening of Eur. Med.!] εν τούτοις
γαρ αττασιν του "δι' δ" τυγχάνοντας, ου ττάντα της τεκνοκτονίας αίτια
τυγχάνει, μόνη δε ή Μήδεια. Cf. also Cic. Fat. 35f. Such an effect should
therefore be explicitly ascribed to a cause, and this is managed linguistically by
the use of a causal conjunction (εκ του συνδέσμου, which is opposed to
αύτόθεν). This, I think, is what it says in this text, but äs to the exact
meaning of καΐ ην ττάλιν το τοιούτον εκ του συνδέσμου ήτιολογημένου,
Ι see more than one solution.
According to LSJ s.v. αίτιολογέω it means: "the conjunction indicates that the
cause resides in ...". Thus, το τοιούτον (namely άτταιδευτειν, or rather
ήτταιδεύτησας) is put forward äs a cause; this is effectuated by the conjunction,
i.e. it is the conjunction δτι which makes us see the άτταιδευτειν äs the cause
of the beating which may take place in the future. If this is what the
construction is like, we have indeed found a parallel for "τα γαρ γεγονότα
αΐτιολογέϊται".
But if το τοιούτον can refer to ήτταιδεύτησας, I do not see why it could not
refer just äs well to δαρήσεσθαι or δαρήση: This would enable us to apply the
more usual construction of αίτιολογέω, the Interpretation being "and this
(namely the δαρήσεσθαι) is explained by means of the conjunction".
There is also a third and entirely different possibility, which I tentatively
propose: The sequence, I think, would make any Interpretation preferable which
can oppose the last example(s) in their entirety to the first two: τα δύο τα
ττρότερα means "the two first mentioned examples", i.e. two combinations of a
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Opposition between causal ϊνα + past tense and final ϊνα + future tense (or
verb-form with future reference) by comparing the ambiguous γράψω with the
corresponding forms of κείρω: *δός ϊνα κερώ is non-Greek,10 whereas the
unambiguous aorist-form κείρω yields an acceptable construction.
This means that for the time being we have to conclude that in coni.
244,24ff. Apollonius leaves us uncertain whether after all there is a difference in
temporal construction between 'ίνα αΐτιολογικός and άττοτελεστικός, and if so,
what is its nature. Therefore it is useful to compare his remarks in de
coniunctionibus with those found in his Syntax. After that I will briefly return
to the views expounded in de coniunctionibus.
1.2. Causal'Lva. in the Syntax
There are two relevant passages, 381,10ff. and 388,9ff. In the former the
issue is the tense of the apodosis after a protasis containing εάν or ϊνα
άττοτελεστικός. From 382,3 onwards Apollonius declares that if a preterite tense
is used, ϊνα may also be taken äs αιτιώδης, his example being 'ίνα φιλολογήσω
•παρεγενήθη Τρύφων.
11
 This is said to be an equivalent of διότι έφιλολόγησα
τταρεγενήθη Τρύφων.
12
 Apollonius then adds (382,5ff.) that: ου τούτο δε φημι,
δτι καΐ άττοτελεστικώς ττάλιν ου δύναται άκούεσθαι. δύναται γαρ ττάλιν
ούτως άκούειν, είς το φιλολογήσα'ι με τταρεγενήθη Τρύφων. - έττΐ τοις
ουν έσομένοις ή σύνταξις του α'ιτιολογικοϋ ουκ αν γένοιτο, έττΐ γαρ
γεγονόσιν α'ι αίτίαι έταλέγονται. όθεν καταλληλότερος γίνεται ό
αΐτιολογικός έττιφερομένων των παρωχημένων ίνα υβρίσω Θεωνά, ου
öu-clause with an apodosis. Could το ήτιολογημένον mean "the causal
(complex) proposition"? Apollonius would then have invented (? I know of no
earlier, nor, for that matter, of a later example of this use) a name
corresponding perfectly to συνημμένον, συμτΓετΓλεγμένον or διεζευγμένον: a
perfect participle passive to indicate a species of the complex axiomata. Cf. D.L.
VII 69. The problem is that there is no parallel for this use (but see below,
section 2. with note 38 for another attempt at making the terminology uniform),
and that there already existed a name for the causal complex axioma, to wit, το
αιτιώδες. Nevertheless, this is a Suggestion that I would venture.
10
 For the comparison with Doric, cf. synt. 389,13ff.
11
 "Because I was studying, Trypho came by."
12
 id.
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φήσομεν, αγανακτήσει Δίων, ήγανάκτησεν δε. έττί γε μην του
άττοτελεστικοϋ ενεστι φάναι ίνα υβρίσω Θεωνά τταρεσται Τρύφων.
13
In the context discussed here there is no room for doubt: The issue is
clearly the tense of the apodosis (see especially the example ίνα υβρίσω
Θέωυα, ου φήσομεν αγανακτήσει etc.).14 Apollonius' point is that whereas a
final Interpretation of ίνα is possible irrespective of the tense of the apodosis,
a causal Interpretation is virtually excluded if a future tense is used in the
apodosis. We should notice that the preference for a past event being explained
by a causal protasis rests on logical grounds. One can only establish the fact
that something has been caused by something eise with certainty after the effect
has actually come into existence. To Apollonius the use of past tenses in a
causal context is, therefore, apparently prototypic. Incidentally, it may be
remarked that Apollonius himself does not restrict himself to such prototypic
examples in bis discussion of the αΐτιολογικο'ι. We may compare the examples
quoted in note 9 of öu αΊτιολογικός.
Thus, the phrase έττί γαρ γεγονόσιν αϊ α'ιτίαι επιλέγονται sheds a
clear light on its ambiguous brother "τα γεγονότα αιτιολογείται". The former
cannot but signify that causes are attributed to things past and έττΐ γεγονόσιν
must indicate the action or event expressed by the predicate of the apodosis.^
It seems not unreasonable to suppose that this Interpretation, which makes good
sense, was at the bottom of the passage from de coniunctionibus äs well - I
shall return to this shortly (1.3.).
When we look at the other Syntax passage about causal ϊνα (387, Iff.),16
13
 "Now I don't mean that it may not also be taken äs a purpose clause; it
can have the sense of eis to philologesai me paregenethe Truphon (Tryphon
came in order for me to study'). But the construction cannot have the causal
Interpretation in a future context; causes are attributed only in the past [or
rather. for causes are attributed only to past events, i.e. retrospectively I.S.].
That's why the causal Interpretation is more grammatical in a past context: if I
Start with hina hubriso Theona in the causal sense ('because I injured Theon'), I
won't finish aganaktesei Dion ('Dion will be angry'), but eganaktesen ('was
angry'). But in the final sense it's all right to say hina hubriso Theona parestai
Truphon (Tryphon will come so that [rather: 'in order that' I.S.] I may insult
Theon')" (transl. Householder).
14
 Έττιφερομένων των παρωχημένων can hardly refer to both protasis
and apodosis in this passage; for in that case Apollonius renders his argument
unnecessarily obscure by apparently interpreting ϊυα υβρίσω in two different
ways, one of which we know he rejected out of hand (cf. section 1.1. infine).
15
 Schöpsdau (1978, 277) rejects the parallelism of these phrases and
explains the one in de coniunctionibus äs referring to the Contents of the
protasis and only the Syntax passage äs dealing with the apodosis.
16
 Cf. Schöpsdau 1978, 278f.
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we find that again the context is important. Here, Apollonius is involved in the
question why the so-called έταζευκτικοί reject construction with verb-forms
with past-tense endings. He explains this from the semantic incompatibility of
the notion "past" and the connotation of futurity inherent in the σύνδεσμοι
έττιζευκτικοί. For these convey a δισταγμός ... των ως έσομένων
-πραγμάτων ... καΐ έτι των ως τελεσθησομένων.17
In contrast with synt. 381,10ff. we have here to do with the tense of the
protasis (cf. synt. 387,3 where *έάν ελεγον, *έάν ττέττοιθα are declared
ungrammatical). Past and future cannot be thus united.18 Therefore a form is
17
 "Uncertainty about things that one expects will happen and, furthermore,
about things that one expects will be completed/fulfilled." Uhlig has collected a
number of parallele for this use of ως ad synt. 39,11. In some contexts the
addition of ως indicates that the following word is used in a wider sense, cf.
adv. 121,7f. τα μεν άρθρα -προς τα -πτωτικά ή ως -πτωτικά ("the article is
construed with declinable parts of speech or words that behaye like them"; cf.
Schneider, Tractatus 150f.). On the other hand, sometimes ως is just superfluous
and does not add anything, cf. pro«. 10,21 with synt. 39,11. I am sorely tempted
to consider τα ως έσόμενα -πράγματα and τα ως τελεσθησόμενα -πράγματα
äs exponents of the former group ("things/actions that probably (according to
one's expectations) will happen", "things/actions that will probably (according to
one's expectations) be effectuated"), but I readily admit that I cannot prove this.
The Greek for "things/actions that will happen" would be τα μέλλοντα
(εσεσθαι) -πράγματα. Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 255.
18
 We are here confronted with the problem of the temporal value of the
subjunctive aorist, which I will not enter into very deeply. If we compare the
scheme in section 1.2. in fine, we see that the subjunctive should be past to
generate a causal Interpretation for 'ίνα, but may not be so for final ϊνα to be
possible. We should realize in the first place that causal ϊνα is excepted from
the rule about causal conjunctions + past indicative. For the rest, the gist of the
problem is this: The subjunctive mood has no preterite endings, since the
meaning of the conjunctions [and the subjunctive mood is characterized by the
fact that it does not occur without a conjunction] is basically incompatible with
"past-ness": they imply futurity (synt. 387,Iff.). Therefore, the subjunctive cannot
end in -ov: *έάν ελεγον is an unviable expression (at least in hterary texts; in
colloquial koine, έάν/αν gradually replaced ει, so that εάν came to be
construed with the indicative äs well), ϊνα/έάν άναγνώ are acceptable,
because their ending does not indicate a past tense.
The meaning of εάν άναγνώ is ει άνΰσαιμι το μαθεΐν. The value of the
conjunction is still that of expressing το ως έσόμενον, but the conjunctions
are in themselves unmarked for τταράτασις or άνυσις: This is the additional
value contributed by the use of present or aorist stem respectively.
Παράτασις and άνυσις are temporal notions. Skrzecka 1855,15 wrongly finds
Apollonius unprecise, when he declares that the aorist subjunctive does not
indicate "past-ness" (synt. 387,lff.), and then uses words for present and past
tenses when discussing the construction of certain conjunctions (synt. 389,6f.).
He fails to see that -παρωχημένος is used in a broader sense for all past tense
forms, including all forms of the aorist stem, and in a stricter sense for the
semantic value "past" (which is not identical with συντελείωσις).
Berrettoni 1989, 38f. rightly Stresses the fact that in all Antiquity np separate
word for "aspect" existed; he points out the intrinsic improbability of the
hypothesis that the ancient grammarians would not have given a name to such a
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used which does not express a past tense: 'ίνα. άναγνώ, εάν άναγνώ (synt.
388,2).19
The case of Ινα. αιτιολογικός is again granted a separate mention (synt.
388,9ff.): Φαίνεται ουν δτι ό αιτιολογικός σύνδεσμος [i.e. ϊνα in its causal
Interpretation] τη ττρός τον άττοτελεστικόν ομοφωνία συνήρττασε και τα
της συντάξεως είς ταΰτό, τάχα καΐ της έττιρρηματικης ομοφωνίας
συλλαμβανομένης τω λόγω' συντασσόμενα γαρ τα οριστικά μετά του ίνα
ενδείκνυται το τοττικόν επίρρημα "ίνα τ' ετραφεν ήδ' έγένοντο" (κ 417).
όμόλογον γαρ δτι οι αιτιολογικοί τταρωχημένοις χρόνοις συντάσσονται,
δτι έγραψα, ότι ένόησα.
20
The double coincidence of ϊνα - which can represent an adverb and either
of two kinds of conjunctions - has occasioned an exceptional construction for
ϊνα αιτιολογικός. Apollonius tentatively suggests that it was the formal
coincidence with the adverb that stimulated a different construction, viz. that
with the subjunctive, for all syndesmic uses of ϊνα; for the indicative is
usually the sign that ϊνα is to be taken äs an adverb.21 Therefore, even if ϊνα
is causal, and should normally speaking have allowed of (or even preferred) the
construction with a past tense indicative, it construes with the subjunctive
instead. This is only a secondary argument for Apollonius, who defends the
unusual construction of causal ϊνα mainly by invoking the analogy with the
construction of final ϊνα. This syndesmic use went band in hand with a
category, if, that is, it really was fundamentally different from the category
χρόνος. I find this very convincing. See further Ruijgh 1985, especially 21ff.
Very wisely, Choeroboscus was later to cut short a similar discussion about the
present and future tense endings of the aorist subjunctive (GG IV ii 278,23ff.).
He does not want to explain this by saying that the subjunctive cannot indicate
"past-ness": Κρεϊττον ουν εστί λέγειν, δτι αύται α'ι καταλήξεις
χαρακτηριστικοί είσι των ύττοτακτικών, τουτέστιν ή είς ω και ή εις μαι,
και μη άττοδιδόναι αίτιαν.
19
 Uhlig ad synt. 388,1 rightly calls attention to the fact that Apollonius
does not mention the ind.praet. with ϊνα in an irrealis-construction.
20
 "Evidently the causal conjunction hina takes the same [subjunctive]
construction äs the purpose hina because of its identity of form, perhaps also
influenced by the homophony of the [relative] adverb hina ('where'). When
indicatives are constraed with hina, it regularly has the locative sense [rather: it
suggests the local adverb, I.S.], äs in Odyssey 10,417 ... 'where they were born
and brought up'. For it is well known that, otherwise, causal conjunctions are
construed with past tenses, e.g. hoti egrapsa ('because I wrote') or hoti enoesa
('because I thought')" (transl. Householder). Notice the tentative Suggestion that
the homonymy with the local adverb also played a part: ϊνα μη συνεμττέσηι ...!
Cf. section 3.3.
21
 Cf. coni. 243,12ff. where the use of indicative vs. subjunctive was the
criterion for ϊνα being an adverb or a conjunction respectively.
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subjunctive, whose endings do not indicate "pastness", and so the other
syndesmic use of Ινα was automatically combined with a subjunctive, too.
The following picture of the ideal, normative, prototypic construction of
causal conjunctions has emerged from the foregoing: A causal conjunction is
preferably construed with a preterite indicative in the protasis (synt. 389,4f.),
the exception being causal ϊνα; this is caused by its homophony with the final
conjunction (synt. 388,9ff.). The construction of a causal conjunction with a
future tense in the apodosis is either neglected or cautiously rejected (synt.
382,7f.; cf. 382,9f., where the alternative construction with a past tense is called
καταλληλότερος).22 Apparently, a causal protasis combined with a future action or
event is not considered prototypic.
A final conjunction may be construed with a past tense in the apodosis
(synt. 382,5ff.), but not in the protasis, where a future tense is normal, synt.
387,7ff. Usually, it will be construed with a future or present tense in the
apodosis äs well (synt. 382, lf.). As long äs we distinguish whether the tense of
the apodosis or that of the protasis is under discussion, this picture is coherent
enough. In a schematic representation it appears äs follows:
protasis apodosis
semantic value semantic value
pres. past fut. pres. past fut.
causal + + + + -
final - + + ++ + + +
(+ = possible; H- + = preferential; - = cautious rejection; -- = impossible).
1.3. Recapitulation; Apollonius on causal Ινα.
If we re-read the passage from de coniunctionibus with the aforesaid in
mind, we find that it is indeed confused.23 Apollonius begins äs if he is about to
22
 Although, according to Uhlig a.L, this is a case of comparativus pro
positivo. The theoretical preference for a past tense has no serious practical
consequences, cf. e.g. coni. 235,7 öu ήτταιδεύτησας, δαρήση. This is, qf
course, one of those cases where the causal relationship is based on the explicit
addition of the causal conjunction only, since there is no necessary, logical
causal relationship between the two propositions.
23
 I disagree, therefore, with Schöpsdau (1978, 276 and 279t), who
maintains that the differences between coni. and synt. should be explained in
terms of a development between the two works. He probably underestimates the
influence that Apollonius' ideas on the functioning of causal conjunctions in
general exercised on his view of the accompanying verbal tenses - therefore the
tension between the construction of causal ϊνα and the other causal
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discuss the distribution of tenses in causal and final apodoseis (244,27-8), but
then abruptly Switches to the use of the various tenses in the protasis
(244,29ff.). He then gets mixed up, because ίνα is the worst possible example
with which to demonstrate the temporal characteristics of the protasis, since it
is not construed with an indicative mood. It is explicitly called an exception
synt. 388,9ff. Thus, he has to recant bis affirmations about ϊνα γράψω
contaming a future tense, and feebly concludes by saying that he has now
explained the cause of this ϋττόληψις. He never returns to the original question
of the constraction of causal vs. final conjunctions.24
Whereas the prototypic causal period preferably consists of a past-tense
protasis and apodosis, ίνα is exceptional in that it is not followed by a past
tense indicative in the protasis; the use of that tense is avoided in this case in
order to prevent confusion with the homophonous local adverb. Instead it is
construed with a subjunctive on the strength of the analogous final conjunction.
The fact that a subjunctive has no past-tense value has to be accepted into the
bargain.
The phenomenon of causal ϊνα recurs in Apollonius' grammatical
successors.
25
 A notable exception is his son Herodian, who only discusses ϊνα in
the context of the αιτιολογικοί in the broader sense I will shortly describe.
Herodian does not distinguish a separate category of αποτελεσματικοί, or
άττοτελεστικο'ι. As we shall see, a causal meaning is never attributed to 'ίνα by
grammarians who do not also acknowledge a separate group of final
conjunctions.
Thus, Apollonius knows of a causal use of ϊνα which he discusses at
various places in his work. Moreover he has firmly conceived ideas about the
conjunctions went unnoticed.
24
 The order of the works of ApD. is usually considered to be pron., adv.,
conl, synt. Dronke 1857,566; Schneider GG II iii vi ff. Cf. e.g. synt. 378,7f. öu
γαρ έκαστος αυτών (sc. των τταραττληρωματικών) έχει τινά δύναμιν,
τταρεστήσαμεν εν τω ττερί συνδέσμων. The problem is that the internal
references are often contradictory, which was prpbably caused by the fact that,
just like the lecture notes of Aristotle, Apollonius' work was being constantly
revised and added to. However this may be, in the accepted order the later work
would be more elaborate and careful on the matter of the construction of causal
conjunctions. In general, Apollonius can be more concise in his Syntax on
matters of detail which had received a more ample treatment in his works on the
individual parts of speech.
25
 Choeroboscus, GG IV ii 275,8ff.; 277,24ff.; Sophr. GG IV ii 410,14ff.;
MichSync. 1690ff. Donnet (notice that elsewhere (1369f.; 1437ff.) he uses
α'ιτιολογικοί in the broad sense, see below); Lex. Vindob. 105,7ff.
With the exception of MichSync. each time the difference in construction vis a
vis the final use is remarked upon.
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syntactical characteristics of this conjunction. His examples derive from school
practice and we may ask ourselves if we have to do with an Alexandrian
colloquialism. Further, a number of bis successors are also aware of this use of
'ίνα.
2. The origin of ϊνα αιτιολογικός äs a final conjunction; the theory of
causation
At this point several questions arise: How did the notion of Ινα
αιτιολογικός develop? Does it correspond to any "real" linguistic phenomenon,
or is it just a construction of the grammar schools? In order to answer the first
question, we must take a closer look at the αιτιολογικοί σύνδεσμοι and, in
general, at the ancient ideas on causation.
At the root of the concept of ϊνα αιτιολογικός lies Aristotle's distinction
of four types of causes,26 the essence, the material cause, the efficient cause
and the final cause. It is only the last two that interest us. The efficient cause
is the δια τι, the final cause is το τίνος ένεκα. Now, the point is that these
two "may äs it were play into each other's hands" (Ross on An.Post. 94bl2-20).
Thus, in practice, efficient and final causes may frequently coincide (e.g.
An.Post. 94bllf. δια τ'ι δε άττό δε'ητνοί) δει ττεριττατεϊν, και ένεκα τίνος
δει, ουδέν διαφέρει).27
Α second relevant point is the fact that one may ask for the final cause by
saying δια τί;28 E.g. An.Post. 94b8ff.: "Οσων δ' αίτιον το ένεκα τίνος-
26
 Phys. II 3 (194bl6ffi); Met. IV 2; Met. I 3 (983a26-32), andAn.Post. II 11
(94a20ff.). The last passage differs in the second cause.
27
 "Why one has to take a walk after dinner, and what for one has to do
so, does not make any difference." Cf. Ross on An.Post., 643: "Between a
purposive action (such äs walking after dinner) and the ultimate result aimed at
(e.g. health) there may intervene an event [viz. the descent of food into the
stomach, I.S.] which äs efficient cause seryes to explain the occurrence of the
ultimate result and may in turn be teleologically explained by the result which is
its final cause.
28
 Cf. also Philopon. in Phys. CAG 16,241,16f.; Asclep. in Metaph. CAG
6,l,23,15ff. Donnet 1967, 35 remarks: "Sans doute est-il vrai que le but poursuivi
se confond avec la cause de l'action..."
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οίον δια τί ττεριττατεΐ; δίνω? ύγιαίνη. δια τ'ι οίκία εστίν; δττως
σωζηται τα σκεύη.
29
Ι should like to call special attention to the example which recurred twice
already, to wit that of the constitutional after-dinner walk. We find it again
Phys. 194b33f.: το ου ένεκα, οίον του ττεριττατείν ή ΰγίεια' δια τί γαρ
ττεριττατεϊ; φαμεν "1'να ύγιαίνη", και είττόντες οΰ'τως οίόμεθα
άττοδεδωκέναι το αίτιον.
30
 This example recurs in Apollonius: synt. 377, Iff.
Τρύφων ττεριττατει Ινα ΰγιάυτ],31 and coni. 243,23t Θέων διακινεί ϊνα
ϋγιάντι.
32
 It is a well-known fact that the grammarians do not aspire to
originality in their examples. Thus, the similarity of examples can be used to
trace back a tradition to its origins. Apollonius is the first,33 äs far äs we
know, to distinguish a grammatical sub-category of final conjunctions. It can be
no coincidence that the example which illustrates this usage is the same äs
Aristotle's, who first distinguished a telic cause.
Whereas the idea that final and causal meaning differ from each other may
have been borrowed from the Peripatos, Apollonius' theory of the conjunction is
deeply influenced by the Stoa.34 His main categories of conjunctions are the
Stoic ones, i.e. the ones the Stoa needed to form their various kinds of complex
axiomata (D.L. VII 69). Among these is το αΐτιώδε?, the causal complex
axiom, formed by means of the conjunction διότι. The Stoic α'ιτία-theory,35
which has come down to us in a rather unclear series of sources, does not seem
to have contained anything like a final cause. The Stoa indeed has well-defined
29
 "And of all things of which the 'what for' is the cause - e.g. Why does
he walk? In prder that he may be healthy. Why is there a house? In order that
the furniture is safe."
30
 "The final cause, e.g. 'health' of 'walking'. For why does one walk? We
say 'in order that one may be (remain) healthy' and in so saying we believe we
have given the cause."
31
 "Trypho walks in order that he may be healthy."
32
 "Theon takes physical exercise in order that he may be healthy."
33
 Or maybe Trypho, if the use of his name in the example means anything,
äs it well may, cf. the list of examples in note 42.
34
 Cf. chapter I section 2.1.2.; II section 3.3.1.1.
35
 Cf. Forschner 1981, 87ff.; Görler 1987.
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ideas about το τέλος äs is clear from their TeXos-formulae. However, to my
knowledge they never use a sentence containing Ινα to express this τέλος.36
The grammarians probably took over the Stoic term σύνδεσμοι αιτιώδεις,
which included final and causal conjunctions, but also words like εάν.37 As an
alternative (and much more populär) designation αιτιολογικός came to be
used,38 whereas usually no separate category of αποτελεσματικοί was
distinguished. Traces of this remain in the many places where ϊνα is called
αΐτιολογικός, while evidently a final meaning only is envisaged.39
36
 The normal way to indicate το τέλος is the expression (το) ου
ένεκα, e.g. SVF III 2; 16; 17. Conversely, if ϊνα had been important in this
respect, one would have expected this to be reflected in their theory of the
axiom, cf. Sluiter 1988a, 60.
37
 A representative collection is found in DTh. 93,2: αιτιολογικοί· ϊνα
δφρα δττως ένεκα οϋνεκα διδ διότι καθ' δ καθ' ότι καθ' δσον.
Ais regards εάν, notice the following: Priscian calls ϊνα and ut "adiunctivae"
GL III 95,15ff.; this is a translation of έτπζευκτικο'ι. The most common example
of the έττιζευκτικοί is εάν which is linked with ϊνα in a number of texts:
ps. Theodos. 48,3ff. (εάν signifying αίτια); MichSync. 1369f.; Gramer AO
374,14 calling εάν "αιτιολογικός"; Zonaras 1111 (ίνα ... αντί του αν); Et.
Μ. 471,6ff. (id.; in both cases Hom. H 353 is the occasion, cf. Chantr.,
gramm.hom. 2681, 278f. and 282f. on the final value of ει, "to see if). For the
reverse, viz. the explanation of εάν ... αντί του ϊνα, see SchArist. Ran. 175.
Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 251ff.
38
 Here, too, the uniformity of the terminology was probably a decisive
factor in the vast preference accorded to αΐτιολογικός äs against αιτιώδες.
Cf. the names of the other σύνδεσμοι: συμπλεκτικοί, διαζευκτικοί, συνοπτικοί,
τταρασυνατττικοί κτλ. Notice that the Stoic complex axiom "το διασαφούν το
μάλλον κτλ." is reflected in the grammatical category of the σύνδεσμοι
διασαφητικοί, cf. Sluiter 1988a, 57. Αΐτιολογικός evidently ousted the alternative
candidate αίτιατικός, since the latter was already in use äs the terminus
technicus for the accusative case.
39
 Αιτιώδες: Apollonius Sophista s.v. ϊνα; Porphyrius, Quaest. Hom. lib. I
(ed. Sodano), 37,15ff.; Eustath. 4,624,22ff. vdV. (who mentions the other
designations, viz. αΐτιατικώς and κατ' αΐτ'ιαν in the same breath).
Αιτιολογικός: DTh. 93,2; SchDTh. 439,27ff.; Hdn. Gramer AO. III 280,20f.; Choer.
ps. epim. 63,13ff.; Greg.Cor. § 17,82ff.; Et. M. 471,6ff.; MichSync. 13691; 1432ff.
(but cf. note 25); Eustath. see above.
In Priscian the label causales covers a large group of conjunctions with different
semantic values (GL III 94,25ff.) äs well äs the homonymous sub-group (quasi
proprio nomine) (ibid. 95,10); cf. 95,13ff. In the Latin grammarians causalis is a
normal label for ut (cf. Diom. I 408,23f.; Agroecius VII 121,9ff. (ne)\ Beda VII
287,6ff.; Caper VII 100,9f.; Prise, saep.). (Charpin 1965 is irrelevant here.)
I have only quoted grammatical or pseudo-grammatical sources thus far. Note
that the Christian writers also take αίτια and αίτιατικός to include the telic
cause (e.g. Theodorus of Mopsuestia on Rom. 7:4: ουκ έτι·' αιτίας δε λέγει
το ϊνα, αλλά το έττόμενον τω πράγματι κατά το σύνηθες αύτφ (i.e.
it is not final, but consecutive). See nirther below, section 5).
Cf. on the broader use of αιτιολογικός also Skrzecka 1869,13.
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If we look at Apollonius' treatment of the αΐτιολογικοί in de
coniunctionibus once again, we now realize that although to him the
αιτιολογικοί are the strictly causal conjunctions only, he does discus here not
only this smaller group, but automatically adds the rest of the traditional group
of the αιτιολογικοί, including the final conjunctions. The place of the discussion
of the final conjunctions seems, therefore, to be traditionally defined.
3. The raison d' etre of causal ϊνα
The foregoing section explains the use of αιτιολογικοί in a broader and a
stricter sense, but we are still in the dark about Apollonius' motives for
introducing a causal (in the strict sense) ϊνα next to his freshly recognized
final one. In theory there can be various reasons for this, the first being that a
causal value of ίνα actually existed - at times we almost forget that even
ancient grammarians may occasionally describe the actual linguistic facts.
A second possibility is that Apollonius (or Trypho, cf. note 33) was himself
the victim of a misunderstanding, caused by the developments that were
described in the preceding section: It is just conceivable that he adopted the
term άττοτελεσ(μα)τικός,40 because he feit that this was a more adequate
description of the most frequent use of ϊνα, but nevertheless was brought to
believe that his predecessors called ϊνα "αιτιολογικός", because it really could
occasionally be the bearer of causal meaning. He then construed appropriate
examples and the ghost-construction ϊνα αιτιολογικό? was born.
The third and to my mind most attractive solution is a combination of the
other two: There was indeed some terminological confusion which was solved by
promoting causal ϊνα to handbook Status. This was made easier by the fact that
causal ϊνα was a (colloquially) known, if marginal, linguistic possibility.
3.1. The existence of causal ϊνα.
Let me Start with this latter point. The main difficulty in believing that the
grammarians really knew of a causal ϊνα is the fact that they do not quote any
40
 The origin of the term αττοτελεσ(μα)τικός is not quite clear. In both
forms the word is post-classical. In non-grammatical texts αποτελεσματικός is
used especially in connection with astrology and other kinds of prophesying, e.g.
Eustath. 3,378,9f. vdV.; 3,640,5f. vdV.; Vettius Valens, Anthol. 332,1. The
collocation αίτιον άττοτελεσματικόν is found only once and may have been
coined under the influence of the grammatical usage (Syrianus, in Hermog. comm.
l,106,7ff.): δτι μεν γαρ εκ τεσσάρων στοιχείων σύγκειται ό άνθρωπος,
ττασι καταφανές, τί δε το αίτιον το άττοτελεσματικόν του τοιοϋδε
χρήματος, δ και διαφόρους έττοίησε τους χαρακτήρας, άτταγγέλλειν αδύνατον.
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literary sources to confirm this usage,41 äs they do for all other kinds of
grammatical phenomena. Virtually all examples of causal 'ίνα bear the mark of
their being constructed for educational purposes, illustrating a usage which, if
literary, can have been rare and marginal at best.42 Alternatively, causal 'ίνα
may have been a phenomenon of (Alexandrian?) colloquial language. This
possibility, which would also account for the classroom examples, cannot be
completely discarded, but it cannot be proved either.
For Apollonius I am afraid we can get no further than this, but there is
more: Possibly encouraged by the fact that causal 'ίνα was not utterly
unimaginable after Apollonius, there are at least two later sources which
managed to find a literary example. One of them is the Lexicon Vindobonense,
the other the Christian writer Andreas of Caesarea.43 Apart from these ancient
causal interpretations of 'ίνα, there are a few places where we may actually
have to do with attestations of causal 'ίνα. All in all, the material is extremely
meagre, but it may warrant the rather conservative conclusion that there was a
marginal usage in live Greek which corresponded to the grammarians' theories.
3.1.1. Ancient causal interpretations oflva
The modern grammars of New Testament Greek cautiously mention causal
'ίνα.
44
 For its existence they lean heavily on the testimony of Apollonius
Dyscolus. However, it is not necessary to postulate causal 'ίνα in any of the
proposed passages on linguistic grounds. A causal Interpretation can only be
defended by arguments of a theological nature and it so happens that such
41
 For the one exception, see below, section 3.1.1.
42
 The examples are the following:
'ίνα άναγνώ έτιμήθην: ApD. synt. 277,4f.; coni. 243,21; SchDTh. 400,22.
'ίνα άναγνω Τρύφων έτιμήθη: SchDTh. 245,17f.
'ίνα άναγνω ώφελήθην: Choer. GGIV ii 278,1.
'ίνα άναστώ ήνιάθη Τρύφων: ApD. synt. 277,5.
'ίνα φιλολογήσω τταρεγενήθη Τρύφων: ApD. synt. 382,4.
'ίνα υβρίσω Θεωνά ... ήγανάκτησεν (Δίων): ApD. synt. 382,10f.
'ίνα λοιδορήσω έττεττλήχθην: ApD. coni. 243,21f.
'ίνα γράψω ταϋτά μοι έγένετο: ApD. coni. 244,29.
'ίνα προκόψω έφθόνησάς με: Sophr. GG IV ii 410,15f.; Choer. GG IV ii 277,36
should be emended accordingly.
'ίνα τιμηθώ έλυττήθης: Choer. GG IV ii 275,12; 276,3; 276,22.
'ίνα λαλήσω έτάχθην: MichSync. 1690ff. (after Inversion of the examples).
43
 Of these two, it is of course only the composer of the Lex.Vindob. who
can be credited with the ambition to find a case of ϊνα αιτιολογικό?.
44
 Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 456 Anm. 2 (discussing Apocal 22:14; 16;15;
Marc. 4:12; 4:22; l Petr. 4:6); Moulton-Turner III 102. a. further Jannaris §
1741; Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II647 (causal ut).
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arguments can always be countered by other theological arguments. The question
is, however, whether such an Interpretation of 'ίνα is attested in any ancient
source. I found indeed one place in the ancient Christian writers which Supports
a causal Interpretation in one of the proposed passages.45 In contrast with
consecutive ϊνα, however, there are no theoretical remarks connected with the
causal Interpretation, which is given very drily in the form of a paraphrasis.
My example concerns one of the best candidates for causal ϊνα, viz.
Apocal. 22:14: Μακάριοι öl ττλύνοντες τάς στολάς αυτών, ϊνα εσται ή
εξουσία αυτών έττΐ το ξΰλον της ζωής καΐ τοις ττυλώσιν είσέλθωσιν
είς την ττόλιν.
46
 Α causal Interpretation of ϊνα is supported by the parallel
passage from Matth. (5:3ff.) which reads μακάριοι ... δτι.47 In his commentary
on the Apocalypse, Andreas of Caesarea (s. VI) has the following entry (PGM
106,449): "Μακάριοι öl ττοιοϋντες τάς έντολάς έμοϋ' ϊνα εσται ή
εξουσία αυτών έττΐ το ξύλον της ζωής, και τοις ττυλεώσιν ε'ισέλθωσιν
είς την ττόλιν." - "Οντως δε μακαρισμοΰ άξιοι οΐ ττοιοϋντες τάς
45
 There is also a varia lectio at Joh. 9:2: τίς ημαρτεν, ούτος ή öl
-γονείς αύτοϋ, ϊνα τυφλός γεννηθη; here, ϊνα is probably consecutive (or,
more precisely, inferential), although a final Interpretation cannot be excluded
either; the variant ÖTI proves that the scriba considered the clause tp be
causal/inferential, cf. Moulton-Turner III 102. These interpretatipns can at times
be extremely close to one another, cf. the English example "It is raining, for I
do not see anybody in the street". In such cases the consequence of a state of
affairs is adduced äs the reason from which that state of affairs is inferred. In
the terminology of functional grammar, the ϊνα-clause has the syntactical
function of disjunct here. Cf. Rijksbaron 1976, 52. See also section 5 note 82.
^ "Happy are those who wash their robes clean! [For?] They will have the
right to the tree of life and will enter by the gates of the city." Cf. in the same
construction Apocal. 16:15 μακάριος ό γρήγορων και τηρών τα Ιμάτια
αύτοϋ, ϊνα μη γυμνός ττεριττατη. Other candidates are Marc. 4:llf. ϋμίν
το μυστήριον δέδοται της βασιλείας του Θεοϋ- έκείνοις δε τοις έξω
εν τταραβολαΐς τα ττάντα γίνεται, ϊνα βλέποντες βλέττωσιν και μη ΐδωσιν.
και άκοΰοντες άκοΰωσιν και μη συνιώσιν. Cf. Matth. 13:13 δια τοϋτο εν
τταραβολαΐς αΰτοϊς λαλώ, ότι βλέττοντες ου βλέττουσιν κτλ. (cf. Is. 6:9-10).
The passage from Mark may be taken either in a causal sense ("because (it is
written that they).." or in a final one, or epexegetically ("it happens to them in
all respects that they ..."), cf. Moulton-Turner III 102. The stränge coordination
of a future indicative and an aorist subjunctive in the text from the Apocalypse
may be due to John's limited command of Greek. Είσέλθωσιν may have been feit
äs a future, on the basis of ambiguous forms like ποιήσω.
47
 However, a final Interpretation is also possible, if one construes ϊνα
with ττλΰυοντες (cf. Blass-Debr.-Rehk. I.e.). If ϊνα is causal, the syntactic
Status of the clause introduced by it is not self-evident. I should say it is likely
to be a disjunct here (motivatipn of the sentiment expressed in the previous
sentence); in theory it can also introduce an adjunct, äs it certainly does in the
examples provided by the grammarians, see note 45.
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έντολάς του Θεοϋ
-
 έξουσ'ιαν γαρ εξουσιν εν τη άλήκτω ζωή, τω
ξύλω της ζωής Χριστώ τω Θεώ ημών έιτανατταύεσθαι κτέ.4^
Ι realize one cannot attach too much weight to this passage. Let us
proceed, therefore, to the one grammatical source which managed to find a
more or less literary example of causal ίνα· The Lexicon Vmdobonense 105,3ff.
quotes a passage of Libanius to Support the Interpretation of ίνα äs και δια
τοϋτο,
49
 remarking, moreover, that ϊνα in this usage καΐ μετά τταρεληλυθότος
συντάσσεται.
50
 The passage in question is Declam. 34,40. A son has promised a
talent to the gods if his very sick father recovers. The father does recover and
proceeds to accuse his son, claiming that the loss of the talent has ruined him.
In the course of his bitter complaints he indignantly asks: εΐτ' ώ κατάρατε και
ύττέρ το δέον φιλότιμε, εγώ μόνος έδυστύχουν αφόρητα, ϊνα μοι
δυστυχέστερον της νόσον την ϋγείαν άντέδωκας;-"1
If the Lexicon really means us to take ϊνα äs "and therefore", its
Interpretation is obscure and unnecessary. A purely causal Interpretation
("because") gives a fairly satisfactory sense, if we take αφόρητα äs the father's
present poverty. But this leaves the imperfect έδυστύχουν unexplained, and it is
not, strictly speaking, what the Lexicon proposes. "Ινα, therefore, is probably
final here after all. Δυστυχέστερον should then be taken proleptically (in order
that you should render me such health that was to turn out more unhappy than
my illness), and the αφόρητα can no longer be the poverty to which the father
sees himself reduced, but must refer to the illness. The likelihood of a final
Interpretation is increased by the echo of έδυστύχουν (referring to the illness)
and δυστυχέστερον (referring to the restored health). However this may be, the
48
 '"Happy are those who keep my commandments; They will have the right
to the tree pf life and will enter by the gates of the city' - Truly those are
worthy of being called happy who keep the commandments of God; for they will
have the right in the unending life, to rest in Christ our Lord, the tree of life."
49
 Kai δια τοϋτο means, of course, "and therefore" instead of "because".
This makes it equivalent to τω which on principle was rejected äs a σύνδεσμος
by Apollonius (see chapter II section 3.3.1.1.). Ancient grammatical sources
sometimes did consider δια τοϋτο a σύνδεσμος, cf. Choer. ps.epim. 58,32ff.
(Δια τοϋτο' δεικτική αντωνυμία η μάλλον έττιρρηματική δεικτική ή
σύνδεσμος α'ιτιολογικός) and the Et. M. 773,29ff. on τω.
50
 "... is construed with a past tense äs well."
51
 "You cursed and excessively ambitious man, did I alone suffer unbearable
misfortune, in order for you to render me such health äs was to be more
unfortunate than my illness?" (or: "and did you therefore render me such health
etc.", or possibly even "because you rendered me such health etc."). Reiske:
"malim δυστυχεστέραν".
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important thing is that an ancient source has linked the theoretical concept of
'ίνα αΙτιολογικός with a concrete, literary example.
The Lexicon Vindobonense also knows of another intriguing and unusual
usage of Ινα which it paraphrases äs ωσάν. This time the quotation derives
from Johannes Chrysostomus (de Sacerdotio, ed. A.-M. Malingrey, SC 272, I
4,33ff.): όσοι δε είσιν αφειδέστεροι των αίτιωμένων ταϋτά τε ήμιν
αμφότερα έγκαλοϋσιν όμοΰ και ττροστιθέασι την εις τους τετιμηκότας
υβριν, δίκαια ττεττονθέναι λέγοντες αυτούς καί εΐ μείζονα τούτων
άτιμασθέντες ετυχον τταρ' ημών ότι τοσούτους καΐ τηλικούτους αφέντες
άνδρας, μειράκια χθες καί ττρώην έτι ταΐς του βίου μερίμναις
έγκαλινδούμενα, 'ίνα χρόνον βραχύν τάς όφρΰς συναγάγωσι, καΐ φαιά
ττεριβάλλωνται και κατήφειαν ύττοκρίνωνται, εξαίφνης είς τοσαύτην ήγαγον
τιμήν οσην ουδέ δναρ λήψεσθαι ττροσεδόκησαν.52 Ωσάν indeed can have a
causal shade of meaning.53 The ancient grammarians nowhere discuss it under the
causal conjunctions.
3.1.2. Examples of causal ϊνα
Gradually, we have entered the search for "real" causal 'ίνα.54 Here, the
52
 "And all those detractors who are even less sparing in their accusations,
accuse us of both these things at the same time and they add our insolent
behaviour towards those that have honoured us, saying that they suffered what
they deserved, even if they had received a still more ignominious treatment from
our side, because they had dismissed such formidable men and of such an
honourable age, in order all of a sudden to promote youths who qnly a short
time ago were completely involved in all the antics of the worldly life, because
(or: provided) they frowned for a short time and dressed in grey and feigned a
sombre and serious attitude, to such an honour äs they would not even in their
dreams have expected to receive."
53
 Construed with a participle e.g. Lucian. Alex. 31; ApD. synt. 384,11. As
ως αν, cf. KG II461, e.g. Hom. θ 239; PL Prot. 335d4f.
54
 Such a search is rather destructive in character. It is easier to disclaim
alleged instances, than to find new ones. In itself this indicates the absolutely
marginal Status of the phenomenpn.
The examples claimed by Schneider (index) for Apollonius can all be discarded. I
only mention here the one example which has at least a semblance of
verisimilitude, synt. 229, Iff. The issue is whether Zenodotus' change of σφωέ
into σφωι, is correct (this would imply that the second person pronoun σφώι
would become a third person pronoun merely by virtue of a change of accent):
αλλ' εστί γε καΐ ΰττέρ της τταραδεδομένης γραφής εκείνο φάναι, ως
μάλλον κατώρθοοται 'ίνα μη ή αύτη ούσα φωνή τταρά την εγκλισι,ν
ττροσώττου μεταβατική γίγνηται, δττερ ουκ εστίν έττινοήσαι εν
άντωνυμίαις τταρεττόμενον. "Ινα can be taken in a final sense, if one supply
"in order to avoid our being forced to accept that etc.". See Thierfelder 1935, 88
who rejects a causal use (claimed by Schneider) coni. 258,21f. (I think ϊνα
simply means "where" there).
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results are meagre indeed. I have found only one text where I can neither think
of any objection to a causal Interpretation, nor of a better (or even an
acceptable) alternative. Two other texts I put forward in the knowledge that
they can neither of them be considered decisive. However, they merit
consideration. The last text quoted in the previous section is not included in
these examples, because the nuance "provided that" (for which, however, I know
no satisfactory parallel) cannot be excluded. I Start with my tramp ace:
Anth.Pal. IX 169 a poor schoolmaster laments his fate:
Μήνις Άχιλλήος καΐ έμοί ττρόφασις γεγένηται
ούλομένης ττενίης γραμματικειισαμένω.
εϊθε δε συν Δαναοί? με κατέκτανε μήνις εκείνη,
ττρίν χαλεττός λιμός γραμματικής όλέσει.
αλλ' ϊν' άφαρττάξτ] Βρισηίδα ττρίν Αγαμέμνων
την ' Ελένην δ' ο Πάρις, -πτωχός εγώ 'γενόμην.^
Apart from the excellent sense the following arguments for a causal
Interpretation can be adduced here:
There is a chain of causation which runs from the rape of Heien and that
of Brise'is via the μήνις of Achilles to the poverty of the grammarian. The
first two distichs call attention to the link between μήνις and poverty, the last
between the raped ladies and poverty - it does not make sense to take ϊνα äs
final in this connection. Moreover, I think ττρίν (vs. 5) would put an unpleasant
and unnecessary emphasis on the Inversion of cause and effect in the case of a
final Interpretation of ϊνα, whereas in a causal Interpretation ττρίν has the
function of stressing the anteriority of άφαρττάξη to 'γενόμην.
There are two elements in this little epigram which point in the direction
of a possible Alexandrian colloquialism. The first is its writer: The epigram is
attributed to Palladas of Alexandria (s. IV p.Chr.). The second point is that it
would not be the only vulgarism in this poem: Notice the use of ττρίν + ind. tut.
(line 4), which is unclassical.56
55
 "The wrath of Achilles was the cause of pernicious poverty to me too,
since I adopted the profession of a grammarian. Would that the "wrath" had
killed me with the Greeks, before the bitter hunger of grammar had put an end
to me. But all to let Agamemnon run away with Briseis, and Paris with Heien, I
have become poor" (transl. Paton). Notice that Paton does not translate ττρίν.
for the last couplet I would suggest: "But all because in former times Agamemnon
raped Briseis and Paris Heien, I have become a beggar." See for the theme of
this epigram Sluiter 1988b, 59ff.
56
 Reading όλέση does not help: in that case the construction is incorrect
because the main clause lacks a negative. The combination εϊθε δε is
unclassical. It is not attested before the fourth Century p.Chr. I found 27
instances in the TLG material. Two parallels stem from the Anthologia Palatino
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My second example stems from the sermon in qua Potestate by Severianus
of Gabala (s. IV p.Chr.).57 This example has the definite drawback of textual
uncertainties and I will not insist on its value:
Μωϋσής ό τοσούτος καΐ τηλικοϋτος άνήρ ..., ω διηρέθη θάλασσα, ...
ούτος, *ιν'* εν τι των ΰττό Θεοΰ κελευσθέντων τόλμησα? (τολμήση (Μ))
άνθρωπίνω λογισμω μετρησαι, καΐ μη τη θείοι δυνάμει τταραχωρησαι,
άτταραίτητον ύττέσχε την δίκην. ως γαρ έφθασεν έττΐ την ττέτραν, λέγει
•προς τον λαόν "ώ λαός σκληρός και άττειθής, μη εκ της πέτρας
ταύτης δυνήσομαι ύμίν δοϋναι ύδωρ;" καΐ τι ττρός αυτόν ό Θεός;
"άνθ' ων ουκ έδόξασάς με ένώττιου της συναγωγής, ουκ ε'ισελεΰσει
» \ " »' n^8
εις την γην ην ωμοσα. Jö
The Migne text reads ϊνα and τολμήσας which cannot be constraed. The
problem is that the corruption of τολμήση into τολμήσας is unexplicable
(unless from an Optative τολμήσαι which is virtually unthinkable in a text of
this quality and period).59 If ϊνα could stand, however, it surely would have to
be causal: Not only is it highly unlikely that Severianus can be credited with
complicated teleological innuendoes, but furthermore the text itself contains a
clear sign that it is a causal relationship which is envisaged between Moses'
arrogance and divine retribution, viz. άνθ' ων.60
The third example is better, if late. It features in the Quaestiones by
Anastasius Sinaita (s. VII p.Chr.) (PGM 89,800). The question in which it occurs,
is why there are four, only four and no more than four Gospels. In his reply
Anastasius exclaims: μάταιοι ττάντες καΐ αμαθείς, ττροσέτι δε και
τολμηροί, ο'ι άθετοϋντες την Ίδέαν του Ευαγγελίου, και είτε ττλείονα
ε'ίτε έλάττονα των είρημένων τταρεισφέροντες Ευαγγελίων ττρόσωττα· οι
itself; one even from Palladas: Anth.Pal. IX 167,2; cf. XVI 352,2. It is found six
times in the Alexandrian Athanasius, which brings the total -of certain
Alexandrian instances up to 8.
57
 The text is in PGM 56,419 (cf. CPG 4193); I use the text äs constituted
by drs. Peter Stehouwer (unedited).
58
 "Moses, that great and honourable man ... for whom the sea parted ... he
inescapably underwent his punishment because he had ventured to measure one of
God's commandments with human reason. For when he came at the rock he said
to the people: 'Hard and disobedient people, shall I be able to give you water
from this rock?' And what did God say to him? 'Because you have not glorified
me in front of the assembly, you shall not enter the land that I promised.'" Cf.
Num. 20:2-13.
59
 Alternatively, the final H may have been misread for a Σ.
60
 Cf. SD II 661.
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μεν 'ίνα, ττλείονα δόξωσι της αληθείας έξευρηκέναι, οι δε τάς
οικονομίας Θεοί άθετήσωσιν (sic).^
There are several intriguing aspects to this passage. First of all, we are
again dealing with an Alexandrian, although several centuries have passed
between Anastasius and Palladas, let alone Apollonius. Secondly, at the end of
the seventh Century and during the eighth Century A.D., colloquialisms found
their way more and more into written language - if we look at the last sentence
of the quotation, for instance, we remark the absence of a second 'ίνα. These
facts would again point in the direction of a possible Alexandrian colloquialism.
Another interesting point is the construction itself: The sequence μάταιοι
... οι άθετοϋντες ... Ινα is remarkably similar to the Biblical μακάριοι οι
ττλίινοντες ... ϊυα (see above section 3.1.1. and note 46). Anastasius may have
thought that he had actually adopted a Biblical idiom. In bis adapted Version,
however, the original ambiguity of the ϊνα sentence, which could either be
taken in a causal sense explaining μακάριοι, or in a final sense with the
participle, was completely lost. For Anastasius breaks up the construction by
adding a distributive apposition οι μεν, öl δε, leaving in principle only a
causal Interpretation of ϊνα. However, one may also connect this apposition not
with μάταιοι κτλ., but with the participle τταρεισφέροντες. In that case, the most
obvious Interpretation is that of "fated finality" and the text loses its value for
my argument.62 On the other hand, even if the Biblical parallels are disparaged,
the position of 'ίνα teils against this solution. Therefore, the passage Stands, if
not äs firmly äs might have been hoped for.
Other examples I have not found. There are, however, a number of places
where a causal Interpretation would be perfectly in order, but which can equally
well be final. Such passages may have helped at least to make the theoretical
concept of ϊνα αιτιολογικός less disturbing. As an example I quote a very
prosaic remark from thepsalm-epimerisms by Choeroboscus (20,10ff.):
Διατί ττάντων των του λόγου μερών έσχατος τίθεται ό σύνδεσμος; ϊνα
συνδήση καί συνδεσμήση πάντα τα ττρό αύτοΰ λεχθέντα μέρη του
61
 "Foolish and stupid and, moreover, reckless are they who disparagingly
reject the (present) form of the Gospel and who introduce either more or less
forms than the Gospels we know. The former group [are foolish etc.] because
they expect to have found more than the truth, the latter because they set at
naught the plans of God."
62
 See section 5. The difference between a sentence expressing "fated
finality" and a purely cpnsecutive one is that the latter has the syntactical
function of adjunct, while sentences expressing "fated finality" share in the
characteristics of a disjunct: someone exterior to the action observes that one
Situation has resulted from another one - the exact causal nexus is immaterial.
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λόγου.
63
 Cf. SchDTh. 521,36f. ö δε σύνδεσμος τελευταίαν επέχει τάξιν,
έττειδή ττέφυκε συνδειν τα τφοϋττοκείμενα μέρη τον λόγου.64
Before looking briefly at the possible semantic development of ϊνα which
led to a causal Interpretation, I would like to draw attention to the fact that
the sparse rules Apollonius gave for the use of causal ίνα do no apply in all
the passages we found. Apollonius prefers a past tense apodosis and asks for an
(aorist) subjunctive in the protasis, although causal conjunctions in general
should preferably be construed with a past tense protasis äs well. The texts from
Palladas and perhaps Severianus tally with this prescription. The biblical example
which was paraphrased by Andreas of Caesarea contains Ινα + future
indicative65 and has no finite verb in its apodosis. Libanius' text has a
combination of ϊνα + past indicative in the protasis and an imperfect in the
apodosis. The latter Situation obtains in Anastasius, too, who has a combination
of ϊνα + aorist subjunctive in the protasis.
3.1.3. Semantic development
The last issue I want to discuss is the possible semantic development of
ϊνα, which supported a causal Interpretation. I can do no more here than give
some suggestions äs to how such a development may have come about.
In the first place there is the virtually indiscriminate use of Ιναύ, δια
τ'ι and τίνος ένεκα66 (in later Greek) to ask for a cause or a reason.
Originally Ινατί (or ϊνα τί) asks for the goal, äs e.g. PL Smp. 205a,67 but
later this is no longer necessarily the case, cf. e.g. Act.apost. 4:25 ϊνα τί
έφρύαξαν έθνη και λαοί έμελέτησαν κενά;6^ In this context one could
63 "Why is the conjunction put last of all the parts of Speech? Because (or:
in order that) it binds together and links up all parts of speech that were
enumerated before it."
64
 "The conjunction occupies the last position because of its very nature it
binds together the foregoing parts of speech."
65
 Which came to be used instead of the aorist subjunctive in later Greek,
cf. my remark on the epigram by Palladas.
66
 Cf. Et. M. 471,16; Zonaras 1110 Ίναή διατί ή ένεκα τίνος. More
testimonies are to be found in the Christian writers: Diodorus of Tarsus (CCSG
6,12,llf.): ϊνατί ...; Αντί του τις ή αιτία η ττοίαν εσχον άφορμήν του
τοσούτου μίσους; (cf. further ibid. 24,91 (Ινατί paraphrased by τίνος ένεκεν).
67
 Cf. KG II520.
68 "Why did the Gentiles rage and the people lay their plots in vain?" Cf.
SchDTh. 585,19. Cf. Arist. Fax 409 ϊνα δη τί τοΰτο δρατον; - ότιή ...
(causal Interpretation effected a posterioi by ότιή) and Arist. Nub. 1192 ϊνα
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imagine that, just äs the question ίνατί αναγιγνώσκεις; can trigger the answer
ϊνα τιμηθώ, so the question ίνατί έτιμήθης; came to be answered by
another 'Cva clause: 'Cva άναγνώ. Interestingly, in the Et. M. 471,16ff. and in
the psalm-epimerisms 66,17ff. it is remarked that when 'Cva is combined with u,
it is no longer followed by a subjunctive, but by a past tense indicative mood.
This reminds one of the construction of causal conjunctions with past tenses,
because causes explain things past. There can hardly be another reason for the
insistence on a past tense. The change of subjunctive to indicative corresponds,
of course, to a change in sentence type.
Secondly, apart from the "why" questions, there is the fact that in later
Greek 'Cva clauses could virtually indiscriminately be substituted for infinitive
constructions.69 This holds not only for infinitives with the function
complement,70 but also for final substantivized infinitives of the type το μη ( +
inf.), του μη (+ inf.) (= ϊνα μη); είς το (+ inf.) (= Ινα).71 One wonders if
causal ϊνα might be connected with the frequent causal infinitive construction
δια το (inf.) and ένεκα του (inf.). This would explain the syntactical side of
the development.
Thirdly, there is the possibility mentioned by Thierfelder.72 He takes ϊνα
λοιδορήσω έττεττλήχθην äs an ironical final sentence, comparing Flaut. Bacch.
812 propterea hoc facio (sc. te vincio), ut suadeas gnato meo, ut pergraecetur
tecum, tervenefice.73 One can imagine that such ironical final sentences,
δη TL ...; - ϊν' ... (final). The combination of ϊνα and u is several times
called an έτάρρημα ερωτήσεως, e.g.ps.epim. 66,15f.;Et. M. 471,6ff.
69
 Cf. Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf §§ 388-94.
70
 E.g. Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 392f.
71
 Cf. Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 399f.; 402; see ApD. synt. 382,7.
72
 1935, 88 n. 1. Thierfelder's first Suggestion is a little problematic. He
explains ϊνα άναγνώ έτιμήθην äs "I was praised in order that I would read
just äs well in the future". Cf. KG II 381 for examples of a protasis with a
subjunctive and an apodosis with a past tense. The causal use is a matter of
Interpretation anyhow; this is, of course, perfectly viable. However none of the
examples quoted in KG mean "in order that I may even now...", for which one
would rather expect a present subjunctive in our example anyway. In all cases
the envisaged end of the action lies in the present or future exclusively, without
a trace of a similar Situation having obtained in the past.
73
 "This is what I do this (sc. binding you) for, to make you persuade my
relative to play the Greek (i.e. revel) with you, you triple-dyed scoundrel." For
ironical final sentences, cf. also Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II 837, e.g. luv.
5,120f. structorem interea, nequa indignatip desit, saltantem spectes.
For the development of a causal meaning from combinations like propterea ... ut,
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expressing at the same time a motivation and a prohibition, are especially at
home in colloquial usage. However, even of the few examples of causal ϊνα that
we have, only a small part can be explained from this point of view.
The fourth relevant construction is that of ϊνα after verbs which express
emotion:74 Moulton-Turner75 call attention to the ambiguous Status of quod-
sentences after verbs like doleo and gaudeo. Such sentences can express either a
complement or a causal (subordinate) clause with the function of an adjunct, to
put it in modern terms.76 To their examples may be added the Passio Perpetuae
et Felicitatis XII: τω Θεώ χάρις, ϊνα, ως εν σαρκΐ μετά χαράς
έγενόμην, ττλειόνα χαρώ νυν.77 Another example comes from pseudo-
Chrysostomus, from a sermodnatio of Jesus to Judas: και Ινα. μικρόν
cf. Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II 647: ideo ut, Cassiod. vor. 2,32,3; propterea ut,
Itala Matt/z. 13:13.
Irony is also one of the factors at the basis of the development of consecutive
'ίνα, cf. Hom. B 357ff. ει δε τις έκττάγλως έθέλει οικόνδε νέεσθαι/
άτττέσθω ης νηός έιισσέλμοιο μέλαινης,/δφρα ττρόσθ' άλλων θανάτου και
ττότμον έτάσττη, cf. KG II397 Anm. 3 where this is not recognized.
74
 Here ϊνα is equivalent to δτι. Note also ϊνα after verba voluntatis and
iubendi (cf. above on the infinitive constructions). Cf. Moulton-Turner III 138;
Beda (GL VII 293,25f.) calls ut "causalis" in Joh. 17:24: volo ut ubi ego sum et
ipsisint mecum (i.e. in an object clause).
75
 Cf. Moulton-Turner III 138. E.g. Joh. 8:56 Αβραάμ ό ττατήρ υμών
ήγαλλιάσατο ϊνα ϊδη την ήμέραν την έμήν, και ειδεν και έχάρη
("was glad that he should'...").
76
 Here, too, an infinitive construction would have been possible: χαίρω
τω + inf.; χαίρω δια το + inf. Withouth the article, cf. e.g. the construction
of αίσχύνεσθαι, KG II73.
77
 "Thank God, that/because, äs I was alive with joy, I am filled with even
more joy now."
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αλαβάστρον τοις ττοσΐ καταχεθη, γογγύζεις.
78
 Sentences like this may have
had an intermediary function in the development of "purely" causal ϊυα.79
4. Conclusion
In the preceding sections I collected some material which indicated that in
some contexts ancient writers interpreted ϊνα äs having a causal value.
Moreover, there were a number of possible attestations of a "causal" use of ϊνα
in a non-theoretical context. However, if one asks oneself if the occurrence of
the phenomenon of causal ϊνα in our grammatical sources is satisfactorily
explained by real linguistic usage, some doubts are left. I therefore prefer to
combine the two explanations I proposed earlier.
The origin of causal 'ίνα. seems to have been a terminological confusion
which started from the distinction of the final conjunctions äs a separate
category of σύνδεσμοι. Since this group was not generally adopted, the tradition
was äs it were split in two. In one line, the αΙτιολογικοί, kept including the
final conjunctions, in the other the term αΐτι,ολογικοί was reserved for the
strictly causal ones. Those who called ϊνα "άττοτελεσματι,κός", tried to cope
with the fact that their sources seemed to know a ίνα αΙτιολογικός, in that
they constructed examples of causal 'ίνα.. In so doing, they were supported by
the fact that ϊνα could indeed not always be considered strictly final
(consecutive and epegetic uses, the expression Ινατί, the influence of Latin,
colloquial usage).
The probability of this development is increased by the fact that causal
78
 "You grumble that/because a tiny flask was poured out over my feet"
(CPG 4984 λόγος εις τον φαρισαΐον και εις την ττόρνην). The text
continues μη ούν ττροΐκα αυτό ελαβον, ϊνα "/ογγύζτις; (cf. my remarks in
note 45). I used the collation by dr. K.H. Uthemann. Drs. H. Tevel in the middle
of his work on his own thesis kindly called my attentipn to this passage. Maybe
there is also some influence from the development in the use of öu: In the
contexts where öu was used to introduce direct speech, it came to be replaced
by ϊνα in late Greek (but this replacement was not fully effected until the
Byzantine period), a development which was to lead to the modern Greek να.
Could a parallel and analogical shift of the causal use of öu to ϊνα have taken
place?
79
 By way of appendix I add that in itself a development from local or
temporal adverb to causal one has many parallels (ΟΤΓΟΌ, όττότε etc.). In the
case of ϊνα, however, there is always the problem of the subjunctive. I can
think of no better explanation than Apollonius' here, viz. the invocation of an
analogy with the common final conjunction.
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'ίνα does not appear in grammatical sources which do not explicitly distinguish a
category of final conjunctions.
5. Appendix: consecutive 'ίνα.; Christian writers äs a source for the study of
ancient grammar
The causal use of 'ίνα was not the only deviation from its most common
Interpretation that caught the attention of ancient linguists or commentators. In
this excursus I will look at some of the ancient remarks on the consecutive use
of this conjunction. This excursus serves mainly to make a methodological point,
which deserves more attention in future studies of ancient linguistics: My point
is that the ancient Christian writers in their commentaries on and explanations
of the Bible often have useful material to offer to the Student of ancient
grammatical theory. Their methods and exegetical and critical Instruments derive
directly from their pagan grammatical training. Moreover, an enormous amount of
their writings is preserved, even if it is not very well disclosed. Nevertheless,
this material does fill some of the chronological gaps in the more strictly
grammatical material. Although several studies by patristici have recently been
dedicated to the importance and influence of pagan grammatical and rhetorical
training in the writings of several Christian writers,80 the reverse is hardly the
case: As far äs I know, no study exists of the material to be gleaned from the
Christian writers for the benefit of the study of the history of grammar.
The consecutive use of 'ίνα may serve äs an example. Especially in later
Greek, 'ίνα. took on other shades of meaning than the final one only. Partly
under the influence of Latin ut, its use varied, but merged mainly into the
consecutive. The intermediate Step was probably the Interpretation of "fated
finality". The consecutive use of 'ίνα is also discussed in our modern
grammars.81 The examples quoted there, some äs early äs Homer, are not all
equally convincing. In several cases, especially where the Homeric instances are
concerned, a final Interpretation can be well defended, if one takes into account
80
 Schäublin 1974; Neuschäfer 1987.
81
 E.g. KG II 379 Anm. 3; more examples may be found in Moulton-Turner
III 102; Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 391; Jannaris § 1951; in cases like Epict. II
2,16 ούτω μωρός ήν>, 'ίνα μη ϊδη; Clem.Rom. Hom. PGM 2,97 ου γαρ
έσμεν όντως νήτη,οι/, 'ίνα ..., the use of ουτω(ς) helps to steer us in the
direction of a consecutive Interpretation. Apollonius Dyscolus himself also often
uses 'ίνα like this, cf. Schneider, Tractatus 158.
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who is speaking to whom: irony cannot always be excluded.82 However, what
interests me here, is the fact that at least one of the examples put forward by
KG, is also mentioned by Eustathius. For this means that the question of right
or wrong has to be postponed: what matters is the fact that a consecutive use
was recognized in Antiquity also.
Eustathius makes the following remarks, triggered by X 326ff. (4,624,17ff.
vdV.):83 "Οτι ττολλάκις ό ττοιητής τα εκ τύχης ως εξ αιτίας τινός
αποτελούμενα λέγει καΐ εκ ττρονοίας βουλευτικής, οίον "ήλθε δ' έττί
Νότος ώκα ... /δφρ' έτι την όλοήν αναμετρήσαιμι Χάρυβδιν" [μ 427f. =
KG I.e.]. τοιούτον κοινότερον και το "εττνευσεν άνεμος ϊνα ό οίκος
καταρριφη η άττόληται ή ναϋς". ομοιον κάνταϋθα (vs. 327) ... ίνα τι
λαλήση· το γαρ κατά τύχην γενόμενον αΐτιατικώς έξήνεγκεν κτλ.84 The
Scholia a.l. quote an anonymous (φασι) source for this opinion: το εκ τύχης
συμβεβηκός αίτιατικώς έξενήνοχεν.85
Between the source of the Scholia and Eustathius I have found only one
similar comment on a pagan text. The Scholiast on Find. Nem. I 7b explains the
phrase Ζηνός Αίτναίου χάριν äs a poetical expression: ό δε τρόττος
82
 KG's example from later Greelc (Plut. adv. Colot. 1115a) is probably
inferential. In this case, too, ϊνα can replace a δτι-sentence, cf. LSJ s.v. ÖTI
B2; cf. sentences introduced by άλλα γαρ... See also section 3.1.1. note 45. The
text runs: iroü γαρ ων της άοικήτου το βιβλ'ιον έγραφες, ϊνα ταϋτα
συυτιθεις τα εγκλήματα μη τοις εκείνων συντάγμασιν έντύχης ...;
("Where on earth were you that you ...") and even a final Interpretation could be
defended. In bis polemical reply to Colotes, Plutarch would then insinuate that
Colotes maliciously wrote in a wilderness, in order that he might not have to
take those books into account which contradicted bis proposition (viz. that Plato
was followed in a number of his doctrines by Aristotle, Xenocrates,
Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics).
83
 Tfj p' έττί öl μεμαώτ' ελασ' εγχει διος .Άχιλλεύς,/άντικρϋ δ'
άτταλοιο δι' αϋχένος ήλυθ' άκωκή./ούδ' αρ' άττ' άσφάραγον μελίη τάμε
χαλκοβάρεια./δφρά τι μιν ττροτιείττοι άμειβόιαενος έττέεσσιν. This is an
example of "fated finality", merging into the consecutive. In this case, there is a
possible, but not a necessary consequence, which becomes reality.
84
 "Remarkable because the poet often mentions what happens accidentally
äs if it were effected on account of some cause and with planning forethought,
äs 'and swiftly the South wind came, that I might traverse again the way to
baneful Charybdis (transl. Murray)'. A more everyday example of the same
phenomenon is 'the wind blew that (in order that/so that) the house feil down
or the ship was shipwrecked'. Here, too, we have a similar case: 'that it might
speak'. For he presented something which had happened accidentally in a 'causal'
cpnstruction." Note that both αιτία and αΐτιατικώς are used in the broad sense
discussed above: they include final causes.
85
 "He presented something which had happened accidentally in a 'causal'
construction." SchHom. X 328-9a1 and a2: εϊωθε δε τα εκ τύχης ως εξ
αιτίας λέγειν.
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ττοιητικός ώστε το άττό του αυτομάτου συμβαίνον ως αίτιον λαμβάνειν,
ου γαρ ένεκα του άσθήναι τον έττίνικον εν τη ττανηγύρει του
Αίτναίου Διός ένίκησεν, άλλα νικήσαντος εμελλεν ή εις αυτόν φδή
άσθήσεσθαι.
86
But this same phenomenon is noticed äs a characteristic of Biblical
linguistic usage by several Christian writers,87 in the footsteps of Origen.88
Origen (185-253) is followed by Diodorus of Tarsus (bishop from 378 to 394,
teacher of Theodorus and Johannes Chrysostomus),89 and he in his turn by his
pupil Theodorus of Mopsuestia, who also was a pupil of Libanius, and a bishop
from 392 until 428. His extensive note on PS. 50:6 b may function äs a locus
dassicus. It is quoted and translated completely in Schäublin 1974, 152f. with
note 289. I mention only the beginning of the note, since that contains all we
need right now: το δττως κατά Ιδίωμα λέγει το γραφικόν ουκ έττί
αίτιας, το δε άναγκαίως έκβάν ως αίτίαν τεθεικώς· τίθησι γαρ αεί
το αίτιατόν αντί του αιτίου όταν εξ ανάγκης έττόμενον ή τω
αίτίω.
90
 It is funny to notice that the Christian concept of consecutive ϊνα
86
 "The manner of speech is poetic, so that it presents that which happens
accidentally, äs a cause. For he did not gain his victory in order that the
victory song might be sung at the festival of Zeus of the Aetna, but when he
had gained his victory the öde addressed to him would be sung." The Scholiast
explains that Hieron and his people are used to sing the victory ödes during the
games and the festival of Zeus of the Aetna. Didymus is quoted äs an authority
for the likelihood that this particular victory öde was indeed composed for this
end also. The scholium then continues with our quotation.
87
 The main difference is the fact that in Homer the effect was not aimed
at, but εκ τύχης, while in the Bible consequences are concerned which follow
εξ ανάγκης.
88
 In commenting on PS. 50:6 c-d ("Οττως αν δικαιωθής εν τοις
λόγοις σου και νικήσης εν τω κρίνεσθαί σε (cf. Rom. 3:4)) he writes:
ουκ α'ιτιατικόν εστί τοϋτο το δττως· ου γαρ δια τοϋτο ήμάρτανον δττως
αν δικαιωθτι ό Θεός εν τοις λόγοις αϋτοϋ. έδικαιοϋτο δε ό Θεός
ε'ικότως αφ' ων εκείνοι ευεργετούμενοι ήγνωμόνοιιν.
89
 CCSG 6, 314,90ff. (on the same psalm-text): Έττισημαυτέον δε και
τφ Ίδιώματι της γραφής δτι είττεν ""Οττως όϊν κτλ."· ουδέ γαρ δια
τοϋτο ό λαός ήμαρτε τω Θεώ ϊνα ο Θεός εν τω κρίνεσθαί δίκαιος
άναφανή, αλλ' έττειδή ήγνωμόνησεν ό λαός, άναγκαίως άγνωμονηθείς
δίκαια εΐχεν έγκαλείν ττρός τους άγνωμονοϋντας. Το ούν δττως ου
κείται ενταύθα έττί αιτίας
 ; ει και έιιφαίνει τούτο ζ αλλ' αυτήν την
άκολουθίαν εξηγείται ότι του λαού άμαρτήσαντος, ό Θεός δίκαιος
άναφανεΐται κρινόμενος ττρός αυτούς.
90
 "He uses δττως in accordance with the usage of the Scripture, not to
denote 'cause' [including final cause, I.S.] but in a 'causaP representation of a
necessary event. For he always gives that which is caused instead of the cause
whenever it follows its cause of necessity." There are several parallels from the
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finally finds it way into the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax also.91 In this way the
circle has been closed.
work of Theodorus, mentioned by Schäublin 1974, 154 n. 294.
91
 SchDTh. 585,17ff. in apparatu critico. The relevant addition is the word
άττοβοίτικώς to design this usage. A paraphrasis by means of the expected ώστε
is found in Joh. Chrysostomus, PGM 60,478; moreover, he uses εκβασις instead
of airoßoms.
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Chapter IV - THE INTERJECTION
0. Introduction
We have approached the study of ancient linguistics from three different
angles in the preceding chapters. I shall now add a fourth and concentrate my
research on one of the indeclinable parts of speech. Moreover, whereas in the
first three chapters the emphasis was on the Greek sources, in this case the
Roman grammarians will be the centre of attention. For there is one point in the
theory of the indeclinable parts of speech on which the Romans claim to have
made a substantial correction to their Greek predecessors: They separated the
interjections from the adverbs and put them into a part of speech of their own.
Interjections, it is true, may seem to be somewhat of a marginal issue, but
nevertheless I feel justified in discussing them rather extensively. There are
various reasons for this. In the first place, the theories of the ancient
grammarians on at least one of the indeclinable parts of speech will be discussed
in extenso and fairly systematically. This should help us to acquire a clear image
of the working of ancient grammar. Secondly, it will be seen that the theory of
the interjections touches upon various essential problems of ancient linguistics,
that of the origin of language among them. I shall take the opportunity to
discuss such topics äs they cross the path of my investigation. Moreover, there
are again a number of minor problems of Interpretation in the grammarians'
texts. These will also be paid attention to.
I will Start my inquiry with the relationship between grammar and rhetoric.
The first remarks made in a Latin source about the kind of words that were
later to be classified äs interjections, are found in a rhetorical/philological
context. It will appear that the grammarians allowed rhetorical theory to
influence their discussions. In coping with the terminological discrepancies
between rhetoric and their own discipline (section 1.), they used rhetorical
concepts to extend their notion of what an interjection was. They combined the
grammatical (and philosophical) idea that interjections serve to express an
emotion, with the rhetorical (and philological) conception of "interjection" äs any
kind of addition to a sentence which Interrupts the line of thought. This brought
them to the insight that other parts of speech could also fill the (rhetorical)
function of an interjection. In this case rhetoric made it easier for them to see
how such a change of function worked. The phenomenon itself of parts of speech
fulfilling the function of another part of speech and thus, according to the
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ancient grammarians, becoming such a part of speech, was well-enough known
(cf. chapter II) (section 2.1.)·
Another sign of influence from the discipline of rhetoric is the attention
devoted to the use of interjections in the creation of an impression of ήθος, in
the sense of "character portrayal". Among other linguistic means, interjections
are regarded by the grammarians äs clues to the speaker's age, sex, and social
Status. This sounds like an anticipation of some of the basic ideas of modern
socio-linguistics (section 2.2.).
The most intriguing aspect of the Roman theory of the interjection is their
defence of their "revolutionary" approach to these particles, and their reaction
to the inherent tension in rationalizing äs a straightforward part of speech a
group of words which of its very nature has something irregulär and irrational
about it (section 3.). Although they do not manage to hide the intrinsic problems
altogether, it will be argued that they at least went to some trouble to
circumvent obvious self-contradictions. This is especially clear from their
terminology. I will uphold that they described interjections äs being voce
incondita, avoiding on the whole the word confusa, in order to maintain a
certain consistency between their chapters de interiectionibus and de voce
respectively.
Further, they stressed any regularity that came to the fore, especially in
the semantics of the interjection, generally declared to be that particle's only
accidens. From a formal point of view, however, they saw that they must despair
of regularity, and they therefore promoted the impossibility of legislation itself
to the general rule. The only exceptions to the rule of irregularity were those
interjections which had a formal, phonological resemblance to a more "organized"
part of speech, in which case analogy immediately claimed its due (section 3.2.).
The difficulties of integrating the interjections into a theory of the parts
of speech, are also manifest if one looks at the connection of the interjections
with ancient theories on the origin of language. The grammarians seem to have
treated this relationship with studied indifference, äs it would have exposed once
again the inherent weakness of their theory: How can the interjection be a
full-blown, rational part of speech, if it is a relic of primitive, inarticulate
language? (section 3.3.)
The problem of how to distinguish interjections from the homonymous
adverbs was also solved ingeniously and consistently, but hardly convincingly.
Three criteria were applied, which derived from the interjections' phonological
nature, their meaning and their construction (section 4.).
After a brief description of the problems faced mainly by the church
fathers in translating interjections (section 5.) I will turn to possible Greek
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parallels with the Roman theory. In order to establish them, I must first isolate
the relevant material - for since the Greeks did not recognize the interjection äs
a separate part of speech, it is not immediately clear where to find their
theories, if any, about them. This investigation will show that almost every
opinion the Romans held about the interjections can be paralleled from our
Greek sources. But since Greek priority in this respect cannot be proved, I will
have to leave it at that (section 6.).
l. Grammar and rhetoric
Our earliest witness for the use of interiectio in a linguistic context is
Varro. The fragment in which it occurs,1 clearly has a philological/rhetorical
drift: 'egone illam? quae illum? quae me? quae non? sine modo,/mori me malim;
sendet qui vir siem' [Ter. Eun. 65]. Praecise: ... generat animi passionem. Quod
novi generis cum non sit interiectio sed ademptio, tarnen interiecti animi causa
vocitamus?
Admittedly, this text is not altogether clear. What is clear, however, is that
the extreme conciseness (praecise) caused by the self-interruptions in which
words are left out (ademptio), produces the same effect äs the use of an
interiectio would have done, viz. the Impression of animi passio? Several
1
 Jul. Romanus (Char.) 315,7 = Funaioli fr. 40, p. 203 = fr. 60 G.-S. This
text should be connected with Char. 311,14ff. Cf. M. De Nonno, la grammatica
a&\\' Anonymus Bobiensis, Roma 1982, 74 n. 60.
2
 "Abraptly: this procures the effect of emotionality of the soul. Although
this is not an interjection of an unusual type, but rather an omission, we
nevertheless exclaim it on account of the soul being 'interjected'."
3
 Cf. Donatus' remarks on Ter. Eun. 65 (1): familiaris ελλει,ψΐΛ
irascentibus; nam singula sie explentur: 'egone illam' non ulciscar, 'quae illum'
recepit, 'quae me' exclusit, 'quae non' admisit. etenim <nec> necesse habet nee
potest complere orationem, qui et secum loquitur et dolore vexatur.
(2) nam amat άττοσιωττήσεις nimia indignatio, ut Vergilius [A. I 135] 'quos ego
... !' etc.; Don. in Ter. Eun. 1050: quae narravit: nimius affectus in utramque
partem defectus orationis amat; cf. Quint. 9,2,54 Άττοσιώττησι? (= interruptio;
reticentia) ... ostend.it affectus ...; 9,2,57 Est alia non quidem reticentia, quae sit
imperfecti sermonis, sed tarnen praecisa velut ante legitimum finem oratio ...
Macr. 4,6,17 ex.dama.tio, quae apud Graecos έκφώυησις dicitur, movet pathos;
4,6,20 contrana huic figurae άίΓΟοαώττηοας, quod est tacitumitas. nam ut illic
aliqua exclamando dicimus, ita hie aliqua tacendo subducimus, quae tarnen
intellegere possit auditor. hoc autem praecipue irascentibus convenit. The Greek
term έκφώνησις has the same double reference: it may denote a "real"
interjection, äs well äs a rhetprical construction, see below. E.g. Jul. Romanus
(Char.) 313,1-3: 'vita deum immortalium', Cato Senex, ubi Statilius Maximus
'έκφώυησι?', inquit, 'αρχαϊκή, ως ώ TTOTTOL,' and the Sch.Bob. on Cicero pro
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emendations of this passage have been proposed; I give the one put forward in
the TLL: Praedse: ... generat animi passionem; quod novi generis cum non sit
intenectio, sed ademptio, tarnen interiecti <motus> animi causa <interiectionem>
vocitamus.4
The text of the Roman grammarian Romanus (Charisius) - from which the
Varro-fragment was taken - continues with various other examples of sentences
of an emotional nature, all of which lack a "real" interjection, i.e. a word
belonging to the homonymous part of speech (licet nulla sit interiecta particula,
Char. 315,14); they consist of the "normal" parts of speech.
Varro does not use the word intenectio in a grammatical sense to indicate
the interjection äs a part of speech, although he does describe words which the
later grammatical tradition was to call interjections: LL VII 93 we read: 'Euax'
verbum nihtt significat, sed effutitum naturaliter est.5 As further examples of
this kind of words Varro mentions hahae, eu and heu.
If we look at the use of the word intenectio in rhetoric, we find that it
mostly refers rather neutrally to a parenthetic word or word-group without any
additional Information on the emotionality conveyed by such a word or word-
group. In other words intenectio can serve the same purpose äs the words δια
μέσου (cf. chapter II section 1.4.4.). This makes it likely that the concept was
also used in a philological context (text-interpretation),6 and refers with its
counterpart ΐητερβατόυ to the logical order of a sentence. The rhetorical use is
documented in Quintilian, who also knows of a separate grammatical meaning
(1,4,19; 1,5,50). Rhetorically speaking we are according to bim dealing with
intenectio "... cum continuationi sermonis medius aliqui sensus intervenit"1
Flacco 39 o pastores nescio quos cupidos litterarum: Έκφώνησις.
4
 "Abraptly: this procures the effect of emotionality of the soul, Although
this is not an interjection of an unusual type, but rather an omission, we
nevertheless call it an interjection because of the soul's emotions being thrown
in." Cf. Diom. I 419,19 fere quidquid motus animi orationi inseruerit ..., numero
interiectionis accedet; Pomp. V 281,16ff. nam intenectio est res quae expnmit
animi motum. quidquid potest animi motum exprimere, sive in una re fuerit sive
in multis, intenectio dicenda est. (Here, too, the rhetorical use of intenectio is
alluded to). Praecisio: Cf. auct. ad Her. 4,30,41: praecisio est cum dictis quibus
reliqum quod coeptum est dici relinquitur incohatum.
Generat: This metaphorical use of generare would be the first occurrence of its
kind; it is not unusual after Augustus.
5
 "'Hurray' is a word that in itself means nothing, but is a natural
(spontaneous) ejaculation." For naturaliter, cf. Pellicer 1966, 329.
6
 In such cases äs this the philological and rhetorical contexts are
especially close; they relate to one another äs description to prescription.
7
 "... when some meaningful element Interrupts the course of speech."
(9,3,23; cf. 8,2,15).8 This figura verborum is also called τταρέυθεσις9 or
τταρέμιττωσις,^ and in Latin interpositio or interclusio (ibid.). As I said, no
mention is made in this context of any emotional effect being produced by such
parentheses.
In this respect there seems to be a closer relationship between the
rhetorical term exclamatio and the grammatical interjection than between the
latter and its rhetorical counterpart. Exclamatio is described by Cicero äs one of
the means of achieving omatus, and he pays explicit attention to its emotional
character (Or. 135 ... aut si est aliqua exclamatio vel admirationis vel
questionis).^1 So does Quintilian (9,2,26f.) when he lists exclamatio äs one of the
ways in which emotionality may be increased. He refers to short sentences
expressing feelings like anger, joy, fear, admiration, pain, Indignation, longing
etc. Although in rhetoric exclamatio is by far the more frequent term for such
sentences, Quintilian once calls his example an interiectio (9,3,29) (the same
example that was adduced 9,2,26, viz. Cic. Phil. 2,64, recurs here). The rhetorical
meaning of interiectio is, therefore, twofold: It may either refer to an
emotionally neutral parenthesis or to an emotional exclamation. Quintilian
distinguishes between true exclamations and artificial ones, only the latter being
Schemata (9,2,27).12 One may compare Varro's effutitum naturaliter äs cited
above: interjections/exclamations belong to the field of natura, not that of ars.
Incidentally, Quintilian nowhere explicitly classifies "real" interjections äs true
exclamations. As we shall see, the elements of "emotional appeal" and
"naturalness" recur in the more strictly grammatical tradition.
According to Quintilian (1,4,20), the term asseveratio was applied by some
to words like eheu. It is unclear in what respect, if any, the asseveratio differed
8
 In a more philological context, Quint. 11,3,37 (on Verg. A. Iff.):
interiectio est fato profugus et continuum sermonem, qui faciebat Italiam
Lavinaque. dividit. Cf. section 6.3. note 243.
9
 Cf. comm. Einsidl. VIII 218,lff.
10
 Cf. ORAmm. 2,2; 2,15.
11
 "... or if there is any exclamation of admiration or complaint". Cf. auct.
ad Her. 4,22 Exclamatio est, quae conficit significationem doloris aut
indignationis alicuius per hominis aut urbis aut loci aut rei cuiuspiam compellationem.
12
 Since they belong to the department of affectus, they are Schemata, i.e.
figurae sententiarum, rather than figurae orationis: 9,3,97 est ... posita inter
figuras verborum exclamatio quam sententiae potius puto (adfectus enim est). Cf.
Quint. 11,3,61.
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from the interiectio,13 Quintilian is our only witness for its use in a grammatical
context äs the name of a part of speech, and he rejects it.
2. Between grammar and rhetoric
2.1. Otherparts of speech and word-groups functioning äs interjections
Grammarians cannot be expected to give a rhetorical discussion of the
interjection, and indeed they do not. They do, however, have to cope with the
fact that if one looks at the whole of linguistic terminology,14 the word
"interiectio" was not confined to the part of speech, äs appears from the
preceding section. Thus, they usually remark that other parts of speech may
also be used äs interjections (pro interiectione), either by themselves or äs a
word-group: Don. IV 391,30f. licet autem pro interiectione etiam alias partes
orationis singulas pluresve subponere, ut 'nefas', 'pro nefas'.15 The difference
13
 Pinborg 1961, 134 n. 27 thinks asseveratio is the translation of
σχετλιασμός. I think it more likely that it translates (δια)βεβαίωσις, cf. DTh.
Techne 85,1; Corp.Gloss.Lat. (ed.Goetz) II 270,13 s.v. διαβεβαιουμαι (sie):
adsevero. This has the advantage of reducing the adseverationes to a well-
defined subgroup of the interjection, whereas the σχετλιαστικά constitute its
major category (cf. Jul. Romanus (Char.) 246,25f.). The example eheu has been
doubted. Colson (1916, 27) unconvincingly suggest euhoe (which is a θειασμοϋ
δηλωτικό v, DTh. Techne 86,1). Niedermann proposes eu which is never called
anything but an adverbium laudantis in our grammatical sources (I.W. Beck, de
differentiarum scriptoribus Latinis, Groningae 1883, 55 no.10). Non liquet.
14
 I.e. not only the strictly grammatical Jargon, but that of other
disciplines studying language, such äs rhetoric, too.
15
 "One may also substitute one or more other parts of speech for the
interjection, e.g. 'nefas', Oh horror', 'pro nefas' Oh horror'."
Cf. Diom. I 419,14ff. Examples: o mi, ellum, amabo, nefas, pro nefas, malum,
miserum, infandum; Char. 314,28ff. pro luppiter; Don. in Ter. Eun. 537 'amabo'
interiectio est amantis etsi verbum sonat; Serv. in Verg, A. I 251 infandum; A. IV
591 pro luppiter, A. VI 21 miserum; Sergius IV 562,22ff. (from Plautus and Virgil)
nefas, infandum, pro dolor, pro pudor (cf. Max. Vict. VI 204,23ff.); Clemens
Scotus 101,3 If. soli autem interiectioni non anteponitur praepositio nisi illis
dictionibus quae in [in] interiectionem transeunt, ut 'infandum', 'pro dolor' (my
corrections; the text ran: ... quae in in interiectionem transeunt, ut 'infandum'
pro 'dolor'.
Attention should also be called to Dosith. VII 424,12 licet autem pro interiectione
[το autem παρενθέσεως] etiam alias partes orationis singulas pluresve subponere
... Dositheus presents us with the same text äs Donatus but for the part included
between brackets. Indeed, these words may be a later addition, for Dositheus
does not use Greek paraphrases to clarify the meaning of bis Latin phraseology,
äs Priscian sometimes does. [The Greek translation which he gives of large parts
of his work does not have this function. It does in Priscian who works from a
Greek original ex confesso. By his translations Dositheus enables Greeks to use
his work äs a study-book for learning Latin. For Priscian, see e.g. III 14,19; III
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between these interjections, or - from a grammatical point of view - pseudo-
interjections, and the real ones consists in the fact that the former in
themselves are voces plenae or integrae, while the latter are not, see section
3.2.: Sergius IV 518,25ff. plerumque ... contingit ut et vox integra et quae aliam
partem orationis efficiat, interiectio sit pro sensu.16 Servius in Don. IV 420,19ff.:
et plenus frequenter sermo pro interiectione habetur, si affectum significet ...17
The function "interjection" is assigned to these words or word-groups on the
criteria of the presence of affectus and optionalitv.18
Sergius V 443,21ff. explicitly calls attention to the fact that these words
should not be called interiectiones tout court; according to him they are pro
interiectionibus: cum autem plenas voces adhibemus ad exprimendos animi
affectus, non tarn interiectiones dicuntur quam pro interiectionibus, ut [Verg. A.
IV 590].19
This possibility of using "ordinary" words and especially word-groups äs
interjections is clearly a rhetorical conception. Once it is accepted that a
formally perfectly normal word may function äs an interjection, "interjections"
gradually expand into whole sentences. The gradual transition from the
grammatical to the rhetorical concept of "interjection" is best shown by
Pompeius, who with his usual verbosity rises to the occasion (V 281,10ff.): plane
illud scire debes quod plerumque non solum integra pars orationis, sed elocutio
108,18 he gives the Greek original to clarify his Latin translation.] Nevertheless,
it is an illuminating remark, äs interiectio is clearly interpreted in its rhetorical
sense, viz. that of τταρέυθεσις. I do not think that the text of the glosse - if
that is what it is - can stand äs it is. The only emendation which has occurred
to me is 'id est αντί παρενθέσεως', the abbreviation pf 'id est' (i§ or :3&)
being mistaken for το. The possibility that το autem is to be taken äs "the
word 'aulem'" is of course untenable.
•^ "It regularly happens that a word which is pure and correct and which
constitutes an other part of Speech, is semantically an interjection."
17
 "Often a füll utterance, too, is considered to be an equivalent of an
interjection, if it indicates emotion."
Cf. Petrus grammaticus VIII 171,20ff. Hoc quaerendum est, si potest integra
elocutio interiectio dici, an non. Potest. Quomodo? Cum aliquid dolore cordis vel
laetitia vel admiratione vel metu referimus, etiamsi longo tractu finiatur, ipsa
elocutio interiectio dicenda est.
18
 See e.g. Diom. I 419,16ff. quoted below (section 4.2.). The necessary
presence of affectus increases the probability that there is rhetorical, rather
than "philological" influence here: Parts of the sentence that can be left out if
one wants to simplify the construction (δια μέσου), but which are not of an
emotional nature, are never called interiectio by the Roman grammarians.
19
 "However, when we use füll words to express the emotions of the soul,
they are not called 'interjections', but rather 'equivalents of interjections'." Cf.
Serv. IV 420,19ff. quoted above.
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omnis pro interiectione est.20 He proceeds by giving examples of growing
complexity: pro, nefas, pro nefas, pro nefas hoc contigisse, culminating in
(15ff.) 'pro luppiter optime nefas hoc contigisse', omnis ista elocutio pro una
interiectione est. nam interiectio est res2i quae exprimit animi motum. quidquid
potest animi motum expnmere, sive in una re fuerit, sive in multis, interiectio
dicenda est.22
2.2. Rhetorical functions of interjections
Interjections themselves (äs opposed to the term interiectio) can of course
have various rhetorical functions. One is that of winning time (Don. in Ter. Ad.
789 nota, quod ubi non invenit quid dignum loqueretur, ab interiectione coepit 'ei
mihi').23 Far more important, obviously, is that of heightening the pathos, since
the emotional value of interjections is their principal characteristic.24 Julius
Romanus (Char. 311,16ff.) calls attention to the fact that interjections may also
be used in a text which primarily represents a certain ήθος: (interiectiones)
quae quamvis πάθους στάσιν <habeant>25 nee ήθους, invenimus tarnen etiam
20
 "You should know clearly that not only a pure and correct part of
speech, but also a complete uttering may regularly be used äs an interjection."
21
 Res, "thing", is a vague word for "word", cf. V 263,29.
22
 "'By the good Jove, oh horror, that this should have happened', this
whple utterance functions äs one interjection. For an interjection is a 'thing
which expresses the soul being moved. Everything that can express the emotion
of the soul, either in one thing or in more, should be called an interjection."
23
 "N.B.: since he could not find anything suitable to say, he started with
the interjection 'ei mihi".
24
 Cf. ^ Apsin. ars rhet. I 406,9f. Spengel: πάθος ποιοϋσι καΐ οι
σχετλιασμοί, φευ καΐ οϊμοί' ττάθος ποιεί και τα ανακλητικά "θέαμα
δεινόν, ώ γη και θεοί".
25
 Habeant was suggested by Keil. I think the combination πάθους στάσιν
<habeant> is objectionable from a semantic point of view: Surely, an Opposition
is intended between the use pf interjections by authors who are known äs ethici,
and whose interest in stirring πάθος is at best mediocre, and the normal
function of interjections, viz. to convey ττάθος, or to increase the "pathetic"
contents of a text. (Cf. also Rhet. Gr. I 358,27f. Spengel; 406,9, see previous
note). But στάσιν höhere would normally mean:
a) ϊστασθαι (absol. use), έστάναι, (είναι), cf. Hebr. 9:8 τοϋτο δηλούντος του
πνεύματος του αγίου μήττω ττεφανερώσθαι την των αγίων όδόν έτι
της πρώτης σκηνής έχούσης στάσιν; Polyb. 5,5,3 (of the winds: "to have set
in ). We cannot use this here, äs the genitive would be awkward.
b) with gen. the principal meaning is: to make something stop. The only
combination which is at all frequent, viz. ανέμου στάσις may mean a dropping
cessation of the wind (1), the direction, state of the wind (the wind in a certain
direction) (2), and "seditio ventorum", a squall (3), cf. P.W. Walbank A Historical
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apud eos qui videntur ethici mediocriter pathos solere concz're.26 Th& function
of the interjections is still to demonstrate or even (rhetorically) to create
pathos, but this time the pathos is of such a moderate nature that the word
ήθος is a more apt designation for it. This is not the only place where
interjections are related to ήθος, nor is this the only way in which both
notions are connected. For ήθος can have other rhetorical connotations äs well,
and interjections can play a role in all of them. Therefore, I shall look a little
closer into the concept of ήθος, into the way interjections and other
indeclinable parts of speech produce the effect of ήθος, and into the
relationship with ττάθος.
Commentary on Polybius, ad I 48,2. The first possibility may be left out of
account. The second cannot be excluded completely (cf. the combinations of
Status with a defining genitive, e.g. Cic. Fin. 2,28 iste non dolendi Status, OLD
i.v. 6), although it leads us more or less to the contradictio in terminis that
interjections produce an effect of "steady ττάθος". This is not very likely, cf.
Longin, ττ. ϋψ. 20,2 (though in a different connotation of στάσις): Είθ' Ινα.
μη έττΐ των αυτών ό λόγος ίων σττ| (εν στάσει -γαρ το ήρεμοΰν,
εν αταξία δε το ττάθος, έττει φορά ψυχής και συγκίνησ'ις εστίν),
εΰθΰς έττ' άλλα μεθήλατο ασύνδετα και έτταναφοράς (Longinus then quotes
examples from Dem. 21,72). But, äs I said, the possibility of the existence of a
"state of instability" cannot be excluded. The third possibility generates the
Interpretation of interjections showing conflicting πάθη, not conflicting ήθη-
again this outcome is undesirable and unsatisfactory. I do not find it likely that
στάσιν hides Latin statum; this does not solve much since the construction with
an inanimate possessor of the Status and the following genitive is again
unparalleled.
I give three conjectures exempli gratia: 1. quae quamvis ττάθους signa sint
nee ήθους. The reading στάσιν would again have developed from a
misinterpretation of an abbreviation, cf. n. 15 above.^r<t$"^~= signa sint, read äs
στάσιν under influence of the Greek word immediately preceding.
2. Alternatively we could read
τάσιν instead of στάσιν. (τάσις indicates "intensity" cf. LSJ i.V.), e.g. Plut.
Sulla XVIII 3 of the intensity or momentum propelling a missile. In Hp. Acut. 37
the inverse confusion is found; here the MSS read τάσις instead of στάσις.
3. Supply <indicent>. However, this
would be tantamount to again creating the second meaning of στάσιν habere
discussed above.
26
 "(Interjections) which although they have the (status of pathos?), not of
ethos, we nevertheless find in those writers also, who being ethici seem usually
to rouse pathos in a moderate way." It seems better to let solere concire depend
from videntur, than to take it äs part of an accusativus cum infinitivo dependent
on inyenimus. The passage apparently had a Greek source, which may explain the
predicative use of ethici (δντες) (äs a Substantive, ethici is extremely rare, cf.
TLL s.v. ethicus B 1). Furthermore, the meaning of videntur ethici ("who seem to
be ethici) is not suitable here. Thirdly, in the passage 315,3ff. it is also the
authors, not the interjections that excite pathos. Finally, if qui videntur ethici is
taken together, one would have expected a subjunctive (although this cannot be
decisive).
Cf. on -ττάθος in ethici 315,3ff. De Nonno 1982, 74 n. 60.
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τΗθος is a very important concept in the theories of ancient rhetoric and
I will not try to cover it all. However, a brief outline of the development of the
term may be useful. τΗθος is used by Aristotle first and foremost to denote the
presentation or self-presentation of the person described or the Speaker, whereas
ττάθος refers to the reaction produced in the audience. Various scholars have
pointed out that this state of affairs seems to reflect a primarily rhetorical
approach to ττάθος,27 and a mainly poetical view of ήθος.28
If we look for linguistic indicators of ήθος, we find that the effect of
ήθος is produced, if a way of speaking is specifically related to factors like
sex, age, and social Status.29 Aristotle feels language expresses ήθος most
clearly, if it informs us about the speaker's ττροοάρεσις, the motivation for his
actions.30 τΗθος "character(-portrayal)" is not unrelated to πάθος. The
vigorous expression of ήθος "character" produces the additional effect of
ττάθος
31
 and the reverse may also be true; persisting ττάθος contributes to the
ήθος of a certain passage.32
In later theory stress is put increasingly on the stylistic difference
between "ethical" and "emotional" style.33 Both types of style are thought to
produce a certain effect on the audience. The result is that ήθος and ττάθος
come to represent different stages on the scale of emotionality. They no longer
differ in nature, only in degree, ήθος representing the more subdued, sweeter
emotions, ττάθος the more vehement ones.34 An example of this usage is
formed by the text from Julius Romanus that was quoted at the beginning of this
section.
27
 Gill 1984,153ff.
28
 Hagen 1966, 58.
29
 Cf. Ar. Rhet. 1408a25ff. Cf. in practice SchHom. X 477b: ηθικός ό
λόγος καΐ αρμόδιος γυναικ'ι (cf. Δ 20). Cf. Steinmann 1907, 35ί.;Όί11 1984,
157 n. 39; 159 n. 49. Hagen relates this use of ηθοποιία especially to the genre
of the τφογυμυάσματα.
30
 Ar. Rhet. 1417al6ff.
31
 Cf. Kennedy 1972, 41; Gill 1984, 157.
32 Cf
·
 e
-§- SchHom. Π 56-9a (where Achilles recounts to Patroclos the
injurious deeds of Agamemnon) ... εστί δε ηθικόν δμοιον γαρ τοις
θυμοΌμένοις [in itself a πάθος] καΐ προς τοις είδότας διη-νεισθαι
Achilles is thus characterized äs a θυμούμενος by his behaviour.
33
 Gill 1984, 155ff.
34
 Cf. Zucker 1953,19; Hagen 1966, 76.
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A further refinement is found especially in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
Stylistic overtones apart, ήθος in Dionysius is either a rather neutral word for
any personality or character, or it indicates a morally acceptable, decent
character.3·' When Dionysius discusses the excellent ήθοττοιί,α in Lysias, the
latter is what he means.
All this implies that by the time of our grammatical sources ήθος and
ηθικός could be used in a number of contexts. In Opposition to the more
vehement sentiments, ηθικός can refer to the complacent tone of a passage, to
its friendliness and urbanity. Often the Interpretation "personal" fits very well.
Humorous undertones (διάχυσις) can induce us to Interpret εν ηθει äs
"ironical(ly)".36 But, of course, the primary meaning "indicative of (a certain)
ήθος" should not be forgotten either.
What, then, is the relationship between the indeclinable parts of speech and
the termini technici ήθος/ηθικός? I shall first give a few other instances and
then I shall return to the interjections.
The ancient commentaries on the use of the σύνδεσμος ή illustrate how
close the different connotations of ηθικός may be to one another and to the
production of ττάθος. TH may be labeled ττευστικόν καΐ ηθικόν, äs in
SchHom. Z SISc1 and c2 in which Paris addresses Hector: this is a somewhat
timid question of younger to eider brother.37 It is styled ηθικώς μετά
ττεύσεως ή διαβεβαιωτικώς in Γ 46-52, where Hector addresses Paris in a
sarcastic question, which may also be taken äs a strong affirmation. These
passages share the characteristic that they contain rhetorical questions; the
questions are in themselves superfluous: no actual Information is required. Their
main function seems to be to typify the relationship of Speaker to addressee.
And indeed, ήθος and ηθικός often have the connotation of a characteristic,
personal relationship of close relatives or friends.3^
35
 Meerwaldt 1920,18ff.; cf. 21 on the effect on the audience.
36
 Cf. Kroll 1918. Hdn. de figuris, Rhet. Gr. III 92,29ff. Spengel:
χαριεντισμός δε εστί λόγος ηθικός μετά χάριτος τταριστών την του
λέγοντος έττ'ι τινι διάχυσιν ("merriment"); Dion. Hai. Dem. 34,3 Demosthenes is
called άνηθοττο'ιητος, άδιάχυτος. See also note 38. Cf. Zucker 1953, 20; Gill
1984, 162.
37
 Cf. SchHom. Z SISb1.
38
 At first sight the use of ήθει(ε) (Z 518) may seem to have contributed
to this judgment of the passage. However, the scholiasts do not connect ήθεΐε
with ήθος, but with θείος pr εθος (SchHom. Z 518a and b). Cf. further Rhet.
Gr. I 428,2ff. Spengel: ήθος ... εστί ψυχής διάθεσις ένεσκιρρωμένη και
δυσεξάλειτττος, οίον των πατέρων ττρός τους τταΐδας; Quint. 6,2,13 ήθος ...
non solum mite ac placidum sed plerumque blandum et humanum ... quod est sine
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But linguistic phenomena contributing to ethos, are, according to ancient
commentators, used to rouse pathos äs well.39 Agamemnon's groan of anguish
dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas. The reverse relationship appears from
Cic. ep.Att. 10,10,6 iuvenem nostrum non possum non amare, sed ab eo nos non
amari plane intellegp. Nihil ego vidi tarn άνηθοττοίητον, tarn aversum a suis. The
correct Interpretation of άνηθοττοίητος and the relationship between these
passages was pointed out already by Meerwaldt 1920, 23 n. l· cf Zucker 1953·
Gill 1984,162 n. 71.
In SchHom. I 622b the four Speakers of the episode of the embassy to Achilles
are characterized: ' Οδυσσεύς συνετός, -πανούργος, θεραπευτικός (i e
"soothing", cf. Rhet. Gr. I 427,21 Spengel)· Άχιλλεύς θυμικός, μεγαλόφρων'
Φοίνιξ ηθικός, ττραος, παιδευτικός· Α'ίας... Here the adjective ηθικός is
used of a human being. Phoenix makes a good impression, he is a friendly,
decent person, but might not bis relationship with and attitude towards Achilles'
acquired oyer Ά Ipng period, cpntribute to bis being qualified äs ηθικός ("a
real friend")? H is called ηθικόν και έρωτηματικόν also in SchHom Φ 583b
which discusses Agenor's addressing Achilles in a defiant (ironical) question
shortly before the fighting Starts.
There are some other examples of σύνδεσμοι and έταρρήματα whose use is
deemed ηθικός. So for ή διασαφητικός Gramer AO I 189,25 (on Hom A 117)·
άρα: SchAp.Rhod. B 438 (here ηθικός probably means "friendly" cf B 437
ττεριττολλόν έυφρονέων); and an example of επίρρημα: SchEur 'Phöen 901
(δητα) ηθικόν επίρρημα αντί του αληθώς. In the latter passage the exact
meaning of ηθικός is difficult to establish. There is no irony nor does the tone
sound particularly friendly. But δητα is said to be used instead of αληθώς
which is an επίρρημα βεβαιωτικόν, cf. SchHom. Z SISc1 and c2 and the
examples quoted below: Ηθικός may refer to the personal, urgent tone of the
question.
39
 Cf. for mixed ethos-pathos effects: SchHom. E 648-54, where the use of
very short sentences (κομματίζειν) is held to be either caused by θυμός or
because it is ηθικός "ironical".
Not only by using conjunctions and adverbs can the effect of ήθος be produced;
the same result is obtained by joining sentences asyndetically. An asyndetic style
characterizes the ruler (SchHom. B 9: on Zeus' addressing the dream he sends to
Agamemnon, cf. Eustath. 1,255,31 vdV.) and SchHom. Π 128a states more
generally: παρατηρητέον δε ττρός τα ασύνδετα την προσωποποιίαν δτι
έμφαντικωτάτη. Nor is there a clear-cut border between ήθος and πάθος in
the case of asyndeton. It is, äs would appear from the comments of the
Scholiasts, one of Homer's favourite ways of making bis figures show that they
are angry (SchHom. Γ 50; 53a) or are subject to ττάθος in general (SchHom K
9; X 295). It makes Homer's style γοργότερον, "more vehement, more vieorous"
(Eust. 381,35ff.).
 r
 ^
A Latin example in which both ήθος and πάθος may be considered the results
of asyndeton, is Don. in Ter. Eun. 821 haec ασύνδετα instantis dominae vultum
habitumque demonstrant. On the one band we are dealing with a domina and her
habitus (ήθος); on the other we learn that she is instantis and the way she
speaks is indicative of the expression on her face (ττάθος).
I started this chapter with a discussion of a fragment of Varro: There the
rhetorical figure of praecisio was said to produce heightening of the emotional
t
c°??T°f the Passa§e (i·6· the 'πάθος). We may now compare this passage with
bchHom. X 111-22: After a long conditional protasis, in which Hector has
deliberated on the possibility of putting down bis shield and proposing the
delivery of Heien to Achilles, Hector does not proceed with the apodosis, but
Interrupts himself with the words: αλλά τ'ιη μοι ταϋτα φίλος διελέ'ξατο
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when he sees that bis brother is wounded, is called ηθικόν καΐ ττεριτταθές.40
And the occasions where Achilles addresses the dead Patroclus have the same
double effect on the audience, viz. that of imparting the emotion of the moment
and that of stressing the special bond between the two friends.41 The scholium
on Σ 333 calls this type of speech έμψυχος, the very word Hermogenes uses,
too, when he describes how an impression of ήθος is effected by connecting the
typical and appropriate words to each person.42 This can be managed by
applying decency, simplicity and το κατ' αυτών έμφαινόμενον αληθές καΐ
ένδιάθετον.
43
 And then, we are back to the interjections, for in dealing with
"truth" Hermogenes explains (375,19ff.): "Ιδιαί γε μην είσιν εννοιαι τταρά
τάς ττροειρημένας του οίον εμψύχου λόγου αϊ σχετλιαστικαί.44
Σχετλιαστικα'ι are the Greek equivalents to the Roman interjections - apparently,
θύμος; The scholiast comments that either the foregoing sentences introduced
by ει should be read διαττορητικώς or Hector is speaking κομματικώς. On the
other hand: δύναται ... καΐ ηθικώς ό "Εκτωρ ατταξ εν μετάνοια
γενόμενος, ττρίν άνταττοδοϋναι, διακόψαι τον λόγον. For another example of
the relationship between μετάνοια and ήθος, cf. SchHom. I 453a. In the passage
discussed there, Phpenk has told how bis mother had requested him to sleep
with his father's mistress. He proceeds "τη ττιθόμην καΐ ερεξα", on which the
Scholiast reacts äs follows: εν ήθει δει αναγινώσκειν ως μετανοοΰντος
αυτού. This is a reading direction: Phoenix says this in quiet, subdued tones,
thus indicating his regret for what he did. The commentator apparently did not
visualize Hector's self-interruption äs a brasque and emotional affair, but Hector
regrets his impulse and now quietly faces reality again. Cf. SchHom. 0 244ax:
(τίη δε συ <νόσφιν άττ' άλλων > (the words are spoken by Apollo, who has
come to assist the wounded Hector): ηθικώς ττάνυ, ως ττρός νοσοϋντά
φαμεν "τί κατάκεισαι;" Here, ηθικώς must mean something like "softly", too.
The phenomena of ήθος and -πάθος are close indeed and often it depends on
the Interpretation of the commentator whether a word or phenomenon is held to
contribute to the ήθος or the ττάθος of any given passage. It may have been
the presence of ή that was decisive in the diagnosis .of ήθος here. Cf. also
Eustath. 4,585,3ff. vdV.
40
 SchHom. Δ 153b. Once again ηθικός probably refers to the typical
relationship between relatives, this time brothers. Cf. 'Ψ 94 (Achilles to Patroclus)
ήθείη κεφαλή, but see note 38.
41
 SchHom. Σ 333 ττεριτταθές καΐ ηθικόν το ττρός τοις τεθνεώτας
διαλέγεσθαι ως ττρός ζώντας, καΐ εστίν εμψυχον το τοιούτον είδος των
λόγων; SchHom. T 316a.
42
 Hermogenes, ττ.ίδεών 352,22ff. Rabe = Rhet. Gr. II 375,19ff. Spengel.
43
 "Truth and spontaneity apparent in them."
44
 "But apart from the afore-mentioned, expressions of Indignation are
peculiar to the kind of speech that is, so to say, alive." Examples are ω Ζει,
ω γη καΐ θεοί, οϊμοι. Cf. Hagen 1966, 48.
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interjections can contribute to ήθος, character portrayal, äs well äs to the
production of ττάθος.45
And indeed, interjections - primarily indicators of pathos - in practice
often indicate a combination of pathos and ethos (character portrayal, type
portrayal).46 These are closely interconnected in Don. in Ter. An. 751: AU
interiectio est constematae mulieris.^ One Step further bringe us to comments
which concentrate exclusively on the contribution interjections can make to the
image of any given character - they may be characteristic for a specific group.
Thus, Donatus (Don. in Ter. H. 347) comments: HEM interiectio feminea ac
matronalis (sex and social Status specified; no special emphasis on emotional
value). In this category belong the many remarks in our Greek sources, where
we are told that certain interjections are typical of seamen, hunters,
grapetreaders, shepherds, goatherds and swineherds (there are a lot of different
kinds of cattle in Greece and sheep apparently appreciated not being addressed
äs if they were goats); there is even one interjection which, it would seem, is
45
 The same sentiment is expresses by pseudo-Dionysius, but he evaluates it
differently. He rejects this method of striving for cheap effects which he sees in
the μελετα'ι, the practical exercises in rhetoric, where character is simply
represented by τα καλούμενα επιφωνήματα, the so-called exclamations (ττερί
των εν μελέταις ττλημμελουμένων = Η. Usener and L. Radermacher, Dionysii
Halicam. Opuscula II 359,12ff.: αλλ' ό του ήθους άγων υπάρχει τα
καλούμενα επιφωνήματα, ττροστυχοϋσαΊ τίνες αυτόματοι φωναί ήθικα'ι.).
46
 Although the words ethos and pathos need not be explicitly used.
47
 "'Au' is an interjection of an woman in dismay". Cf. An. 781 conturbatae
mulieris; Eun. 680 conturbatae feminae nee constantis sibi; Eun. 899 perturbatae
mulieris. See further on the Greek side e.g. Dem. eloc. 57, where αϊ αϊ is held
to rouse pathos and Bachm. AG I 48,28 where it is called ηθικόν (although the
context does not allow us to establish the exact meaning of ηθικόν here).
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peculiar to "barbarians pulling something".48 Age is the decisive factor in the
use of wcrrds like τέττα and άττα, which are used to address older people.49
One more observation on the use of interjections, this time a stylistic one,
deserves mention here. Pseudo-Probus (IV 255,28-256,14) has a long note on the
stylistic level befitting certain interjections. Words like hahahae and papae
mainly fit the lower genres,50 and are avoided in the lyric poetry of Horace äs
well äs in epic and tragedy.51 (E)heu can be thrown in anywhere.
As we saw, the grammarians did not confine themselves to marking a word
down äs an interjection, but were also anxious to explain its (rhetorical)
function. First and foremost, interjections increased the pathos of the text. They
could be used for winning time. But they could also have the effect of ethos in
either of two ways: They could convey the less vehement, quieter types of
emotion and they could have a function in typifying a character. Accordingly, we
find various observations in the ancient grammarians regarding the ήθος, the
impression of character, age, sex and social Status that is suggested by the use
of certain interjections. In so doing, they anticipated some aspects of our
48
 Seamen: Hdn. GG III i 506,20 (Bachmann AG I 146,7f.; Bekker AG I
446,321); Theogn. Gramer AO II 161,8; ps. Theodos. 79,16f.; Zonaras 1623;
Eustath. 3,230,llff. vdV.; Suda II 396,lff. Hunters: Theogn. Gramer ΛΟ II 161,8.
Grapetreaders: Joh.Chrys. PGM 64,956 (Fragm. in leremiam (32:30)): "καΐ ουδέ
ώσττερ öl ληνοβατοϋντες άττοκριθήσονται ττρός ττάντας τους καθήμενους
έττΐ της γης·" Το ο'ίδε ου καλώς κείται τταρά τω Έλληνικω· ή Δάδ
γαρ έχρην κεΐσθαι. Δάδ δε εστίν έτάρρημα των ληνοβατοϋντων
άττοκρινομένων ττρός τους καταλέγοντας [ad colligentes]. "Ωσττερ τοίνυν,
φησί, το έτάρρημα τούτο λέγοντες ττροθύμως ττατοϋσι την σταφΐ)λήν,
ούτως υμάς καταπατήσει, ως ληνοβάτης ό Βαβυλώνιος ατταντα τα έθνη.
(Ν.Β. ληνοΒατέω = ληνοττατέω. The Septuagint reads Αιδαδ (sie) for the
interjection.) Shepherds: Gramer AO I 118,14. Goatherds: Hesych. s.v. σί,ττα.
Swineherds: Eustath. 3,230,15 vdV. Barbarians: ps. Theodos. 79,18; Suda 396,25 i.v.
έττοτΓοΐ: ώ εία ώ εία· μ'ιμημα βαρβάρων έξελκόντων τι; Zonaras ibid.; cf.
Arist. Fax 459ff. The Scholia a.l. comment: μιμείται δε τους βαρβαριστι
έξέλκοντας and this leads us to the source of the corruption. For that is what
it is, of course, if only because there is a Signal lack of suitable barbarians in
the Aristophanic context. v. Leeuwen a.1. explains the reading of the Scholiast,
which is apparently at the basis of the later tradition äs a ludiaum
dittographema for βάρος τι; he is evidently right.
49
 See LSJ s.w. Add Phot. BibL 279, 531a, 32ff. Γι ττοτε γαρ δήλοι το
τέττα, μέχρι νυν οί5ττω συνομολογείται' αλλ' οΐ μεν σετττικήν ("reverential",
see Suda s.v. ττάτητα) αυτό φωνή ν είναι φίλου ττρός εταίρο ν φασιν, οΐ δε
"Κωτίλλε (1. Κωτίλε, "chatterbox") ώ ούτος", άλλοι δε ττάλιν "σε λέγω", ο'ι
ττλε'ιους δε των γραμματικών νεωτέρου φασιν είναι ττροσφώνησιν ε'ις
•πρεσβύτερον. SchHom. Δ 412 (Diomedes addressing Sthenelos) is exceptional for
giving the reverse explanation.
50
 ... in comico cannine, leni scilicet et humili vel iucundo.
51
 [Probus] almost exclusively mentions poetic genres because he Starts
from the prosodic characteristics of final syllables.
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modern discipline of socio-linguistics. I have limited myself here to some
illustrations of this fact, taken from the use of indeclinable words or their
absence.
3. The interjection in Roman grammar
In this section and the following one attention will be paid to those
observations of the Roman grammarians about the interjections that are of a
more or less "technical" nature.52 First and foremost, I shall discuss that focal
point of grammatical lore, the definition (3.1.). Then, I will turn to those aspects
of the grammatical doctrine which centre on the formal phonological aspects of
the interjection, paying attention in particular to the terminological problem of
the use of inconditus and confusus (3.2.). Finally, the relationship between
interjections and primitive, rough-and-ready utterings will lead me to discuss the
role, if any, played by the interjections in the origin and development of
language according to ancient philosophy (3.3.).
3.1. Definitions
The only element which recurs in every form of the definition of
interjection is the fact that it expresses the affectus, motus, passiones, sensus
animi, the emotions of the soul. This, plus the fact that we are dealing with a
pars orationis (not unimportant in view of the most current Greek opinion)
constitutes the whole of the definitions attributed to Julius Romanus (Char.
311,14f.)53 and Cominianus (Char. 311,4f.). Both definitions are illustrated by
several examples.
The third definition found in Charisius (311,10f.) and attributed to Q.
Remmius Palaemon runs äs follows:54 interiectiones sunt quae nihil dodbile
52
 Barwick 1922, 35 remarks that the gramrnarians (esp. Donatus, Diomedes
Charisius and Dositheus) show a greater diversity in their discussion Of this pari
of speech than they usually do.
53
 Interiectio estpars orationis motum animi significans. Cf. Jeep 1893, 7.
54
 Barwick 1922, 149 commits a serious petitio principii in his judgment of
Palaemon's definition: In the case of the interjection, he argues, the school
tradition strongly deviates from Palaemon, whom it otherwise follows Jul
Romanus' definition, on the other band, cpnforms to the school tradition'
Moreover, Jul. Romanus borrowed his definition of the adverb from Palaemon
Therefore, one expects him to have done so in the case of the interjection also
Barwick concludes that the school tradition preserves the correct version of the
Palaemonian definition. This clearly cannot be upheld. In addition to the
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habent, significant tarnen adfectum animi. Palaemon does not specify that an
interjection is a pars orationis. That he did consider them äs such, appears from
Quint. l,4,19f. The latter pari of Palaemon's definition is the well-known
o/fecto-clausula, but the former part is a new formulation which has no parallel
in the whole of the antique theory of the interjection, except for the ars
Ambrosiana, a commentary on Donatus probably dating from the seventh Century
A.D., which has conserved Palaemon's definition in a somewhat distorted form.55
Nihil dodbile habent does remind one, however, of the Opposition, briefly alluded
to above (section 1.), between ars and natura.56 Interjections do not seem to fall
under the sway of the ars grammatica, one cannot formulate a regulär doctrina
about them.57 This idea does recur in other discussions, e.g. Diom. I 419,12f. et
siqua sunt similia, quae affectus potius quam observationes artis inducant.^ The
inherent tension in the attempts of the grammarians to state rules about words
which by their very nature are irregulär, will be a recurrent theme in our
discussion of the interjections.
The words quae nihil dodbile habent also allow of another
Interpretation:59 In Plato's Cratylus Socrates explains to Hermogenes that names
are äs it were Instruments for name-giving. Imposing names means teaching
pbjection of circularity, it may be remarked that the so-called "school tradition"
is not uniform at all in the case of the interjection. Cf. Jeep 1893, 27 and Holtz
1981,106 on the fluctuating doctrine on the interjection in Donatus.
55
 Interiectiones, quae nihil docebile [sie] habent, significant tarnen
affectum animi, CCSL 133 c, 179,22f.
56
 Hus 1965, l and 336 ignores this early attestation of dodbile.
57
 In itself dodbilis may have passive äs well äs active meaning, cf. TLL
s.v., V l, 1765f. Hus 1965, 336 distinguishes three values for the more common
dodlis: (1) "une valeur moyenne", to denote "un etre pourvu d'une qualite
naturelle et dynamique"; (2) "une valeur passive, qui rend le dodlis susceptible
d'etre l'objet du docere ... que le dodlis designe la personne ä laquelle s'adresse
le docere ou la "connaissance" que transmet le docere". (The latter possibility is
the rarer by much); (3) "une valeur active, ou mieux intransitive, par laquelle le
dodlis serait "celui qui a la faculte de docere." (According to Hus, this
Interpretation is virtually neyer found in practice). See for examples Hus 1965,
342ff.: dodlis "füll of teaching, who/which can teach" perhaps in Prop. 4,2,63
(the statue of Vertumnus addresses bis creator: qui me tarn dodlis potuisti
fundere in usus). However, I find this Interpretation unnecessary and even
undesirable here. See Hus 1965, 349.
58
 "And similar cases that are produced by emotions rather than by
theoretical rules." The naturalness of interjections is opposed to their having
meaning in Varro LL VII 93: 'Euax' verbum nihil significat, sed effutitum
naturaliter est.
59
 Cf. Biese 1954, 14.
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something about the things surrounding us and discerning them from each other.
Socrates' concludes (388bl2f.): "Ονομα άρα διδασκαλικού τ'ι εστίν οργάνου
καΐ διακριτικού της ουσίας ../* Anyone who wants to make a correct use
of names, should employ them for didactic purposes (388c6f. διδασκαλικώς
(χρήσθαι)). If we compare this text to the words ascribed to Palaemon, we find
that the latter may also mean that the interjections are to be distinguished from
the other pari of speech, because only they cannot teach us anything about the
state of affairs.61
I think this Interpretation preferable, but we should not overlook the fact
that the two possibilities offered here are closer to each other than it might
seem at first blush: The fact that interjections do not signify, was related to
their being "natural" in Varro; the absence of meaning implies the fact that
interjections cannot be used to teach us anything; on the other hand, it is the
naturalness of the interjections which prevent their being the object of
teaching.62 The lack of context or explanation for the words of Palaemon is
bound to frustrate any attempt to come to a final choice between the two
interpretations bis words admit of.
Marius Plotius Sacerdos (s. III/IV A.D.) adds another new element: (VI
447, Iff.) interiectio est pars orationis adverbio persimilü qua significantur animi
variae passiones, quas quidam affectus dicunt.63 I shall return to the problems
connected with distinguishing between adverbs and interjections below (section
4.2.).
Two more refinements were added to the basic definition (containing, äs
will be recalled, the fact that the interjection is a pars orationis and that it
expresses the emotions of the soul), both by Donatus, viz. that the interjection
signifies emotions voce incondita (ars minor, IV 366,13f.)64 and that it functions
60
 "A name is, therefore, a didactic Instrument which is able .to make
distinctions in all that is."
61
 The Stoics would never have agreed with this representation of the
didactic function of words, cf. S.E. AM XI 224: το μεν οίν σώμα συ
διδάσκεται καΐ μάλιστα κατά τους άττό της Στοας. λεκτά γαρ εστί TJH,
διδασκόμενα, σώμα δ' ουκ εστί τα λεκτά.
62
 Διδάσκειν and its deriyates are also used in both constructions, i.e. with
language äs its subject and object, sometimes in the same context. Cf. Diogenes
of Oenoanda's account of the prigin of language, Fr. X col. II/III και των
φθόνγων δε ένεκεν ... μήτε τον Έρμην τταραλαμβάνωμεν εις
διδασκαλίαν ... μήτε των φιλοσόφων ττιστεΰωμεν τοις λέγουσι κατά θέσιν
καΐ διδανήν έττιτεθήναι τα ονόματα τοις ττράγμασιν; cf. Lucr. V 104Iff.
63
 "An interjection is a pari of speech which is very similar to the adverb.
The yarious passions of the soul, which some call emotions (affectus') are
signified by it."
190 64 "In the form of disordered sound".
interiecta aliis partibus orationis (ars maior, IV 391,26f.).^ The latter remark is
manifestly meant äs an explanation for the name interiectio ^  the former again
has to do with the fact that interjections defy doctrinal description. Incondita
refers to the irregulär, disordered, confused, "artless" nature of the interjections,
which will be discussed more fully in section 3.2. Later definitions have little to
add to this.
Special mention may be made of Probus (IV 146, Iff.) and the so-called
Excerpta Audacis (VII 356, Iff.) which depend on Probus. Here it is stated that:
interiectio est pars orationis ostendens animi motum per suspirationem.^
Although primarily indicating the general way in which interjections are uttered,
per suspirationem (IV 146, Iff.) may also be associated with the idea of
interjections' not being well-formed. Apart from suggesting the anguish or
emotional state in general in which an uttering is made, sighing is itself
suggestive of (excessive) aspiration, which äs we shall see, could occur in
interjections in unusual phonological context. The Greeks, too, draw attention to
this characteristic of interjections (see section 6.3.2.). Suspiratio indicates a
complete exclamation made with a sigh in Plin. NH praef. § 9.68
Noteworthy also is the following Statement found in Augustmus' Regulae (V
524,8ff.): interiectio non pars orationis est, sed affectio erumpentis animi in
vocem ... quot sunt perturbati animi motus, tot voces reddunt et vocantur
interiectiones quod interrumpant orationem.^ An explanation is not offered, but
65
 "Thrown in between the other parts of speech." The same stipulations
are found in Diomedes 1419,2ff.
66
 Such etymological explanations also occur without being added to the
definition itself, e.g. Diom. I 419,3f.: quae aliis partibus orationis interiaci et
inseri solet.
67
 "The interjection is a part of speech showing the movement of the soul
in a sigh." Probus shows an almost compulsive repetitiveness of the phrase per
suspirationem. He apparently considers this to be the test par excellence to
establish whether or not a word is an interjection. See section 4.2.
68
 O te felicem, M. Porci, a quo rem improbam petere nemo audet. The
particle o is combined with an exclamatory acc. c. inf. In this case, however,
Probus would probably have classified the particle o äs an adverb, see section 4.2.
69
 "An interjection is not a part of speech, but the emotion of the soul
bursting into sound ... There are äs many sound expressions äs there are
emotions of the disturbed soul, and they are called interjections because they
Interrupt the speech." One rnight wonder if the phrase erumpentis animi in vocem
furnishes an acceptable parallel to the Strange animi interiecti causa found in
Jul. Romanus (Char.) 315,12 (cf. section 1.). In both cases animus Stands for the
seat of emotions and is almost synonymous with the emotions themselves.
However, it seems more likely to me that the phrase affectio erumpentis animi in
vocem is a contamination of two thoughts, namely that the interjections signify
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we may well assume that it would have centred on the question of the number
of the parts of speech and the Separation of interjections from adverbs, for
which see section 4.
Almost invariably examples of interjections are joined to the more
theoretical remarks, and it is stated which emotions they express, äs significatio
is the only accidens of the interjection (Donatus, Diomedes, Asper, Julianus of
Toledo).70 The significatio is known either from consuetudo or from the context
(Diom. I 419,4f.). Sometimes we are told that no complete list of interjections
and meanings will or can be given, since the number of examples may virtually
be augmented ad libitum?1
The same examples occur over and over again, whereas the emotions which
are to be expressed generally stay within the limits of Quintilian's list given
above (section 1.). To give just one example: Donatus (IV 391,26f.) informs us
that interjections express the emotions out metuentis, ut ei; out optantis, ut o;
auf dolentis, ut heu; aut laetantis, ut euax.72 Yet, sometimes we do find
something unexpected, äs when Julianus Toletanus (V 320,5f.) teils us that:
solitum est parvulo dici 'totto', quando prohibetur comedere ierram.73 I have not
had the opportunity of testing the efficacity of this admonition myself, but I
gladly mention it: any young parents among my readers should feel free to try
it.
Unusual, to say the least, are the examples adduced by the somewhat
shadowy and enigmatic Vergilius Maro (s. VII A.D.). Sounds like rauc, sarap,
the affectio of the soul, and that their sound-form is unorganized, inarticulate,
and the result of a random transformatipn of breath into sound, cf. Hilarius of
Poitiers, in PS. LI cap. 7, PLM 9,313: Linguae humanae officium est, ut naturali
impulsa ratione, motu vano eodemque moderato vocem in verba distinguat,
exstetque per eam ex. confuso erumpentis spiritus sono dissonans (= distinctus, cf.
TLL s.v. dissonans) ad rerum intelligentiam sermo. Here we have to do with the
physiological function of the tongue in the process of articulation, see below
section 3.3.2. The use of spiritus and animus suggests some kind of conflation
(through anima?). For erumpere in cf. Quint. 11,3,51 vox ... ultra vires urgenda
non est. nam ... elisa in illum sonum erumpit cui Graeci nomen a Gallorum
immaturo cantu dedennt. See further TLL s.v. erumpo, V 2, 840.
70
 See Tolkiehn 1904, 29, who reconstructs the order of the passaee in Jul
Romanus (Char. 311,14-315,27).
71
 M. Plot. Sacerdos VI 447,llf.; Don. IV 366,16f.; Max. Vict. VI 205 3f-
Cled. V 26,22f.; Serg. VIII 158,35ff.; ars Ambros. 180,32ff.; ars Bonif. CCSL 133 b"
72
 "Either of someone who fears (ei), or of someone who wishes (o), or of
someone who is in pain (heu), or of someone who rejoices (euax)."
73
 "We are used to say 'totto' to a toddler when we forbid him to eat earth."
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salecon, ehunave, cetiu, faticalpin or quesgoor (giving a random selection only)
result in one believing Virgil's remark, unlikely at first blush, that nulla ... pene
[= paene] earum ad dicendum nobisprompta ei?.74 Incidentally, Virgil's treatment
of the interjection is not a very enthusiastic one. He reluctantly includes it
among the parts of Speech, but, according to him, it is hardly ever used and
would never have been believed to be Latin, if it had not been absent from
Greek discussions (176,3f.). This attitude is probably caused by the fact that
Latin was not Virgil's mother tongue. Interjections are of course a typical
phenomenon of colloquial language, which Virgil "rarely reads" (176,4). But since
the Juliani and Vergilii are hardly representative, we had better return to their
more orthodox colleagues.
3.2. Formal aspects of interjections
From a formal point of view, too, the inherent irrationality of the
interjections constitutes a major drawback to the formulation of rules. The most
prominent formal characteristic of interjections is that they lack any well-
defined form. Interjections are confusa voce?5 voce incondita,76 or, in a related
but different sense, voce abscondita.17 In the following I will look into the use
the grammarians made of these designations and their meaning. In particular, the
differences with respect to their terminology in the chapters de voce will be
investigated. For there is something Strange here, which in anticipation of my
results may roughly be described äs follows: In the chapters de voce the
grammarians distinguish a subgroup called vox confusa. By this term they mean
disordered and inarticulate sound which cannot be written. It is opposed to vox
articulata, to which all parts of speech belong.
Now, the interjections are mostly described äs being voce incondita, which
is no species of vox in the chapters de voce. But incondita is virtually
synonymous to confusa. There is a tendency in modern research to equate vox
74
 176,lff. ed. Huemer (BT). Dr. van der Laan of Leyden suggested to me
that some at least of these wprds are oaths or asseverations (like ecastor or
mehercule). Sarap probably derives from Sarapis or Serapis, in ehunave we may
recognize the populär medieval exclamation lesu nave.
75
 "Of confused sound." Sergius VIII 158,34 (omnia, quae confusa voce
proferuntur ad exprimendos affectus); ars Ambros. 181,74 (interiectio confusa est
sono), cf. 181,64 ('o' interiectio vox confusa est et eadem saepius variatur
[meaning that it can vary semantically]).
76
 "Of disordered sound." Diom. I 419,lf.; Don. IV 366,13f.; Servius IV
420,18f.; Pomp. V 281,5f.; Verg. Maro 76,lfi; Cassiodorus VII 215,221
77
 "Of obscure sound." Prise. II 48,25.
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incondita and vox confusa without more ado. But, äs will be seen from this brief
survey, in that case a contradiction is forced on the grammarians which to all
appearances they themselves sought to avoid. I suggest, therefore, that the
grammarians preferred to describe the interjections äs vox incondita, avoiding in
the context of the interjections the word confusus commonly found in the
chapters de voce, in order to hide the tension between the interjections'
irrationality and their inclusion among the parts of speech. For these belonged
äs a body to vox articulata or its equivalents, i.e. the exact opposite of vox
confusa (3.2.1.).
After discussing this terminological matter I shall briefly discuss how formal
irregularity affects the interjections' accent and meaning äs well äs their
spelling. However, if an interjection shows similarity to a more regulär part of
speech, analogy will Claim its due (3.2.2.).
3.2.1. Vox abscondita, incondita, confusa; a terminologicalproblem
At first sight it is a logical step to compare the remarks found in the Latin
grammarians on the vox of interjections with their theory of vox in the chapters
de voce.78 However, we are immediately confronted with the problem that,
whereas vox confusa is a normal subtype of vox in the de voce-chapters, its use
to designate interjections is rare and late. Moreover, nowhere does it occur in a
formal definition. On the other hand, vox incondita, the most usual label for the
interjections and reserved almost exclusively for them, never occurs in the de
voce-passages. The third expression, voce abscondita is found in Priscian only. It
occurs in the context of the interjections and I will Start my research from it.
If interjections are voce abscondita, this implies that they do not follow
the normal phonological rales of Latin, stating for instance, that no word should
end in /h/: Prise. II 19,26ff.: Quaeritur, cur in 'vah\ 'ah' post vocales ponitur
aspiratio, et dicimus, quod apocopa facta est extremae vocalis, cui praeponebatur
aspiratio; nam perfecta 'vaha' 'aha' sunt. ideo autem abscisione facta extremae
vocalis tarnen aspiratio mansit ex supenore pendens vocali, quia suum est
intenectionis voce abscondita proferri. itaque pars absconditae extremitatis
videtur congrue intenectionis naturali prolatione remansisse?^
78
 This was done by e.g. Biese 1954,14f. and Pinborg 1961, 132.
79
 "It is asked: why is there a breathing after the vowels in 'vah' and 'a/z'?
And we say, because an 'apocope' of the last vowel was made, which was
preceded by the breathing. In complete form, it is 'vaha', 'aha'. And the reason
why the breathing remains attached to the preceding vowel in spite of the last
vowel being cut off, is that it is characteristic for the interjection to be
uttered äs an obscure sound. Therefore it seems congruous for part of the hidden
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Priscian teils us that the form of the interjections is not "whole",
"complete", "sound"; part of it is hidden, and so, therefore, is its pure and
original form. To say that interjections are voce abscondita has the same
implications äs their Opposition to voces plenae or integraeß® This view of
interjections is peculiar to Priscian: voce abscondita is not a synonym of voce
incondita or confusa, äs we shall see, although it may have been chosen because
of its likeness to incondita.
A parallel passage steers us in the direction of the de voce-chapters again,
be it circuitously (II 48,22ff.): In h ... non potest tenninari syllaba. invenio tarnen
in 'vah' et 'ah' interiectionibus terminalem videri syllabae h, sed magis puto ...
per apocopam hoc solere fieri, cum perfecta 'vaha' et 'aha' sint, vel quod
abscondita voce solent intenectiones et huiuscemodi voces proferri, ut etiam 'ha
ha' 'he he'.&1 It is again clear that interjections may claim an exceptional
phonological position by definition. But it is the examples adduced which take us
further: Priscian's huiuscemodi voces are apparently onomatopoeic reproductions
of laughter etc., which are called imitations of unwritable sounds elsewhere, cf.
III 91,3f. inter has (i.e. intenectiones) ponunt etiam sonituum illiteratorum
imitationes ut risus 'ha ha hae' et 'phy' et 'euhoe' et 'aw'.82 It is these sonitus
illiterati which again remind one of the chapters de voce and it is time to look
at these a little closer.
The thorough and careful study by Ax has shown that in Roman grammar
vox is usually analysed by means of the application of either of two dihaereseis
(1986b, 44): The first type, represented by Donatus, distinguishes between vox
articulata and vox con/ksa,83 on the criterium of whether or not a sound can be
ending to remain behind because of the natural way of uttering an interjection."
80
 Cf. sectipn 2.1. and Priscian II 13,4f. nulla syllaba Latina vel Graeca per
intesras dictiones in eam (sc. h litteram) desinit; cf. Servius IV 420,20.
81
 "No syllable can end in /h/. Yet I do find that in the interjections 'vah'
and 'ah' the /h/ seems to be the last sound of the syllable, but I rather think
that that is mostly the result of apocope, the complete forms being 'vaha' and
'aha', or if you like, it is because interjections and words like them are usually
uttered in an obscured (sound-)form, äs holds also true for 'ha ha' and 'he he'."
Vel quod introduces an alternative formulation only. Cf. Diom. 1423,19f.
82
 "Among these (interjections) they also number imitations of sounds that
cannot be represented in writing, äs laughter 'ha ha hae' and 'phy' and 'euhoe'
and 'au'."
Notice that we are here dealing with a distinct sub-type, see below.
83
 For the physiological meaning of articulatus, see section 3.3.2.
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written.84 Priscian is our first example of the second type, which, confusingly
enough, applies the term articulata (vs. inarticulata) to introduce another
criterium, viz. that of intelligibility, meaningfulness ("Semantizität"). What
Donatus called articulata, is now styled literata. Thus, a fourfold division is
created, words being either (+writable, +meaningful), (+writable, -meaningful), (-
writable, + meaningful), or (-writable, -meaningful). Priscian's examples of words
which cannot be written, but are understood all the same, are sibili hominum et
gemitus (II 5,12f.): hae enim voces, quamvis sensum aliquem significent
proferentis eas, scribi tarnen nonpossunt.^
Thus, the sonitus illiterati of the second type coincide with the voces
confusae of the first: They cannot be written down in a clearly circumscribed
way, we have to make do with a sort of ad hoc spelling. And, äs appeared from
the Priscian quotation above, some at least of the sonitus illiterati are also voce
abscondita.
So far, we have seen that the term vox abscondita, applied primarily to
interjections, also covered some words which were described in the chapter de
voce äs sonitus illiterati. We now turn to vox incondita.
Voce incondita may be translated "of a crude, confused, rough-and-ready
sound-form". Paulus Diaconus (Epitome Festi) explains inconditum by non Ordinate
compositum. If one Scans the Thesaurus s.v. inconditus two things stand out: In
the first place, on various occasions inconditus is explicitly linked with confusus,
the two being apparently near-synonyms.86 Secondly, inconditus is often
associated with barbarians, animals and/or the time when human, rational speech
84
 Incidentally, it is hardly fair to adduce the chapters de voce äs an
argument for the so-called "confusion of written and spoken language" in the
ancient grammarians: if littera is called the smallest pari of vox articulata (e.g.
Don. IV 367,9), that is a perfectly logical consequence of defining articulata in
terms of writability. This may confuse us and we may not agree with this
approach, but that is a different matter entirely and immaterial here. See
Desbordes 1987, who quotes various passages illustrating the grammarians'
awareness of the differences between "phonemes" and "graphemes", if I may be
allowed this anachronism.
85
 '"Human whistling and moaning': for although these sounds do convey a
sentiment of sorts of the one who utters them, yet they cannot be written."
86
 E.g. Tert. adv. Hermog. 23,1 (CCSL I 416,24f.) informem et confusam et
inconditam ... materiam; 41,1 (CCSL I 431,12f.) inconditus et confusus et
turbulentus_ fuit materiae motus. Cf. also Cic. Rep. III 3 cum accepisset (sc.
mens divinä) homines inconditis vocibus inchoatum quiddam et confusum
sonantes, incidit hos et distinxit in partis eqs.
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had yet to come into being.87 I will return to the latter point shortly, but first
things first: If confusus would have done just äs well to describe the formal
nature of the interjections, why did the grammarians introduce inconditus, thus
creating an apparent terminological inconsistency? Let us compare the de voce-
chapters with the ones on interjections again.
Vox incondita is found in Donatus, Diomedes, Servius, Pompeius, Vergilius
Maro and Cassiodorus. I shall concentrate on Donatus and Diomedes.88 Donatus'
is the most straightforward case. As I said, in bis chapter de voce vox is divided
into vox articulata and vox confusa. The criterium applied is whether or not a
sound can be written. His chapter de interiectione assigns the interjections äs a
body to vox incondita. No trace is to be found of a subdivision among the
interjections themselves.89 But if we substitute confusa for incondita a major
problem arises in this seemingly simple scheme. The parts of speech belong äs a
group to vox articulata (Ax 1986b, 38ff.). If the interjections are deemed a part
of speech, äs they professedly are, their definition contains a contradictio in
terminis.
In his chapter de voce Diomedes first divides vox into vox articulata and
vox confusa, and then adds vox modulata äs a third species. The primary
criterium is whether or not the sound is produced by a rational being - which in
practice generates the same division äs the criterium of writability. Vox
articulata is both "rational" and writable, vox confusa is neither. Moreover, he
adds that vox articulata is produced by human beings, vox confusa by either
animals or inanimate objects (since vox modulata, said of musical Instruments,
does not concern us, I shall leave it out of account here).
Now, if the characteristics of (-"rational", -writable) are inherent to
interjections, they should indeed be included in vox incondita/confusa. But in
that case the problems are multiplied: Apart from the objection that parts of
speech should be vox articulata (and Diomedes also thinks interjections are a
part of speech, I 419,Iff.), we would here have a vox confusa/incondita
produced by human beings.
87
 Cf. the passages quoted in the previous note and e.g. Sen. consol. ad
Polyb. 18,9 (opp. Latina verba); Lact. de ira 7,7f., see below.
88
 Servius, Pompeius and Cassiodorus (Excerpta) contain a commentary on
Donatus; Servius, moreover, does not have anything on vox; nor does Verg. Maro.
Pompeius, on the other hand, expatiates eloquently on the summary account of
Donatus de voce (V 99,9ff.), without, however, adding anything of significance.
Cassiodorus is muddled and mentions vox articulata only (VII 215,4ff.).
89
 Donatus does, however, take into account the possibility that there are
other inconditae voces than the interjections alone, IV 392,2f.; cf. Dosith. VII 424,15.
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Here we may compare what Probus has to say on vox. His is an exceptional
case, for after dividing (IV 47,3ff.) vox into vox articulata and vox confusa and
stating that the former consists of human speech which may be taken down in
writing, he divides vox confusa into vox animalium (e.g. the neighing of horses),
inanimalium (e.g. the sound of cymbals) and hominum. This is elaborated äs
follows (47,llff.): est et confusa vox sive sonus hominum, quae litteris
conprehendi non potest, ut puta oris risus vel sibilatus, pectoris mugitus et
cetera talia ...90 In this case, therefore, human beings may produce vox
articulata äs well äs vox confusa. However, we should notice that "ordinary
interjections" like "o" are not necessarily included in Probus' examples.91
Apart from it not being clear from his examples whether or not all
interjections are supposed to be pari of vox confusa, it should be noticed that
Probus himself never applies this term to them. His only remark that may refer
to formal characteristics, is that interjections are pToducedpersuspirationem.
A comparison of the passages de voce and de intenectionibus made it
improbable that the grammarians kept the genus of vox (confusa) so well apart
from the accidens "voce incondita" of the interjections by mere accident.
Therefore, we should not follow Biese (1954, 15) and Pinborg (1961, 132), who
unconditionally identify vox incondita, "unartikuliert", with vox confusa?1 If we
equate the two, we might be forcing a contradiction on the grammarians, which
they themselves evidently sought to avoid. It cannot, of course, be denied that
the contradiction itself is there. No matter how carefully the grammarians
formulated their definitions, the rationalizing of the essentially irrational was an
unrewarding task. It cannot be helped that the interjections do not conform to
several of the characteristics of vox articulata, such äs being rationalis,^ or
90
 "There is also human confused voice or sound, which cannot be caught
in writing, e.g. laughter or whistling, or a bellowing of the breast etc."
91
 As a matter of fact, Probus may be the source of Priscian's division of
the interjections in interiectiones and huiuscemodi voces (II 48,28 (?)). Such a
division of interjections is sometimes also made in the grammarians' discussion of
accent, e.g. in Cledonius V 79,16ff., see note 100 below. This anticipates a
medieval theory to the effect that some interjections have a generally accepted
semantic value and a more or less fixed (conventional) phonological pattern,
whereas others do not, cf. Pinborg 1961,124; 133.
92
 Pinborg does so on the strength of Pompeius V 281,5ff., where "o" is
called a vox confusa, the term voces inconditae occurring immediately after. We
should, however, take into account here Pompeius' habit of extensively
paraphrasing Donatus' text. As we saw, confusus is a handy synonym for
inconditus. I dare say Pompeius did not think about theories de voce when he
made the Substitution. I again call attention to the fact that the occurrences of
voce confusa applied to interjections are rare and late.
93
 Cf. Diom. 1420,llff. (from the chapter de voce).
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having and expressing ars.94 But the grammarians cannot be accused of
introducing an overt contradiction in their chapters de interiectionibus. The
problem is there, under the surface, but vox incondita is not completely the
same äs vox confusa.
3.2.2. Voce incondita
The Symptoms of the interjections' being incondita voce are primarily their
oscillating orthography. Moreover, äs was only to be expected, indistinct form
was connected with the absence of a clearly circumscribed meaning, cf. Hier.
Commentarioli in PS. 88:16 vel quod iubilus inconditos sonos proferens nequaquam
sensus per verba distinguat. 95
In a few cases the confusio of the interjection is held to affect the
significatio rather than the form.96 One interjection may have several
signiflcationes and may thus be called confusa.97 The combination incondita
significatio is also attested once.98
Apart from the general vagueness ascribed to the interjections' form,
regularity in accent is also despaired of. We often find Statements to the effect
that firm rules in this respect cannot be given: accentus in interiectionibus certi
esse non possunt (Don. IV 392,2f.).99 Nevertheless, if the interjections formally
resemble "normal" parts of speech, Cledonius Claims they are to be
94
 Cf. the etymological explanation of the word articulata, Explan, in Don.
IV 519,15ff. (dealing with littera/vox): articulata (sc. vox) est quae scribi potest,
quae subest articulis, id est digitis, qui scriburt [cf. Audax V 323,6]; vel quod
artem habeat aut exprimat. For the (primarily) biological/physiological meaning of
articulata, cf. e.g. Lucr. IV 551-55; see section 3.2.
95
 "Or because joyous shouting, bringing forth indistinct sounds, does not
by its words produce any clear meaning at all."
96
 For confiisus denoting a semantic quality, cf. Gell. NA 10,20,9 eademque
omnia confuso et indistincto vocabülo "rogationes" dixerunt', 13,31,5 Quonam ...
pacto legere ego possum quae non adsequor? Indistincta namque et confusa fient
quae legero, et tuam quoque impedient intentionem.
97
 Cf. ars Ambros. 181,2ff. about o.
98
 Ars Ambros. 180,47ff.: et verbis integris expremimus [sie] affectus, ut
'pro hoc me pati': ecce verba integra inconditam incipiunt habere significationem.
The opposite phenomenon, viz. that interjections manage to supply an intention
that cannot be made clear by more organized linguistic means, is described by
Clemens Scotus (109,3ff.): quod conditus sermo exprimere non potest, plerumque
interiectio explicat.
99
 "There cannot be any certain accents in interjections." Cf. Dosith. VII
424,14f.; Cled. V 79,16ff., ars Ambros. 181,71w.; [Prise.] III 520,23ff.; 528,34f.
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"accentuated" accordingly.100 As accentus may be taken in the wide sense of
"prosodic characteristics", it not only includes word-accent, but also the length
of vowels and syllables, and breathings.101 This might help to explain Cledonius'
Statement. Although he is not explicit äs to the actual accent of his examples
papae and attat, it would only be fair to presume he meant them to be
pronounced papae and attat respectively, if he took accentus to refer to word-
accent only. However, [Prise.] III 528,34f. explicitly declares that the correct
accent is papae, hardly surprising in view of the Greek.102 Now, papae is also
discussed in the context of another prosodic rule to the effect that omnes
interiectiones longae sunt, si monosyllabae fuerint, ut heu; si vero duarum vel
amplius syllabarum fuerint, quoniam speciem iam retinent partium orationis, ad
exempla earum quibus similes erunt iudicandae sunt, ut papae attat.im In this
text we not only find the same examples (papae, attat), but also the same
foundation for the general rale: As soon äs interjections begin to resemble
civilized parts of speech, they promptly Start behaving like proper ones and
agree with some kind of analogy.104 In this case, however, it is not accent
100
 Cled. V 79,16ff. in his interiectionibus non possunt certi accentus
reperiri, quae inconditis vocibus constant, ut heu va. certi sunt accentus in istis
quae possunt distingui, ut papae, attat. "possunt distingui" is to say that one can
get a phonological grip on the words in question, which therefore receive an
accent from analogy with more regulär parts of speech (presumably a nom.plur.
like nautae or lupae and a verb of the first conjugation, 3 sing, like captaf).
Note that according to Cledonius interjections are not invariably 'voce incondita'.
101
 The Greek word -προσωδία, Latin accentus (Quint. 1,5,22), does not
only embrace the accents in a narrow sense of the word, but - in later
grammatical texts (from the second Century p.Chr.n. onwards, cf. P. Hanschke de
accentuum Graecorum nominibus, Bonnae 1914, HOff.) - also breathings and the
length of vowels and syllables. Cf. e.g. SchDTh. 129,7; 454,9f. In Latin the
relationship between accent and syllable-length is, of course, even more marked
than in Greek.
102
 On the other band, one does not get a uniform picture of this problem
from the grammarians: cf. Excerpta Audacis VII 361,9fr., interiectiones omnes,
quia de graeco sermone mutuati sumus, ideo in novissimis syllabis fastigium
capiunt. ut papae, attat, ehem.
103
 "All interjections are long, if they are monosyllabic, äs heu; if,
however, they have two or more syllables (since they then look like a part of
speech), they are to be judged by the example of those parts of speech, to
which they will be similar." Max. Vict. VI 239,12ff.; cf. Märt. Cap. III288.
104
 Conversely, Prise. III 65,14ff. mentions the problems of stating rules for
adverbia primitiva. These are mostly monosyllabic, and lack any material for
comparison. The difficulties of accommodating monosyllables in a system of
analogy had troubled the grammarians at least from the first Century B.C.
onwards (Philoxenus, ττερι μονοσυλλάβων ρημάτων).
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which is involved, but prosodic length.105 It should be stressed that word-
accent and length of syllables are, of course, especially narrowly bound up with
each other in Latin, cf. [Prise.] III 520,23ff. in interiectionibus et in peregrinis
verbis et in barbans nominibus nulli certi sunt accentus. ideoque in potestate
uniuscuiusque consistit ut, quomodo necessarium viderit, sie in, metro ponat.^ l
therefore take it that Cledonius does not specifically refer to word-accent.
The view that interjections practically lose their own character, once they
have become so common äs to Start behaving according to recognizable patterns,
is also found in Verg. Maro 176,15ff. According to him the only interjection we
use with any frequency at all, namely vae, has to all practical purposes turned
into a noun, a verb or - most probably - an adverb.107
Finally, a formal characteristic is also involved in the one passage that
mentions that interjections do not form compounds with other words.108
Thus, interjections are characterized by a signal lack of explicit formal
features. They are phonologically irregulär and no firm rules äs to their accent
can be given. However, should an interjection have so distinct a form that it
resembles a regulär part of Speech, it may accordingly behave in an analogous
way.
3.3. Interjections, onomatopoeia and the origin oflanguage
Donatus allows for the possiblity that not only interjections, but other
words, too, may be voce incondita (IV 392,2f. accentus in interiectionibus certi
esse non possunt, ut fere in aliis vocibus quas inconditas invenimus^ cf.
Dosith. VII 424,15). These aliae voces can be identified by comparing his remarks
on accent IV 371,24f. accentus in integris dictionibus observantur, in
interiectionibus et in peregrinis verbis et in barbaris nominibus nulli certi
105
 Cf. [Probus] IV 256,5f. item interiectio admirationis papae duabus longis
constat, primaper unamproductam vocalem, postremaper diphthongum.
106 "in interjections, foreign words and barbaric names there are no firm
accents. Therefore everybody may use them in a metrical context just äs one
sees fit." Cf. for the relationship between word-accent, syllable-length and
metrical usage Gell. NA IV 7, where the correct accents of the Punic names
Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar in the casus obliqui are discussed.
107 Again we are confronted with the pandectes-efiect of the adverb: Each
word which no longer fulfills its original role stops belonging to its original part
of Speech and turns into an adverb, e.g. Char. 252,29ff.; Clem. 88,17ff. Cf.
Pinkster 1972, 42; Lallot 1985, 86.
108
 Clemens Scotus 37,19f.; 38,10.
109
 "As is generally speaking the case in the other words which we find to
be of unestablished form, there can be no certain accents in interjections."
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 Being inconditus entails uncertainty, rather than impossibility, of
spelling. One may compare the modern Western European practice of adapting
Russian names and the resulting wavering spelling, accent and pronunciation.
Interjections may indeed be written - although we have no criterium to establish
whether we have speit them correctly or not, just äs we can write imitations of
sounds that in themselves cannot be written, like the sound of a creaking door,
or one that is slammed, the hissing of a snake and other sonitus illiterati.iu If
we want to incorporate these unwritable sounds in regulär linguistic utterings,
we adapt them by applying the principle of onomatopoeia, the establishing of
form for the unformed sound.112
Onomatopoeia is based on Imitation (κατά μίμησιυ, Demetr. I.e.), like
Priscian's imitationes, and is bound up explicitly with vox confusa, i.e. sound
that cannot be written, by Charisius 361,26ff.: onomatopoeia est dictio ad
imitandum sonum vocis confusae ficta, ut cum dicimus hinnire equos, balare oves,
110
 "The accents are observed in complete, sound words; where
interjections, foreign words and barbarian names are concerned, there are no
firm accents." (This would be noticed in Latin sooner than in Greek, where the
rules limiting word-accent were not violated or adapted in the case of foreign
words, e.g. κεντουρίων.)
Another link between interjections and foreign names is established by Priscian
II 19,37 (?)ff.: (Some Latin interjections have an h in word-final position) nee
mirum, cum in Syrorum Aegyptiorumque dictionibus soleant etiam in fine aspirari
vocales, - interiectionum autem pleraeque communes sunt naturaliter omnium
gentium voces (an appeal to the consensus omnium). Cf. further section 3.3.1. on
the association of inconditus with barbarian speech.
111
 Here another modern parallel offers itself, viz. the practice of our
comics-writers, who also seem to have found generally accepted Solutions for the
writing of the unwritable:
112
 Cf. Lausberg 1960 § 548; Demetr. ehe. 2,94-8; Quint. 8,3,30; 8,6,31. In
Plato's Cratylus Socrates draws attention to the difference between merely
imitating a sound and the Imitation applied when a word is made to "resemble"
the thing denoted (Crat. 423c). Onomatopoeia lies somewhere in between.
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stridere valvas et cetera his sz'mz'ßa.113 It is an activity related to the time
when language originated.114 Further, in itself onomatopoeia always refers to a
noun or verb (or, for that matter, an adjective, adverb or participle) created to
designate a sound or the production of the sound (mugitus, mugire). No
interjections are formed by onomatopoeia, but rather it is words like the
interjections themselves which are at the basis of an onomatopoeic formation
(e.g. Demetr. eloc. 98 ήλέλι,ξε is formed from the άναβόησι? έλελεΰ). It is
seductive to Interpret the Statement that onomatopoeia has to do with names
being given to affectus or ττάθη115 on these lines. Taken in this way,
interjections being voce incondita and expressive of affectus, can be at the basis
of onomatopoeic derivations. This, however, remains speculative and cannot in
itself be considered sufficient evidence of the role interjections were assumed to
have played in the originating of language: Apart from Demetrius - who is no
grammarian and who would probably have classified έλελεϋ äs an adverb
anyway, no grammarian discussed this kind of "onomatopoeia".
I mentioned above that the expression inconditus is often associated with
barbarians,1·1^ animals and the origins of language. Onomatopoeia, too, was
connected with the origin of language, the link with the interjections being the
sonitus illiterati. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to investigate how interjections
are fitted into ancient accounts of the origin of language and, conversely,
whether we can find any clearer traces of these accounts in the grammarians'
discussions.
To start with the latter point: On this issue the Roman grammarians are
separated from the philosophers by the self-imposed barrier discussed above.
113
 "Onomatopoeia is a word created to imitate the sound of an indistinct
uttering, äs when we say that horses 'whinny', sheep 'bleat', doors 'creak', etc.".
(Notice that this again gives us reason to connect the sonitus illiterati with vox
confusa.) Cf. Diomedes I 460, Iff.: onomatopoeia est dictio configurata ad
imitandam vocis confusae significationem (examples äs above). See further
Demetr. eloc.95 οίον ψόφοις έοικέναι.
114
 Demetr. I.e. 94 εοικευ γοϋυ (sc. probably "Ομηρος) όνοματουργών
τοις ττρώτΌΐς θεμένοι,ς τα ονόματα; Quint. 8,3,30 non alia Übertäte quam
<qua> illi primi homines rebus appellations dederunt; 8,6,31 et sunt plurima ita
posita ab iis qui sermonem primi fecerunt.
115
 Demetr. eloc. 94: τα κατά μί,μησιν έκφερόμενα πάθους ή
πράγματος; Quint. 8,3,30 (Graeci) qui sonis etiam quibusdam et affectibus non
dubitaverunt nomina aptare (just like the first namegivers!); 8,6,31 üs qui
sermonem primi fecerunt, aptantes adfectibus vocem: nam mugitus et sibilus et
murmur inde venerunt. However, the last mentioned examples should make us
careful.
116
 The very word βάρβαρος is an onomatopoeic formation imitating the
gibberish of non-Greeks.
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Their choice to integrale the interjections in a theory of the parts of speech
and thus to rationalize the essentially irrational made it a priori unattractive
for them to stress the primitive aspects of the interjection. And since the Greek
grammarians were only rarely explicitly occupied with the interjections äs a
separate category, chances are that we will not find much there either. From the
grammarians one gets no more than a glimpse of the philosophical aspects of a
theory of the interjection - and this glimpse consists of those sidelong
references to barbarian language, animal sounds and the concept of
onomatopoeia mentioned above. To this series may be added children's language
to which I shall have occasion to return below (6.2.). I shall look briefly into
the relation between these categories and the theories on the origin of language,
and refute the view that the Stoics had any function for the interjection in
such a theory.
3.3.1. Children, animals and barbarians
Children's words for "father", "mother" etc. are called ακλι,τα and
ττρωτόθετα by Eustathius (2,815,15ff. vdV.; cf. Od. 2,113,17ff. Stallb.). The first
qualification makes them into adverbs (or interjections), the second links them
with the origin of language.117 Children's language and primitive language are
compared e.g. in Lucretius' description of the origin of language (V 1028-33; cf.
1022).118 Lucretius sees an analogy between the ontogenetical and phylogenetical
evolution of language, i.e. the way a child learns to speak is, äs it were, a
117
 The usual wprd for a "root-word", which may be at the basis of
derivation without being derived itself, is τφωτότυττον. Eustathius also used
ττρωτόθετον in this function, e.g. 2,50,4 vdV.: του δε είλυμένος ττρωτόθετου
το είλώ. The connection with the origin of language appears only in the
passages mentioned above and in 1,63,10fr. vdV. In Od. 2,113,18ff. Stallb. άττα is
described äs follows: καΐ εστίν ή λέξις άτταράγωγος, ακίνητος καΐ το
όλον είττείν ττρωτόθετος. ου γαρ εστίν αρχήν τίνα του αττα εύρείν και,
ουδέ έρμηνείαν έχει. 1,63, lOff. vdV. is a very interesting discussion of
onomatopoeia and the correspondence between significantia and significata. In
l,63,27ff. vdV. the phenomenon of homonymy is explained in the following
comparison: ως γαρ τι? ξενίζων μεν •πλείστους, οικίας δε μη τοσαύτας
έχων, ΐιφ' ένί σταθμω Ηλείους καταλύειν άφίησιν, ούτω καΐ ττερί
όνοαατοθεσίαν ήσχολημένος τις πολλάκις ονόματι ένί ττρωτοθέτω ττολλά
•ΰττήγαγεν ετέρα λαλοΰντα καθ' όμωνυμίαν είς εν.
Πρωτότυττος and ττρωτόθετος are connected in DTh. Techne 25,3f.: τφωτότυττον
... εστί το κατά την ττρώτην θέσιν λεχθέν. Notice that Eustath. l,154,19ff.
vdV. calls ττότΓοι an έτάρρημα τφωτόθετον καΐ 'ίσως ώνοματοττεττοιημένον-
once again the origin of language, onomatopoeia and an adverb (interjection,
see section 6.) are interconnected.
118
 Cf. Schrijvers 1974, 339 with n. 8. The most beautiful ancient
description of a child's learning to talk is Aug. Conf. 1,8 and 13.
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mirror in which we see a reflection of the historical process of man's learning
to speak.
Just like children's language, the "language" of animals is sometimes
connected with theories about the origin of language, in the sense that animals
share in some of the lower, communicative faculties of man. This view is
especially manifest in Aristotle, whose biological comparatism leads him to this
kind of observations, and in Epicurism, where animals are regarded äs the
mirror of nature.119 By the same token, they are supposed to reflect all that is
"natural" in man. What we see in animal language is a reflection of a sub-human
level of linguistic competence. Again Lucretius may be compared.120 Animals are
able to communicate their feelings of metus, dolor and gaudia to one another
(Lucr. V 1061). A fortiori man should be able to develop a means of
communication (V 1056ff.; 1087ff.). A similar observation is found in Aristotle,
who regards the Organisation of nature äs an implicative hierarchy, each level
bearing all the characteristics of the one before, plus some additional power. On
the faculty of Speech he remarks (Pol. 1253a9ff.): λό-γον δε μόνος άνθρωπος
έχει των ζώων ή μεν ουν φωνή του λυττηροϋ καΐ ήδέος εστί
σημείον, διό και τοις άλλοις υπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι -γαρ τούτου ή
φύσις αυτών έλήλυθε, του εχειν αΐσθησιν λυττηροϋ καΐ ήδέος καΐ ταΰτα
σημαίνειν άλλήλοις), ό δε λό-γος έττΐ τω δηλοϋν εστί το συμφέρον καΐ
το βλαβερόν, ώστε καΐ το δίκαιον καΐ το αδικον.
121
 This means that the
human faculty of speech is bound up with the ethical content of what is to be
expressed, whereas the expression of pleasure and pain Stands at a level of
evolution which man shares with all living beings. There is no explicit reference
in this passage to the origin of language äs there is in Lucretius, although there
is the Suggestion of a progressive evolution.122
In Lactantius the relationship between human and animal "speech" is also
pointed out: Animals manage very well to express their emotions. Lactantius calls
119
 Cic. Fin. 2,32 bestiis, quaeputat (sc. Epicurus) esse specula naturae.
120
 V 1056ff. Cf. Schrijvers 1974, n. 11. See further D.L. X 75-6; DeLacy
1939, 88.
121 "Of living beings only man has the power of speech. For the sound of
voice is a sign of pain or pleasure, therefore other living beings also have it
(for their nature has progressed to the experience of pain and pleasure and the
capacity of indicating those things to each other), but the faculty of speech
serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, so that it also indicates
right and wrong." Cf. Ax 1986b, 189 n. 207.
122 N0tice esp. μέχρι γαρ τούτου ή φύσις αυτών έλήλυθε.
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attention to the fact that animal sounds seem inconditae, at least to our ears.
There is no reference to the origin of language in this text either.123
To the Stoa, matters are essentially different. Chrysippus124 also indicated
that there are several levels of sound production and bis remarks link animal and
children's language. Making sound in itself is achieved even by ravens, crows and
children. However this is not logui, but ut loqui. The fundamental difference is
that there is no λόγος behind the sound-production of children and animals.
Animals and children cannot even be credited with expressing their emotions,
their Tta&^/affectus, because they do not have any in the true sense. Emotions
are wrong judgments. If something lacks the Instrument for making judgments,
it cannot, by the same token, be liable to true emotions.125 There is no trace
of a theory of the origin of language in Chrysippus' observations, but only the
development of the faculty of speech in the individual human being is remarked
upon; I shall return to this below, section 3.3.3.
The unintelligibility of animal and barbarian speech is often compared.
Especially bird-sounds are an apt metaphor for the sounds barbarians produce
and vice versah Barbarian words are connected with the interjections in that
they share the qualification inconditus and difficult to spell (see above). There is
only one text which applies the term barbarus to a primitive stage in the
development of mankind. It is found in Manilius who is a rather meagre exponent
of the "Kulturentstehungslehre" (see below).127 He describes the origin of
language in one line: tunc et lingua suas accepit barbara leges. Barbara alludes
123
 Lact. de ira 7,7-8: Nam cetera quae videntur esse homini propria, etsi
non sunt talia in mutis (i.e. animals, which lack the power of speech), tarnen
similia videri possunt. Proprius est homini sermo, est tarnen et in illis quaedam
similitudo sermonis. Nam et dinoscunt invicem se vocibus et, cum irascuntur,
edunt sonum iurgio similem et, cum se ex interyallo vident, gratulandi officium
voce declarant. Nobis quidem voces earum videntur inconditae, sicut et illis
fortasse nostrae, sed ipsis qui se intellegunt verba sunt. Denique in omni adfectu
certas voces notas exprimunt quibus habitum mentis ostendant. Notice the
similarity of the last sentence to the definition of the interjection in the
grammarians. It cannot be excluded that Lactantius was influenced by Lucretius,
cf. Ingremeau (Bude-ed.) a.1.
124
 InVarroLLVI56.
125
 Cf. Dierauer 1977, 233f. Posidonius defends an adapted form of child-
and animal-psychology, because he does not believe that all affectus derive from
the activities of the λόγος.
126
 Cf. Dierauer 1977, 30f.; e.g. Hdt. 2,57; for more references see Dierauer
1977, 31 n. 33. Cf. also Hesych. s.v. χελιδόνας δίκην: τους βαρβάρους
χελιδόσιν άττεικάζουσι δια τήυ άσύνθετον λαλιάν.
127
 See Fehling 1965, 224.
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to the inarticulateness of primitive sounds, which resemble the inarticulateness of
a foreign language. Furthermore, barbarus has, of course, general overtones of
lack of cultivation;128 and that is exactly what the tongue suffered from before
it had learned to talk properly.129
3.3.2. Διάρθρωσις and theories ofthe development of language
This takes us to a major factor which operated in the development of
language, the process of articulation (διάρθρωσις).130 Διάρθρωσις is a term used
in a physiological sense for the development of, for instance, the embryo.131
When applied to the tongue, it refers to the articulatory activities of that
organ. Άρθρόω, too, seems to be used primarily in the physiological context of
the development and usage of parts of the body.132 As far äs we know,
Lucretius was the first to translate this term by articulare (IV 549).133
Now, it will be remembered that there are two mainstreams in the ancient
theories on the origin of language.134 The first sees language äs an invention (in
accordance with the traditional establishing of a ττρώτος εΰρέι-ης). This
invention is attributed either to a god or to a kind of cult hero. The second
explanation is more scientific in approach and combats the "mythological" views
of the first one: It looks upon language äs the product of an evolution from an
animal existence to a civilized, more fully human Situation.135 Traditionally, the
128
 This connotation is absent from older Greek.
129
 Cf. Sen. Cons. ad Polyb. 11,18,8 barbarorum inconditus fremitus;
Dubuisson 1984, 55ff.
130
 Again note the terminological relationship: The process of διάρθρωσις
is often applied to things that are συγκεχυμένος (= confusus): Porph. ad
Marcellam 10: Συνάγοις δ' αν καΐ ένί,ζοις τάς έμφυτους εννοίας καΐ
διαοθοοϋν συγκενυμένας καΙ είς φως ελκειν έσκοησμένας ττειρωμένη ...
διαρθροί/ης δ' όϊν α -/ε άκήκοας. The same Opposition occurs (in a physical
sense) Ar. GA 721b34: συγκεχυμένου vs. διηρθρωμένον γράμμα (of a birth-
mark). The only passage where συγκεχυμένος is used of primitive language is
Diod.Sic. 1,8,3.
For what it is worth, Σΰγχυσις is the name used in the Septuaginta for Babel
(Gen. 11:7-9).
131
 Cf. Dierauer 1977, 32f.; Ar. HA 504a7.
132
 Cf. Ar. HA 535a25ff.; cf. 536a4; PA 660al4ff.; X. Mem. 1,4,12.
133 jVfoöz'fe articulat verborum (sc. voces) daedala lingua. Cf. Schrijvers
1974, 353f.
134
 Fehling 1965, 220ff. See chapter I section 2.2.
135
 Fehling 1965, 223ff.
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most important representatives of the "invention" group are Plato's Cratylus136
and the Stoa. The evolutiouary theory is exemplified by Epicurism.
In the evolutionary conception of the origin of language the process of
διάρθρωσις
137
 consists in the gradual articulation and clarification of the
primitive indistinct sounds produced by force of nature.138 These primitive
sounds would be the kind of interjections of pain, pleasure and fear discussed
above.139 Διάρθρωσις functions on a phylogenetical level here.
In the group of "mythical" theories a sub-distinction may be made. In the
homonymous dialogue of Plato, Protagoras describes the invention of language äs
follows (322a5ff.): εττειτα φωυήυ και ονόματα ταχΐι δι/ηρθρώσατο τη τέχνη
καΐ οικήσεις καΐ ... ηυρετο.
140
 In this case we clearly have to do with the
beginnings of human civilization. Primitive man brings Order into the unformed
sounds and thus language springs into existence. But not all members of this
"mythical" group apply the principle of διάρθρωσις to the primitive stage of
language.
Although διάρθρωσις also plays a role in Stoicism, I do not believe it has
anything to do with the origin of language there. From chapter I section 2.2. it
should be clear that no parallelism between ontogenetical processes and
phylogenetical ones can be attested in the case of the Stoics: On the contrary, a
process to arrive at a perfect state is out of the question; διάρθρωσι? can be
important only in the development of the linguistic abilities of the individual
136
 The Cratylus deserves mention here, because it was used äs a point of
reference in the discussion by the other ancient participants. It is not, however,
primarily concerned with the origin of language at all, but with the relationship
between words and things, and thus with the relationship between language and
knowledge. If words are based on a supreme knowledge of the world, we can
learn to know the world through a study of words. If words attach to things in
a random way, in accordance with what the Speakers arbitrarily agreed upon,
words have no inherent cognitive value. Cf. Giussani 1896, 267ff.; Fehling 1965,
220ff., esp. 225f. Fehling argues that the special character of the Cratylus
consists in its combining the "mythical" view of the origin of language with
etymology.
137
 Fehling 1965, 224.
138
 Cf. Pellicer 1966, 345: "Chez Lucrece ... natura dans le theme de
l'origine du langage se dofinit avant tout par son Opposition ä l'hypothese d'une
creation volontaire, reflechie, oeuvre de quelque homme suporieur, et peut-etre
par Opposition implicite ä l'idee que la divinite a pu intervenir dans le meme sens."
139
 Our main sources for the Epicurean analysis of the origin of language
are Lucr. V 1028ff. and a brief account in D.L. X 75f. (= Epic. ep. ad Hat ) Cf
further SE AM 1 142; Philo Mut. 262; Fehling 1965, 227f.
140 "Xheri he quickly and ably articulated sound and names and invented
houses and ..."
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child, who at first cannot use bis tongue at all, but subsequently learns to speak
(loqui).14i I have not found the word διάρθρωσις explicitly applied to this
process, but if it had a function in the Stoic theory of the development of
speech in the individual, it must have been this one. For διάρθρωσις does occur
in the description of a closely related phenomenon, namely the development of
the ττρολήψείΛ in a child, which are necessary for bis epistemological and ethical
functioning.142 In the ethical part of Stoic philosophy, διάρθρωσις figures in the
heading of a series of titles by Chrysippus. The works summed up belong to the
ηθικοί λόγου του ττερί την διάρθρωσιν των ηθικών εννοιών.
143
What, then, about the Stoics' views on primitive, inarticulate sound, on
interjections?
3.3.3. The Stoics, the origin oflanguage and interjections
In his 1961 article on "Interjektionen und Naturlaute", Pinborg so focused
on the relationship between interjections and origin of speech that he telescoped
a theory of the interjection into the different theories about the origin of
language. He concluded that there were two mainstreams in Greek philosophical
linguistics, a Stoicizing current emphasizing the rational content of this part of
speech144 and a current on Epicurean lines, which considered the interjection
"ein Relikt der Ursprache und ein Naturlaut" (1961, 135). This theory has to be
revised in various respects.
As will be remembered (chapter I section 2.2.) the Stoics believed that
language, like man, was originally in perfect rational order. It is unclear in what
way this rational order was initially effected. However this may be, original
language, like original man, undergoes a process of gradual corruption
(διαστροφή) and it is alienated from its origins. This process of corruption
141
 Cf. Varro LL VI 56 (Chrysippus) discussed above. Cf. also Lucr. IV
549ff. and V 1031.
142
 These are closely related anyway. Cf. Epict. 1,17,1; 2,11,18; Pohlenz
1947, II 33.
143
 "Ethical work on the articulation of ethical concepts" (SVF II 8,28). Cf.
the proposed Supplement SVF II 4,37. See Barwick 1957, 60 and Epict. 2,17,7; 10;
13.
144
 Here, there seems to be a confusion of the rationalisation of the
affectus and that of a linguistic means to express these affectus, cf. above
section 3.3.1. Since affectus are undesirable, why should the Stoics have paid
special attention to the correct (?) way of linguistically expressing them?
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affects the whole kosmos.145 Eventually, it leads to an έκττύρωσις, after which
a new cycle Starts. Evidently, there is no room in this picture for sub-human
sounds gradually evolving into organized language. The general primitivistic
tendencies of the Stoa, i.e. - schematically speaking - the belief in a general
decline from perfection to destruction, decidedly teil against this.146
Moreover, in no way can the ττρώται φωυαί that according to Origenes c.
Celsum 24 were an "imitation of the things", be identified with the interjections.
The examples our spokesmen adduce are onomatopoeic formations of the type
hinnire, balare, mugire, for which see above. Even supposing that the examples
are provided by later sources which partially, or even completely, misunderstood
the Stoic intentions, we are not justified in drawing this kind of unwarranted
conclusions on the strength of the meagre Information we possess.
For, and this is my third and final point, the Stoics did not even recognize
the interjections äs a separate part of speech. It is unclear whether they took
any notice of them at all in their discussions of the adverbs and even if they
did, we should remember that not until Antipater was this part of speech added
to the original five parts of speech distinguished by the Stoics. Considering,
therefore, the relatively marginal Status of the adverbs in Stoic linguistic theory
and the absence of the interjections, I think it would be too much to attribute
to them a rationalizing theory of the interjection.
145
 For an extreme example of this kind of cultural pessimism, see Sen ep.
90.
146
 Cf. Lovejoy & Boas 1935, 260ff.
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3.3.4. Recapitulation
The results of this section are the following: In Antiquity there were two
different approaches to the question of the origin of language. One group, the
"mythical" one, assumed there had been a first namegiver (or namegivers). He
created a language in which perfect, rational order obtained. Words and things
denoted were related in a logical way. In these theories, evidently, there is no
place for interjections, representing a sub-human animal stage of
communication, at least not if this stage is seen äs a preparation for the
functioning of "real" language. There is not a trace left of any Stoic interest for
such words.
The other group, represented by Epicurus, believed in a gradual evolution.
One can get an idea of how this evolution worked by observing a child learning
to speak. In this theory, interjections were regarded äs prototypic, primitive
utterings, which were used to give vent to feelings of anger, joy, fear, pain etc.
If the grammarians borrowed philosophical ideas for their theories of the
interjection, they would have to use the material provided by this group. As a
matter of fact, we do find some indications of the relationship between
interjections and primitive language in the grammarians, but it is nowhere made
explicit - and this can easily be explained by the same mechanism äs operated in
the grammarians' terminological procedures: Explicit reference to the
primitiveness and sub-human nature of the interjections would have undermined
their Status äs a full-blown pars orationis. This may be the reason why
philosophical motifs were suppressed in this chapter of the artes grammaticae.
4. Adverbs and interjections^
4.1. Theseparation
The most important question regarding the Latin theory of the interjection
is, of course, what made the Romans separate it from the adverbs? Julius
Romanus (Char. 246,25ff.) devotes quite some attention to the diverse possible
Solutions of the meristic distribution of adverbs and interjections.148 The
147
 I also discussed the subject matter of this section in Sluiter 1989.
148
 This interesting and very complicated passage will be dealt with
exhaustively in a monograph on Julius Romanus by Professor D.M. Schenkeveld
(forthcoming). I will not, therefore, discuss it in detail, but remark the following
only: I believe Rpmanus mentions three possibilities:
a) The interjections do not form a part of speech of their own; they belong with
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principal objection to the combination of adverbs and interjections into one part
of speech is the fact that interjections do not fulfil the foremost task of an
adverb, namely that of closely adhering to the verb syntactically and
semantically. Interjections may even occur in sentences which completely lack a
verb, so that they clearly cannot be adverbs. To give one instance of this
argumentation: Serv. in Verg. A. XII 486: omne adverbium verbo cohaeret. unde
'heu', 'en' et 'attat' et similia, quia verbo cohaerere non possunt, separata
fecerunt aliam partem orationis, scilicet intenectionem, quam sola Latinitas
possidet.i49 Incidentally, certain sources stress the fact that the Greeks
refrained from separating interjections from adverbs because they thought that
the interjections were in fact construed with a verb or that a verb might at
least be understood.150
There is also the factor that the Romans had no use for the article äs a
separate part of speech, since Latin does not have any articles, although the
Suggestion that they only adopted the interjection to make up the (Aristarchean)
canonical number of eight parts of speech is indignantly rejected at least
once.151 However, some of the Latin grammarians' descriptions of the parts of
speech increase the suspicion that this Suggestion is not completely unfounded,
the adverbs (opinion of the Greeks, 246,25ff. and of an unidentified group
(possibly the Greeks are meant again), 247,llf.).
b) The other extreme position is represented by Umbrius Primus, who assigns the
interjections to a part of speech of their own, which is unrelated to that of the
adverb. Although he does recognize the possibility of homophony of the adverbs
with other parts of speech, he rejects the existence of such a relationship
between the adverbs and the interjection (247,9f.).
c) The intermediate position is exemplified by Jul. Romanus himself: He puts the
interjections into a separate part of speech, but realizes that interjections may
often coincide with adverbs (247,3ff.)·
149
 "Every adverb coheres with a verb. Therefore, because 'heu'., 'en' and
'attat' etc. cannot cohere with a verb, they separately constitute another part of
speech, viz. the interjection, which Latin only possesses." This argument is found
in one form or another in Jul. Rom. (Char.) 246,23ff.; 248,7ff.; Diom. I 419,19ff.;
Don. IV 386,23f.; 391,28ff.; Aug. V 518,23ff.; Dos. VII 424,10ff.; Clemens Scotus
108,17ff.
150
 Prise. III 90,6ff.; cf. ApD. adv. 121,14ff. See further section 6.3.1.
151
 Jul. Romanus (Char.) 246,26ff. Note that the number of the parts of
speech very long remained a matter of dispute. In the first Century p.Chr.n. the
critic and rhetor Dionysius of Halicarnassus was totally unaware of a canonical
number (Schenkeveld 1983, 72f.). Quintilian accepts eight parts, but in the
second Century Herodian still separated proper and common nouns, äs did Scaurus
in the third (Diom. I 300,27). However, the Latin grammarians from the fourth
Century and later always adopt the number of eight parts.
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or was at least shared by some of the ancient grammarians themselves.152
Quintilian blandly states that the interjection fills the vacancy of the article
(1,4,19):153 noster sermo articulos non desiderat ... sed accedit superioribus
interiectio.1^4
On the other hand, I think there is ample reason to believe that the Roman
grammarians were actually induced to create the part of speech of the
interjections by truly linguistic considerations, and not mere chauvinism. For
what about the famous Stoic influence on Roman grammar? Without going into
the question of the exact extent of this influence, I think no one will dispute its
existence. However, in this particular case, Roman grammar seems to have taken
a conscious stand against the Stoa in not accepting the appellatio or proper
name äs a separate part of speech,i;55 a procedure which would also have
brought the number of parts up to eight. It is not unlikely therefore that
Palaemon, the founder of the Roman eight-parts System (Quint. 1,4,20) did make
bis readjustments of the Greek list on conceptual, rather than merely
arithmetical grounds.
Nevertheless, adverbs and interjections were often hard to distinguish, äs
was noted in the very definition of the interjection by M. Plotius Sacerdos cited
above (2.1.)·
4.2. Distinctive features of interjections vs. adverbs
The features which enabled the grammarians to assign a word in a certain
context either to the adverbs or to the interjections were the following:
1. The form of the interjections (see also section 3.2.2.). This criterium assigns a
number of words to the interjections straight away on account of their irregulär
formation, and is also used to distinguish between homonyms. In the latter case
the explanation may needs be somewhat forced.
152
 Diom. I 301,lf.; Cled. V 34,19ff.; Pomp. V 135,13ff.; cf. Serv. (?) IV
428,14f.; ars Bernensis VIII 63,15ff.; ars Ambros. 4,104ff.
153
 Although the addition of the interjection has in this case nothing to do
with preserving eight parts of speech; this number is not mentioned until after
our passage.
154
 "Our language has no need for articles ... but the interjection adjoins
the parts of speech mentioned above."
155
 The Stoics had divided the part of speech of the nouns into proper and
common nouns, cf. D.L. VII 57. (Incidentally, the Stoics knew five (or six) parts
of speech.) Scaurus alone of the Latin grammarians seems to have taken over
this feature of Stoic grammar, Diom. 1300,27.
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2. The presence or absence of affectus (cf. Julius Romanus (Char.) 247,25f.).
Clearly, there is some danger of subjectivity in applying this criterium. It is
closely related to the third and last criterium: As interjections signify affectus
only, they may be omitted without syntactical consequences. In other words:
3. "Optionality" of the word under discussion, i.e. the (lack of) syntactic and/or
semantic coherence with verbs or the linguistic context in general (cf. Julius
Romanus (Char.) 248,7ff.; 249,19ff.; Probus IV 146,14).
In general it should again be noted that in the case of the interjections the
grammarians are confronted with the paradoxical problem of having to rationalize
the linguistic functioning of a group of words which by its very nature defies
such a procedure. There is tension between the essentially irrational character of
the interjections and the attempts to cover them in a technical grammatical
theory. This difficulty is most acute where decisions have to be taken about the
emotional load conferred by interjections (the second criterium mentioned above).
The second and third criteria are succinctly described by Diomedes (I
419,17ff.) et fere quidquid motus animi orationi inseruerit (criterium 2), quo
detracto textus integer reperitur (criterium 3), numero interiectionis accedet^
Probus also Stresses the emotional load of the interjections (IV 146,34ff)
sie et ceterae interiectiones ab aliis partibus orationis discemuntur, hoc est ut,
quotiens animurn per suspirationem commovere inveniuntur, tunc suae potestatis
esse intellegantur^ When applied to a homonym, the criterium works äs
follows (IV 146,8ff.): heu, si cum animi affectu proferatur, hoc est per
suspirationem (cf. bis definition, section 3.1.), ent interiectio ut 'heu misero
coniunx' [Verg. A. 2,738]; si vero heu simpliciter proferatur, ent adverbium
respondentis, ut 'heu', vel laudantis, ut 'heu bene fecisti'.^8
To qualify äs an interjection, a word should be used äs a kind of
autonomous uttering which is only expressive of the speaker's own feelings,
without having any other function either in a narrowly linguistic or a pragmatic
(social, communicative) context. - Even if the uttering of the interjection
produces the effect of informing others about our state of mind, that is an
156
 "And virtually everything that is added to our Speech by the emotions
of the soul, the removal of which leaves a sound text, belongs to the interjections."
157
 "In the same way the other interjections, too, may be discerned from
the other parts of speech, i.e. that we understand them to be independent,
whenever they are found to move the soul in a sigh."
158
 "If 'heu' is uttered with some agitation of the soul, i.e. in a sigh, it
will be an interjection, e.g. 'heu misero coniunx', '"heu" my wife (snatched away)
by miserable (fate)'; if on the other band it is uttered just like that, it will be
an adverb of answering, e.g. 'heu', or of praise, e.g. '"heu" well done.'" One
wonders if in the latter example Greek ευ was heard.
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accidental by-product and by no means an intentional achievement on the part of
the Speaker. - If, on the other band, the word in question is used to address a
second person, 'si pro vocatione aliqua proferatur' (Probus IV 146,14), it is an
adverb. In the latter case a vocative and/or a verb in the second person may
also be present. This seems to be the difference between the examples given by
Probus (IV 146,llff.) hei mihi quantum mutatus ab illo Hectore159 (Verg. A. II
274) (expression of personal anxiety) and hei mihi/pater esse disce ab illis, qui
vere scz'wnf160 (Ter. Ad. 124f.), although the same combination hei mihi features
in both. In the former example the Speaker addresses no one in particular; in the
latter there is a recognizable communicative intention. The addressee is supposed
to take notice of the feelings of irritation and despair of the Speaker. The whole
distinction is, of course, somewhat forced.161
All the same, Probus' discussion is not entirely free from problems: (IV
146,21ff.) o, si cum animi affectu proferatur, hoc est per suspirationem, erit
interiectio, ut puta Ό mihi sola mei super Astyanactis imago'iS2 (Verg. A. 3,489;
no verb present; expression of personal anxiety). si vero o ad accusativum casum
proferatur, erit adverbium exclamantis, ut Ό condicionem miseram', item Ό
bellum magnopere pertimescendum'^ Absence of a verb alone is apparently an
insufficient reason to assign a word to the class of the interjections. From Char.
247,26f., too, it appears that occasionally adverbs may be construed with cases
instead of verbs. A word like o may therefore be an adverb when combined with
an exclamatory accusative.
But what, then, are we to think of another example adduced by the same
Probus (IV 146,3If.): va quemquamne hominem in animo instituere aut/parare quod
sit carius, quam ipse est sibi (Ter. Ad. 38f.)?164 Here, va is called an interiectio
159
 '"Hei mihi', how different from that Hector"
160 mfjei mihi' learn to be a father from those, who really know."
161
 Cf. Pomp. V 251,24ff. The distinction is not universally recognized, cf.
e.g. Julianus' example totto (section 3.1. in fine), which clearly has a
communicative intention. Ancient theory is not monolithic.
162 <"Q' van b
e an
 interjection, if it is uttered emotionally, i.e. in a sigh,
e.g. Ό image only that is left of my Astyanax'."
163
 "If, on the other band, Ό' is uttered in a construction with an
accusative, it will be an exclamatory adverb, e.g. "Ό" miserable Situation', and
again "Ό" war, much to be feared'." The examples stem from Curt. 7,1,37 and
Cic. Cat. 2,24 respectively.
164 «>y
a
> fa
ai any0ne should take it into his head to procure a thing to be
dearer to him than his own seif (transl. Sargeaunt (adapted)). -ne is a
coniunctio according to ancient theory, cf. e.g. Probus IV 145,16ff.
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because it is used cum animi affectu. Perhaps Probus instinctively feit that the
tie between va and the exclamatory accusativus cum infinitivo was looser than
the one between o and the accusativus exclamationis in the preceding example.
The presence of -ne (in quamquamne etc.) may have exerted its influence
here.165 In that case va practically forms an exclamation by itself and represents
a separate uttering expressive of the mood of the Speaker only.
Something very similar is described in Julius Romanus (Char.) 313,18ff. Em
G. Gracchus ut lex Papiria accipiatur: 'pessimi Tiberium fratrem meum Optimum
interfecerunt. em! videte quam par pari sim'. at quidam em pro en volunt esse,
sed decet commemorationi fratemae mortis ingemescere. itaque mora distinctionis
par est ostendere adfectus.^66
If the Interpretation of quidam is followed, en is an adverb adhering closely to
videte (address of second person; demonstrative adverb).167 Reading em followed
by a pause implies that em is an independent uttering indicating the emotional
state of mind of the Speaker.168 As an indication that we should read the
passage so, we must punctuate after em! (distinctio^^This solution is preferred
by Charisius äs the more fitting, since a brother's death is involved. Thus, in
this case also, it is the independence of the linguistic context and the fact that
the word in question is not used to communicate anything,170 if I may thus
165
 Cf. KS 1719f. (16).
166
 "'Em' is used by C. Gracchus in his plea tp get the lex Papiria
accepted: "The most worthless people have killed Tiberius, my most excellent
brother. "Em!" Ipok how I resemble him'. But some claim that 'em' is used in lieu
of 'en'. But it is fitting to moan at the remembrance of the death of one's
brother. Therefore, it is suitable to show the emotionality by a pause, i.e. by
punctuating." Cf. Dipm. I 437,10ff.; 438,26 Diomedes declares that one of the
reasons for interposing a mora is, "ut actus verborum emineat et luceat, qui ex
aliquo moveatur affectu vel indignatione vel miseratione conlata".
167
 Cf. Don. IV 386,10 where the examples of a demonstrative adverb are
en and ecce. There is, however, some confusion about en and em. Diomedes calls
both en and em demonstrative adverbs in I 404,9; 419,11 em is called an
interjection quae intentius aliquid demonstrantem significat. The sole difference
between the interjection and the adverb seems to be the intensity of the
demonstration.
168
 Cf. L W. Beck, de differentiarum scriptoribus Latinis, Grom'ngae 1883, 54
no. 6: inter 'en' et 'em' ... : en cum ostendis, velut est ecce; em cum increpas.
Cf. Agroec. VII 114,13.
169
 Cf. note 178.
170
 It should be stressed again that not even the feelings pf the Speaker
are intended to be communicated to anybody eise. The Speaker is, if anything,
addressing himself. Cf. Don. in Ter. Eun. 65, quoted in note 3. The interjection
is a sign of α-ύτοττάθεια, cf. ApD. adv. 127,12.
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express it, which are decisive in classifying it äs an interjection. In this case it
is tantamount to deciding that em should be read, rather than en. For a pause äs
a test and sign of a looser syntactical relationship, cf. also ApD. synt. 305,13ff.
There the question is whether σίι in crii -γράφεις is a nominative or a vocative:
δττερ (viz. συ γράφεις) ένούμευου ευθείας εστίν, ομοίου τω εγώ
γράφω κάκεΐνος γράφει, έττενόίίενον δε κατά τήυ συ και έττιστρέφον το
ττροσφωυούμενον κλητικήυ ομολογήσει.171
Returning to the method of distinguishing homonyms, I shall discuss one
more example, namely heu. At four places Cledonius discusses the Status of heu
and gives three different criteria for distinguishing the adverb heu from the
interjection. At V 21,6ff. we read: heu: quaerendum est quando adverbium sit
respondendi, quando interiectio. si verbum sequitur, adverbium. si alteram partem
orationis, interiectio est. This corresponds to the third criterium mentioned above
(this section in initio) and is by now familiär enough.
At V 21,20ff. the difference between the interiectio dolentis and the
adverbium respondendi is marked by a prosodic feature (cf. the first criterium
mentioned above):172 producta interiectio est, correpta adverbium respondendi.™
These words are not äs straightforward äs they may seem. For admittedly we do
find the rule that all monosyllabic interjections are long (e.g. Max. Vict. VI
239,12ff.), but the same is upheld for monosyllabic adverbs (ibid. 237,9f.). Besides,
we have to do here with a homonym, which in all interpretations contains the
same diphthong, and should, therefore, be long.
Perhaps one should connect Cledonius' Statements here with those at V
67, lf.: heus, si raptim proferimus, adverbium est; si cum dolore, interiectio. sie et
heu.114 Now, what exactly does raptim mean? Raptim, I submit, refers to the
identical effect äs produced by corripere, both being indicative of a way of
articulating a syllable.175 Moreover, I think we may safely take it that raptim
171
 "When it is united in a single [phrase], it is nominative, parallel to ego
grapho (Ί am writing') and ekeinos graphei ('He is writing') [rather: ego grapho
kakeinos graphei (Ί write and he writes'); Householder's translation requires
και, I.S.], but if you hesitate after the su and use it to call the attention of
your addressee, then it will be admitted [that su is] a vocative", transl.
Householder.
172
 The adverbia respondendi are quite commonly distinguished äs a
semantic sub-group of the adverbs, cf. Jeep 1893, 278.
173
 "If it is lengthened, it is an interjection, if it is pronounced short, it is
an adverb of answering."
174
 "If we utter 'heus' rapidly, it is an adverb; if we utter it with pain, it
is an interjection. The same goes for 'heu'" Here, incidentally, the third
criterium used by Cledonius (emotionality) also appears.
175
 Independent, of course, of the nature of the vowel. Cf. note 101. 217
proferri is synonymous with cursim proferri in the following quotation from
Cledonius (V 31,31ff.): Acutus qui cursim profertur, ut arma, excusso enim sono
dicendum est; circumflexus qui tractim, ut Röma,™ In its turn, tractim proferri
is certainly identical to producere, äs can be shown from Gellius (NA IV 6,6):
"succidaneae" ... littera i scilicet tractim pronuntiata; audio enim quosdam eam
litteram in hac voce barbare corripereP^ For in this text corripere is opposed
to tractim pronuntiare. What, then, are the consequences for our passage?
Whether heu is an adverb or an interjection, its diphthong will be naturally
long. However, sometimes it is uttered more rapidly (thus perhaps even creating
an impression of correption?), sometimes it is drawn out. If it is an interjection,
the pathos itself that induces us to utter it, makes us linger over its
articulation. Therefore we produce it tractim with a circumflex accent. If, on
the other hand it is an adverb, it is uttered with an acute accent, which creates
the impression of its being shortened.178
176 "The
 one produced rapidly is the acute accent, äs in arma. For it has
to be said with an ejection of sound; the circumflexus is the one produced with
a drawl, äs Roma." It is usual for the Roman grammarians to describe Latin
prosody in terms of Greek grammar, cf. Kroll 1924, 17; Allen 1973, 15 If. Roman
grammarians do not simply equate the distribution of acute and circumflex
accents with short and long vowels, cf. e.g. Prise. II 7,13ff. hamis vs. hämus, cf.
κώμοι? vs. κώμος. See e.g. Märt. Capella 3,272f.
177
 "'Succidaneae' ... with lengthened z, of course; for I hear that some
take that letter short in this word, thus committing a barbarism."
178
 It cannot be excluded that Cledonius also had at the back of his mind
the absence of a pause (to be stressed by punctuation) after heu, cf. above on
Prob. IV 146,3 If. and Char. 313,18ff. However, I do not find it likely. Admittedly,
there are signs that the ancient grammarians were aware of the effect of a
pause on the length of the preceding syllable (Aphth. VI 37,26ff. nam cum
sermo terminatur et postrema clauditur syliaba, ad initium alterius transitum fieri
manifestum est, quod intervallum aliquanti temporis intercapedinem sumit: sie
syllabae naturalis brevitas additamento temporis crescit.). But it would be too
much to say that the word itself is producta in that case: The grammarians
clearly state that the additional time involved is filled with silence. following the
word in question (cf. also Aphth. VI 77,20f. mora temporis intercedente, quae in
fine versus naturaliter contingit). Although rhythmically speaking more time
passes, this has no metrical consequences, and the context m which the
grammarians discuss this phenomenon is metrical rather than rhythmical
(musical), cf. Aphth. VI 39,6ff. Morepver, they usually apply the concept of
lengthening to cases where a syllable is naturally short. To my knowledge our
place would be the only Latin source where such an effect is described on a
syllable which is long already by nature. Cf. however Ruijgh 1987 for a similar
theory in Dionysius of Halicarnassus - note that no monosyllables are taken into
account there.
Further, the use of correpta would also be Strange, since the reverse effect, the
absence of a pause, is not normally regarded äs the cause of shortening. This
last qbjection could perhaps be countered by the observation that correpta need
describe no more than a relative length in comparison wüh producta.
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One problem is left, viz. the rule that in principle all monosyllables
containing a naturally long vocal or diphthong, have the circumflexus.119
However, the avoidance of συνέμτττωσι,ς may cause this rule to be ignored.180
Finally, at V 69,12f. Cledonius uses the second criterium (cf. this section in
initio) of the interjections' emotional impact: (heu) ... quando ingemiscentis est,
interiectio est.
5. Translating interfections
The uncertainties, especially the semantic ones, surrounding the
interjections caused their translators not a little trouble. By way of a short
excursus I will give a brief survey of the theoretical remarks devoted to the
translation of the interjection. Hardly surprising, this is a terrain which is
dominated by the Christian writers. For in Antiquity the Bible constituted the
main translation-problem. In this section I will give some examples of how this
problem was handled regarding the interjections.
In epist. 20181 Jerome answers the request of Damasus (epist. 19) to explain
to him the expression osanna.182 In 20,3,8 Jerome completes his discussion of the
second part of the word, viz. anna, which may represent two different Hebrew
words: Ex quo animadvertimus, si ex aleph scribatur 'anna', significari Obsecro',
si autem ex heth, esse coniunctionem sive interiectionem, quae apud Graecos
ponitur δη et est in σώσον δη, cuius Interpretationen Latinus sermo non
179
 Cf. [Serg.] IV 524,24; Aphth. VI 192,24ff.
180
 Don. IV 371,25ff. accentuum legem vel distinguendi vel pronuntiandi
ratio vel discernendae ambiguitatis necessitas saepe conturbat; Prise. III 520,27ff.
An example for this procedure is the homonym pone. If pone is a verb, nothing
is the matter; if it is an adverb, it is accentuated on the last syllable. Priscian
adds: quod apud Latinos in ultima syllaba nisi discretionis causa accentus poni
non polest (/./.). The other frequent example is ergo. However, here the
descriptions vary, cf. e.g. Prise, ibid.; [Probus] IV 252, 21ff.; [Serg.] IV 525,llff.;
Velius Longus VII 53,3; Excerpta Audacis VII 330,17; 360,25f.
181
 Cf. Holtz 1981, 39 for the relationship between Jerome's remarks on the
interjection with the theory of Donatus.
182
 On difficulties in translating ωσαννά, cf. Orig. in Matth. 21:9
(Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei, lib. 16,19,62ff. (ed. E. Klostermann,
Origenes' Werke, vol. 10,1. Leipzig 1935). Cf. Neuschäfer 1987,106.
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exprimit.183 Notice that the doubtful expression "coniunctionem sive
interiectionem" is caused by the fact that the Greek did indeed translate it by a
conjunction (namely the σύνδεσμος δη), whereas in Latin no translation was
made at all. Had it been translated, though, the emotional character of the plea
would have demanded an interjection.
Jerome then says that, äs the complete expression osanna could not easily
be translated into Greek, the evangelists - with the exception of Luke who
possibly did not want to puzzle his readers with doubtful Greek - simply took it
over, just like alleluia and amen (20.4. lOff.).
Summing up, Jerome explains that just äs Latin has its interjections, ita et
Hebraei inter reliquas proprietates linguae suae habent interiectionem, ut, quando
volunt Dominum deprecari, ponant verbum petentis affectu et dicant 'anna
Domine', quod Septuaginta dixerunt Ό Domine'. Osi' ergo 'salvifica' interpretatur,
'anna' interiectio deprecantis esl184
In Tract. de PS. 114:4, too, Jerome observes how hard it is to make the
Latin or Greek correspond äs closely to the Hebrew äs possible: Proprietatem
Hebraid Graecus et Latinus exprimere non possunt. Pro o_ in Hebraeo habet
ANNA (which, Jerome teils us, means rogo et deprecor) ... non est enim mirantis,
sed deprecantis affectus.185 Thus, anna is more explicit and less ambiguous than
o.
Sometimes the possibilities of translation are severely doubted, äs in
Isidorus Etym. I 14: Quae voces (sc. the interjections) quarum[cum]que linguarum
propriae sunt, nee in aliam linguam fädle transferuntur.1^ The problem of
finding a correct equivalent for interjections in translations could be solved in
183
 "Therefore, we notice that anna means 'if you please', if it is written
with an aleph; if it is written with a heth, it is a conjunction or an
interjection, like the Greek δη in σώσου δη ('save us') [the Greek translation
of Osanna - osi-anna], which in Latin is not expressly translated."
184
 " ... so too the Hebrews haye interjections among the other features of
their language, so that, when they wish to beseech the Lord, they use the word
of someone who makes a passionate appeal, and say anna Domine, which is
rendered by the Septuaginta o Domine. Thus, osi translates 'save us', anna is an
interjection of beseeching." Cf. Hier. Comm. in PS. 117:25 (CCSL 72, 235).
185
 "Greek and Latin cannot express the Hebrew idiom. Instead of o Hebrew
says 'ANNA' ... For the sentiment is not that of wonder, but of begging."
186 "χ^^ words are peculiar to each language, nor can they be easily
translated into another language." Cf. Aug. PLM 34,1241, serm.dom.in monte c. IX
23 cited below. Pinborg 1961, 133. Prise. II 20,7f. intenectionum ... pleraeque
communes sunt naturaliter omnium gentium voces seems to hold the contrary
opinion, but he is not considering semantics, but describing a phonological
phenomenon.
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different ways. Most simply, the word under discussion might be taken over from
object- to target-language, even at the risk of forming a corpus alienum there.
Luke avoided this risk and chose a second option, viz. leaving out the
exceptionable word. If the Interpreter chose the hard way, he tried to determine
the emotional value of the interjection - since no definite meaning could be
assigned to it - and looked to see if the target-language possessed a word which
would confer the same affectus. Apart from hosanna, another frequent example is
RACHA: Augustinus (PLM 34, 1241, serm.dom.in monte c. IX 23) was told that
RACHA ... esse vocem non significantem aliquid sed indignantis animi motum
expnmentem. Has interiectiones grammatici vocant particulas orationis
significantes commoti animi affectum ... Quae voces quarumque linguarum sunt
propriae,^1 nee in aliam linguam fädle transferuntur: quae causa utique coegit
tarn graecum Interpretern quam latinum vocem ipsam ponere, cum quomodo eam
interpretaretur non inveniret.188
Augustinus also believes that hosanna should be considered an interjection:
(CCSL 36,440 (Tract. in loh. LI 2)) Quod ideo credendum est ita esse, quia neque
Graecus neque Latinus hoc interpretari potuit sicut illud: "Qui dixerit fratri suo:
RACHA [Matth. 5:22], Nam et haec interiectio esse perhibetur, affectum
indignantis ostendens.189 Thus, the impossibility of translation itself becomes an
indication that a word is an interjection.
Yet, an example of translation of an interjection is also to be found in
Augustinus: de Mag. V 15 [Quis enim non videat, si quaeras] quid Graeci
nominent quod nos nominamus 'Heu', responderi Ό'ί',190 but the point of
187
 Cf. Isid. 1 14 quoted above.
188 "R
ac
ha is a word which does not mean anything, but expresses the
mood of an indignant soul. These (small) parts of speech that express the
affections of a disturbed soul, are called 'interjections' by the grammarians ...
Each language has its own peculiar Version of these words nor can they be
easily transposed from one languape into another: This is the reason that forced
the Greek äs well äs the Latin Interpreter to put the word itself in his text,
because he could not find how to translate it."
189
 "The reason why this should be believed to be so, is that it cannot be
translated in Greek, nor in Latin, just like 'who sayeth to his brother "racha".
For that is also alleged to be an interjection, indicative of the emotion of
Indignation." Hier. CCSL 72,28, in Matth. 5:22 says that RACHA means κενός, id
est inanis auf vacuus, quem nos possumus vulgata iniuria 'absque cerebro'
nuncupare; Chrysost. in Matth. PGM 57,248,43ff. το δε ρακά ου μεγάλης
εστίν ύβρεως ρήμα ... αντί του συ; Basilius of Caesarea, Regulae PGM 51,
432 τι εστί ρακά; έταχώριοι* ρήμα ήττιωτέρας ύβρεως, ττρός τοχις
οίκειοτέρους λαμβανόμενον.
190 "ρ
ΟΓ wno
 qoes
 no
t
 seej jf one woui(j ask wnat the Greeks say for our
heu, that the answer is ÖL."
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Augustmus' text is not that interjections can be translated or that o'u is
necessarily the correct äquivalent of heu, but to show that the words - Greek
and Latin - which are here adduced äs examples, are all used in meta-
language, i.e. that they are in this case all of them nomina. Nevertheless, this is
a translation of an interjection and the casual way in which it is introduced
might even be taken to indicate that it was generally held that they could be
translated.
6. Greek grammar and interfections
In the preceding sections I referred more than once to Greek views which
inspired or reflected the Roman ones.191 In order to facilitate a general
overview I will now briefly consider the Greek evidence by itself.
Even when no separate word-class of interjections had yet been
distinguished or at any rate acknowledged, the phenomenon itself existed of
course192 and the Greek grammarians usually classified the corresponding words
äs adverbs. I am well aware of the fact that any step I take beyond this
Statement may seem to betray my principles of looking for what the ancient
grammarians have, not for what they lack. However, it will soon appear that the
Greeks were also conscious of the fact that not all of their adverbs were equally
straightforward; the Status of some was in fact an issue among them. We should
not forget that the adverb had a blanket function. Its pandectes-chaTacter
tended to absorb all words of dubious Status. The criteria for a word to belong
to the class of adverbs were largely negative: If a word could not classify äs
any of the other parts of speech, it automatically feil under the adverbs.193
My method for trying to find out something about the Greek grammarians'
views on "interjections" - despite the fact that they did not recognize" them äs a
separate word-class - will be the following:
In the first place I will discuss a number of semantic sub-groups among the
adverbs, whose adverbial Status was debated. This would not entitle us to look
upon them äs a separate group but for two reasons. The first is, that the words
191
 On the question whether there was some sort of mutual influence
between Greek and Roman grammar or only a one-way traffic of theories, see
Marrou 345f.; 349; 543 n. 2; 544 n. 7; Rawson 1985, 55; 64; esp. 68f.; 98.
192
 Servius IV 428,14f. kindly reminds us of this: interiectionem Graed non
penitus non habent, sed interpartes orationis non conputant.
193
 See note 107. The Greek σύνδεσμοι, were a rather heterogeneous group
äs well.
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belonging in these sub-groups are often described by a series of words which
may be translated äs "exclamation", i.e. a vaguer word than "adverb" is used to
designate them.194 Secondly, the words so described are often lumped together
and made the object of extensive discussions äs to their characteristics, the
more so since they do not entirely comply with the usual behaviour of adverbs.
We even find the Suggestion that they should be considered a separate part of
speech.
When it has thus be established that such a sub-group of the adverbs really
was an issue for the Greek grammarians, my second Step in tracing their views
on "interjections" will be to scrutinize the words for exclamations that are often
applied to adverbs belonging in the semantic sub-groups mentioned above. Those
contexts will then be taken into consideration äs well where such words are not
explicitly called adverbs. This will result in the discovery of a rather coherent
theory which either anticipates or reflects the Roman theory of the interjection.
6.1. The selection ofthe adverbs
The adverbs were distinguished in a large number of semantically defined
sub-groups. The Techne of Dionysius Thrax featured 26 such groups. Apollonius
Dyscolus also knows many semantic categories for the adverbs although he does
not classify them by this criterium.195 If we consider the list in Dionysius
Thrax, there are four, or possibly five groups which, äs our other sources will
confirm, are of an exclamatory character, to wit the σχετλιαστικά, θαυμαστικά,
τταρακελεύσεως and θειασμοϋ. The ευχής σημαντικά are the fifth candidate. I
will return to these later.
To start with the σγετλιαστικά (DTh. 77,1; ApD. adv. 121,19), they are
mostly represented by the examples τταττα'ι, Ιού and φευ and denote a plaintive
mood.196 They are explicitly linked with the interjections by e.g. Prise. III
194
 Alternatively, whenever a word is called an "exclamation" in a
grammatical context, it will usually be classified äs an adverb (not necessarily of
a specified semantic sub-group).
195
 Apollonius mentions the following semantic sub-groups by name:
χρονικά (e.g. adv. 123,16; 148,7); ποιότητος (e.g. adv. 196,8?.); αριθμοί (adv.
141,18); τοτακά (e.g. adv. 154,4ff.); ευχής (adv. 157,27); σχετλιαστικά (adv.
121,21); αποφάσεως (adv. 124,8); κατάφασις (adv. 124,8) (= DTh.
συγκαταθέσεως); άτταγόρευσις (adv. 124,10f.); τταρακελευστικά (adv. 123,12);
ττυσματικόν/κατά ττεΰσιν (adv. 172,9/172,llf.) (= DTh. ερωτήσεως); έττιτατικόν
(adv. 130,7) (cf. coni. 223,4 το έττιτατικόν έτάρρημα, meaning μάλλον which is
classified by DTh. under τα συγκρίσεως); τα εϋαστικά (adv. 121,21) (= DTh.
θειασμοϋ).
In confrontation with the Techne, Apollonius lacks the categories of μεσότητος,
παραβολής η όμοιώσεως, θαυμαστικά, είκασμοϋ, τάξεως, αθροίσεως,
συγκρίσεως, συλλήψεως, άττωμοτικά, κατωμοτικά, βεβαιώσεως and θετικά.
196
 Cf. SchDTh. 110,llff.; 279,21ff. 223
90,12f.: interiectio tarnen non solum quem dicunt Graeci σχετλιασμού significat,
sed etiarn voces quae cuiuscumque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem
intericiuntur.1^ By θειασιιοϋ (δηλωτικά) (DTh. 86,1) are meant ecstatic or
divinely inspired exclamations, äs in the Bacchic rites. Signal examples are εΰοϊ
(εΰοΐ) and εΜν (εύαν).198 The θαυμαστικά express surprise or even
astonishment. The most current example is βαβαί. In SchDTh. 435,19ff. they are
linked to the έκττληκτικά,199 which we can safely add to our collection. In the
Suda lemma & & the fourth category selected from the list in Dionysius Thrax,
the adverbs τταοακελεύσεως (in the Suda styled κελεύσεως), are connected in
their turn with the έταρρήματα εκπλήξεως.200
197
 "But the interjection does not only indicate what the Greeks call
σχετλιασμός (indignant complaint), but also words which are in an exclamatory
way interjected by force of any passion of the soul whatsoever." Cf. Jul.
Romanus (Char.) 246,25ff., on which see above section 4.1.
198
 SchDTh. 102,lff.; 282,22ff. Cf. ApD. adv. 121,19ff. εύαστικά. a
terminological development out of εύαν itself; Harpocr. 141,6f. Εύοϊ
σαβοι.,.βακγικόν τι έττίφθεγμά εστί το εύοΐ; Bekker AG I 257,17 s.v. Εύοϊ
σαβοΐ: μυστικά έττιφθέγματα; CAG 4,5,ll,26ff. (Amm. in Ar. de interpr.) των
ενθουσιαστικών επιρρημάτων; Hesych. II 216 (nr. 6691) Latte ευα-
έπιφημισμός ληναΐκός (i.e. belonging to the Lenaea: "Bacchic"), καΐ
ανστικός. καΐ εα.
Α combination of the denotations σχετλιαστικά and βακχικά is found in Hdn. GG
III i 503,8ff. καΐ καθόλου δε ου δει τα σνετλιαστικά των έταρρημάτων
οιονεί βακχικά οντά υπό την εντεχνον άκολουθ'ιαν όίγειν κτλ. ( =
Theogn. Gramer AO II 158,15ff.); cf. Hdn. GG III ii.i,209,l σγετλιαστικόν καΐ
βακγευτικόν( = Et. M. 481,15). Probus IV 146,6 (?) (st)... bacchamur.
We can now solve a problem in Greg. Cor. p. 310 § 31,175 το αν επίρρημα
θειασμοϋ και λαμβάνεται ως ήρωϊκόν καΐ σύνδεσμος. By the first-
mentioned possibility, the επίρρημα θειασμοϋ, Gregorius clearly means /αν/ in
εύαν (ευάν), cf. SchEur. Troad. 325 ευ αν ευ οΐ.,.βακχικά έττιφθέγματα-
είσΐ δε έττιρρήματα θειασμοϋ. διόρισαν [τα] δε [θειασμοϋ], οίον ευ οι
ευ αν. That αν should be a σύνδεσμος is quite straightforward ancient
theory. Λαμβάνεται ως ήρωϊκόν is more problematic and the text is probably
corrupt here. I suggest Gregorius had in mind the use of αν for άνα
(mentioned by Greg.Cor. dial. 252f. äs a characteristic of Doric), cf. SchHom. Ω
476b, where attention is drawn to άμβαίη (μ 77). (The only "linguistic" fact
described by means of the word ήρωϊκόν is μέτρον.) Professor Ruijgh
suggests e.g. λαμβάνεται <.α_ντΙ της άνά> (p.c.). See further SchHom. A 305a
and the references a.l. Incidentally, the readings containing a v (äs in
άνσχεθέειν, ε 120) go back to Aristarchus, cf. Wackernagel Kl. Schriften I 824.
199
 Cf. the επιρρήματα εκπλήξεως, Suda I 2,lff. (a a); SchArist.
(Tzetzes) Plu. 220a; SchAesch. Septem 482a; cf. 482b; SchDTh. 435,17f.; ps.
Theodos. 79,24f.
200
 A curious entry in the P.Lit.Lond. 182,97ff. runs äs follows:
έττικελευστικά, αττερ οι μεν έττι|φθέγ{γ}ματα καλοϋσιν, οι δε συνεμφάσεις,
ο'ι δε | σχετλιασμούς, φευ, ττατταϊ, ώμοι. (On ώμοι see below, section 6.3.1.)
This is a rather peculiar testimony, äs it is the only place where we find the
form έτακελευστικά äs a label for a group of adverbs. Besides, the use of
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The last Dionysian group of adverbs that might at first sight deserve
inclusion in our discussion was that of the εϋγης σηααντικά (DTh. 76,4).201
Frequent examples are εϊθε, εΐ, αϊ. Their Claims on inclusion in our group
seem to be strengthened by an entry in the Suda (II 523,3): εϊθε· σχετλιαστικόν
επίρρημα, και εΐ ομοίως. However, I would suggest that this remark
originated in a confusion about ά: This word can express a variety of meanings.
In Eustath. Od. 2,77,42ff. Stallb. (Hom. ξ 361) we read: Ίστέον δε ÖTL το &
κλητικόν επίρρημα öv καθά καΐ το ώ, έχει ττρός τη κλίσει [1. κλήσει
I.S.] ως ττολλαχοϋ φαίνεται, και τίνα ττλείω εμφασιν έττΐ σχετλιασμώ ή
θαύματι κατά τους παλαιούς η καΐ άλλως οϊκτω ... (46ff.) "Οτι δε το &
ψιλούμενον καΐ περισπώμενον καΐ αντί του αΐθε λαμβάνεται, δηλον εκ
των παλαιών, οι και χρησιν εις τοϋτο παράγουσιν.
202
 Clearly someone
mistakenly concluded that since α and α'ίθε are Synonyms when introducing a
συνεμφάσεις is also stränge. Maybe it hints at the fact that the function of
these words is to underscore the mood of the uttering, although they do not do
so in a grammatically correct, independent form (type: φεΐ, Fm hurt; φευ
anticipates and summarizes the feeling which is described in the grammatically
whole and correct sequence). Disturbing also is the discrepancy between the
name of the particles and the examples which fit the designation σχετλιασμοί
only. Έπικελεύομαι is virtually synonymous with τταρακελεύομαι in PL Phd.
60e8. In a dream Socrates has heard the words τΩ Σώκρατες ... μουσικήν
ποιεί και έργάζου. He comments (e7ff.): και εγώ εν γε τω πρόσθεν
χρόνω δττερ επραττον τοϋτο ύπελάμβανον αυτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε
καΐ έπικελεύειν, ώσττερ οι τοις θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, και έμοι οϋτω
το ένύττνιον όπερ έττραττον τοϋτο έπικελείιειν ... Cf. Burnet a.l.
τταρακελεύεσθαι is "hortari aliquem ut aliquid faciat"; έττικελεύειν is "indtare
facientem". As to διακελ., according to Burnet it is used for variation's sake and
is a frequent alternative in Plato for τταρακελ. However, in our place it has to be
taken äs an alternative for έττικελεϋειν - Socrates is so to say cheered on
while passing in füll speed like an athlete who is running a course. For
έττικελεύειν cf. Plut. Anton. 77,2 μόλις ή Κλεοπάτρα ... τον δεσμόν
άνελάμβανεν (notice the imperfect), έττικελευομένων των κάτωθεν αύτη
καΐ σχιναγωνιώντων; Dion. Ant.Rom. 2,41,3 οι ... θεαταΐ αγώνος ... τω
κατορθοϋντι των σφετέρων έττικελεύσει τε και τταιανισμω ττολλήν έττοίουν
την ε'ις το εΰψυχον έττίδοσιυ. The latter place is interesting because the
combination with τταιανισμός Stresses the exclamatory character of the
έττικέλευσις (cf. the δεήσεις τε καΐ οίμωγάς that are in the sequence of
the text said to be directed to those who were about to lose the game).
Notice how the names of σχετλιασμός and έττίφθεγμα are unambiguously
coupled -1 will return to this point shortly.
201
 Cf. Et. M. 26,50f.; Zonaras 96 ί.ν. α'ί.
202
 "One should know that a, being a vocative adverb like ω, has in
addition to the function of calling, äs is often apparent, also some further
connotation of indignant complaint or wonder (according to the ancients) or of
pity ... The fact that α with a spiritus lenis and an accentus circumflexus is also
used instead of αΐθε is manifest from the ancients who induced ordinary usage
to follow suit."
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wish, particles introducing a wish are also synonymous to & in other, in casu
"schetliastic", respects.203
There is another good reason not only to leave out of account here the
particles introducing wishes, but also to have second thoughts about the
adhortatory ones. As we have already seen in the chapter on the definition of
the adverb by Apollonius Dyscolus, these adverbs are special. Both kinds are
characterized by being semantically related very closely to the semantic load of
the imperative and optative mood respectively. They do therefore comply with
the first requisite of adverbs, to wit that of closely adhering to a verb. For this
reason, it is safer to concentrate on the σνετλιαστικά. θαυμαστικά and θειασυ,οΐ
δηλωτικά.
There is one more group of adverbs with an exclamatory character, several
examples of which have been cited already. Eustathius mentioned the fact that ά
can be not only a σχετλιαστικόν, but also κλητικόν, ττροσφωνητικόν. There are a
number of related expressions for these kind of adverbs. The "meristic" Status of
some of them was a matter of dispute. I will discuss one example:
Apollonius Dyscolus discusses the form of ώταν (adv. 159,10ff.), which is
problematic on account of its not being a βαρΰτονου, äs one would have
expected on the analogy of the other adverbs in -αν. Besides, it has two accents.
Didymus considered it a form related to the εταιρική έκφώνησις ετης
(159,12), Trypho called it a κλητικόν έτάφθεγμα (159,17). He suggests that it is
formed from the particle ώ followed by the meaningless extension τα. Α /v/ is
added in order to distinguish the newly formed word from ώτα "ears". Apollonius
firmly rejects this solution204 and suggests the following κατάστασις for ώτάυ:
Some nouns have alternative forms in -αν with an identical meaning. Thus, there
exists a form μεγισταν next to μέγιστος and a form ξυνάν next to ξυνός. By
the same token έτάν is considered equivalent to ετης.205 The vocative case is
identical to the nominative. Since vocatives often make for έταρρηματικαί
συντάξεις (e.g. Δάματερ, "Ηρακλες), ώ εταν may well be explained äs having
such an origin.206
203
 Cf. chapter II section 3.2. on rhetorical μετάληψις.
204
 Cf. chapter II section 3.3. n. 333.
205
 a. Zonaras 1896.
206
 Skrzecka's remark (1853, 20f.) "ob er [= ApolloniusJ flTAN, welches er
für ein τταρώνυμον von ετης hielt ... wirklich zu den Adverbien gezählt habe
ist zweifelhaft, zumal da er es mit Δάματερ, "Ηρακλες, τάλαρ zusammenstellt"
does not hold water (incidentally, S. does admit that Apollonius must have
believed ώταυ to be an adverb, on account of adv. 160,10). Cf. Et. G. 141,28ff.
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Now, since εταν is looked upon äs an adverb, and because of the
comparison with Et. G. 141,28ff. quoted in the previous note, where the adverbial
construction of the vocative Δάματερ is said to be applied Im θαυμασμοί), it
seems we should include the κλητικά έττιφθέγματα in our search for Greek
views on "extraordinary adverbs". Another argument for doing so is the
discussion in SchDTh. 419,llff., where the adverbial Status of ώ is defended
against those who feel it is an article in the vocative case.207 Should ώ (ώ) be
an adverb, it is classified äs σχετλιασμοί καΐ ανακλήσεως. Thus, it is again
associated with one of the categories of adverbs we are interested in.208 In
SchEur. Phoen. 269 ώή is called an έττίφθεγμα ανακλήσεως.209 Keeping in
mind the way the Romans handled this category and especially Probus' criteria
for distinguishing adverbs and interjections, we will also take this group of
adverbs into consideration.
There is a passage in Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's de
Interpretatione, which mentions the semantic similarity of the σχετλιαστικά,
θαυμαστικά and θειασμοϋ δηλωτικά.210 The passage is of intrinsic interest and
I will briefly discuss it.
Ammonius wonders why Aristotle only distinguished όνομα and ρήμα,
whereas the grammarians adopt more parts of speech. He then comes to speak
about the difference in semantic Status between those parts of speech that have
a function ττρός άττοφαντικοΰ λόγου -γένεσιν211 (CAG 4,5,11,111.) and others:
(ll,14ff.) τα δε ταΰτα μέυ ου σημα'ινουσι, σχέσιν δε τίνα του
κατηγορουμένου ττρός το ΰττοκε'ιμενον δηλοϋσιν, ώσττερ τα ττλειστα των
Δημήτερ [sie] και Δαμάτερ [sie] διαφέρει, τταρά μεν γαρ τοις εύκτικοις
Δημήτερ Ιστιν έττΐ της θεοϋ, Δαμάτερ δε έττΐ θαυμασμού. Et. M. 79,2ff.
Εκ ττόσων τττώσεων γίνονται τα έττιρρήματα; εκ ττασών ... καΐ άττό
κλητικής, ως το Ήράκλεις τταρά Λουκιανω. Cf. Et. M. 436,llf.
207
 Cf. ApD. synt. 62,6ff.
208
 Cf. again Eustath. on α (Od. l,388,6ff. Stallb.). 3,230,2ff. vdV. the
difference between ώ and α is stated to be the fact that ώ is an exclamation
of the unaffected soul (ψυχής άτταθοϋς), whereas ά indicates that the soul is
affected and disturbed (πάθος ταραχώδες δήλοι ψυχικόν).
209
 Cf. SchAesch. Septem 482a ίώ] έττ'ικλησις το ίώ, και ουκ
έκττληκτικόν, αλλ' αντί του ώ ττρόμαχε.
210
 The ττροσφωνητικά are not mentioned because they are not among
Dionysius Thrax' sub-groups (or, anyway, because they did not belong in a
traditional list of the semantic sub-groups of the adverb).
211
 "With a view to the coming-to-be of the categorical proposition."
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έτηρρημάτωυ.212 He then proceeds to enumerate the various semantic
relationships expressed by the adverbs. It should be noted that bis list shows a
remarkable correspondence to that ascribed to Dionysius Thrax although his
presentation differs widely from that of the Techne. He divides the adverbs into
two groups, to wit those that have a function in an άττοφαυτικός λόγος,213
and those that are capable of σημαίνειν, but can only be used in other εϊδη
λόγου.
214
 All categories distinguished by the Techne are represented in
Ammonius; however, their order is different, at least in the first group. The
relative order of the second group does correspond to that of the Techne.215
212
 "Others do not signify that, but indicate a relationship of the
'predicate' to the 'subject', äs do most of the adverbs."
213
 ll,15ff.: They signify a σχέσις of predicate to subject, i.e. they teil us
something about the way the predicate "belongs to" the subject, cf. 12,22ff.
214
 Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a. Cf. what was said above about the adverbs that
have a natural semantic relationship to imperative and optative utterings.
215
 Cf. the following scheme; numbers between brackets refer to the order
found in the Techne: Ammonius' ordering is entirely determined by semantical
reasons.
Ammonius and the Techne
Ammonius
Group I
11,16 οττως
11.17 ττότε
ττοϋ
ττοσάκις: ώρισμ.
άοριστ.
11.18 τάξις
11.19 τίνι τταραιτλησίως
μάλλον/ήττον
11,20
11,21
11,23
ll,24ff.
ll,26ff.
11,29
11,30
Group II
12,11
12,12
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έτάτασις
ε'ικασμοϋ
βεβαιωσ.
σχετλιασμ.
θαυμασμ.
έπισφραγ.
λυσιτελές.. θετικά
θειασμ.
συγκαταθ.
άρν./άττοφ.
ευχή
άπαγορ.
τταρακελ.
έρωτησ.
Techne
μεσότητος (2), ποιότητος (3), αθροίσεως (16)
[συλλήψεως (21)],
[cf. Amm. 12, lf.]
χρόνου (1)
τοττικά (6)
άριθμοϋ (5)
ποσότητος (4)
τάξεως (15)
παραβολής ή όμοιώσεως (12)
συγκρίσεως (18) [notice how (12)
and (18) have been taken together
on account of their semantic
similarity]
έττιτάσεως (20)
είκασμοϋ (14)
βεβαιώσεως (24)
σχετλιαστικά (8)
θαυμαστικά (13)
άττωμοτικά (22) κατωμοτικά (23)
θετικά (25)
θειασμοϋ (26)
συγκαταθέσεως(10)
αρνήσεως ή άττοφάσεως (9)
ευχής (7)
απαγορεύσεως (11)
τταρακελεΰσεως (17)
ερωτήσεως (19)
If we look at bis description of the σχετλιαστικά, θαυμαστικά and
θειασμοϋ δηλωτικά, we find that they are all described äs adverbs indicating a
state of mind. They express όπως διακείμεθα προς το πράγμα, ττερί ου
άποφαινόμεθα, ή ως σχετλιάζοντες ή ως θαυμάζοντες (21ff.) ... ή καΐ
άνεπιτάτως την κατ' αυτό το ακρότατου αγαθόν χαρακτηριζομένην της
ψυχής διάθεσιν άνευφημοϋντες ως επί των ενθουσιαστικών έπιρρημά-
των εν τω ευ είναι τους κατόχους σημαινόντων (26ff.).216 They share the
characteristic of indicating a state of mind in respect of the contents of the
expression, with the adverbs introducing oaths, those with a deontic notion and
affirmative or negative reactions to a previous Speaker. It is worthwhile noticing
that Ammonius has associated the σχετλιαστικά and θαυμαστικά more closely than
the Techne.
6.2. Other expressions for "exclamatory adverbs"
In a number of passages cited thus far, we saw that the terminus technicus
έττίρρημα was linked with various other expressions for "exclamation". The most
important one is έπίφθεγμα.217 But we also find έκφώνησις,218
επιφώνημα,219 άναφώνημα.220 Moreover, if we concentrate on the examples
216
 "How we are disposed to the action about which we are making a
Statement, either äs persons who are indignant or amazed ... or crying out at the
top of our lungs the maximal disposition of utmost well-being of the soul, äs by
means of ecstatic adverbs indicating that the inspired persons are in a state of
well-being."
The words εν τω ευ είναι probably conceal an έτάρρημα ενθουσιαστικός,
like ευα or ευάν.
217
 SchDTh. 433,32ff. Και πάλιν θειασιιοΰ λέγεται έπιοοήιιατα. α
θειάζοντές τίνες καΐ κάτοχοι τω Διονυσω γινόμενοι ... έταφθέγγονται
καΐ λέγουσιν ευάν εϋοϊ· ταϋτα ου ν εστί του Διονύσου, επειδή καΐ
αυτός μανίας εστί ποιητής, καΐ ταϋτα <τά> έπιφθέγματα υπό των
μυστών ττρός αυτόν λέγεται. Επάγεται δε αϋτοϊς ρήμα το
έταφθέγγομαι. "ευάν έττιφθέγγομαι" καΐ "εΰοϊ επιλέγω". Cf. further Bekker
y4GI49,5(=360,llf.).
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 E.g. ApD. adv. 159,13; cf. Hdn. GG III l,503,8ff. τα σχετλιαστικά των
επιρρημάτων are irrational. For when the soul is disturbed or drunk,
άλογοι... και αϊ εκφωνήσεις αυτής.
219
 Hesych. p. 3 (ld) σχετλιαστικόν επιφώνημα. Cf. Bekker AG I 100 (s.v.
ϊσσα); ps. Theodos. 79,16f.; Zonaras 1623. For the rhetorical notion επιφώνημα
cf. Lausberg 1960, § 879.
220
 Et. Gud. l s.v. α: σχετλιαστικόν άναφώνημα. Άναφώνημα also
occurs e.g. 451,23 (s.v. ιού) and Et. M. 822,33 s.v. ώμοι. Cf. SchAristoph. Nub.
1452; Hephaest. π.ττοιημ. 5,3.
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which the grammarians give for επιρρήματα of the categories selected above,
and check the names by which they are identified, we can add to this list
considerably. My next step, therefore, will be to consider the words that qualify
äs potential indicators of "interjections". After that I will investigate the
opinions held by the grammarians about these words.
The words which deserve consideration, apart from those mentioned above,
are έτπφώνησις,
221
 άναφώνησι/ς,222 ττροσφώνησις,223 ττρόσφθεγμα,224 ττρόσ-
ρημα,225 φώνημα,22^ έττιφημισμός.227 Further, there are μ'ιμημα (with
variöus explicative adjuncts in the genitive),228 and words like στεναγμοί,
όλολυγμοί,229 θρηνώδημα,230 which are in themselves indicative of the nature
of the interjection they signify. Broadly speaking, interjections can be divided
into two groups, although this division is not yet explicit in Antiquity:231 To the
first belong those exclamations which are more or less standardized and have an
accepted meaning among their users (these are indicated by έττίφθεγμα,
έκφώνησις, έττιφώνημα, άναφώνημα, έταφώνησις, ττροσφώνησι,ς, ττρόσφθεγμα,
φώνημα, έταφημισμός.) The second consists of onomatopoeic words, which äs
221
 E.g. ApD. adv. 121,15.
222
 Cf. e.g. SchEur. O. 327; 332; SchHom. Π 46b (ττροαναφωνήσεις).
223
 E.g. Eustath. l,776,33ff. vdV.
224
 ps. Theodos. 79,26f.
225
 Hesych. s.v. ώ ταυ.
226
 Zonaras 379.
227
 Hesych. II 216 (6691) (Schmidt) s.v. ευα; = II 219 (6675) (Latte) who
reads: έττε-υφημιασμρς ληναϊκός και μυστικό?. This is better than
έττιφημισμό? ("dedication", cf. Strabo 6,2,9), although I think έττευφημισμός is
preferable.
228 Κατά μίμησιν όρνέου φωνής, ps. Theodos. 79,3ff.; Suda II 396, Iff.
s.v. έττοττοΐ. μίμημα βαρβάρων έξελκόντων τι; Zonaras ibid.', ps. Theodos.
79,18, cf. Arist. Fax 459ff. (see section 2.2.); μίμημα ύλακής κιινών, ps.
Theodos. 79,21. Cf. SchAesch. SuppL 827c.
229
 Plut. Quaest.Plat. X 1009d; in this text a comparison is made between
the Opposition of the parts of speech endowed with meaning (nouns and verbs)
to "the rest" and the στεναγμοί and όλολυγμοί of actors, äs the non-
significant additions to their (meaningful) text. Their supplementary Status also
appears from the fact that they are often used extra metrum.
230
 Eustath. Od. l,220,38ff. Stallb. (on ε 299).
231
 Cf. section 3.2.1. note 91.
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it were capture in writing either animal sounds or human moaning, sighing etc.
in forms which are ill-suited to codification (indicated by μίμημα etc.).232
As I said before, none of these words can be proved to have any technical
sense and I do not mean to ascribe to them the technical meaning of
interjection.233 But the examples described by this series of words are elsewhere
(sometimes even in the same context) called adverbs and often even adverbs of
the types specified above. Moreover, some sort of special Status was attached to
these words äs a group.
My case is strongest for έπ'ιφθεγμα which never denotes a word belonging
to a part of speech other than the adverb. The group προσφώνησι,ς,
έπιφώνησις, άναφώυησις and πρόσρημα may be looked upon with some doubts.
They are also used of nominal constituents.234 The reason for including
προσφώνησις was a passage from Eustathius (l,776,33ff. vdV.) combined with a
Scholium on Homer (Δ 412b1; b2). In the Scholium τέττα is called an επίρρημα
σχετλιαστικόν,
235
 in Eustathius it is called a προσφώνησις.
Now, Nauck has shown that περί προσφωνήσεων constituted a chapter in a
work called Λέξει? by Aristophanes of Byzantium. In this chapter Aristophanes
discussed children's words for father, mother etc. These προσφωνήσεις (or
προσφώνηματα,236 or λέξεις προσφωνητικαί)237 were äs a group defined äs
232
 Cf. in Latin theory Priscian's sonituum illiteratorum imitationes (III
91,3) which are added to the voces quae cuiuscumque passionis animi pulsu per
exdamationem intericiuntur. The distinctipn is not all too clear yet - sounds we
make in showing various emotional reactions also fall under the category of the
μιμήματα, e.g. Ιόφ, which, äs the Scholiast on Aesch. Suppl. 827c teils us,
εστί άποπτυσμοϋ μ'ιμημα. The vagueness of the distinction is clear from the
sequence: από δε τοΐ άποπτύειν έπίφθεγμα έποίησεν. διό δει την
ΰστέραυ δασυυειν. In this case μίμημα and έπ'ιφθεγμα are so closely related
äs to indicate the same phenomenon. In the same way Hesychius teils us κόγξ is
an interjection used by those initiated in the mysteries. However, he adds, it is
also an pnomatopoeic Imitation of the sound of a voting-pebble, just äs βλόψ (to
those living in Attica!) imitates the sound of the clepsydra.
In the Middle Ages, the view that distinction should be made between
interjections with a certain, conventional meaning and those onomatopoeic
formations which are in themselves meaningless, gained wide acclaim, cf. Pinborg
1961, 133.
233
 Though cf. LSJ s.v. επιφώνημα; έπ'ιφθεγμα; άναφώνημα.
234
 Eustath. 3,732,lff. vdV.: έχει ... τινας έπιφωνήσεις ό ποιητής
αναλόγως τοις ΰποκειμένοις πράγμασιν. εν οις καΐ το σχέτλιος,
έπιλεγόμενον τοις επί τι σφοδροίς και άκατασχέτοις, και το νήπιος, ο
περ άναφώνησ'ις εστίν ως τα πολλά σημαντική των άστοχούντων του
δέοντος. For πρόσρημα, see LSJ s.v.
235
 Nauck 1848 (1963), 156 proposes to change επίρρημα into έπ'ιφθε-γμα.
236
 Eust. 2,815,15ff. vdV.; Nauck 1848, 153.
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ττρωτόθετα and άκλιτα.238 The latter characteristic makes them into adverbs.
The former interestingly calls to mind the relationship between the origin of
language and children's language, cf. section 3.3.1. The Status of these words
changed, however, for later grammarians construed nominative cases for them
(e.g. ττάτπτας).239 As we saw, Apollonius Dyscolus still considered ώταν an
adverb, but his motivation is the fact that vocative constructions often freeze
into adverbial constituents. This implies precedence for the nominal Status.
The difference between those adverbs which are used to address someone
other than the Speaker, and those which are just sounds uttered without
communicative intentions - remember Probus' criteria for distinguishing
interjections and adverbs - comes out clearly in Eustathius 3,230,9ff. vdV. ßä ...
και ταύτα μεν ττρός τι, τουτέστιν άττό τίνος φωνοΰντος ττρός τίνα έτερον,
ε'ισΐ δε και τίνες μιμητικαΐ φωναι αΰταΐ κατά αυτούς τους φωνοΰντας
... (e.g. άρϋ ώ δψ μα ψό βή).240 Nauck considers it probable that
Aristophanes devoted some attention to this latter group of interjection-like
adverbs too.241 That would make him the earliest grammarian to realize that
these words did form some sort of a problem in the μερισμός. Other early
testimonies about these exclamatory sounds stem from Trypho, Didymus and
Apion;242 this relegates the discussion of this sub-group of the adverbs to the
second half of the first Century B.C. and the first half of the first Century
p.Chr.n.
237
 Gramer AP III 242.
238
 Eustath. 2,815, 15ff. vdV.; cf. Od. 2,113,17ff. Stallb.; Nauck 1848, 153.
The word ττρωτόθετος is almost exclusively found in Eustathius. Apollonius
Dyscolus usually calls words which are themselves not derived from another one
τφωτότυττα. Cf. section 3.3.1. with note 117.
239
 Nauck 1848, 154 n. 6. This is colloquial usage äs well.
240 ">Ba> _ _ _ And ^ese are related to something, i.e. they are addressed on
the part of a Speaker to someone eise. But there are also mimetic sounds which
affect no one but the ones who utter them."
241
 He thinks a trace of Aristophanes' interest in interjections may be
discerned in his note on the gloss συρβάβυττα (which Nauck emendates to σύρβα
τύρβα), Nauck 161f. (cf. 241 = Slater 163).
242
 ApD. adv. 159,18; Ammon. 130 (Trypho) ; ApD. adv. 159,13 (Didymus);
Apion 288,7ff. (ά = έτάρρ.σχετλιαστ.)
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6.3. The Greek "theoty ofthe interjection"
Now that we have selected our material, let us take a look at the
difficulties singled out for special treatment by the Greek grammarians. In the
sections on the rhetorical functions of the interjection (2.2.), and their
connection with the origin of language (3.3.) Greek parallels for Roman theory
have been given already.243 Some Greek material was given in the notes to
section 5 äs well. What interests me here in the first place, is the μερισμός of
the Greek "interjections": As we shall see, their Status äs adverbs did not go
unchallenged. We shall look briefly at the arguments with which their μερισμός
äs adverbs was supported for all that.
Secondly, the intrinsic irregularity of form of this group of adverbs was not
lost on the Greek grammarians either. As signal examples of anomaly, the trio
ιδού, Ιου and ου will be discussed. With regard to the formal aspects of
interjections we also find Greek parallels for the view that despite the intrinsic
irregularity of the interjections, a formal resemblance to one of the other parts
of speech brings about some sort of analogous behaviour. This is illustrated in
the case of ώ TTOTTOI.
6.3.1. Μερισμός
As I said, the "interjections" were not classified äs adverbs by the Greek
grammarians without discussion. According to some they did not deserve to be
considered a part of speech at all,244 according to others they should be given
an independent position in the list of parts of speech.245 The oldest füll
discussion of their Status is to be found in Apollonius Dyscolus (adv. 121,14ff.).
When he explains the part of bis definition of επίρρημα which runs
"κατηγορούσα των εν τοις ρήμασι εγκλίσεων" (adv. 119,5f.), he Stresses the
243
 In this context it is especially interesting to add that a connection
between exclamations and the text-interpretative notion δια μέσου is confirmed
by our Greek sources, cf. section 1. with note 8. Cf. e.g. SchEur. O. 340 το
δε "δεινών ττόνων" εν μέσω άναττέφωνηται (the alternative being that it is
construed with the rest of the sentence); Ph. 550 ϋττέρφευ· ύττεράγαν. δια
μέσου μετά σχετλιασμού το ΰττέρφευ άναττεφώνηται; An. 1273 ω ττοτνι' ω
γενναία' το έ£ής· ώ ττότνια, Νηρέως γένεθλον, χαίρε, ώστε το ώ
γενναία συγκοιμήματα κατά άναφώνησιν Ίδιάν έξενήνεκται; Hipp. 812 το
δε α'ιάϊ τόλμ-ας δια μέσου άναττεφώνηται. καϊ ούτως το έ£ης ΐσταται.
244
 Hdn. GG III i 503,9f. ουδέ μέρη λόγου τινές ταϋτα [sc. τα
σχετλιαστικά] ένόμισαν. They are completely irrational.
245
 SchDTh. 272,7ff. (τίνες) το φευ και το οϊμοι... ώήθησαν μη
είναι έττιρρήματα, αλλ' ετέρα μέρη λόγου. Cf. SchDTh. 520,25ff. άλλοι δε
ένδεκα [sc. λέγουσι είναι μέρη λόγου], διαχωρίζοντες την ττροσηγορίαν εκ
των ονομάτων και τα απαρέμφατα εκ των ρημάτων και τα σνετλιαστικά
εκ των έττιρρημάτων.
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fact that no adverb can be independent of a verb and he expands on this point
äs follows: (adv. 121,14ff.) Ου μόνου δε ρητοί? ουσι τοίς ρήμασι κατά
την σύνταξιν του λόγου το έττιρρημοί προσφέρεται, αλλά καΐ σιγωμένοις,
εϊγε καΐ αϊ έταφωνήσεις ουδέν άλλο ε'ισίν η έταρρήματα των
ρημάτων <ού>κ έττιγινομένων, καθό τοις ει άναγινώσκουσι το κάλλιστα
έταφωνοΰμεν και τοις ευ διατιθεϊσιν ήμας το ηδιστα, καΐ τοις
άκριβοϋσι τάς Ιδίας -πράξεις καΐ τέχνας το καλώς έττιφωνοϋμεν.246 As
he is wont to do, Apollonius proceeds by dealing with a possible objection: If we
are mentally to supply a verb with every adverb we find, what are we to do
with οϊμοι and the other σχετλιαστικά καΐ εΰαστικά? Will they not
automatically fall outside the scope of the adverbs?247
Apollonius' reaction to all this is twofold: In the first place the words in
question might be called adverbs if one is prepared to Stretch that notion a
little (καταχρηστικώτερον, cf. chapter II section 1.2.). Furthermore, one might
not even need to suppose these words to be second-rate adverbs: μη ττοτε δε
και αυτά δυνάμει άττό διαθέσεως ρηματικής ανάγονται· ο'ι γαρ
σχετλιάζοντες ττεττόνθασι, το δε τταθεΐν ττεισίν τίνα των εκ πράγματος
δήλοι (adv. 121,24ff.).248 As usual Apollonius gives us a heavily Condensed
version of his views. It is clear, however, that he means that the act of
lamenting (σχετλιάζειν) itself has been caused by some kind of suffering. Since
suffering means that one has undergone an action, a verb is implicit in the
context. Therefore, "interjections" are also dependent of, and should be
(mentally) construed with, a verb.
This explanation has been adopted by various grammarians, e.g. SchDTh.
95,26ff.: Διό [namely, because adverbs are always combined with verbs]
έζήτησάν τίνες, ττώς το φευ καΐ το οϊμοι ουκ εχουσιν έτταγόμενον
246
 "Not only when the verbs are (physically) expressed in the
construction of the sentence is the adverb construed with them, but also when
they are not. For exclamations are nothing but adverbs without an expressed
verb. Thus, we exclaim 'excellent' to those who read well and 'most kind' to
people who do us a favour and 'well done' to anyone who does a fine Job and
performs his work well."
247 The objection that σχετλιαστικά etc. cannot be construed with a verb is
also prominent in the discussions in SchDTh. 272,7f. δια το μη εχειν
έταφερόμενον ρήμα; 520,27ff. φασ'ι γαρ, δτι τα επιρρήματα ή ρήμασι
θέλει συντάττεσθαι ή σπανίως όνόμασιν, ως έπι του "μα την
άλήθειαν" ... τα δε σχετλιαστικά ούτε ρήμασιν ούτε όνόμασιν οϋκοϋν
ουκ ε'ισίν επιρρήματα. These passages are strongly influenced by Apollonius.
248
 "And perhaps they are thernselves virtually derived from a verbal
disposition. For people who are lamenting have undergone something, and having
undergone something indicates passivity caused by an action (represented by a
verb)."
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ρήμα. Καί φαμεν, έττειδή δυνάμει καΐ ταϋτα από διαθέσεως ρηματικής
ανάγονται' οΐ γαρ θαυμάζοντες η σχετλιάζοντες προπεπόνθασι δηλονότι.249
The same argument is employed by Apollonius when he discusses the Status
of οϊμοι/ώμοι (adv. 126,27-128,9, in the passage about the meristic dubia
(126,24-145,25)). As is his habit, Apollonius gives us a disputatio in utramque
partem. Some people think οϊμοι and ώμοι should be considered two parts of
speech, the pronoun μοι being one of them. Adverbial Status for these words is
incompatible in their view with the fact that they are used exclusively to refer
to a first person singular, whereas an adverb may be used in the same
indeclinable, form with all persons indifferently. Only pronouns and verbs are
marked for person. Therefore, if οϊμοι and ώμοι are not verbs - which they
clearly are not - they must be pronouns (127,29-127,4). Apart from this
theoretical point, they also base their argument on the form of the words in
question, but that is irrelevant to us now.
Apollonius realizes the need to explain why οϊμοι and ώμοι cannot be
combined with any verb form. He argues äs follows (adv. 127,12ff.): Καθόλου τα
τοιαύτα των έττιφθεγμάτων, εξ αΰτοπαθε'ιας άναττεμττόμενα, την ττερί τον
λέγοντα μόνον ττεϊσιν αφηγείται, καΐ ένθεν ουκ επικοινωνεί δευτέροις
καΐ τρ'ιτοις. εφαμεν δε, ότι ουδέ επί ρήμα φέρεται, καΐ το τοιούτον
249 "Therefore, some have asked themselves why it is that φευ and οϊμοι
have no verb to be construed with. And we say this is because virtually they,
too, are derived from a verbal disposition: For people who are amazed or who
are lamenting clearly have suffered something previously."
Cf. SchDTh. 272,25ff. who elaborates on the καθόλου ή μερικώς-clause of
Apollonius' definition of adverb: (272,16f. το δε έτάρρημα ττοιεϊται πάντως
άε'ι ποτέ την σύνταξιν προς το ρήμα ή καθόλου ή μερικώς ή
αίσθητώς ή νοητώς)...(25ίί.) δια τοϋτο <δέ> εϊρηται "ή καθόλου η
μερικώς" επειδή έκαστον μόριον έχει την Ιδίαν σύνταξιν πή μεν
καθόλου, ττή δε εν μέρει, πή δε νοητώς, ως δταν εϊπω Ίατταταϊ ή
όττοτοι, μηδέν έπαγαγών δ'ιδωσι γαρ ή έννοια του επιρρήματος δτι
μέλλων σχετλιάζειν ταύτα έφθεγξάμην αίσθητώς δε, δταν αΰταΐς ταϊς
φωναΐς δείξω καΐ συντάξω το επίρρημα τοις ρήμασιν εν γαρ εστί των
συντελοϋντων ε'ις την άναπλήρωσιν του λόγου. The same sentiment is
expressed by Aug. V 518,26ff. Graeci autem interiectionem ab adverbio non
separant, propterea quia motus animi qualitati adsignant et haec omnia sub
genere qualitatis putant adverbia. Sunt adverbia quantitatis, ut lange alte,
qualitatis, ut bene, male. It must be remembered that exclamations like "well
(done)!" belonged with the σχετλιαστικά and the negatives and affirmations,
because all three groups could to all appearances be used without an
accompanying verb, cf. chapter II section 2.2.2.1.
Cf. for qualitas, Char. 248,8 omnes ... adverbiorum cemimus semitas ire cum
verbis sive per verba, nee polest ulla qualitas nisi verbo subsequente sonore; in
Prise. III 91,20ff. optime tarnen de accentibus earum docuit Donatus, quod non
sunt certi, quippe, cum et abscondita voce ... proferantur et pro affectus commoti
qualitate, confunduntur in eis accentus, pro o.e. qualitate should be interpreted
äs "according to the nature of the disturbed passion." Cf. further chapter II
section 3.1.1.
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πάλιν έπελΰετο, ως 'παν πάθος γίνεται εκ τίνος διαθέσεως, ίδιον δε
των ρημάτων διάθεσις, και ην κατά τοΰτό γε πάλιν επίρρημα το
ώμοι, έπεί διάθεσιν την εκ ρήματος άναπεμπομένην ειχε.2^ Apollonius
makes two points here: In the first place the exclusive relevance of ώμοι to
the first person Singular is defended by introducing the concept of αύτοπάθεια,
which may be clarified by comparing pron. 34,30ff.251 Secondly, he explains again
how the words under discussion may be considered adverbs, even though no verb
is explicitly present in the context. Πάθος implies activity on the part of
someone who inflicts it. Activity and passivity (διάθεσις) are verbal features.
Therefore, in a way ώμοι and the like can be referred to a verb and should be
considered adverbs.
Like their Latin colleagues, the Greek grammarians usually draw attention
to the fact that the σχετλιαστικά inform us (if only quasi accidentally) about the
state of mind of the Speaker. There are no surprises in the emotions and so on,
which they are said to express.252
6.3.2. Formal characteristics ofthe σχετλιαστικά c.s.
Apart from discussing its correct μερισμός, Greek grammarians also paid
attention to the characteristics this group of adverbs had in common. Like their
Latin counterparts, they were well aware of the intrinsic anomaly of these
particles (Hdn. GG III i 503,8ff.): Kai καθόλου δε ου δει τα σχετλιαστικά
των έταρρημάτων οιονεί βακχικά οντά υπό την εντεχνον άκολουθίαν
250
 "In general, such ejaculations which rise in us on account of a personal
experience, only indicate that the Speaker has undergone something. Therefore, it
has nothing in common with second and third persons. Now, we said that it is
not cpnstrued with a verb at all. That problem can be solved, because every
affection originates in a disposition, and disposition is a characteristic of the
verb. On that score ώμοι would again be an adverb, because it has a disposition
which has arisen out of [the action of] a verb."
Cf. on this passage the commentary of Schneider a.l.
251 There, too, Apollonius in the section of de pronominibus which deals
with the meristic dubia of that part of speech, advocates the view that ώμοι is
an adverb. Of course he has to discuss the problem that ώμοι cannot be
construed with all persons like the other adverbs, which he solves äs follows: τα
σχετλιαστικά των έττιρρημάτων, εξ αυτοπαθε'ιας εκπεμπόμενα, αυτό μόνον
του ΰποκρινομένου προσώπου το λυπηρόν παρίστησι, την δ' επί τα άλλα
πρόσωπα μετάβασιν άπήρνηνται. τοΰτο γαρ ην καΐ το δόξαν πρώτου
προσώπου εμφασιν δηλοϋν. For αΰτοπάθεια, cf. also SchDTh. 431,22f. Probus'
way of demarcating the domains of adverbs and interjections resembles the
working with αΰτοπάθεια (IV 146,8ff.; see section 4.2. above).
252
 E.g. κακοπάθεια, SchHom. ξ 415; χαρμόσυνου, SchAristoph. Nub. 1170
(ίου); λύπη, Et. G. 451,23; Et. M. 822,33; χαρά Zonaras 1115; cf. Zonaras 1130
ί.ν. ϊσσα: επιφώνημα έπιχαρτικόν; ScnDTh. 100,14f. ό γαρ λυπούμενος ή
δυσφορών λέγων ταΰτα την περί αυτόν μόνον πεισιν αφηγείται.
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άγειν ... ττασχούσης γαρ ψυχής η διακόρου ΰττό ο'ίνον ούσης άλογοι
δηλονότι καΐ αϊ εκφωνήσεις αυτής.
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 As with the Latin grammarians,
regularity is associated with the rules given by a τέχνη. Interjections will not
be governed by λόγος. There are many examples of this sentiment, e.g. Hdn. GG
III i 507,8f- τα σχετλιαστικά ου ττεφρόντικε της ακριβούς εξετάσεως.254
In practice the irregulär behaviour of the σχετλιαστικά c.s. appears
especially in their formal characteristics. They do not follow the normal rules for
accent,255 no sensible predictions can be made about their endings and they
show a marked propensity for aspirations in unexpected places, äs for instance in
the middle of the word. These phenomena are often explained "sympathetically",
i.e. by means of the theory of συμπάθεια of form and meaning discussed in
chapter I. The most famous examples of anomalous accent seem to be the trio
Ιδού, Ίου and ου, which I will discuss briefly.
6.3.2.1. Ιδού, Ίου, ου256
Ιδού, Ιού and ου are exceptional with regard to two rules, one of
which states that ττασα δίφθογγος τελική εις υ λήγουσα και εφ' εαυτής
έχουσα τον τόνον ττεριστταται.
257
 The other is even more specific and is
restricted to the adverbs in -ου: They should be circumflexed and either have
local meaning or end in -χου and derive from a word indicating a quantity (in
-κις or -χως).258 Neither rale applies to Ιδού, Ιού and ου.259 It should be
253
 "And in general one should not try and include the adverbs that
express sadness under any form of technical regularity ... for when the soul is
suffering or intoxicated by wine its ejaculations will of course also be
irrational." = GG III ii i 301,26ff.; GG III ii i 209,1 = Et. M. 481,15; Theogn.
Gramer AO II 158,19ff.; SchDTh. 282,22ff; 434,4ff.; Gramer AO l 45,5ff. τα δε
σχετλιαστικά οϋδ' ΰττάγεται αναλογία, ου γαρ άττό έρρωμέυης διανοίας ττέμιτεται.
254
 "Laments do not react favourably to diligent investigation."
255
 E.g. Hdn. GG III ii ii 933,18ff. et saep.
256
 Ου is apparently always oxytone according to Herodian (GG III i
494,20f.) and cannot but be oxytone in the context of this discussion, where it
functions äs an independent uttering.
257 "Every diphthong in word-final position that ends in -υ and bears the
accent is circumflexed." Cf. Choer. GG IV i 387,27ff.; ps.epim. 10,12ff.; SchDTh.
431,28ff.; Theogn. Gramer AO II 199,lf£; SchEur. Andr. 250 (where καΐ ου
should be supplemented after the two other exceptions) [further, instead of
deleting καί ήλθες, read καΐ έλθέ (271,20 ed. Schwartz) and instead of
[τούτο] την άντιδιαστολήν (272,2 ed. Schwartz) read τούτο [την άντιδιαστολήν]].
258
 Hdn. GG III i 504,lff.; SchDTh. 431,31f.; Choer. GG IV i. 387,37ff.; (cf.
ApD. adv. 176,8ff.; 193,20ff.; 207,9ff.).
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noted that in this context ου bears an acute accent. This is explicit ancient
grammatical doctrine.260 Modern practice follows the conventions observed in the
manuscripts, which diverge from the extant theoretical accounts.2^1
Several explanations are offered for our trio's deviant accent. All of them
somehow bear on the semantic relevance of the accent. Some sources note that
these three adverbs fall outside the semantic category of the other adverbs in
-ου
262
. Thus, Choeroboscus (GG IV i 388,15ff.) explains that Ιδού, ίου and
ου end in -ου, but that they neither have local meaning nor derive (by means
of the ending -χου) from a word indicating a quantity, äs do the other adverbs
in -ου. Since, therefore, they are exceptional äs to their meaning, there is no
reason why the form, c.q. accent, should not be exceptional äs well. This kind of
reasoning goes back all the way to Trypho (apud Apollonius Dyscolus);263 it is
entirely based on the distinction of form and meaning. Corruption of either
complicates the recognition of their relationship and facilitates corraption in the
other. Although this is in itself correct, one is still obliged to explain the
corruptions, äs Apollonius for instance does more than once. He recognizes the
fact that corruptions may entail other changes, because the word-form which
came into being by the first corraption, demands certain formal
characteristics.264 Further there are false analogies (συνεκδρομαί), i.e. a word
may misleadingly look like a certain part of speech. Συυεκδρομή causes a word
to conform to rules that do not in fact apply to it.265 Offering the presence of
one exceptional phenomenon äs an explanation for another without more ado, is
a iuxta hoc, ergo propter hoc, and thus invalid reasoning from our point of view.
This is indeed a rather crude implementation of a more sophisticated underlying
theory.
The justification of an irregularity by the fact that other irregularities also
259
 Ιδού is most remarkable because of the imperative ίδόϋ - its
accent may have been the result of a contamination of ίδοΰ and Ιού.
260
 Hdn. GG III i 504,6ff.
261
 Cf. on this matter SD II591; 596 ß.
262
 Cf. SchDTh.431,31f.
263
 ApD. coni. 232,14, cf. chapter I section 3.1. note 122.
264
 Adv. 135,10-3; see chapter I section 3.1. note 122.
265
 Cf. e.g. ApD. adv. 142,9-19; 143,26.
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attach to the word in question can be attested from a number of later
grammatical writers.266
Before offering this solution for the problem of the accent of Ιδού etc.,
Choeroboscus put forward a more fantastic one: According to τίνες "το ιδού
δεικτικόν δια τούτο οξύνεται, έττειδή δεικνύοντες τω δακτύλω τον
τύττον της οξείας άττοτελοϋμεν. το δε Ιού δια τοϋτο οξύνεται, έττειδή
σχετλιαστικόν εστίν, οΐ δε σχετλιάζοντες οξεία κέχρηνται φωνή· το δε
ου άρνητικόν δια τοϋτο οξύνεται, έττειδή αρνήσεως εστί δηλωτικόν,
αρνούμενοι δε άνανεύομεν και άττοτελοΰμεν τον τύττον της
οξείας".
267
 Here it is supposed that the gestures accompanying the
exclamations are imitated in writing, so that tilting the head backwards-
meaning "no" - is projected in the form of a slash on the writing material. This
rather baroque explanation reminds one of the σΌμττάθεια-theory discussed above
(chapter I section 3.1.)· It is an extension of this theory in that the φωνή is
266
 Thierfelder's claim (1935, 80) that Apollonius applied the same principle
is not trae without qualification. Apollonius never, äs rar äs I know, uses the
principle in its crude form. The examples quoted by Thierfelder do not hold
water, since there Apollonius either argues that a seeming exception in fact does
not fall under the rule (adv. 165,20fL), or (äs Thierfelder admits) applies the
principle of συνεκδρομή discussed above. See chapter I note 122.
267
 "Ιδού has an acute accent, because we execute the form of the acute
accent when we point with our fingen Ίου has an acute accent, because it is
used in lamentation, and those who lament produce an acute (shrill) sound. The
denial ου has an acute accent, because it signifies denial, and when we deny
something we slant our head backwards and so execute the form of the acute
accent." Cf. Choer. ps.epim. lO.llff. ... ως μιμησάμενα το σχήμα της
άνανεύσεως (here this explanation covers all three words); SchEur. Andr. 250
οξύνεται δε αεί και ούδέττοτε βαρύνεται το ου δια το σχήμα και την
άνάτασιν της κεφαλής του άτταρνουμένου. ό μεν γαρ κατατιθέμενος και
το να'ι λέγων δια σχήματος την <συγ>κατάθεσιν ποιούμενος κλίνει την
κεφαλήν, ο δε άτταρνούμενος ττρος το δρθιον σχηματίζει αυτήν. Νο
consequences for the accentuation of ναί were ever attached to this line of
thought.
The form of a written accent imitates something (a gesture, an Intonation) which
accompanies the uttering pf an interjection in these theories. Conversely, the
name of a letter is sometimes held to explain its form, rather than its sound,
e.g. SchDTh. 321,14ff.: Τί εστί γάμμα; Σύμφωνον αφωνον μέσον του κ και
χ. Πόθεν γάμμα; Άττό του την γήν αμάν ήτοι θερίζειν δρεττανοειδές
γάρ
-
 ω και ο τύττος του γράμματος όμοιος; 321,7ff. Δέλτα is
etymologically derived from "διάρτιον" and "το μη δν έλλιττές τη
έττάρσει": ίσόττλευρον γαρ. Apparently, the point is that it is "completely
balanced" and "not deficient in being elevated" (because of the delta's pyramidal
structure? (Διάρτιος is not found in LSJ; it is a hapax, perhaps a mathematical
or geometrical term. I suspect διάρτιος is no more than άρτιος to which δι-
was added in order to supply the δ- necessary for the etymology. In the same
way έλλιττές τη έττάρσει is a cumbrous phrase chosen because it provides
-ελ-.) The epsilon (E) is a picture of an open mouth with a protruding tongue;
323,3ff. ττόθεν χι; ... άλλοι δε αυτό σχι είττον, δτι έχει όξειαν καΐ
βαρείαν < αλλήλας > δια μέσον σχίζουσας.
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not here the acoustic, phonological phenomenon, but rather the written
representation.268
A third explanation of the accent of Ιδού etc. is mentioned by the
scholiast of Euripides (Andr. 250): Ιδού and Ιού are oxytona to distinguish
them (irpös άντιδιαστολήν) from their otherwise homonyms, the imperatives
Ιδοϋ and Ιου (constructed by the scholiast or bis source for the occasion).269
This explanation is rejected in the case of ου, which is not completely
identical to oi,270 in favour of the "imitation"-theory described above. Ου
always has an acute accent because of the movement we make with our heads
when we deny something. The permanency of the acute had by then already been
made probable, because it had been linked to the meaning of oii: δια το
μηδέν σημα'ινειν και ανυπαρξίας είναι δηλωτικόν το ου <οΰχ> ό τόνος
ο ασθενέστερο? επετέθη αύτω, ό δυνάμενο? καΐ μεταβάλλεσθαι και
παντελώς άττοτίθεσθαι. μεταβάλλεται- μεν γαρ είς βαρεΐαν ως εν τη
συνεπεία, άποτίθεται <δέ> παντελώς εν τοίς έγκλινομένοις ως το
εγώ ειμί, εγώ φημί" οξύνεται δε αεί καΐ ούδέττοτε βαρύνεται το ου
δια το σχήμα καΐ την άνάτασιν της κεφαλής του άπαρνουμένου (cf.
Hdn. GGIII i 504,6f.).271
Sometimes the rule itself is so formulated that it includes its exceptions, äs
268
 The explanation of Ιού is closer to the earlier version of the
συμττάθεια-theory; the earliest traces of this development are perhaps the
sympathetic exphcation of the spelling of χιράδες, "chapped hands", which exists
next to χειράδες and is etymolpgically derived from χειρ; if the orthographical
problem has arisen from iotacism, we are in this case also dealing with the
written representation, not the phonological characteristics, which undergoes
συμπάθεια, cf. Hdn. GG III ii 605,29; Choer. ps.epim. 27,28ff.; Eust. 1,298,21
vdV.; Od. 1,253,44; 2,284,22 Stallb. The word is attested in D.L. I 81 in the
spelling χειράδας.
269 TMS explanation would be rejected offhand by Apollonius Dyscolus, cf.
chapter Π section 3.3. An alternative explanation for the imperative ίου is
perhaps a confusion with ίώ: In the latter case the explanation given by the
scholiast would apply. But it is unlikely for such a confusion to have originated
in the context of the discussion of the three homoeoteleutic words Ιδού, Ιού,
ου.
270
 There is some polemic here, cf. Gramer A 0145,2ff.
271
 "Because ου means 'nothing', 'by no means' and signifies that
something is not the case, it is not accented by the weaker accent, which can
be changed or removed altogether. (It changes into a grave accent when put in a
context, and it is removed altogether in the case of the enclitics, such äs εγώ
ε'ιμι, Ί am', εγώ φημι, Ί say"). But it always bears the acute accent and
never has the grave accent because of the attitude and the backward movement
of the head of someone who says 'no'."
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in the scholiast of Euripides. In the same way Choeroboscus gives the rule only
in answer to the question about the acute accents of our trio.272
Only once is the irregularity linked up explicitly with the character of the
σχετλιαστικά which rebut analogy (Gramer AO145,5ff.).
6.3.2.2. Σχετλιαστικά and analogy; ώ ττόττοι
Greek grammarians are also aware of the phenomenon that formal behaviour
of interjections may be influenced by the fact that they resemble a pari of
speech that is subject to analogy. The accent of the "schetliastic" combination ώ
ττόττοι is, äs we shall see, explained by the fact that it resembles the nominal
group ώ φίλοι. The combination ώ ττόττοι has an interesting philological
history.273 It is found quite frequently in Homer and was accordingly adopted
with some enthusiasm by his epigons.274 Its meaning, however, was a matter of
dispute. This was apparently occasioned by the use of ώ, which led one to
expect that the following word would be a noun in the vocative case.275 Thus,
Lycophron (Alex. 943) and Euphorien (fr. 136 Powell = 99 Meineke), always happy
to accommodate the more obscure and far-fetched expressions of the epic
vocabulary, took it to mean ώ θεοί and declined it accordingly.276 Their
Interpretation was rejected by Aristarchus, because he considered it unlikely that
Zeus himself would then have used it (H 455; v 140). Later, it was revived and
advocated by Apion (fr. 108 Neitzel; cf. Hesych. s.v. ττόττοι). Via Apollonius
Sophista the notion was passed on and grew to be long-lived in the grammatical
tradition. ΪΙόττοι was explained etymologically äs having originated by means of
συναλοιφή or άφαίρεσις from εττοττοι (= έττόττται).277
272
 ps.epim, 109,8ff.
273
 For the following, cf. especially Lehrs 18823 (1964), 118-20; Meineke on
Euphorion fr. 99; Neitzel on Apion fr. 118; Holzinger on Lycophron 943.
274
 E.g. ApRhod. 3,558 etsaep.
275
 Cf. Lehrs /./. 119; Hdn. GG III i, 503,Iff.; SchDTh. 278,6ff.; Theogn.
Cramer^iO II 158,5ff.; Cramer^O IV 409,32ff.
276
 Perhaps ττόττος, "god", belongs to the same category äs στητή,
"woman", the learned riddle deriving from Hom. A 6 διαστήτην (δια στήτην)
έρ'ισαντε.
277
 Ap.Soph. s.v. ττόττοι; Eustath. l,155,3ff. vdV. ττόττοι λεγόμενοι οιονεί
εττοττοι κατά τους τταλαιοίις, ως τα -πάντα διοιττεύοντες, όττοΐου δη τι
καΐ ο δίοττο? δήλοι, λέξις τταρ' Αίσχύλω ηγεμονική (i.e. "a word for
'leader'"); Gramer AO IV 409,32ff. ... εΰρομεν -γαρ εν πολλοίς το ττόττοι
αντί του θεοί κατά άφα'ιρεσιν τουτέστιν ώ εττοττοι καΐ έφοροι και
διοτττεύοντες πάντα θεοί. δθεν και διότττης καΐ έττότΓτης τταρ' Αίσχΰλφ.
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In most cases, the equation of the Homeric ώ ΤΓΟΤΓΟΙ with ώ θεοί- was
rejected by later grammarians, because it was seen äs a violent imposition of
later linguistic usage on Homer.278 The bland Statement that ώ ττόττοι is a
Dryopic idiom27^ may just conceivably have been a kind of compromise. In order
to justify Lycophron's use of the expression some unknown grammarian may
have pleaded special circumstances: Lycophron used ττόττοι ("gods") in the
context of the story of Panopeus, the father of Epeios who was to build the
Trojan horse. As a punishment for a false oath the gods (ττόττοι) made Panopeus'
son a coward. It seems that, since Panopeus was a Phocian (Panopeus is also the
name of a Phocian city), someone argued that the word ττόττοι was meant to
lend a certain couleur locale to the story, being restricted to the dialect of
Panopeus c.s. Why then Dryopic instead of Phocian? This is where we have to
presume Lycophron's champion to have committed a real howler. He equated the
early Phocians (and of course ώ ΤΓΟΤΓΟΙ would have to be an archaic locution)
with the Dryopians on the strength of Herodotus VIII 31: της γαρ Δωρίδας
χώρης ττοδεών στεινός ταύτη κατατείνει, ως τριήκοντα σταδίων μάλιστα
κη εύρος, κείμενος μεταξύ τη? τε Μηλίδος καΐ Φωκίδος χώρης, ηττερ
ην το τταλαιόν Δρυοττίς. The relative clause belonging with της ... Δωρίδος
χώρης was misconstrued with της ... Φωκίδος χώρης.280 All this, of course,
is speculative, since we have no more than the apodictic verdict that ω ττόττοι
is Dryopic, without any additional Information.281
To return, however, to the formal problems relating to ω ττόττοι: Its
μερισμός was a matter of some dispute. It was unclear whether one was dealing
with one or two adverbs, or with an adverb plus a noun (Gramer AO IV
409,321). Mostly, it was decided that there were originally two adverbs (ώ was
278
 E.g. Eustath. /./. τοις δε βιαζομένοις τον "Ομηρον καΐ μετάγουσι
ττρός έτερους ττοιητάς τα εκείνου (this seems a stränge way of saying
"projecting the usage of other poets back to him", which is apparently what is
meant; can μετάγουσι ττρός mean "combine with"? (Professor Slings, p.c.))
αρέσκει λέγειν το ώ ττόττοι αντί του ώ θεοί, έττειδή ευρηνται εν τοις
μεθ' "Ομηρον οι θεοί ττόττοι λεγόμενοι κτλ.
27
^ Plut. audpoet. 22dlf. Δρύοττες δε ττόττους τους δαίμονας (sc.
καλοϋσιν); SchHom. α 32 ττόττοι οι θεοί κατά την των Δρυόττων φωνήν;
SchLycophron 943 ή δε λέξις Δρυόττων.
280
 Ι owe the reference to Herodotus to the commentary on Lycophron 943
by Holzinger. However, Hplzinger ascribes the theory of TTOTTOI'S Dryopic origins
to Lycophron himself, which is, of course, untenable, since in Homer no link
between this expression and the Phocian dialect can be made.
281
 According to Herodianus ττόττοι are Scythian god-statues (GG III i
187,24f.). Cf. Gramer AO I 447,20ff.; Theogn. Gramer AO II 158,5ff.; Et. M.
823,24ff. His source is unknown.
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explicitly considered such e.g. Ap.Soph. s.v. ώ) which together formed one
μέρος λόγου in an εκ παραλλήλου construction,282 a pleonastic combination of
two synonymous expressions. This also explained why ώ πόποι had two
accents.283 The word-group thus functioned äs one adverb.
There remained the problematic accent of πόποι itself.284 Its being
oxytonous instead of perispomenon was explained, äs I mentioned already, by
adducing its resemblance to a noun. So e.g. SchDTh. 278,6ff.: τα <ε'ις OL>
σχετλιαστικά περισπάται των εις αϊ περισπωμένων, οίον άτταταΐ. όττοτοί ...
το ώ πόποι σημειώδες, παπαί γαρ περισπάταΐ' ένομίσθη γαρ ως όνομα
είναι, διό καΐ όνοματικήν έλαβε τάσιν. ως γαρ ώ φίλοι, ώ θεοί, ούτως
ώ ττόττοι. εστί δε δυο σχετλιαστικά επιρρήματα.285 This explanation
ultimately derives from Aristarchus (Hdn. GG III l 503,lff.), who while rejecting
the meaning "o gods", did acknowledge ώ πόποι'5 resemblance to a noun-group.
Thus, in this respect the Latin theory of the interjection was anticipated by the
Greeks.
6.3.3. The Greek theory on the interjection; recapitulation
In this section we saw that many of the Roman views on the interjection
can be paralleled from our Greek sources. The rhetorical aspects of the Greek
"interjections" were not again discussed extensively (see section 2.2.). However,
it will be remembered that in Greek theory, too, σχετλιασμοί were held to
contribute to the creation of pathos äs well äs ethos; many exclamations were
282
 Cf. Eustath. l,154,llff. vdV.: εκ παραλλήλου δε καΐ το ώ καΐ το
πόποι δηλοϋσι το αυτό, ως εάν τις εϊποι "φευ παπαί". και γαρ το
"φευ παπαί" παράλληλα κείμενα την αυτήν σημασ'ιαν εχουσιν. εστί δε
σχήμα εκ παραλλήλου, δτε δύο λέξεις όμοΰ κείνται παράλληλοι προφορά
μόνη διαφέρουσαι, σημαίνουσαι δε το αυτό, οίον ... το λίαν πάνυ και
το τυχόν ϊσως; Gramer ΑΟ1447,20ff.; IV 409,24ff.; Et. M. 823,24ff.
283
 Hdn. GG III i 503,lff.; Gramer AO I 447,20ff.; Theogn. Gramer AO II
158,5ff.; Et. M. 823,24ff.
284
 ApD. adv. 177,2ff.; SchDTh. 278,6ff.; 431,26ff.
285
 "The schetliastika in οι have the circumflex accent on the last syllable,
when those in αϊ also have it, e.g. άτταται (next to) όττοτοί ... ΤΩ πόποι is
exceptional, for παπαί does have the circumflex accent on the last syllable. This
is because it was considered a noun, therefore it received a nominal accent. For
we say ώ πόποι just like we say ω φίλοι, ώ θεοί." Here, the example ώ
θεοί seems to be an intrusion from the semantic discussion about ω πόποι,
whereas Hesych. s.v. ω πόποι exhibits traces of the explanations of its accents
when he paraphrases ώ δαίμονες, ώ φίλοι, ώ θεοί (cf. Hesych. s.v. πόποι).
Cf. further Hdn. GG III i 503,lff.; Gramer AO I 447,20ff. (συνεξηκολούθησε τη
ονοματική πτώσει); Et. M. 823,24ff. (id.)^ Theogn. Gramer AO II 158,5ff.: ..'.
λέγομεν δε βαρύνεσθαι αυτό ως το ω φίλοι, εκ του ΰπολαβείν όνομα
είναι το πόποι.
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associated with particular groups of people, such äs shepherds or seamen. In
passing it was remarked that on the Greek side one can also observe a
"philological" approach to the interjection: Sometimes it is explicitly regarded äs
an intrusion in the normal syntactic structure of a sentence. The emotional
nature of this kind of intrusive elements seems to be stressed by the use of
descriptions such äs άναττεφώνητοα, which is more colourful than neutral words
like ττοφέ-γκειται (cf. chapter II section 1.4.4. note 119).
Like their Roman colleagues, the Greek grammarians discussed the
possibility that exclamations, which to all appearances form an independent
utterance, cannot be regarded äs adverbs. However, they did not all come to the
same conclusions äs the Romans had: Instead of separating interjections and
adverbs, they explained the absence of a verb äs deceptive. They argued that the
emotions expressed by an exclamation had to be caused by some action - and
since actions are expressed by verbs, a verb was potentially present in these
contexts äs well.
The groups of adverbs we studied, the σχετλιασμοί prominent among them,
were characterized by their intrinsic irregularity. No τέχνη could sensibly
predict their behaviour. However, analogy could be restored if an exclamation
resembled a more normal pari of speech. The case of ώ ττόττοι was discussed äs
an example. For this principle Greek priority could be proved. In many of the
other instances, however, it is impossible definitively to settle this matter.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the ancient theories on the interjection. It
appeared that the Roman grammarians adopted ideas which had originated in a
philological and rhetorical context and so developed the following picture of an
interjection: all kinds of exclamations that Interrupt the regulär construction of
the sentence could be called an interjection, provided they expressed the
emotions of the Speaker. This last addition seems to have been the grammarian's
own.
Further, attention was paid to the rhetorical and stylistic functions of
interjections: These could be used to increase the pathetical impact of a text, to
win time, or to provide clues äs to the speaker's sex, age and social Status. The
use of interjections can also be an indication of the stylistic level of a text.
According to the Roman grammarians, their (almost) universal adoption of
the interjections äs an independent and full-blown part of speech was an
Innovation. They had to cope, however, with the difficulties resulting from
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incorporating an essentially irregulär and irrational linguistic phenomenon into
their rationalized System of the parts of speech. Several concessions of a
terminological and conceptual nature had to be made to hide the intrinsic tension
this procedure brought about.
Terminologically, they described the interjections äs being voce incondita to
prevent a glaring self-contradiction with their chapters de voce. For there an
Opposition was made between vox articulata and vox confusa; all parts of speech
belong to the former one, while the latter term describes inarticulate sound. This
made it less attractive to use vox confusa in describing the interjections, which
had just been promoted to the Status of a true part of speech.
On a conceptual level, the very impossibility of legislation was made into
the general rule: an interjection was irregulär by defmition.
It is remarkable that the grammarians seldom refer to philosophical ideas on
the interjections, although these did play a part in the (Epicurean) ideas on the
origin of language. Stoicism probably had no use for them in their linguistic
doctrine, since the primitive and sub-human nature of the interjection clashes
with the Stoic views on the origin of language; we know nothing about Stoic
views on "rationalized interjections" and it seems unlikely there were any. But in
Epicurism the interjections were regarded äs representatives of the earliest
stages of language, from which the later, rational developments started. I argued
that the silence of the grammarians on this issue can be explained by the same
mechanism that probably influenced their terminological proceedings: They
avoided calling unnecessary attention to any characteristics of the interjections
that seemed to undermine their Status äs a truepaw orationis.
We then turned to the problem of distinguishing adverbs and interjections.
For the latter were not completely amputated from the former: Several words
were regarded äs homonyms of an interjection and an adverb and criteria had to
be sought to distinguish them. Remarkably enough, the formal criterium was not
completely neutralized by the homonymy. The manner of pronouncing the words
in question was also taken into consideration. Further criteria were the presence
or absence of affectus and the question whether the word could be simply
omitted from its context, because it did not attach semantically or syntactically
to any other constituent in the sentence.
After briefly surveying some remarks of (mostly) the Christian writers on
translation-problems, the Greek parallele for the Roman theory were looked into.
In some cases the Greek theory anticipated that of the Romans. In many other
instances, it proved impossible to establish the extent of originality of the
Roman theory.
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ABBREVTATIONS
The Greek grammarians are quoted after the edition of the Grammatid Graeti
(GG), Leipzig 1878-1910 (Hildesheim 1965) by R. Schneider and G. Uhlig. The
works of Apollonius Dyscolus are abbreviated pron. for de pronominibus (GG II
i); adv. for de adverbio (GG II i); coni. for de coniunctionibus (GG II i); synt.
for the Syntax (GG II ii); and GG II iii for the fragments. Further I refer to the
commentary by Schneider in GG II l (comm.), to his epimetrum (ibid.) (epim.),
and to his Tractatus deApollonii consuetudine (Tractatus) (in GG II iii).
For the Latin grammarians I use the edition by Keil (Grammatid Latini); they
will be quoted by the number of the volume, page and line. For Charisius,
however the text of Barwick is used.
Bachmann AG = Anecdota Graeca e codd. mss. bibl. reg. paris. vol. I-II (ed. L.
Bachmann), Leipzig 1828 (Hildesheim 1965).
BekkerylG = Anecdota Graeca I-III (ed. I. Bekker), Berlin 1814-21 (Graz 1965).
Boissonade AG = Anecdota Graeca e codd. reg. I-V (ed. J.Fr. Boissonade), Paris
1829-33.
CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca. Berlin 1881-1907.
CCSG = Corpus Christianomm, series graeca, Brepols-Turnhout.
CCSL = Corpus Christianomm, series latina, Brepols-Turnhout.
Choerob. ps. epim. = Georgii Choerobosci Epimerismi in Psalmos (ed. Th.
Gaisford), Oxford 1842.
CPG = Clavis patrum graecorum vol. I-V (ed. M. Geerard), Corpus Christianomm,
Brepols-Turnhout 1974-87.
Gramer AO = Anecdota Graeca e codd. mss. bibl. Oxoniensium I-IV, (ed. J.A.
Gramer), Oxford 1835-7 (Amsterdam 1963).
DTh. = Dionysius Thrax. The Τέχνη in his name is quoted according to the
edition by G. Uhlig, GG I i, Leipzig 1883 (Hildesheim 1965).
Et. G. = Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum (ed. F.W. Sturz), Leipzig 1818
(Hildesheim - New York 1973).
Et. M. = Etymologicum Magnum (ed. T. Gaisford), Oxford 1848 (Amsterdam 1962).
Et. Or. = Orion Thebanus Etymologicon (ed. F.W. Sturz), Leipzig 1820 (Hildesheim
- New York 1973).
PDS = Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker (ed. K.-H. Hülser), Stuttgart - Bad
Cannstatt 1987-88.
Greg.Cor. = Gregorius Corinthius, Le traite ττερί συντάξεως λόγου de Gregoire
de Corinthe (ed. D. Donnet), Bruxelles-Rpme 1967.
MichSync. = Michael Syncellus, Le traite de la construction de la phrase (ed. D.
Donnet), Braxelles-Rome 1982.
PGM = Patrologia Graeca Migne.
PGL = Patrologia Latina Migne.
ps. Theodos. = ΘΕΟΔΟΣΙΟΥ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ ττερί γραμματικής (ed. G.G.
Goettling), Lipsiae 1822.
SchDTh = Scholia in Dionysn Thracis artem grammaticam (rec. A. Hilgard), GG I
iii, Leipzig 1901 (Hildesheim 1965).
SchHom = Scholia graeca in Hörnen Iliadem (rec. H. Erbse), Berlin 1969-83;
Scholia graeca in Hörnen Odysseam (ed. W. Dindorf), Oxford 1855.
SVF = Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (coll. I. ab Armm), Leipzig 1905-24.
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η. 53; η. 89; η. 119; 2.3.1.;
3.3.1.; 3.3.1.2.; III η. 89
II η. 375; η. 376; η. 383; III
passim
II 2.2.3.; 92; 2.3.3.; 3.3.; III
1.1.
In. 91
II 1.4.4.; η. 118; η. 119; η.
121; IV 1.; η. 18; η. 243
Ι η. 84; IV 3.3.2.
19; Ι η. 69; IV 3.3.3.
II 0.; η. 9; 1.4.3.; 1.4.4.
II 2.1.; 2.3.2.; 2.3.2.1.
IV η. 3; 226; 6.2.; 6.3.2.
42; 51f.; II 1.3.2.; 1.5.; 98; η.
331; 4.
II 0.; η. 9; 1.4.3.; 1.4.4.; 2.4.;
4.
II 1.4.4.; Ι ν. 243
27; 46; II η. 31; 76; η. 139;
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τ) διασαφητικός
•η σύνδεσμος
ήθος
Ιδού
ιδού, Ιού, ου
'Cva., see μερισμός
κατάλληλον, see (ά)καταλληλότης
κατηγορειν
λάξ, see μερισμός
λεληθότα
λεκτόν
λέξις
μερισμός (general)
μερισμός of δει
ένεκα
έττε'ι
ϊνα
μεταξύ
λάξ
ττύξ
ΧΡή
μετάβασις
μετάληψις
μεταξύ, see μερισμός
όνοματοττοι'ια
όρθοέττεια
τταράδοσις
ττραγμα
ττρώται φωνα'ι
ττρωτόθετος
ττύξ, see μερισμός
σολοικισμός
στοιχεΐον
συζυγία
συμττάθεια
συνέμτττωσις
συνήθεια
σχέσις
σχετλιαστικά
τυγχάνον
2.3.4.; (IV η. 45); η. 234;
6.3.1.
Ι 2.1.2.; IV η. 38
IV 2.2.
IV 0.; 2.2.
Ι η. 122; 233
IV 6.3.2.1.
II η. 27; 2.1.; 2.3.2.; 2.3.2.2.;
101; 2.5.; η. 256
II 0.; 1.4.
Ι η. 91; 25; 34; η. 135; 43;
45f.; II η. 45; 54; 1.4.4.; 1.5.;
90ff.
Ι η. 91; 44; II η. 19; η. 25;
64; η. 95; η. 130; 88
43; 64; II η. 99; 70; 2.2.1.; 3.;
η. 244; 4.; IV 6.3.; 6.3.1.;
6.3.2.2.
89f.;II3.1.
II η. 292; 116; η. 385
II 3.3.1.; 3.3.1.1.1.
\\lpassim
II η. 385
II 3.2.1.
II 3.2.1.
II 3.1.
II 1.4.2.; η. 79
43; II 3.2.; 3.2.1.; 3.3.1.2.; 4.
Ι 2.2.; η. 117; IV 195; 3.3.; η.
117; 3.3.3.; 6.2.; η. 232
Ι η. 24; η. 25; II 0.
II 1.4.3.
45; 97; II η. 256; η. 228;
109ff.; n. 256; η. 363
Ι 2.2.; 29; η. 117; η. 125;
3.2.; IV 3.3.3.
IV 3.3.1.; η. 117; η. 238
In. 91
44; II η. 19; η. 34
Ι η. 116; 47f.; II η. 53; 2.3.1.;
η. 172; 123; 3.3.1.; 3.3.1.2.; 4.
13.; 48; IV 6.3.2.; 6.3.2.1.
Ι η. 116; 43; II 2.2.3.; 83; η.
188; 124; 3.3.; 3.3.1.; III 1.1.;
150ff.; η. 20; IV 0.; η. 117;
η. 148; 4.2.; η. 180; 6.3.2.1.;
7.
Ι η. 91; II η. 78; 1.4.3.
Ι η. 116; 48; II η. 36; 98;
3.3.1.1.; IV η. 212; η. 213
IV η. 13; η. 24; 185; 6.1.; 6.3.
passim
Ι η. 88; 23; 3.2.; 3.3.
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ΰτΓερβατόν
φωναί ττρώται, see ττρώται φωναί
^ρή, see μερισμός
ω ττόττοι
Ι 1.3.; II η. 10; η. 90; 62;
2.4.; IV 1
IV η. 3; η. 117; 233; 6.3.2.2.
II Latin
capita de voce IV 0.; 3.2.; 3.2.1.
confusus IV 0.; 3.2.; 3.2.1.; 7.
consuetudo II 1.4.3.; 192
corripere 217ff.; IV n. 178
disputatio in utramquepartem II3.; 4.; IV 6.3.1.
dodbüe IV 3.1.
exclamatio IV n. 3; 1.
inconditus IV 0.; 3.2.; 3.2.1.; 7.
/Z£tf α /ioc ergo propter hoc 238
suspiratio 191; IV n. 67; 4.2.
III Subject
ambiguity: see αμφιβολία
analogy II 1.2.; n. 45; 1.4.2.; n. 65;
1.4.3.; 1.5.; 129; IV 0.
animals, speech of 196ff.; IV 3.3.; 3.3.1.
Aristotle: see Peripatos
aspect/tense II 2.3.3.; III n. 18
barbarians, speech of 196; IV 3.3.; 3.3.1.;
causality, theory of causation 14; II n. 43; 3.3.1.; n. 368; n.
376; III0.; 2.
children, speech of 204; IV 3.3.1.; 6.2.
Christian writers I n. 16; II n. 82; n. 84; n.
119; 115; n. 287; n. 288; III
0.; n. 39; 3.1.; 3.1.1.; 3.1.2.;
3.1.3.; 5.; IV 5.; 7.
circularity II n. 69
confusion, terminological; see technical terminology
correctness of language I n. 24; 43; 51; 56
Epicurism IV 3.3.1.; 3.3.2.; 3.3.4.; 7.
hidden mistakes II n. 10; 1.4.; 1.5.
interjection I n. 117; II n. 32; IVpassim
isomprphism II 1.2.
localistic case theory 48f.; II n. 40
majority II n. 78
medicine II n. 1; n. 50; 57; n. 65; n.
66; n. 68
Nicanor: see δια μέσου and punctuation
normative grammar 53
one-to-one correspondence 7; 34; 37; 43; 53f.; 63; 65;
90ff.; 126; II4.
origin of language I 2.2.; 53; 63; IV 0.; 196f.;
3.3.; 3.3.1.; 3.3.2.; 3.3.3.;
3.3.4.; 7.
Peripatos III 0.; 2.; IV 3.3.1.
"prosody" IV 3.2.2.; n. 101; 4.2.; n. 176
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punctuation
regularity: see (ά)καταλληλότης
rhetoric
semantic categories of adverbs
semantic representation
Stoa
Subordination
technical terminology
word-picture: see semantic representation
II n. 90; n. 117; IV 4.2.; n.
166; n. 178
II n. 161; 3.2.; 3.3.; 3.3.1.1.;
4.; IV 0.; L; 2.; 2.1.; 2.2.;
6.3.3.; 7.
II n. 345; 3.3.1.; 3.3.1.1.; 4.
43; II 1.4.4.; 1.5.; 109; 4.
I 0.; 1.1.; 2.; 3.; II n. 11; 43;
n. 36; n. 43; n. 45; 1.4.2.; 81;
n. 151; 91; n. 195; 94f.; n.
231; 2.5.; n. 256; n. 306; n.
316; 124; n. 333; 3.3.1.;
3.3.1.1.; 4.; III 0.; 2.; IV n.
61; 3.3.1.; 3.3.2.; 3.3.3.; 3.3.4.;
4.1.; 7.
II 3.3.1.1.1.
46f.; II n. 36; 64; 81f.; 2.3.1.;
2.3.2.1.; 2.3.2.2.; n. 230; 4. III
0.; n. 9; n. 38; IV 0.; 3.2.;
3.2.1.; 3.3.4.
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SAMENVATTING
Dit boek bevat een aantal detailstudies over de antieke grammatica.
Uitgangspunt is dat de antieke ideeen over taal zoveel mogelijk binnen het in de
Oudheid zelf gecreeerde kader verklaard moeten worden. Er worden dus alleen
maar vergelijkingen met latere theorieen getroffen, wanneer dat verhelderend kan
zijn voor de interpretatie van de antieke opvattingen.
Twee thema's lopen als een rode draad door het boek: Het eerste is de
grote verwevenheid van alle antieke disciplines die zieh met taalbeschouwing
bezighielden: Filosofie, rhetorica en filologie droegen alle bij tot de toename van
kennis van en inzicht in het functioneren van taal. Het is van belang zieh te
realiseren dat deze disciplines weliswaar ook "technische" inzichten in taal
opleverden, maar dat dit neveneffecten van hun respectievelijke activiteiten
waren. De context waarin dit soort van inzichten tot stand kwam, mag bij de
beoordeling ervan niet verwaarloosd worden. Tegen de achtergrond van de
bovengenoemde disciplines ontwikkelde zieh allengs de echte grammatica, de
Studie van de interne opbouw van taal. De emancipatie van dit nieuwe vak
verliep zeer langzaam, langzamer dan men gewoonlijk geneigd is aan te nemen.
Zelfs Apollonius Dyscolus, de beroemde grammaticus uit de tweede eeuw na
Christus, demonstreert nog op iedere bladzijde van zijn werk zijn band met
filosofie, rhetorica en filologie.
Het tweede hoofdthema van het boek is de overwegend semantische
gerichtheid van de antieke grammatica: Taal wordt in de Oudheid algemeen
gezien als een Instrument om een betekenis, een boodschap over te brengen. Het
beschrijven van de syntactische structuren waarin die boodschap gevat is, is
nooit een doel op zichzelf.
Het materiaal waarop deze studies gebaseerd zijn, is dat van de
onverbuigbare woordsoorten, de indedinabüia: prepositie, bijwoord, voegwoord en
interjectie.1 Dit materiaal wordt niet in zijn volledigheid gepresenteerd, maar in
de vorm van een aantal zogenaamde "case-studies". leder hoofdstuk
vertegenwoordigt daarbij een andere benadering van de materie. Hoofdstuk I gaat
uit van de vroege taalbeschouwing in vooral de (Stoische) filosofie. Hoofdstuk II
behandelt de beste grammaticus die de Oudheid heeft opgeleverd, Apollonius
Dyscolus. Hoofdstuk III neemt een grammaticaal verschijnsel als uitgangspunt,
namelijk het zogenaamde causale gebruik van de conjunctie hina, en hoofdstuk IV
1
 De antieke begrippen zijn niet volledig in overeenstemming met de
Nederlandse termen die hier gebruikt zijn.
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tenslotte, beschrijft de antieke theorieen over een specifieke woordsoort, de
interjectie. Deze aanpak brengt met zieh mede dat in de eerste drie
hoofdstukken het Griekse materiaal als uitgangspunt dient, terwijl in het laatste
de nadruk op de Latijnse brennen valt. De problemen die aan de orde gesteld
worden, zijn zo uitgekozen dat ook meer algemene vragen uit de antieke
taaltheorie aan bod kunnen körnen. Voor dat soort van vragen, maar ook voor
het oplossen van detailproblemen van interpretatorische aard is steeds ruimte ge-
maakt.
In hoofdstuk I körnen eerst de vroegste producten van taalreflectie aan de
orde: glossografie en de Studie van (quasi-)synoniemen. Nadenken over taal
gebeurt in dit Stadium steeds in verband met iets anders: het verklaren van
dichters of het beoefenen van (een bepaalde) filosofie. In de rest van het
hoofdstuk wordt aandacht besteed aan de Stoa.
De Sto'ici waren bijzonder trots op de grote interne coherentie van nun
systeem, en het is dan ook noodzakelijk hun linguistische opvattingen in de
context van hun hele filosofie te plaatsen. Volgens de Stoa was taal
oorspronkelijk volkomen rationeel opgebouwd - er was een duidelijke samenhang
tussen woorden en hun betekenis. Naderhand raakte die samenhang verstoord,
maar met behulp van de etymologie kan hij weer opgespoord worden. Men ging
er daarbij van uit dat als woorden veranderden (gecorrumpeerd werden), de
betekenis onaangetast zou blijven. Hoewel er geen twijfel aan kan bestaan dat de
filosofen van de Stoa de oertoestand van de taal als een ideale beschouwden,
zijn hun opvattingen over het ontstaan van die toestand veel minder duidelijk.
Na een beschrijving van de Stoische betekenistheorie, onderzoek ik enkele
voorbeelden van de doorwerking ervan bij de latere grammatici. Die zijn
weliswaar duidelijk bei'nvloed door bijvoorbeeld de Stoische scheiding tussen vorm
en betekenis, maar er zijn ook evidente voorbeelden van theorieen die een heel
andere weg gegaan zijn dan in Stoisch kader mogelijk was geweest. Dit hangt
wellicht samen met het feit dat de filosofische ideeen tenminste ten dele
gemeengoed waren geworden, zodat men zieh van de oorspronkelijk filosofische
context nauwelijks meer bewust was, laat staan dat men daaraan beperkende
consequenties zou verbinden: de filosofie leeft niet steeds in de grammaticale
theorie.
In hoofdstuk II is de aandacht gericht op een uitzonderlijke grammaticus,
Apollonius Dyscolus. Apollonius heeft welomschreven opvattingen over taal en
taalstructuur. Taal is een geordende, symmetrische eenheid, hierarchisch
georganiseerd in verschallende niveaus. De interne structuur van deze niveaus
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vertoont een grote overeenkomst, wat impliceert dat elementen van verschillende
niveaus toch met elkaar vergeleken kunnen worden. Het hoogste niveau is dat
van de (onlichamelijke) betekenissen. Betekenissen gaan combinaties aan,
waardoor complete boodschappen ontstaan. De lagere niveaus zijn die van de
(fysieke) uitdrukking. Deze tweedeling van vorm en betekenis is een erfenis van
de Stoa.
Taal kan zowel van zijn formele als van zijn inhoudelijke zijde bestudeerd
worden. De inhoud, betekenis, is echter intrinsiek belangrijker dan de geluiden
die de uitdrukking vormen. Mochten vorm en betekenis elkaar tegenspreken als
het gaat om het indelen van een woord in een woordsoort (merismos), dan geeft
het semantische aspect de doorslag.
Een tweede indicatie van het belang dat aan de betekenis gehecht werd, is
de notie katallelotes, die ook sterk semantisch van aard is. Katallelotes is de
totale syntactische en semantische regelmaat. De Symmetrie van structuur en
betekenis vallen in dit woord samen. Idealiter zou katallelotes een eigenschap van
vorm en betekenis van een uitdrukking moeten zijn, maar in de praktijk komt
het er vaak op neer dat er iets mis is met het taalgebruik om ons heen, zowel
in de dagelijkse conversatie als in literaire teksten.
Wanneer zieh problemen voordoen moet een grammaticus zijn verstand, zijn
rede, gebraiken. Bij moeilijkheden in een (literaire) tekst kan hij zijn toevlucht
nemen tot literaire parallellen en het specifieke taalgebruik van de auteur die hij
bestudeert - dezelfde criteria die een filoloog zou toepassen. Als er iets mis gaat
in het dagelijks taalgebruik, dan kan hij ook de werken van vroegere
grammatici raadplegen en proberen door observatie van het dagelijks taalgebruik
het probleem op te lossen. Dit waren de criteria die gebruikt werden door
geleerden die "correct Grieks", Hellenismos, bestudeerden. Deze geleerden
verschilden van Apollonius doordat zij zieh voornamelijk bezighielden met
Problemen van morfologische aard. Wanneer echter alle andere criteria falen,
dan blijft de rede over.
Een belangrijk Instrument voor de grammaticus is verder het
falsificatieprincipe dat elenchos genoemd wordt. Dit is eveneens semantisch van
aard. Een woord of een constructie kan alleen verworpen worden indien er een
ander talig middel is dat dezelfde betekenis op meer gepaste wijze aanduidt.
Wat er ook fout gaat met de vorm van de uitdrukking, de katallelotes van
de betekenis blijft binnen het bereik van de rede. Het voordeel van dit criterium
is namelijk dat het rechtstreeks in de regelmaat van de betekenis kan
doordringen. Daardoor kan het ook die formele afwijkingen aan de kaak stellen
die amper opvallen, en die dus door observatie alleen niet vastgesteld kunnen
worden. De rede verwijst ons steeds naar het regelsysteem en de wezenlijke
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regelmaat die ten grondslag liggen aan de feitelijke verschijningsvorm van de
taal. De voornaamste theoretische functie van dit onderliggende systeem is dat
het kan helpen bij de interpretatie en verheldering van de zinnen waarmee de
grammaticus zieh geconfronteerd ziet. De betekenis van deze zinnen wordt
uitgedrukt door een parafrase. Zo'n parafrase heeft niet de Status van een
nieuwe zin die op zijn beurt verklaring behoeft, maar dient als een soort
semantische representatie, een weergave van de (onlichamelijke) betekenis zelf,
die noodzakelijkerwijs in de vorm van woorden gegoten wordt, omdat het ons
onmogelijk is er op een andere manier over te praten. Zo'n afbeelding in
woorden is een nabootsing van de ideale έέη-ορ-όέη verhouding die tussen vorm
en betekenis zou moeten bestaan, maar die sinds de oertijd in de praktijk
goeddeels verdwenen is.
Na dit overzicht van Apollonius' theoretische opvattingen over taal en de
taak van de grammaticus volgt een behandeling van zijn praktische werkwijze.
Uitgangspunt is Apollonius' geschrift over de bijwoorden. Een aantal passages
daaruit wordt verklaard, in de eerste plaats de definitie. De inteφretatie daarvan
geschiedt met behulp van de bespreking die erop volgt en parallellen uit de rest
van Apollonius' werk. De definitie is niet eenduidig, maar past volledig in zijn
ideeen over taalstructuur. Een probleem bij de interpretatie van Apollonius
blijkt te zijn dat hij technische termen ook in een ruimere zin gebruikt. In het
vervolg van de adverbio gebruikt Apollonius zijn definitie als een belangrijk
criterium om tot merismos te körnen.
De belangrijkste eenheid in de taal-analyse van Apollonius is de woordsoort
- dit kenmerk deelt hij met zijn antieke collega's. Men associeerde de
woordsoorten haast automatisch met bepaalde functies, of liever gezegd,
bepaalde semantische categorieen werden bij voorkeur vertegenwoordigd door een
specifieke woordsoort. Dit resulteert erin dat een correcte merismos van een
woord neerkomt op een correcte beschrijving van het linguistische functioneren
ervan en omgekeerd. Beschreven wordt hoe Apollonius de merismos van een
aantal problematische woorden vaststelt. Terugkerende methodische elementen
zijn de disputatio in utramque partem (bij de presentatie van zijn onderzoek),
ontleend aan de rhetorica, en de metalepsis. Deze laatste term duidt aan het
vervangen van het woord in kwestie door een minder problematisch equivalent.
Aan de merismos van dit equivalent kan men consequenties verbinden voor de
merismos van het woord in kwestie. Metalepsis was niet alleen een populair
rhetorisch middel dat diende ter verheldering, maar het was ook een vertrouwde
filologische techniek (parafrase!). Het is een van de manieren waarop Apollonius
het probleem van het samenvallen van woordvormen, homonymie, te lijf gaat.
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Homonymie (synemptosis) was een kwestie waarmee iedereen die nadacht
over taal, geconfronteerd werd. Het is een symptoom van een onvolmaakte een-
ορ-έέη correspondentie tussen vorm en betekenis, omdat όέη vorm meerdere
betekenissen uitdrukt. Apollonius accepteert het bestaan van homonymie en steh
zieh ermee tevreden aan te geven hoe een grammaticus met het verschijnsel om
kan gaan: Hij wijst erop dat de context gewoonlijk afdoende is om de ambigu'iteit
die uit de homonymie kan voortvloeien, op te lossen.
Interessant is, dat synemptosis het een grammaticus onmogelijk maakt om
zijn toevlucht te nemen tot formele argumenten om een merismos vast te stellen.
Hij is gedwongen inhoudelijke argumenten voor zijn indeling aan te voeren, van
syntactische of semantische aard. Opnieuw blijkt dat de semantische
overwegingen overheersen. Sommige betekeniscategorieen worden automatisch
geassocieerd met een bepaalde woordsoort. Tijdsverhoudingen bijvoorbeeld
kunnen alleen door bijwoorden (zoals "gisteren") worden uitgedrukt, als het
tenminste gaat om uitdrukkingen die op zichzelf een woord vormen (dit laatste
omdat werkwoorden natuurlijk door hun vervoeging heden, verleden of toekomst
kunnen aanduiden). Het gevolg is dat er gedurende de hele Oudheid geen sprake
kan zijn van een "voegwoord van tijd".
Een andere belangrijke factor bij de merismos is de vraag of een woord in
een "rijtje" kan worden ondergebracht, dus of het paradigmatische relaties met
andere woorden aangaat, waarvan de merismos mogelijk evident is. Is dat het
geval, dan volgt het woord in kwestie de merismos van zijn "rijtje".
Hoofdstuk III gaat over een specifiek taalverschijnsel, dat wij eigenlijk
vrijwel uitsluitend kennen door het getuigenis van de antieke grammatici: het
zogenaamde causale gebruik van hina. Ik betoog dat de grammaticale theorie van
de conjunctie tenslotte op twee verschillende filosofische bronnen teruggaat: De
Peripatos, die veel werk op het terrein van de causaliteitsleer verzette en
allerlei verschillende soorten van oorzaken onderscheidde, waaronder de causa
finalis en de causa efficiens; en de Stoa, die een meer monolithische
oorzakelijkheidsleer kende, maar waarvan de terminologie uiteindelijk zou
doordringen in de grammaticale bronnen. Het gevolg was dat de grammatici in
principe maar een woord hadden voor alle soorten van oorzakelijke verbanden
(zowel causaal als finaal), namelijk aitiodes, of - in aangepast vorm -
aitiologikos.
Later kreeg men echter behoefde aan een meer verfijnde terminologie.
Aitiologikos bleef in gebruik voor "causaal", maar nu in de engere betekenis;
voor "finaal" gebruik van de conjuncties werd de term apoteles(ma)tikos bedacht.
Hier ligt waarschijnlijk de bron van verwarring: hina "opdat" kon nog steeds
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aangeduid worden met de term aitiologikos in de raimere zin van dat woord,
maar hina aitiologikos kon makkelijk opgevat worden als "causaal hina" in de
engere zin van het woord - het gevolg was dat men op zoek ging naar causale
gebruikswijzen van hina.
Dit werd waarschijnlijk in zoverre vergemakkelijkt dat er werkelijk een
marginaal causaal gebruik van hina bestond. Het is onduidelijk wat de oorsprong
is van dit gebruik. Mogelijk was het een Alexandrijns colloquialisme.
In een excurs pleit ik voor een intensiever gebruik van de Oud-Christelijke
schrijvers als bron voor de grammaticale opvattingen in de Oudheid.
In hoofdstuk IV Staat een woordsoort centraal: de interjectie. In dit
hoofdstuk körnen dan ook de Latijnse grammatici volop aan bod, want de Griekse
grammatici behandelden alle soorten uitroepen als bij'woorden.
Opnieuw is er aandacht voor de verhouding tot de rhetorische theorie. De
invloeden op de grammatica vanuit de rhetorica komen aan bod en de rhetorische
en stilistische functies van de interjectie worden besproken. Daarna volgt een
körte beschrijving van de "technische" Romeinse theorie over de interjectie. Bij
hun pogingen een in wezen onregelmatig en irrationeel taalverschijnsel als de
interjectie te rationaliseren en in te passen in het taalkundige systeem
ondervonden de Romeinse grammatici de nodige moeilijkheden. Op terminologisch
en inhoudelijk gebied moesten zij concessies doen om de intrinsieke spanning van
hun onderneming te verbergen.
Daarom beschreven zij de interjectie als bestaande uit vox incondita
(ongestructureerd geluid), hoewel zij voor hetzelfde verschijnsel in hun capita de
voce de term confusa (verward) gebruikten. Maar vox confusa beschreef daar nu
juist allerlei geluiden die niet onder de woordsoorten gerangscm'kt konden
worden. Daarom konden de grammatici deze term in hun hoofdstuk over de
interjectie voor deze echte woordsoort moeilijk gebruiken - de tegenstrijdigheid
zou er dan te dik bovenop liggen.
Inhoudelijk bleef de grammatici niet veel anders over dan de
onregelmatigheid zelf tot de regelmaat te bombarderen: Als regel en per definitie
was een interjectie dus onregelmatig.
Een complicatie was verder dat de grammatici de mogelijkheid toelieten dat
sommige bijwoorden en interjecties homoniem konden zijn. Dat hield in dat zij
criteria moesten aangeven met behulp waarvan men afhankelijk van de context
kon beslissen of men met een interjectie of met het homonieme bijwoord van
doen had. Inderdaad slaagden zij erin op vernuftige en consistente wijze zulke
criteria aan te wijzen - of het onderscheid ook overtuigend is doet niet ter
zake.
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Na een beschrijving van de vertaalproblemen die interjecties opleverden
(vooral bij de Christelijke schrijvers), volgt tot slot een overzicht van de
Griekse parallellen voor de Romeinse theorie. Ondanks het feit dat de meeste
Griekse grammatici de interjectie niet als aparte woordsoort erkenden, blijken zij
toch de uitroepen als een bijzondere soort van bijwoorden gezien te hebben.
Voor de meeste Romeinse opvattingen over de interjectie zijn dan ook Griekse
parallellen aan te wijzen.
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